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-ABSTRACT-
This thesis explores the interaction of literature and theology by means of archetypal 
criticism with specific reference to certain characters in the Gospel of John. Northrop 
Frye’s system of archetypal literary criticism consisting of the four mythoi or 
archetypes of romance, tragedy, irony and satire, and comedy forms the governing 
framework and means of exchange between literature and theology. This synchronic 
interaction is centered on Jesus, an innocent man acting on behalf of others, as 
romance; Pilate, unable or unwilling to act justly in an unwanted and unavoidable 
particular circumstance, as tragedy: Thomas and the Jews, variations on the theme of 
seeing and not seeing as irony; and Peter, who denies Christ and later recovers, as 
comedy. These characters function as points of exchange, each reaching their defining 
literary and theological climax during the crucifixion events. Within the FG’s narrative 
these characters also serve as imaginative points of contact and identification for the 
reader at which the reader’s own faith response may be placed within the literary and 
theological milieu of the Fourth Gospel. Conceptually, Jesus and romance, Pilate and 
tragedy, Thomas, the Jews, and irony, and Peter and comedy may be characterized by 
representation, reduction, negation, and integration, respectively. The variable between 
these four mythoi and between these characters is the relationship between a belief or 
an ideal and experience or reality assumed by the work as a whole and/or assumed and 
displayed by each character.
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PREFACE
Every Ph.D. dissertation has a story behind it. The story of this Ph.D. began some time 
ago when I was an undergraduate at a small Christian liberal arts college in the United 
States. As it relates to this work, my story there can be summarized by two men. The 
first was the Old Testament professor, a man of stellar academic credentials (Ph.D. 
Brandeis under Cyrus Gordon), who approached the Bible with the tools of the 
historical critical school. The second was a professor of English with training in both 
Biblical studies/theology and, of course, English literature. Although sharing the same 
basic views and faith commitments, the striking thing was that the English professor 
said things about the Bible that were so much more insightful and interesting- indeed 
gripping. In a sense this comparison is unfair; the professor of English, however 
eccentric, was a man of undoubted genius who remains the greatest mind I have 
encountered anywhere. But the contrast was really more of a contrast of 
methodologies and modes of thinking. Although I later left that school for a variety of 
reasons, I made a perhaps greater move-1 changed my major from Bible to English.
The story picks up again some time later. After a 10 year hiatus from the 
academic world spent ranching and farming among the rocks and sagebrush of the 
family farm in eastern Washington state, I hit the books again at a major American 
Evangelical seminary. While I greatly respect this institution and very much share its 
general ethos and outlook, here I came increasingly to see an inadequate appreciation 
of the Bible as a work of literature, particularly its narrative portions. Perhaps the 
motivation stemmed from an aversion of allegorical readings (horrors), the excesses of 
many current literaiy readings, and a laudable desire to read the Bible, as history where 
appropriate, in its historical context. Yet this seemed to me to lead to a kind of 
blindness to certain aspects of the Bible, ironically, aspects that can well be said to be 
part of the author’s intention. Ascending the soapbox for a moment, the gathering 
around the fire in John 21 cannot be confined to the dust bin of “local color” and its 
resonances, however sentimental, of the warmth of the presence of Jesus must be taken 
into account. Likewise, the deaths of Elimelech, Mahlon, and Killion in Moab in the
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opening verses of Ruth offer, at least minimally, an invitation to associate these deaths 
with Moab and judgment rather then, as I heard in one memorable lecture, bare details 
with which to begin a story. However trivial, these examples represent a clash of 
methodologies and modes of thinlcing of no small importance when, especially, 
preaching from one or the other is taken into account.
To some extent, this dissertation represents an attempt to explore and, if 
possible, come to terms with these tensions for myself, for my evangelical fellow 
travelers, and possibly for others. Two strains of my life and interests, the Bible and 
theology on the one hand and literature and literary analysis on the other, are here 
placed in a sustained dialogue which attempts to give frill weight to what each has to 
ofifer in a way that, it is hoped, is mutually beneficial. While some might have 
reseivations of the place given to theology with respect to literature, doubtless others 
may have equal reservations of the reverse.
As regards the dissertation itself, several things may be helpfully noted. The 
chapters are relatively independent, partly because they each interact with bodies of 
critical literature which are relatively independent of each other, and partly because the 
subject matter of each chapter raises its own issues and challenges. Each chapter 
therefore has its specific concerns and do not so much build on each other as they build 
the collective case for which the work is arguing. At the same time, they nevertheless 
relate to each other and are approached from and within the framework governing the 
entire work. Additionally, while writing some chapters, I was continually met by the 
challenge of presenting the material in a coherent order when everything related to that 
chapter needed to be explained at once.
In any case, the subject matter presented here has been a reward in itself- full of 
discoveries, holding my interest, deepening my appreciation for the Gospel of John, and 
indeed for the Gospel itself.
TTiatsuOrtvi TO soayyeliov 
Brian Larsen St. Andrews, September 2001
-INTRODUCTION-
“It is in Literature, in the poem, in the play, in the novel that philosophic models, 
that trials o f abstract metaphysical and moral possibility, have been given the density, 
the enacted and existential weight o f felt life. ”
George Steiner, “A Reading Against Shakespeare, ” Essays, 109
“Literary Criticism shoidd be completed by criticism from a definite ethical and
theological standpoint. ”
T. S. Eliot, “Religion and Literature,” m Selected Essays, 388.
I OPENING REMARKS
The Bible itself is manifestly a work of literature and a work of theology. As 
such it offers a distinct perspective on the relationship between God and the created 
order. Christian theology usually includes significant reflection and reliance on the 
Biblical texts and some significant attempt to address issues of life arising from the 
experience of human beings living within the created order. Given the enormity and 
scope of the issues, it is not surprising that much of world literature attempts to 
articulate, express, or reflect on the meaning of human life with respect to the existence 
of God and his interactions with human beings and the temporal order. The 
relationship between beliefs and experience, and immanence and transcendence are
perennial issues in both literature and theology. While they do often explore the same 
issues, recalling Steiner’s comment, works of literature and the Bible may themselves 
be studied as literary locations at which and by which the issues pertaining to theology 
and experience themselves are given artistic form.
The Fourth Gospel (FG) is just such a location, arguably the most transparently 
literary and theological of the four Gospels. Using the FG with reference to specific 
characters in the FG, the present work will seek to outline and explore the relationship 
between literature and specifically Christian theology by holding each up for 
comparison and contrast in a sustained interaction that will prove mutually illuminating 
and contribute to the field of literary studies applied to the Bible.
In a sense, whatever follows can be framed by the two quotations from Steiner 
and Eliot cited above. Because of their mutual concern with expressing and evaluating 
human experience with reference to God or the transcendent, literature and theology 
may be assumed to be in some relationship to each other, on an explicitly theistic basis 
rooted in the Biblical teaching that God is the Creator or for no other reason than that 
both are simply part of the phenomena of human history and experience. This is not, 
however, to equate religious experience and literary experience,^ it is to note that there 
are some similarities. The nature, content, and limits of that relationship is unclear nor 
is there any readily apparent systematic means by which such a relationship might be 
explored. By way of introduction, it will therefore be necessary to, first, oqtline the 
way in which literature and theology will be placed in dialogue here, an interaction
 ^For a critique of this tendency, see Leland Ryken, Triumphs o f the Imagination: Literature in 
Christian Perspective (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1979).
based on four elements; A) the principle of interaction- human experience; B) the 
means of interaction-archetypal criticism; C) the location of interaction- characters in 
the FG; D) the ideology and governing principle of the interaction- Christian theology. 
Human experience and Christian theology, on a Christian understanding, very much 
interact and connect to form something of a circle or totality of which archetypal 
criticism and the characters in the FG form a part. Time and reading being linear, 
however, these elements will be introduced below by moving from A to D in 
progressive and overlapping fashion, concluding with a statement of objectives and 
qualifications.
II EXPERIENCE, ARCHETYPE, 
AND ARCHETYPAL LITERARY CRITICISM
The concept of archetype as a way of categorizing and explaining human
experience rose to prominence through the work of Carl Jung in the field of
psychology. Jung defines archetype as follows.
The primordial image or archetype is a figure, whether it be a daemon, 
man, or process, that repeats itself in the course of history wherever 
creative phantasy is freely manifested. Essentially, therefore, it is a 
mythological figure. If we subject these images to a closer investigation we 
discover them to be the formulated resultants of countless typical 
experiences of our ancestors. They are, as it were, the psychic residua of 
numberless experiences of the same type. They depict millions of 
individual experiences in the average, presenting a kind of picture of the 
psychic life distributed and projected into the manifold shapes of the
psychological pandemonium Each of these images contains a piece of
human psychology and human destiny, a relic of suffering or delight that 
has happened countless times in our ancestral story, and on the average 
follows ever the same course. It is like a deeply graven river-bed in the 
soul, in which the waters of life, that had spread hitherto with groping and 
uncertain course over wide but shallow surfaces, suddenly become a 
mighty river. This happens when that particular chain of circumstances is
encountered which from immemorial time has contributed to the laying 
down of the primordial image/
Archetypes, Jung believes, are to be found in a variety of intellectual contexts, ranging 
from Plato’s concept of forms to Kant’s categories of human cognition and beyond. 
But rather than logical or metaphysical categories, Jung finds archetypes rooted in 
depth psychology.^ For Jung, archetypes are visible manifestations of something 
rooted in the deepest soil of human experience."  ^ Frasier’s influential The Golden 
Bough pursues a similar line of thought from an anthropological perspective.^ 
Whatever its source, in general terms the concept of archetype has a long histoiy and 
has been widely used in a number of disciplines.
One of those disciplines is literary criticism. Archetypal literary criticism may
be defined as follows.
Archetypal criticism focuses on the generic, recurring and conventional 
elements in literature that cannot be explained as matters of historical 
influence or tradition. It studies each literary work as part of the whole of 
literature. This kind of criticism accepts as its informing principle that 
archetypes- typical images, characters, narratives designs, themes, and 
other literary phenomena- are present in all literature and so provide the 
basis for study of its interconnectedness.^
 ^Carl Jung, Contributions to Analytical Psychology, trans. H. G. and C. F. Baynes (London: Kegan 
Paul, 1928) 246-7.
Tbid., 278-279.
"ibid., 118-119.
^Foi a psychological perspective see Joseph Campbell, The Hero With A Thousand Faces, 2 ed. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968).
Alvin Lee, “Archetypal Criticism” m Encyclopedia o f Contemporary Literary Theory, ed. Irena 
Makaiyk (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 1993) 3.
Or plainly, “The archetype is simply the typical at the highest power of literary 
generalization.”^
The application of archetypal analysis to literature received its most 
comprehensive and influential treatment in Northrop Frye’s Anatomy o f Criticism. 
Indeed, perhaps no work of literary criticism produced in the second half of the 
twentieth century has had the impact of VxyC ^  Anatomy o f Criticism, specifically his 
third essay, “Archetypal Criticism: Theory of Myths.”  ^ While indebted to Jung and 
Frasier, Frye is by no means bound by a link between archetype and anthropology and 
depth psychology.^ For Frye, archetypes ar e simply typical and recurring elements of 
literature, something resembling a convention, a way in which literary experience, itself 
a social fact and mode of communication, may be unified. Building on the universal 
tendency to set an ideal and innocent world against the fallen world of realism and 
experience and employing the concept of archetype, Frye develops a comprehensive 
theory of literary criticism based on four enduring literary mythoi or generic plots; 
romance, tragedy, satire and irony, and comedy which Frye analogously relates to the 
Summer, Fall, Winter, and Spring, respectively. They are typically diagrammed in 
relation to each other below.
’ Geoffrey Hartman, “Ghostlier Demarcations: The Sweet Science of Northrop Fiye,” in Beyond 
Formalism: Literary Essays 1958-1970 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970) 25. 
 ^Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1957) 131-242.
® Lee writes, “So far as Frye’s account of archetypal criticism is concerned, it its important to 
recognize that he disengaged the concept of the literary archetype from its anthropological and 
psychological beginnings.” Lee, “Archetypal Criticism,” 4.
Anatomy, 99.
3ROMANCE
SUMMER
COMEDY TRAGEDY
SPRING \  /  FALL
IRONY/SATIRE
WINTER
For Frye, in common with other forms of archetypal analysis, these four mythoi 
transcend time, place and genre; they are simply the enduring patterns of all narrative 
literature/^ He outlines the four primary mythoi as follows,
" “The archetypal view of literature shows us liteiature as a total form and literary experience as a part 
of tlie continuimi of life, in which one of tlie poet’s functions is to visualize tlie goals of human work.” 
YxyQ, Anatomy, 115.
^^Fiye, Anatomy, 192. The classifications adopted here will follow Frye with the exception of triumph 
in defeat being always seen as tragedy. Tiimnph in defeat, as in tlie case of Jesus, is more in keeping 
with romance.
The four mythoi that we are dealing with, comedy, romance, tragedy, and 
irony, may now be seen as four aspects of a central unifying myth. Agon or 
conflict is the basis or archetypal theme of romance, the radical of romance 
being a sequence of marvelous adventures. Pathos or catastrophe, whether 
in triumph or in defeat, is the archetypal theme of tragedy. Sparagmos, or 
the sense that heroism and effective action are absent, disorganized or 
doomed to defeat, and that confusion and anarchy reign over the world, is 
the archetype of irony and satire. Anagnorisis, or recognition of a 
newborn society rising in triumph around a still somewhat mysterious hero 
and his bride, is the archetypal theme of comedy.
These categories enjoy broad popular recognition and command wide recognition 
among literary critics. By organizing these literary categories into a comprehensive 
scheme of interpretation, Frye’s program enables systematic comparison and contrast.
As a way of limiting the scope of the inquiry into literature and theology and to 
avoid a discussion of the romance, tragedy, irony and satire, and comedy abstracted
from any specific text, or applied generally to a specific text, these literary archetypes 
will be applied to characters in the FG who, it will be argued, embody the salient 
features of each mythos: Jesus, an innocent and virtuous man acting on behalf of others 
embodies much of the heroic pattern characteristic of romance; Pilate, unable or 
unwilling to act justly in an unwanted and unavoidable particular circumstance, as 
tragic; Thomas and the Jews, as representatives of the ironic and skeptical point of 
view; and Peter, who denies Christ and later recovers, as comic. Conversely, these 
characters will serve as focal points for an integration of the various ai chetypes with 
theological concerns. Fiye’s system will serve as the conduit by which literature and 
theology may be in dialogue at the specific location of these characters in the FG.^^
The advantages of Fiye’s system are, as stated, that it is comprehensive and 
straightforward encompassing a large portion of western imaginative literature without 
being simplistic. And Frye’s classification system offers the advantage of explaining the 
relationships of one type of literature with another, as a way of putting the whole of 
literature in dialogue with itself. Additionally, by concentrating on archetype rather 
than geme, and because archetype precedes and transcends genre, Frye sidesteps 
pedantic concerns as to whether, for example, a novel can be tragic because it is a 
prose narrative rather than a dramatic production. Genre, on the other hand, refers 
to the specific form in which the literary work actually appears. For example, the
By mythoi or mythos, Fiye essentially argues for a mode or meta-archetype, tlie basic idea being tlie 
same in both cases. Since tlie current discussion is largely confined to character and for simplicity and 
grammatical ease of reference, “archetype” will generally be used in place of Frye’s mythoi. 
see Frye, Anatomy, 162.
^^For example, Reardon obseives, “The “novel” is undoubtedly a major literaiy geme. The broader 
term “romance” may well signify sonietliing bigger and more important tlian a mere literaiy geme. In 
may constitute a whole mode of tliought, a frame of reference, an authority for our behaviour: Frye’s
form and presentation of Hardy’s The Return o f the Native is in the genre of a novel yet 
it follows many of the conventions of Greek tragedy and may be considered, like Gr eek 
tragedy, as archetypal tragedy. A novel might conceivably contain elements of all four 
archetypes. Finally, Frye’s system itself, like the Jungian archetypal analysis to which it 
owes no small debt, is applicable beyond literature and, for example, has been usefully 
applied to the narrative forms of history writing by Hayden White. Elements of 
White’s work will also be employed to a limited extent as it relates to literary and 
conceptual issues.
Frye has his critics. Frye often interchanged the terms systematic and
scientific*  ^and proposed his system as a means of establishing literary criticism on a
scientific basis. For this it has drawn criticism and time has shown this to be a false
hope.** However, this has by no means decreased its explanatory usefulness as a self-
coherent system. Reflecting the difficulty of relating universal s to particulars, any
classification system tends to clarify and obscure by virtue of the fact the universals do
not always illuminate a particular work.*^ An additional related criticism is that Fiye’s
system with its emphasis on universal themes of literature is notably synclironic rather
than diachronic. Colin Flack observes,
A classifying theorist such as Northrop Frye, while being intimately familiar 
with the history of literature, has no way of making sense of the familiarity 
within his classificatory scheme. Much of the argument of Frye’s Anatomy
term “secular scripture” is a singularly felicitous formula.” B. P. Reardon. The Form of Greek 
Romance (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1991) 12.
Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore 
and London: The Joluis Hopkins University Press, 1973).
John Casey, “A ‘Science’ of Criticism: Nortlu-op Fiye.” chapter YU in The Language o f Criticism, 
London: Metlmen & Co., 1966, 140.
* i^bid., 140-151.
see Wayne Boolli, A Rhetoric o f Irony (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press,
1974) 100-101, note.
o f Criticism rests on generalizations which beg the main questions at issue, 
and he has only the most improvisational things to say about why our 
literary conventions have changed as they have. The flaw in Frye’s 
approach is that it is standpointless and unhistorical rather than based in a 
present-day creative sensibility, and that it can therefore oflfer us little more 
than an academic exercise in literaiy taxonomy.^**
What Flack says, while generally true, need not be taken as a disadvantage and can be 
taken just as easily as an advantage. Indeed, the very purpose of archetypal criticism of 
any sort is to be “standpointlesss and unhistorical” and to focus on perennial themes 
regardless of when and where they occur. What Flack views as a fatal flaw is little 
more than stating the obvious. Fiye did not concQivQ Anatomy o f Criticism as a literary 
history. And, diachronic analysis of any kind must recognize the persistence of a given 
form through time and therefore uanavoidably pays some attention to the synchronic 
aspect of literature. In many ways, the synchronic approach oiYxyC ^  Anatomy 
provides the natural counterpoint to Auerbach’sM/m^m, a work that might easily be 
criticized as being too wedded to a diachronic approach. Criticism of Frye or 
Auerbach on the grounds of being synchronic or diachronic, or stressing the universal 
or the particular, is equally correct and equally misguided.^*
Flack also notes that ih& Anatomy o f Criticism “rests on generalizations which 
beg the main questions at issue.” Booth makes a similar obseiwation on Frye, 
commenting, “I find myself again and again unable to guess “how he knows” a
Colin Flack, Myth, Truth, and Literature: Towards a true post-modernism, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989) 89.
The diachronic and synchronic methods can profomidly critique each other; indeed, a synchronic 
approach to tlie FG may expose interpretative myopia witliin diachronic criticism as diachronic 
criticism.
particular asseition.”^^  Likewise Borkland points out, “Fiye’s ‘method’ - his constant 
dependence on simile and analogy to make his main points- raises some serious 
questions. The analogies are often striking, but whether or not they have much logical 
validity is another m a t t e r . T h e  issue here is Frye’s method of argumentation. The 
simple fact of the matter is that Frye’s method is self justifying and self-evident; he 
makes no formal attempt at proof. In common with all analogical reasoning, it has no 
“logical” validity. For Frye, and for the present work, this must be laid bare and kept in 
mind from start to finish. Like any argument from analogy, connections can only be 
suggested, never “proved.” Arguments from analogy can be better or worse and must 
be evaluated on the basis of what analogy is and does. The only authority available is 
implicit, one relying on an imaginative sense of the authoritative similitude of things and 
the inherent appropriateness of various generalizations and specific connections. 
Archetypal criticism in any form in any discipline relies on assumptions of similarity.
But rather than being a conspicuous exception, Frye is well within the tradition
of literary criticism as interpretation, of reasoning by analogy and speaking for
literature as its interpreter. Frye has simply taken a common method of interpretation,
fashioned it into a system, and made it a distinct target in doing so. Interpretation of
this sort perfonns a function similar to that which historians often do for the facts of
history. Indeed, in his analysis of forms of history writing White favorably observes.
Romantic historians, and, indeed, “narrative historians” in general, are 
inclined to construct generalizations about the whole historical field and the 
meaning of its processes that are so extensive that they bear very little
^  Booth, The Rhetoric o f Irony, p. x,
Elmer Borklund, Contemporary Literary Critics (Lonéoiv. St. James Press, 1977) 212-218.
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weight as propositions that can be confirmed or disconfirmed by appeal to 
empirical data/"*
The issue can hardly be confined to the humanities. As Polanyi has shown, “There is 
nothing in any concept that points objectively to any sort of reality.”^^
Additionally, any coherentist effort, including Frye’s or the one offered here, 
suffers from the need to explain the parts in terms of the whole and simultaneously the 
whole in terms of its parts. Part of the difficulty here may be traced to problems related 
to finding a way between induction and deduction, a problem Kuhn, like Polanyi, 
observed with regard to the “difficulties ofl:en encountered in developing points of 
contact between a theory and nature,”^  a difficulty noted by Fiye himself .The 
unavoidable result is some form of circular reasoning. Criticism on this ground alone, 
however, is banal; any scientific or historical theory of any scope manifests the same 
inherent difficulty.^* A coherentist system does not exist in isolation and must be 
judged on the basis of its overall explanatory value of the data it seeks to explain. A 
coherentist system offers the advantage of placing the parts in relation to a whole and 
constructing a whole in relation to its parts rather than isolating the parts or abstracting 
the whole. Historical/ critical and theological studies tend, at least superficially, to be 
at opposite ends of the part/ whole continuum. Reflecting the difficulty of relating
XN\\Hq, Metahistory, 15.
Michael Polanyi and Harry Proscli, Meaning (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1975) 61, his emphasis.
Thomas Kuhn, The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions, second ed., (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1970) 30.
Frye, “The Archetypes of Literature,” in Fables o f Identity: Studies in Poetic Mythology (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & World, 1963) 7-20.
^  This is Kuhn's essential point in Revolutions. Interpretation of the FG in terms of the “Johannine 
commmiity” is essentially a coherentist approach, although, unlilœ tlie present work, one tliat purports 
to establish historical fact.
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universals to particulars, any classification system, especially one as universal as Frye’s, 
clarifies but can also obscure by virtue of the fact the universals do not always 
illuminate particular works/^ Like the four points of a compass, Frye’s four 
archetypes do not always reflect the direction traveled or the lay of the land but they do 
serve as valuable reference points for making one’s way. As with the 
synchronic/diachronic dilemma, it must be acknowledged as a liability, but need not be 
taken as fatal.
The advantage is that Frye’s archetypes are general and flexible yet maintain an 
explanatory value. A practical disadvantage of Frye, one that reflects the partial 
validity of the above criticisms, is that a portion of the minutia of Frye’s analysis seems 
little more than esoteric mumbo-jumbo. On archetypal criticism Hartman remarks, 
“Archetypal analysis can degenerate into an abstract thematic where the living pressure 
of mediations is lost and all comiections are skeletonized.” ®^ In consequence, the 
present work will make use of Frye’s four archetypes as an overall explanatory system 
and refer to Frye as appropriate, but will in no way be bound to everything he says. 
Significantly, an attempt will be made to go beyond Frye and offer a account of each 
archetype that, if less nuanced and emdite, is at least, it is hoped, more specific and 
clear. Yet the basic validity of Frye’s system will simply be assumed as a given, a 
system that provides the basic framework for the classification of literature on which 
the present work is based. If Frye has failed to establish literature on a scientific basis, 
a designation of waning authority and desirability, a state of affairs equally true for
^ s^ee Booth, T Rhetoric o f Irony, 100-101, note. 
Hartman, "Ghostlier Demarcations,” 30.
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historians in their discipline, he in large measure succeeded in providing a self-coherent 
and widely applicable framework of interpretation.
A key feature of Frye’s archetypal system is that it is intended to be non- 
ideological and Frye’s opening “Polemical Introduction” is written to insure that it 
stays that way/* Frye views literary criticism as a discipline in search of some kind of 
unifying theory, still in its infancy at the naive induction and classification stage. 
Anatomy o f Criticism represents Frye’s attempt to fill this void. Literary criticism for 
Fiye must be autonomous and develop its own theories and practices like history or 
science. The importation of sets of values or a conceptual framework, be it Christian 
or Marast, etc., must be avoided. Evaluation of literature must take place on its own 
terms, terms derived from literature itself. Frye responds to the criticism that literature 
must deal with the larger world in some way and thereby be potentially open to outside 
evaluation by insisting that literature creates an autonomous world of its own. Literary 
criticism proceeds, like math, hypothetically and is verified by its internal consistency 
and application to its subject matter. For Frye, literature is primarily a verbal structure. 
In its own way Frye’s non-ideological system was revolutionary and prefigures much of 
later structuralism and deconstmctioi/^ but without the sterility of the former or the 
reader centered-ness of the latter.
VryQ, Anatomy, 3-29.
Richard Stringle, “Northrop Fiye,” in The Johns Hopkins Guide to Literary Theory and Criticism, 
ed. Michael Groden and Martin Kieiswirth (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1994) 318.
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But there is no reason, other than Frye’s own polemical assertions to the 
contrary, to accept Frye’s rejection of ideology.Just  as Fiye himself developed liis 
criticism shorn, perhaps incompletely, of the wool of its psychological and 
anthropological ancestiy, Fiye’s four archetypes are readily suited for some kind of 
ideological or theological analysis. By setting the ideological element aside, if tliis was 
ever a realistic possibility, Frye paradoxically rendered his work more open to the very 
thing he sought to avoid. Fiye’s polemics are a line in the sand and nothing more. The 
present work will give an applied theological interpretation to the basic outlines of 
Fiye’s archetypes as they appear in the FG with reference to specific characters. Since 
the present work is a dialogue, Chiistian theology will also speak to literature by 
integrating theology and a Christian meta-narrative into literature by way of Fiye’s 
archetypal framework, in this sense taking to heart Eliot’s statement, quoted above, 
that, “Literary Criticism should be completed by criticism from a definite ethical and 
theological s t a n d p o i n t . T o  the extent that this proves to be valid, both are 
reinforced by the other’s perspective. Depending on one’s point of view, Fiye may 
perhaps gain more than he loses.
The same method of Frye’s ahistorical reasoning by analogy, or the 
authoritative similitude of things, will be employed in the present work, albeit one with 
an explicitly theological basis- that all of reality as the creation of God may be 
interpreted within the framework of Christian theology. At its most basic level.
Jameson faults Frye’s definition of romance at this veiy point. He notes, “Fiye’s account...fails to 
come to grips with tlie conceptual categories which inform and preselect the attributes and qualities by 
which tliose states [of being in romance] are characterized.” Fredric Jameson, “Magical Narratives: 
Romance as Genre,” New Literary Histofy 1 (1975) 139-140.
S. Eliot, “Religion and Literature,” in Selected Essays (London: Faber, 1951) 388.
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traditional Christian theology holds that all things were created by God (Genesis 1:1, 
John 1:3, Colossians 1:16) and that all of creation exists within a meta-narrative in 
which God is actively involved (Acts 17:28, Colossians 1:16). Although there are limits 
imposed by the fall and the otherness or transcendence of God, it does not follow that 
an assumption of relatedness is unjustified.^^ Any attempt to integrate (or contrast) 
two or more works of artistic creation by the same artist assumes a relatedness whether 
anything is known about the artist or not. Archetypal study of any variety rests on the 
observance of the recurring or typical in human experience as reflected in the wide 
variety of artistic creations. Archetypal study is simply the attempt to make some sense 
and use of these obseiwations, whether on non-theistic or theistic assumptions, as done 
here.^  ^ On an analogical basis by means of archetypal criticism, whether theistic and 
Christian or non theistic, elements of the FG may be compared to Shakespeare or 
Homer or Sophocles with absolutely no account of historical influence offered or 
assumed even though these four archetypes certainly appear in the literature written 
before and during the New Testament era.^^
This is not in any way an attempt to prove the existence of God or predicate something about God by 
reference to tire temporal order after the manner of natural theology; ratlier tlie present work assumes a 
Christian point of view and is an attempt to relate that point of view to imaginative attempts to express 
significant and enduring patterns of human experience as found in literatiue.
If the world is viewed on a tlieistic basis as the creation of God, to that extent it might be expected to 
find and even assert analogical relationships.
Comedy and tragedy are well known to predate tlie NT and irony is certainly a feature of the FG 
itself. Less familial- perhaps, is romance, on wliich Reardon remarks, “Above all, it is now beyond 
question tliat romance constituted, in antiquity, a veritable genre.” B. P. Reardon, The Form of Greek 
Romance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991) 10. It may be remarked that most study of tlie 
NT in its historical setting operates on tlie principle that similarity implies influence. The historical 
critic of tlie FG arguing for a particular historical influence can usually do no more than reason by 
analogy, tlie results of such analogical relations advanced here being qualified and modest in 
comparison.
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At the same time, by relating the four archetypes to characters in the FG a vital 
connection to experience and the particular will be maintained. Rather than being only 
abstract locations of interaction, these characters, like any characters, serve as human 
invitations into the world of the text, points of contact and imaginative identification 
with that strange new world of the FG and points of reference defining the reader’s 
location within that world. Through character identification, a kind of “aesthetic 
encounter”^^  or reader response occurs, one traditionally recognized, but perhaps near 4
or outside the bounds of how that discipline is normally understood.^^ And the FG is 
nothing if it is not the story of one character, Jesus. By focusing on character, some 
account is given to that “surplus of meaning” wherein it is acknowledged that analysis, 
definitions and archetypes can only take us so far. Character, then, offers an 
appropriate meeting place between literature and theology within the field of 
experience- ours and theirs.
By using these characters in the FG as representative of the various archetypes 
the disciplines of literary studies and Christian theology meet on something 
approaching a common ground. The Bible stands as a great cultural and literary 
document and is of crucial importance for its role in shaping Christian theology. The 
choice of Jesus, Pilate, the Jews and Thomas, and Peter, offers the advantage of
Stephen Wright, “An Experiment in Biblical Criticism: Aestlietic Encounter in Reading and 
Preaching Scriptur e,” in Craig Baitliolomew, Colin Greene, Karl Moller, eds., Renewing Biblical 
Interpretation, tlie Scripture and Hermeneutics Series volume 1, (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 2000) 
240-267.
The approach here is theological and vertical, in contr ast to a tendency of much of reader response 
criticism towards a problematic emphasis on a horizontal and Imear- perspective. Stephen Moore 
remarks, “The more the temporality of tlie reading experience is stressed-its cumulative, successive 
side-tlie more the Bible sheds its familiar image a rneaning-M object.” Literary Criticism and the 
Gospels: The Theoretical Challenge (New Haven, Corm.: Yale University Press, 1989) 120.
16
-A
examining these characters each corresponding to a different literaiy archetype and 
who reach their defining literaiy climax during the theologically laden events of the 
crucifixion and resurrection of Christ. In the FG theology and literature meet in a 
profound and dynamic set of circumstances.
I ll THEOLOGY, ARCHETYPE, 
AND CONCEPTUAL PREFIGUREMENT
As a way of initially integrating archetypes and theology on conceptual
grounds, some elements of Hayden Whxto’^  Meiahistory will be employed to clarify and
illustrate the relationships. White’s project is to clarify and categorize various ways in
which the study of history may be approached especially with regard to a work of
history as “...a verbal structure in the form of a narrative prose discourse that purports
to be a model, or icon, of past structures and processes in the interest of explainifig
what they were by representing them.”'*® For White, the “method of emplotment”
employed is fundamentally linked to the conceptualization and interpretation offered for
a given subject matter. He writes,
Providing the “meaning” of a story by identifying the kind o f stoiy that has 
been told is called explanation by emplotment. If, in the course of narrating 
a story, the historian provides it with the plot structure of a Tragedy, he 
has “explained” it in one way; if he has structured it as a Comedy, he has 
“explained” it another way. Emplotment is the way by which a sequence of 
events fashioned into a story is gradually revealed to be a story of a 
particular kind.”"**
Wliite, Metahistory, 2, liis emphasis. 
White, Metahistory, 7.
17
Although it is beyond the scope and object of this work to examine the relationship
between the FG and the data it re-presents, it is significant that, according to White,
history and literature make use of the same narrative structures and conceptual
prefigurements. For the present work however, it is more important to note White’s
observation that the method of emplotment employed for a particular stoiy entails a
certain point of view inherent in a particular method of emplotment/^ Form and
meaning are inseparable. And, to the extent that an archetype refers to human
experience, general or specific, an archetype is both centrifugal and centripetal,
simultaneously conveying and creating meaning.'*^
As another way of conceiving of and introducing the four archetypes and
observing the connection between content and form. White’s analysis of the
tropological function of language may be employed.'*'* White argues that the four
tropes of language recognized by traditional poetics and modern language theory,
metaphor, metonymy, irony, and synecdoche, function as precognitive and pre-critical
ways of prefiguring the way in which the writer (Wliite means the historian) conceives
the subject matter. He writes.
These tropes permit the characterization of objects in different kinds of 
indirect, or figurative, discourse. They are especially useful for 
understanding the operations by which the contents of experience which 
resist description in unambiguous prose presentations can be prefiguratively 
grasped and prepared for conscious apprehension. In Metaphor (literally, 
“transfer”), for example, phenomena can be characterized in terms of their 
similarity to, and difference from, one another, in the manner of analogy or
Similarly, Fiye obseives, “The mythos is the dianoia in movement; the dianoia is llie rnythos in 
stasis.” VryQ, Anatomy, ^3.
In this sense Jung is correct. See above.
The study of tlie tropological elements of language is immense and contains a number of conflicting 
definitions of even tlie most basic terms, especially metonymy and synecdoche. White’s definitions 
will be accepted.
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simile, as in the phrase “my love, a rose.” Through Metonymy (literally, 
“name change”), the name of a part of a thing may be substituted for the 
name of the whole, as in the phrase, “fifty sail” when what is indicated is 
“fifty ships.” With Synecdoche, which is regarded by some theorists as a 
form of Metonymy, a phenomenon can be characterized by using the part 
to symbolize some quality presumed to inhere in the totality, as in the 
expression “He is all heart.” Through Irony, finally, entities can be 
characterized by way of negating on the figurative level what is positively 
affirmed on the literal level. The figures of the manifestly absurd 
expression (catachresis) such as “blind mouths,” and of explicit paradox 
(oxymoron), such as “cold passion,” can be taken as emblems of this 
trope.
Most important is White’s analysis of the relationship of the literal to the figurative in
each trope. He writes.
Irony, Metonymy, and Synecdoche are kinds of Metaphor, but they differ 
from one another in the kinds of reductions or intergrations [sic] they 
effect on the literal level of their meanings and by the kinds of illuminations 
they aim at on the figurative level. Metaphor is essentially 
representational. Metonymy is reductionist. Synecdoche is integrative, and 
Irony is negational^^
Although White does not make any such connections, archetypal modes of emplotment 
may also be related to the four basic tropes on the basis of their figurative/literal 
relationships that obtain within a work of literature itself. What White uses to 
characterize each trope describes the fundamental quality of each archetype and the 
mode of linguistic prefigurement it entails. Mode of archetypal emplotment, which 
possesses a figurative quality in itself, may be matched with the conceptual 
prefigurement manifest in the use of poetic or figurative language. Romance as an 
archetype may be characterized tropologically and conceptually by representation.
Wliite, Metahistory, 34, his emphasis. Wliite differs form Jakobson and others who adopt a dualistic 
conception and see synecdoche and irony as variations on metonymy.
^®ibid., 34, his emphasis.
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tragedy by reduction, comedy by integration, and irony by negation^^ The following 
chart will illustrate.
ARCHETYPE
LITERAL/FIGURATIVE 
TROPE RELATIONSHIP EXAMPLE
BELIEF/REALITY
RELATIONSHIP
ROMANCE METAPHOR REPRESENTATION MY LOVE, A ROSE B=R
TRAGEDY- METONYMY REDUCTION ALL PEOPLE= 
ALL HANDS
B<R
COMEDY SYNECDOCHE INTEGRATION HE IS ALL HEART B>R
SATIRE/
IRONY
IRONY NEGATION COOL PASSION B> <R
Each may be further identified by a conception of reality’s relationship to a 
belief, an ideal, or the transcendent manifest within a work of hterature itself. The 
fundamental ideological or theological variable between each archetype or trope is the 
relationship assumed between reality and experience on the one hand and some ideal, 
transcendent belief, or imaginative conception of things on the other. While the 
specific belief or ideal will vary, the presence o f a belief or ideal and its perceived 
relationship to reality within a work o f literature provides the common ground o f 
conceptual exchange between theology and the four archetypes.^^ Thus, in romance a 
belief or ideal is held up for representation or display, in tragedy a reduction of that
On irony and negation, see Paul Duke, Irony in the Fourth Gospel (Atlanta; Jolm Knox, 1985) 15- 
16.
Similarly, Cahill develops the idea of a “center” as a point of exchange in, P. J. Cahill, “The 
Johaimine Logos as Center,” Catholic Biblical Quarterly 38 (1976) 54-72.
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ideal is effected as the ideal no longer adequately corresponds to reality, in irony reality 
and ideal are separated, and in comedy reality and an ideal progress toward some form 
of integration. While hy no means identical, the relation o f reality to a belief or ideal 
in literature is in theology analogous to the relationship between reality and one's 
belief in God and establishes a point o f exchange between them. Thus, for example, 
Peter is comic in his relation to his partially erroneous theological understanding of 
Jesus and discipleship, and comic strictly in literary terms without reference to the 
theology of the FG.
In romance, the representation of one thing in terms of another is assumed to be 
adequate; the knight is an adequate representation of his ideals, his life being a virtual 
embodiment of some ideal, the representation of an ideal being the theme of romance.
In the FG, Jesus as man is assumed to be an adequate representation of qualities of love 
and obedience and as a man an adequate representation of God himself. Likewise, 
when Jesus speaks of being “bom again” or “living water” he assumes a theological 
reality cast In metaphorical language and invites his listeners to move toward a way of 
thinking that is at once metaphorical and equally theologically meaningfiil. In romance, 
reality is assumed to be infused with meaning, giving rise to the expectation that objects 
or events carry a meaning larger than themselves. Metaphor and symbol, so common 
in romance and the FG, are the inevitable result.
In metonymy a fondamental reduction takes place. “All people” are reduced to 
a constituent part by the expression “all hands.” Conceptually the part stands for the 
whole with an emphasis on the part. “All people” are reduced to “all hands”, the
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people being reduced by being characterized through their implied function as workers. 
In metonymy the more or less integrated conception of metaphor gives way to a 
fractured part-part or whole part relationship wherein one element stands in a 
relationship of reduction to the other. Likewise, in tragedy a reduction takes place 
wherein the integrated world and ideals and beliefs held by the protagonist are exposed 
as inadequate. The protagonist is seen to be reduced by being separated from his/her 
ideals. Further, the protagonist is seen to have a representative function for humanity 
in that he or she stands as a part in relation to the whole of humanity giving rise to the 
theme of sacrifice implicit in tragedy even though, by reduction, the sacrifice of the 
tragic protagonist is viewed as inadequate. Conceptually, the tragic protagonist moves 
to a position in which beliefs and ideals are reduced and exceeded by the demands of 
reality. The validity of those ideals, however, remains, if vestigial, however much 
particular circumstances calls the enactment of those ideals into question. Metonymy 
and tragedy stand between metaphor and romance on the one hand and between irony 
as a trope and irony/satire as an archetype on the other.
In synecdoche a fundamental integration takes place. In White’s example, “he 
is all heart,” qualities represented figuratively by “heart” become integrated as a 
conceptual description of what is intrinsic of the person as a whole. In synecdoche the 
part is seen as integrated with a whole greater than the sum of the parts, yet the part 
retains its own integrity. For example, “crown” in synecdoche stands conceptually for 
rulership or kingship or authority rather than simply for a ruler as it would in 
metonymy. “Crown” implies more than a king or queen in a way opposite to the way
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“all hands” stands for “all people ” Comedy as an archetype displays the living 
movement of an individual’s or group’s integration with a larger whole, whether 
marriage, society, self knowledge, salvation, etc. Misunderstandings, obstacles, and 
mistakes typify the comic movement toward integration. In the FG, Peter stmggles to 
integrate his belief in Jesus with what that means in terms of practical experience.
White characterizes metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche as naive in the sense 
that “they can be deployed only in the belief in language’s capacity to grasp the nature 
of things in figurative terms.”'*® Irony stands in contrast as the mode of negation.
White observes, “The trope of Irony, then, provides a linguistic paradigm of a mode of 
thought which is radically self-critical with respect not only to a given characterization 
of the world of experience but also to the very effort to capture adequately the ti'uth o f 
things in language Metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche lend themselves to the 
expression of some ideal or belief in a way that the negation characteristic of irony does 
not. Irony as an archetype relies on two levels of perception, as do the other tropes, 
but its characteristic negation works against any kind of integration. Irony as a mode 
o f thinking (as opposed to a literary structure) emphasizes the difficulty or impossibility 
of reality being integrated with a belief or ideal in a way that is not illusoiy, where one 
level cannot be integrated with another. In the FG, irony as an archetype and literary 
stmcture is employed to ironize irony as a way of thinking by negation characterized in 
different ways by Thomas and the Jews. To Nicodemus and the Samaritan woman, 
references to “born again” and “living water” begin in literalism and misunderstanding
White, Melahistory, 36. 
“^^ ibid., 37, my emphasis.
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and invite a move through synecdoche to metaphor in its fullest sense, or, fr om irony to 
comedy to romance. The archetypes may be viewed by analogy as narrative extensions 
of the various tropes or, conversely, the tropes as tropological compressions of the 
various archetypes embodied in specific characters in the FG.
Fiye associates each archetype with a particular season of the year. The 
relationship of the leaf to the tree may be employed to illustrate the relationship of 
belief and reality in the four archetypes.
Summer/ romance -the leaf in living union with the tree in full representation of 
itself as a complete and living whole.
Fall/ tragedy
Winter/
satire and irony
-the leaf still attached to the tree, but reduced from its living 
symbiotic union to an altered and dying form of its former self.
-the realized negation of a living relationship between leaf and 
tree.
Spring/comedy -the promise of renewed integration between leaf and tree.
Significantly, the seasons of the year, the stages of the leaf, the four tropes, and the 
four archetypes all blend into each other in a circular continuum with each perhaps best 
defined in relation to its opposite.^* Although fixed by planetary activity, calendar 
dates as definitive markers of the seasons often seem arbitrary when applied to today’s 
weather, when a day in Fall can seem like Summer. Yet seasonal characteristics exist 
that allow us to say that Spring is not Summer and Winter is not Fall. This blend of
Fiyc notes, “If we tliink of our experience off these mythoi,, we shall realize tliat that they form two 
opposed pairs. Tragedy and comedy, contrast rather tlian blend, and so do romance and irony, the 
champions respectively of the ideal an d tlie actual On the other hand, comedy blends insensibly into 
satire at one extreme and into romance at the other; romance may be comic or tragic; tragic extends 
form high romance to bitter and ironic realism.” Frye, Anatomy, 162.
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continuity and distinction and opposites in relation will be helpful to keep in mind. Frye 
tends to be more concerned with continuity within and between archetypes as opposed 
to an emphasis on distinctive features, whereas here this latter tendency will be evident.
The relation of belief to reality, whether in literature or theology, will seiwe as 
the variable by which overall guide to trace continuity, distinction, and relationships. 
The chart below will illustrate many of the items discussed above.
ROMANCE
JESUS
SUMMER
REPRESENTATION
BELIEF OR IDEAL
COMEDY
PETER
SPRING
INTEGRATION
TRAGEDY
PILATE
FALL
REDUCTION
REALITY OR 
EXPERIENCE
IRONY
THOMAS/JEWS 
WINTER 
NEGATION
While the chart’s main purpose is to illustrate the synchronic relationship of belief/ideal to 
reality/experience, it may be noted that this pattern is diachronically analogous to the Biblical meta- 
nairative of innocence, fall, experience, redemption, and consiunmation. The movement through 
representation, reduction, and negation parallels the history of Biblical studies (itself a mirror of 
intellectual history) since tlie Middle ages as outlined by Hans Frei in The Eclipse o f Biblical 
Namative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century flermeneutics (New Haven, CT and 
London; Yale University Press, 1974). Frei’s own work on narrative is an attempt at integration of 
some kind. Altliougli it will not be attempted in detail here. Biblical studies of most kinds may be 
broadly classified according to ideas and relationships shown on the chart.
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Archetype and the specific characters may thus be viewed in parallel by their 
conception of the relationship between experience and some belief or ideal. Each 
archetype may be characterized by the implicit relationship between a belief or ideal and 
experience, a relationship that governs the actual form of a work of literature in terms 
of plot and character (especially), and setting. Form and meaning, or form and 
ideology are linked in a way that is not casual, one that artist and reader tacitly know to 
be true. The difference between an archetypal comic plot and tragic plot reflects a 
fundamental difference in worldview. Each archetype represents a particular point of 
view, or frame of reference that forms the basis for an implicit contract with the reader.
Beliefs comprise part of what has been termed more generally as a “frame of 
reference.” A frame of reference or paradigm is a system or way of thinking about 
reality that includes active consciously held beliefs and tacit assumptions about life. 
Language itself involves a fi*ame of reference or script in which it is to be interpreted. 
Raskin observes,
The script is a large chunk of semantic information surrounding the word 
or evoked by it. The script is a cognitive structure internalized by the 
native speaker and it represents the native speaker’s knowledge of a small 
part of the world. Every speaker has internalized rather a large repertoire 
of scripts of “common sense” which represent his/her knowledge of certain 
routines, standard procedures, basic situations, etc...”^^
Beyond the semantic level, a frame of reference is the ideological, physical, historical, 
sociological, and psychological context in which a given individual or group interprets 
reality. In developing his ideas of paradigms and paradigm shifl:s, Kuhn applies a
53 Victor Raskin, Semantic Mechanisms o f  Humor (Lancaster; D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1985) 
81.
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similar notion to science and scientific revolutions and stresses the idea that science 
advances only in so far as adequate paradigms arise to facilitate progress/'^ Following 
a broad but generally sociological approach to what he terms “frame analysis,”
Gofiftnan notes, “a primary framework is one that is seen as rendering what would 
otherwise be a meaningless aspect of the scene into something that is meaningful 
Life itself, then, involves interpretation and interpretation is inevitably done through a 
frame of reference. In literature, the author or narrator provides a frame of reference 
for the reader and supplies a fi'ame of reference for each character within the narrative. 
The two may or may not correspond. Here, “frame of reference” will be used primarily 
in regard to the relationship of a belief or ideal with reality or experience as a 
convenient way of referring to these issues.
In the FG, the narrator and Jesus share a fi'ame of reference not normally shared 
fully by the other characters. By asserting that “In the beginning was the Word, and 
the Word was with God and the Word was God,” '^^  the prologue of the FG places the 
context of the FG in terms of both story and discourse as beginning in eternity past, 
beyond the creation events narrated in Genesis 1 on which language they draw. The 
proper context or frame of reference of the FG, and by implication, all of reality, lies 
beyond temporal creation with God himself. The prologue of the FG thus establishes a
Kuhn, Stmcture.
^^Goffman, Erving, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization o f Experience (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1974) 21.
Unless noted, all scripture quotations are taken from the New International Version.
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conceptual paradigm by wliich Jesus and the FG are to be interpreted/^ Comparing
the Johannine prologue to its contemporary literature, Harris concludes,
[I]t is to be remembered that the evangelist, by beginning his work with a 
prologue, placed the entire work within the literary sphere of Greek 
religious drama. Consequently it was directed to a widespread 
readership ... The introduction of the Logos into a literary constmction 
which follows the convention of certain ancient Greek prologues in that 
preparation is vital for a correct understanding of the Johannine gospel.
From the prologue onwards the evangelist skillfully unveils the fiill identity- 
the metaphysical identity, one might say - of the protagonist of this cosmic 
drama, the Logos povoysvris 0sos, Jesus Christ.
The prologue also informs the reader that the “Word became flesh and lived for a while 
among us.” (1:14) The context is at once universal and particular. Whatever is said 
about the Word applies to the flesh and must be taken together in what Culpepper calls 
a “steroscopic” reading,how ever much a rebellious world remains in darkness on this 
matter.
IV ARCHETYPAL CRITICISM AND THE FOURTH 
GOSPEL
However uneasy the relationsliip may be to its older cousins, the fact remains 
that in recent years literary studies now play a prominent role in Biblical Studies. The 
appearance in 1983 of The Anatomy o f the Fourth Gospel by Robert Culpepper, who 
had previously approached the FG very much in the historical/ critical tradition.
Barrett notes, “John intends that the whole of his gospel shall be read in tlie light of this verse. The 
deeds and words of Jesus are the deeds and words of God; if tliis be not tme tlie book is blasphemous.” 
Barrett, The Gospel according to St John (London: SPCK, 1978) 156.
^ Elizabeth Harris, Prologue and Gospel: The Theology o f the Fourth Evangelist, JSNTSS 107 
(Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994) 195.
Culpepper, 33.
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established literary approaches to the FG in the mainstream and granted them status not 
previously attained. Although criticized by some as anachronistic/^ Culpepper’s 
Anatomy is generally a modest and straightforward work, employing such traditional 
features of literary criticism as plot and character, along with the more recent concerns 
of narrator and point of view, narrative time, implicit commentary, and the implied 
reader. Culpepper makes limited and cautious use of Frye’s archetypes and will be 
referred to later. Culpepper’s main purpose'm Anatomy is simply to make loiown and 
explain certain literary features of the FG with an emphasis on reader response 
criticism. As such, it tends to be more of a literary handbook to the FG and less of a 
sustained argument or work of theology, a limitation that is at once an asset and 
arguably contributes to the timeless quality and enduring influence of the book.
While  ^Anatomy remains the classic, perhaps no other writer has
written as extensively on literary approaches to the FG than Mark Stibbe. Stibbe’s The 
Gospel o f John as Literature: An Anthology o f Twentieth-Centmy Perspectives offers 
a valuable historical survey of the field as well as representative examples of various 
methodologies and perspectives, from reader response and structural criticism to the 
more ideologically inclined feminist criticism. In John as Storyteller (1992), Stibbe 
attempts to integrate literary criticism of the FG with historical/critical concerns as well 
as covering the gamut from an emphasis on author, text, and reader. John \s Gospel 
(1994) is an effort to read the FG through various literary methodologies. Stibbe is 
impressively eclectic in the approaches he employs.
^°Mark Stibbe, John as Storyteller: Narrative Criticism and the Fourth Gospel. SNTSMS 73 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 11.
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More than anyone else, Stibbe has attempted to apply Frye’s archetypal 
approach to the FG/^ Rather than connecting archetype to character, as Frye tends to 
do and will be done here, Stibbe relates Frye’s archetypes to discrete sections of the 
FG,^  ^ a proposal that, Muiphy believes, undermines the unity of the FG/^ 
Unfortunately, this difference aside, much of Stibbe’s use of archetypes is often 
mistaken resulting from an inadequate understanding of the archetypes combined with 
their haphazard application. In a particularly egregious example, Stibbe designates the 
narrative of the Samaritan woman as romance because in Fiye’s conception of things 
romance relates to Summer, and the encounter by the well takes place at noon in the 
hot sun.^ '*
Significantly, use of Frye’s archetypes and the use of “comedy” and “tragedy” 
as generic terms are common in literaiy criticism of the B i b l e . “Comedy” and 
“tragedy” are often used to refer to little more than the shape of the plot as it relates to
Maik Stibbe, John’s Gospel (London and New York: Routledge, 1994) 62-72; Stibbe, John as 
Storyteller, 121-147.
Stibbe, John's Gospel, 67-70. Stibbe makes good use of tliis method in applying the archetype of 
satire to an analysis of 8:31-59. John’s Gospel, 105-131.
^ Francesca Muiphy observes, “Mark Stibbe claimed tliat the plot of John’s Gospel ultimately obeys 
tlie U-shaped cuive of comedy. But he does not rest content with tliis suggestion: he has found all four 
of Frye’s genres in successive stages of tlie Gospel. Stibbe tliinks that we may discover in John the 
plots of Romance, Tragedy and Satire; it concludes witli the ‘mytlios of comedy’ in the Resurrection.
It beggars credulity to believe tliat John’s Gospel contains four generic plots, each projecting its own 
world, and yet converging to create a dramatic and harmonious whole. Shakespeare suggested the 
possibility, but he was joking.” Murphy, The Comedy of Revelation: Paradise Lost and Regained in 
Biblical Narrative (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000) 229. Perhaps failing to consider the closed nature 
of drama as compared with the open narrative of tlie FG, Murphy’s dismissal is more cavalier than 
carefid. Unlike the more nuanced if mistaken Stibbe, Murphy reads the parts of the Bible she deals 
with exclusively and aggressively in terms of comedy. Against Murphy, it will be argued here that the 
FG contains tlie four archetypal plots, but as applied to characters ratlier than discrete sections. Jesus’ 
stoiy certainly differs from that of Pilate and Peter.
Stibbe, John‘s Gospel, 67.
‘’^ Besides Stibbe and Culpepper, see Lelaiid Ryken, Words o f Delight: A Literary Introduction to the 
Bible, 2nd. ed. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1992.
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a happy or sad ending/^ “Comedy” is also made to refer to any reading of a Biblical 
text seen to contain humor, even if such humor owes its existence to a reading strategy 
that is conceptually ironic and parasitic/^ Additionally, comedy and/or tragedy, unless 
stretched to the breaking point and beyond, cannot account for much of the data/^
And, as opposites, no accounting is offered of possible fonns existing between them/^ 
If this type of criticism is to have significant explanatory value, whether specifically 
designated “archetypal criticism” or not, it must be established on a more definitive 
basis than at present. One of the goals of this work will be to examine and clarify the 
basic components of the archetypes in greater depth than has been previously 
attempted, especially as they relate to theology and Biblical studies, thus providing a 
much needed stabilization of the four points of the literary compass. As noted, in 
Frye’s case some of the confusion may be traced to Frye’s allusive method of argument 
combined with an emphasis on continuity between and within the four archetypes.^® 
The present work differs from Frye in this respect and will attempt to offer a more 
fixed accounting of the salient features of each archetype, a clarification that, it is 
hoped, will prove useful to literary studies applied to any portion of the Bible.
'^For a balanced but skeptical assessment, see Yair Zakovitch “u  and m in the Bible,” Semeia: 
Tragedy and Comedy in the Bible, 32 (1984) 106-114.
For a representative of this the approach, see William J. Whedbee, The Bible and the Comic Vision. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
^ The remarks on Mmphy, (note 61 above) also apply to the point.
^^ For example. Good reads Daniel 1-6 as comedy when it is better taken as romance, or, as Ryken 
does, as a hero story, see Edwin Good, “Apocalyptic as Comedy: The Book of Daniel,’ in Semeia: 
Tragedy and Comedy in the Bible, 32 (1984) 41-70; Leland Ryken, Wotrls of Delight: A Literary 
Introduction to the Bible, second ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1992) 109-114. Ryken observes (109) 
tliat the story of Daniel (1-6) is “tlioroughly governed by the principle of heroic narrative.”
^®Frye divides each archetype into six phases, a subtlety not attempted here.
For example. Good mistakenly reads Daniel as comedy whereas Ryken correctly identifies it as “hero 
story,” a designation much more in keeping with romance. See, Edwin Good, “Apocalyptic as 
Comedy: The Book of Daniel,” in Semeia: Tragedy and Comedy in theBible, 32 (1984) 41-70; Leland
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Stibbe closes John as Stoiyteller with the following remarks;
Of particular value will be studies devoted to the revelatory function of the 
narrative form. The next step fi'om a book such as this must surely be to 
ask the following question; Tf John’s story is revelatory, then how much of 
that sense of disclosure is due to John’s exploitation of the narrative 
fr)rm?’^
Part of the answer to this very large question will be to examine archetypes in 
the FG and relate them to their theological significance. Previous literary treatments of 
the FG offer no integrated literary or theological cosmos and are generally piecemeal 
attempts at applying particular approaches to particular texts. Unlike Stibbe’s gentle 
probing of the FG’s soil with a variety of tools, certainly valuable, the present effort is 
an attempt to utilize one approach, archetypal criticism, to maximum effect and do so 
with a view toward comparing the FG with other literature. Although conceived with 
different methodology with respect to its analysis of discrete narrative units, Dorothy 
Lee’s The Symbolic Narratives o f the Fourth Gospel is an impressive effort to integrate 
narrative analysis with the FG’s theology, an effort that in this work is hoped to be 
carried on in a different but related way. The present work is to a great degree an 
attempt to clarify and expand John’s use of the narrative form by way of a comparison 
with other forms of literature by means of Fiye’s formulation of archetypal criticism.
V GOALS, OBJECTIVES, AND QUALIFICATIONS
Ryken, Words o f Delight: A Literary Introduction to the Bible, second ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker, 
1992) 109-125.
Stibbe, John as Storyteller, 199.
A less successful attempt is Gail O’Day’s Revelation in the Fourth Gospel: Narrative Mode and 
Theological Claim. (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986). see chapter 3 below.
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The goal of this work is a sustained, rigorous, and mutually illuminating 
dialogue between literature and theology facilitated by the four archetypes of romance, 
tragedy, irony, and comedy, a dialogue to be conducted specifically with reference to 
Jesus, Pilate, Thomas and the Jews, and Peter as they appear in the FG. Christian 
theology will be brought to bear on literature and, conversely, literature and literary 
studies may be seen as a legitimate avenue for exploration of certain enduring 
theological themes. This dialogue will cross barriers between literature and theology in 
a way that, it is hoped, will prove mutually illuminating for archetypal criticism, for 
understanding of Jesus, Pilate, the Jews and Thomas, and Peter, as literary characters in 
the FG, and for literature and theology as separate but related disciplines.
Along the way, a number of goals or benefits may be suggested: 1) To suggest 
a way ahead for the comparison and/or integration of literature and theology by means 
of archetypal criticism; 2) To demonstrate the validity and usefulness of archetypal 
criticism in Biblical studies; 3) To establish the correct archetype for each of the five 
characters examined; 4) To define archetypes in relation to and inherent and variable 
relationship between belief or ideal and reality and experience; 5) To define these 
archetypes from a theological point of view in relation to readily recognizable specific 
reference points; and 6) To point to a mamier, mode, or habit of reading the Bible 
theologically and literarily as a way of moving toward a fiiller appreciation of these two 
disciplines as opposed to applying literary analysis of the Bible without reference to its 
theology.
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These goals will, however, be limited and defined by the methodology and 
ideology employed. There are three important elements: the limits of analogy and 
comparison, the strength of each individual analogy and comparison, and the limits of 
suggested theological conclusions. First, by using analogical reasoning in terms of 
comparison and contrast “proof’ can only be relative; there can be no conclusive proof 
as such. With any such undertaking, it is difficult to say “this proves that.” True or 
false is possible only in the sense that analogies and comparisons are appropriate and 
illuminating rather than inappropriate and misleading. It is not so much the intention of 
the present work to “prove” that, for example, that Peter is a comic character as much 
as it is to show that Peter can be best interpreted as a comic character and that a 
valuable and illuminating comparison can be made. Although it is most like a romance, 
in no way is it argued or implied that the FG /j  a romance, tragedy, anti-romance (irony 
and satire) or comedy. It is asserted only that certain elements of the FG, namely 
Jesus, Pilate, the Jews and Thomas, and Peter as they appear in FG, may be analyzed 
and illuminated in terms of their respective archetypes and by being compared to other 
literature and characters typified by the same archetype. Archetype, then, is a means of 
comparison, a point of exchange. The present work is conceived in view of the 
limitations of comparison and analogy, and these must be kept in mind as a general 
principle. The veiy nature of analogy demands the imaginative and poetic. Jasper’s 
comment that, “Literary readings of the Bible hover between the imaginative and 
poetic, and the academic” is quite appropriate here.^ "^
David Jasper, “Literary Readings of the Bible: Trends in Modern Criticism,” in David Jasper, 
Stephen Prickett, eds., The Bible an Literature: A Reader (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999) 52.
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Second, any analogy or comparison is not above evaluation by virtue of being 
an analogy or comparison, but must be evaluated in terms of analogy and comparison. 
Thus, for example, if Jesus is better explained with reference to tragedy rather than 
romance or if Pilate is unconvincingly compared to Oedipus, the analogy and 
comparison is weakened or rendered invalid. On this ground, there is ample space for 
analysis. As a practical consideration, rather than tediously evaluating the strength or 
weakness of each element of each comparison and subject the reader to the death of a 
thousand qualifications, except at points of obvious contention, comparisons will be 
offered and presented as if valid, legitimate, or true. The same goes for qualifications 
related to the principle of analogy; the limitations of analogy have been noted.
The strength of the connections between literature and theology will depend on 
the principle of analogy, the strength of those analogies, and, third, the faith 
commitments brought to bear on the principle of analogy with respect to a Christian 
world view. However much a work of this kind invites a provisional assumption of its 
own point of view, the present work is in no way an attempt to “prove” a Christian 
point of view. Rather it is written with a Christian point of view as its primary and 
governing point of reference. Additionally, as a coherentist effort, the conclusion of 
the argument is the same as the premise; the strength of the “argument” can only be the 
strength of the connections made fi-om and within such a worldview according to tacit 
assumptions of their validity. It is the limitation of the principle of analogy applied to 
interpretation from and within a particular worldview. The validity of the principle 
analogy and the validity of a Christian point of view are mutually interpenetrating
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assumptions in the present work. The middle ground on which evaluation of the 
components of this interaction leading to an increased understanding between literature 
and theology is to occur is the particular and comprehensive strength of its many 
analogies and comparisons. By conjoining archetypal criticism and characters in the 
FG, the twin visions of literature and theology will be focused close and distant, 
however well or poorly, into a single vision of a single cosmos.
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- 1-
THE FOURTH GOSPEL, JESUS, AND 
ROMANCE
'‘...the cost o f glory in romance is repeated suffering and loss. ”
Paul Dean, Restless Wanderers, 273
I INTRODUCTION
The unfamiliarity of Romance as a term designating a recognized body of 
literature with certain distinctive qualities is a fact of life. At the same time, the 
commonness of romance and its qualities and themes is surprising, finding present day 
expression in Westerns and science fiction (both in fiction and in film) and other venues 
where imaginative qualities predominate. Like tragedy, and comedy, romance cannot 
be confined to any one genre (drama, novel, etc.). Significant elements of romance can 
be found in works as diverse as The Odyssey, The Tempest, Pilgiim 's Progi^ ess, and 
Moby Dick. Indeed, in viewing fiction as a “total verbal order” Northrop Frye holds 
that “Romance is the structural core of all fiction.”^
* Northrop Frye, The Secular Scripture: A Study o f the Structure of Romance (London: Harvard 
University Press, 1976) 14.
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The ubiquity of romance as an archetype has much to do with its being 
expansive, open and inclusive. Consequently it often goes unrecognized. Conversely, 
tragedy is characterized by concentration and closure, while comedy is characterized by 
confusion and misunderstanding moving toward integration and a realization of a 
desired end. Romance both ends where tragedy begins and picks up where comedy 
leaves off, assuming from the start an integration and an openness to all things 
imaginative and fantastic. Romance tends to move through something more than 
moving toward something else. Romance, it will be argued, is the archetype that 
applies best to Jesus and the FG as a whole.
II ROMANCE, THE FOURTH GOSPEL, AND JESUS
A. THE FOURTH GOSPEL AS ROMANCE IN CRITICAL OPINION
As might be expected, controversy surrounds the archetype the FG can be best 
compared with. Following Fiye’s method of classifying literature in terms of four 
mythoi, Culpepper cautiously designates the FG as being most like a romance. He 
observes,
As romanôe inclines towards myth the hero may possess attributes of 
divinity, but the conflict “takes place in, or at any rate primarily concerns, 
our world.”  ^ The relevance of a mythos so described is obvious, [i.e. 
romance] In the Gospel of John, Jesus, who has descended from the world 
above, is unrecognized except by a privileged few. As he strives to fulfill 
his mission, preliminary minor “adventures” (i.e., signs and conflicts with 
opponents) begin to reveal his identity. He is faced with a crucial struggle, 
his own death, which he accepts and thereby finishes his task successfully;
''ViovihxopVYyQ, Anatomy o f Criticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957) 187.
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“It is finished” (19:30). Although triumph takes the form of apparent 
defeat, he is recognized by his followers as “my Lord and God” (20:28).^
Culpepper’s discomfort with the romance designation wins out in the end. He notes 
that “The fit is certainly not perfect. The gospels are clearly veiy different from other 
members of this genre or mythos. Only when the general shape of the mythos is 
considered somewhat abstractly do the gospels begin to fit in.”"^ Culpepper here sees 
the problems more than the possibilities.^ No work of literature fits any genre or 
mythos exactly and only when considered somewhat abstractly does any work (or 
object; trees, for example) fit into any classification, a qualification that applies to 
reading the gospels as Greek bioi as well.  ^ Classification of any kind is an exercise in 
comparison and as such it is an exercise in exploring similarities and differences. In the 
case of the FG, the differences present challenges as much as the similarities present 
opportunities; the struggle is to illumine rather than obfuscate through the process of 
comparison and contrast.
Stibbe rejects the designation of the FG as romance. Instead, he finds the 
closest parallel, especially to the passion narrative, in the mythos of tragedy and offers 
Euripides’ Bacche for comparison. Significantly, both The Bacche and the FG feature 
a God appearing on earth in the form of a man who remains unrecognized by those he
 ^Culpepper, Anatomy of the Fourth Gospel: A Study hi Literary Design (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
^ibid., 84.
 ^Culpepper might well have followed tlirough his flirtation with labeling the plot of the FG as 
romance. His actual analysis of tlie plot of tlie FG fits very well with tlie plot of a romance and seems 
only to lack a systematic study and comparison with salient featuies of romance plot. See Culpepper, 
Anatomy, 84-98.
 ^See, Richard Burridge, What are the Gospels? A Comparison with Greco-Roman Biography 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Wliile Burridge's approach is historical and 
empirical, it is nonetlieless analogical and comparative.
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appears to, giving rise to a number of striking parallels/ But in terms of the final shape 
of the plot and the character of the god/God involved, there are radical differences 
which Stibbe fails to take into account. Dionysus resorts to deception and guile and is 
vindictive and spiteful. Jesus comes to reveal and is full of mercy and love. Rejection 
brings out the best in Jesus, the worst in Dionysus, and here is where the two plots are 
crucially different. The mercy and self-sacrifice of Jesus at the point when Dionysus is 
most revolting prompts Stibbe to observe that the story of Jesus subverts the 
conventions of tragedy.*
But this comment begs the question of how much the FG and the story of Jesus 
conforms to the mythos of tragedy and whether or not Jesus is a tragic figure in 
chapters 18-19 or anywhere else. Stibbe does not explicitly say Jesus is a txst%\Q figure, 
but implies as much when he states, “The death of Jesus in John’s gospel is archetypally 
tragic.” Elsewhere he endorses the views of “very influential secular literary critics and 
theorists who have regarded the gospel story of Jesus as the archetypal tragic stoiy.”  ^
Furthermore the FG is manifestly about Jesus, and, as Stibbe himself notes, “The 
identification of the genre of John 18-19 depends therefore on our ability to identify the 
basic image of Jesus, the hero of that stoiy...”^^  Much is therefore at stake in the 
identification of the story of Jesus.
 ^Mark Stibbe, John as Storyteller: Narrative Criticism and the Fourth Gospel, SNTSMS 73 
(Cmiibridge; Cambridge University Press, 1992) 134-5.
^ibid., 144.
^ibid., 138. Stibbe cites Frye (Anatomy, 36) in liis defense. Frye, not always consistent, has been cited 
in the present work as designating Jesus as corresponding to the archetype of romance.
•°ibid., 123.
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Much of Stibbe’s confusion results from inaccurately identifying this or that 
element taken from tragedy with this or that group in the FG. For example, he applies 
the notion of hamartia to the Jews and their rejection of Jesus. But hamartia is 
properly a quality applied to the protagonist of a tragedy, who in this case would be 
Jesus, impossible on the teims of the FG because Jesus is nowhere seen as fallen, sinful, 
or mistaken. Elsewhere Stibbe applies the term anagnorisis, or recognition, to the fact 
that neither Penthus nor the people of Jesus’ day recognized who Jesus was. Again, 
anagnorisis properly applies to recognition on the part of the protagonist who remains 
ignorant of certain facts or perceptions until a moment o îanagnorisis, which comes 
too late to alter the course of events. Jesus is hardly ignorant of anything and the Jews 
never recognize Jesus. Pilate, however, is a tragic character complete with hamartia 
who undergoes precisely such an anagnorisis. In tragedy recognition and reversal are 
consequent on the protagonist undergoing a destruction of self in terms of 
circumstance and self identity. While doubtless there are elements of tragedy in the FG 
in general and specifically in chapters 18-19, the tragic character and the center of the 
tragic story in this passage is Pilate and not Jesus. Rather than subverting the mythos 
of tragedy as Stibbe argues, Jesus is not a tragic figure nor is his story best identified 
with the tragic archetype. Stibbe’s analysis of John 18-19 in comparison with The 
Bacche illuminates because it is ever so close to being right, yet obfuscates as much by 
making a fundamental category mistake and by a lack of precision in applying the 
details of tragedy.
"ibid., 137.
Pilate and tragedy are discussed in detail in chapter two below.
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As Culpepper notes, Jesus and his story in the FG most closely resembles a 
Romance with its pattern “the preliminary minor adventures; the crucial struggle, 
usually some kind of battle in which either the hero or his foe, or both, must die; and 
the exaltation of the hero Responding to Culpepper, Stibbe objects that “There is a
sense of dreamy wistfulness in romances like The Fairie Qiieene which we certainly do 
not sense in John’s gospel.”^^  But this is a matter presentation and tone rather than 
archetypal pattern or what Culpepper refers to as the “general shape” of the story. 
Stibbe also notes that “Jesus’ conflicts with the Jews are nothing like the knight’s 
adventures with dragons and other fictive creatures. They are concrete, flesh-and 
blood encounters with real, societal evils.” But this curiously literal criticism 
overlooks the representative and symbolic nature of dragons and such as standing for 
real dangers met with real selflessness and courage, precisely the qualities evident in 
Jesus as he met the dragons of his day. Nowhere does Jesus exhibit ignorance, hubris, 
or character flaws characteristic of and necessary for a figure to be tragic.
Nor can Jesus in the FG be read as comic. In comedy the need typically arises 
for some outside agency or “miraculous” turn of events to make things right. Jesus is 
fundamentally the agent of such change rather than its recipient, although Jesus is the 
recipient of such an action in the resurrection. But the singular fact that Jesus rises
Culpepper, Anatomy, 83.
Stibbe, John as Storyteller, 126.
^ i^bid., 126.
Margaret Davies notes, “In spite of tlie Gospel’s tragic elements, therefore, they are not tragedies. 
Jesus’ martyrdom is the mijust humiliation of an innocent man but it is also liis final act of obedience 
to God and it is tlie way which leads tlirough deatli to eternal life.” Davies, Rhetoric and Reference in 
the Fourth Gospel, JSNTSS 69 (Slieflield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1992) 108.
"For a reading of John’s Gospel in terms of comedy, see Francesca Murphy, The Comedy o f 
Revelation: Paradise Lost and Regained in Biblical Narrative (Edinbm gh: T&T Clark, 2000) 226- 
249.
42
from the dead does not make his stoiy a comedy. The comic hero is one whose 
understandings and pretensions are at some distance from reality, one who stumbles 
forward in the darkness of misunderstanding. Self imposed incongruity with one’s 
surroundings, ignorance of a contingent sort moving to some kind of integration, are 
the hallmarks of the comic hero and in no way apply Jesus.
B) BASIC ELEMENTS OF ROMANCE
Rather than comedy or tragedy, the story of Jesus and the FG most nearly
resembles romance. There are tliree importapt considerations under which romance
may be broadly defined. First, the basic archetype of romance consists of a story of a
hero^* who embodies and displays some ideal, a characteristic it shares with epic.
The stoiy of the hero takes the form of a quest, an episodic account of the hero’s
identity with that ideal and the maintenance and display of that identity and ideal in the
face of challenges and difficulties. Frye gives the following account of romance;
The complete form of the romance is clearly the successful quest, and such 
a completed form has three main stages: the stage of the perilous journey 
and the preliminary minor adventures; the cmcial struggle, usually some 
kind of battle in which either the hero or his foe or both, must die; and the 
exaltation of the hero. We may call these three stages respectively, using 
Greek terms, the agon or conflict, the pathos or death-struggle, and the 
anagnorisis or discovery, the recognition of the hero, who has clearly 
proved himself to be a hero even if he does not survive the conflict.^'’
“Hero” will be used in tlie sense defined in this paiagrapli, as opposed to tlie more neutral term 
“protagonist.”
i9«[Tjiig emphasis of Homeric criticism, down to about 1750 at least, has been overwhelmingly 
tliematic, concerned with the dianoia or ideal of leadership implicit in the two epics.” Fiye, Anatomy, 
53. 
ibid., 187.
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The hero is identified with the ideal such that representing and maintaining the ideal is
synonymous with preservation of the self. Rather than being selfish, the hero embodies
a kind of universal selflessness. The hero is one who exceeds reality or the pressure of
circumstances and maintains an ideal worthy of death. White observes,
The Romance is fundamentally a drama of self-identification symbolized by 
the hero’s transcendence of the world of experience, his victoiy over it, and 
his final liberation fiom it- the sort of drama associated with the Grail 
legend or the story of the resurrection of Christ in Christian mythology. It 
is a drama of the triumph of good over evil, of virtue over vice, of light 
over darkness, and of the ultimate transcendence of man over the world in 
which he was imprisoned by the fall.^ ^
Although subject to changing external circumstances, the hero tends to be essentially a
static character, the ideological as well as the narrative center of the story, a character
who is revealed and reveals. Culpepper notes,
The plot [of the FG] is a plot of action in the sense that Jesus achieves his 
goals while his fortune apparently changes for the worse. It is a plot of 
character only in the sense that it is bound up with his moral character and 
the threats to it, for Jesus is a static character.
The hero is, poetically speaking, without or very nearly without flaws but is subject to 
tests and challenges in the course of events. As such romance is fundamentally related 
to epic and shares these qualities with the FG. The hero is tempted and tried, but the 
struggle is to maintain an ideal that is readily apparent, not to struggle toward 
integration or destruction in doubt and perplexity as is typical of comedy and tragedy.
Hayden Wliite, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore 
and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973) 8-9.
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To view the FG and the story of Jesus as comedy or tragedy is to mistakenly view a 
particular phase of Jesus’ changing external fortunes as definitive of the whole.
While epic and romance share the fundamental characteristics of a hero who
embodies and represents an ideal, the former gave way to the latter in historical
development. Ker observes,
[T]he victory of the Norman knights over the English axemen has more 
than a fancifiil or superficial analogy to the victory of the new literature of 
chivalry over the older foims of heroic narrative. The history of those two 
orders of literature, of the earlier Epic kinds, followed by the various types 
of medieval Romance, is parallel to the general political history of the 
earlier and the later Middle Ages, and may do something to illustrate the 
general progress of the nations. The passage fiom the earlier “heroic” 
civilisation to the age of chivaliy was not made without some 
contemporary record of the ‘form and pressure’ of the times in the 
changing fashions of literature, and in successive experiments of the 
imagination.^*
Ker’s analysis points to a substantial development, but at the same time demonstrates a 
fimdamental link between the two. However much they may have developed and differ 
in outward trappings, both function as imaginative projections of the ideals of a 
particular society, public and/or private. Noting their differences, Ker continues his 
above comment stating, “Whatever Epic may mean, it implies some weight and solidity; 
Romance means nothing, if it does not convey some notion of mystery and fantasy.” "^^ 
Although Ker shows a marked preference for epic over romance, his comment points 
to the epic tendency toward the objective as compared to the tendency in romance for 
the subjective, landscape and soulscape respectively. And, traditionally but not
W. P. Ker, Epic and Romance: Essays on Medieval Literature (London: MacMillian and Co., 1926)
4.
^"ibid.
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exclusively, epic portrays the destiny of a nation as embodied in its heroes, Aeneas of 
WirgxV s A m id  for example, whereas in romance the focus is on the individual/^ Yet, 
to use an analogy from cathedral architecture reflecting something of the change from 
“solidity” to “fantasy,” the change from Nornian to Gothic style by no means implies a 
change in essential form, purpose, or motivation of the building itself/^ It need not be 
assumed, as Ker seems to imply, that mystery and fantasy, taken on their own terms, 
exclude weight and solidity, however much they may tend in that direction.
In Clara Reeve’s The Progress o f Romance, an old (1785) but still significant
work, a central theme is that romance, despite the tendency to decry romance and
venerate epic, desei*ves to be taken seriously in its own right, is fundamentally related
to epic, and may seriously be compared to it. The common ground between them is the
hero who embodies some virtue or virtues. She writes
By fixing a clear and certain meaning to it [romance], not of my own 
invention or judgment; but borrowing the idea of the Latinists, I would call 
it simply an Heroic fable,- a fabulous Story of such actions as are 
commonly ascribed to heroes, or men of extraordinary courage and 
abilites.[sic] -Or if you would allow of it, I would say an Epic in prose.
They [romance and epic] spring from the same root,- they describe the 
same actions and circumstances,- they produce the same effects, and they 
are continually mistaken for each other.
^ The Complete Romances o f Chretien de Troyes, trails, with an introduction by David Staines 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990) xxvii.
^  Commenting on Ker’s point, Eugene Vinaver writes, “What distinguishes one literary generation or 
one epoch from anotlier is surely not tlie stories they tell but tlie way they tell them.” The Rise of 
Romance (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1971) 1-2.
Clara Reeve, The Progress o f  Romance, Colchester edition of 1785N (New York: The Facsimile 
Text Society, 1930) 13.
^ ibid., 16. These two quotations are offered in place of the following one supplied virtually any time 
Reeve is quoted; “The Romance is an heroic fable, which treats of fabulous persons and tilings. -The 
Novel is a pictm e of real life and manners, and of the times in which it is written. The Romance in 
lofty and elevated language, describes what never happened nor is likely to happen.” (Progress, i l l )  
Taken by itself, tliis quotation connotes a negative view of romance veiy much at odds witli the overall
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More recently, Burrow links epic and romance under the term “epic romance” and 
employs the treatment of pity and sympathy as a common ground for study
If romance is taken as the story of a hero who embodies and represents an ideal, 
the range of subject matter can be as light as Daphnis and Chloe, an early Greek 
romance in which the two main characters embody the pastoral ideals of chastity (for 
the most part) and innocence, to the weight, solemnity, and scope of The Song o f 
Roland, a twelfth centuiy French epic featuring the heroic stand of the Christian 
Roland in the face of certain defeat by the Saracens. The basic format thus extends 
from the lighthearted tone and subject matter typical of comedy to the heaviness of 
tone and subject that extends through epic and into tragedy.*^
The hero must face real situations and in this sense suffers real consequences; 
but to the extent that the hero maintains the ideal, the exigencies of circumstance are of 
secondary importance. The hero thus preserves his identity and detennines his ultimate 
destiny because that identity is fimdamentally about adherence to an ideal. As a 
realized ideal generally free fi om doubt and perplexity acting in accordance with an 
ideal, the hero is the primary causal agent rather than the hapless pawn of the 
impersonal causal forces of chance and fate manifest in circumstance. In contrast, the
theme of the book. Similar to her treatment of romance, Reeve’s concern witli the novel relates to it 
portrayal of virtue, a standard employed to judge the merits of numerous individual works.
^  Colon Burrow, Epic Romance: Homer to Milton (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1993).
Indeed, a similar- point extends to The Iliad and The Odyssey, tlie former tending toward tragedy tire 
latter towards comedy. Fiye remarks, "I shall begin witli a similar dichotomy about literary criticism.
I may express it, in tlie manner of Coleridge, by saying that all literary critics are eitlier Iliad critics or 
Odyssey critics. That is, interest in literature tends to center eitlier in the area of tragedy, realism, and 
irony, or in tlie area of comedy and romance.” Frye, A Natural Perspective: The Development of 
Shakespearean Comedy and Romance, San Diego (New York, London; Harcoui t Brace Javonovich 
1965) 1.
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tragic protagonist is destroyed through adherence to a set of beliefs that are proven by 
events to be flawed or unworkable in a particular circumstance and thus something of 
the tragic protagonist’s identity is destroyed as well. The beliefs and actions of the 
comic protagonist are self caused, but assumed to be false or deficient although 
ultimately harmless. In their own way, tragedy and comedy feature an ideal, but one 
qualified by circumstance. In contrast, an ironic perspective is one characterized by 
negation, a perspective ranging from one in which a departure from an ideal is 
recognized to one in which any ideal is held to be false and illusory.
The second consideration is that romance is the archetype closest to and most
appropriate for the FG as a whole because, besides having similar qualities and themes,
romance as a narrative archetype is inlierently open and inclusive. Dean observes,
The narrative multiplicity of romance, each tale bound within terms of its 
own continuity and defined by the separate character of its interaction with 
the surrounding tales, creates a dynamic and unresolved pattern.*^
Romance is not a genre confined to one literary technique, such as prose or 
poetry, nor is it strictly confined to a set number of stylistic features, such 
as the use of irony or ornate diction. The generic quality of romance is far 
too diverse, too rich in contrast, to tie it down to a fixed set of ordering 
principles. It is the supreme example of a literary genre which achieves 
unity in multiplicity and full expression as a genre by utilizing a wide 
variety of literary forms.*^
Ker makes a similar statement about epic.
Epic poetry is one of the complex and comprehensive kinds of literature, in 
which most of the other kinds may be included- romance, history, comedy;
Jolm Dean, Restless Wanderers: Shakespeare and the Pattern o f Romance (Salsburg; Salzburg 
Studies in English Literature 86, 1979) 9.
^Hbid., 87
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tragical, comical, historical, pastoral are terms not sufficiently various to 
denote the variety of the Iliad and the Odyssey}^
The point is important. Romance and epic can entertain the surrounding tales of 
tragedy and comedy in a way that comedy and tragedy (especially) cannot. The 
relationship is not reciprocal in any straightfoiward way. Tragedy and comedy are not 
archetypes of diversity after the manner of romance and are simply unable to play host 
to all the same literary guests with quite the same grace. Material provided by the epics 
of Homer is expanded and developed by the later tragic poets and not the reverse. The 
issue is not simply one of chronology. It is difficult to imagine how the Iliad and the 
Odyssey could have arisen ft om Greek tragedy. According to Aiistotle, “Again, the 
poet should remember what has been often said, and not make an Epic structure into a 
Tragedy- by an Epic structure I mean one with a multiplicity of plots- as if, for 
instance, you were to make a tragedy out of the entire story of the Iliad The open
and expansive nature of romance and epic is a point that bears some emphasis and will 
be discussed below in relation to story and plot. Apart from accepting the complexity, 
diversity, and interwoven and episodic nature of this style of narrative, a naiTative 
which at the same time achieves a fundamental unity on its own terms, romance will 
remain elusive. At the same time, any attempt to view the nairative of the FG as comic 
or tragic fails to account for the diversity of its nairative.*^
Ker, Epic and Romance, 16, Ms emphasis.
Aristotle, Aristotle’s Poetics, tians., S. H. Butcher, introduction, Francis Fergusson (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1961) XVII1.4; p. 91.
Stibbe rightly argues for the diversity of archet>fpes in the FG but mistakenly does so on the basis of 
sections or episodes of the FG ratlier tlian as embodied in character. See Mark Stibbe, John’s Gospel 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1994) 62-72. Fiye connects archetype witli character.
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Finally, while the FG is primarily the story of Jesus, it is also the story of Peter, 
Pilate, the Jews, and many others. Each of these characters corresponds in varying 
degrees to different archetypal patterns. Jesus is best described by the basic pattern of a 
romance, Pilate by tragedy, and the Jews and Thomas by anti-romance, or satire and 
irony, and Peter by comedy, designations forming much of the substance of the present 
work. The FG presents these characters swirling around in different patterns, at Cross 
purposes and often in conflict with one another and, most importantly, in conflict with 
Jesus. As Fletcher notes, “A systematically complicated character will generate a large 
number of other protagonists who react against or with him in a syllogistic manner.”*® 
Significantly, conflicts with Jesus are not all of the same type and reflect characteristics 
and patterns of specific archetypes. To say that the FG follows the tragic or comic 
archetype is to be partly correct. But to do so will inevitably result in confusion as 
elements of tragedy, comedy, or romance, certainly present, are applied indiscriminately 
to the wrong person or group or extended to the FG as a whole. Clarity of category 
and application is crucial.*^
What is meant in the present work as romance is broadly defined by these 
elements; the story of a hero who embodies and represents an ideal who embarks on a 
journey or quest and undergoes a series of tests portrayed in an expansive, interlacing, 
and episodic narrative which often includes other stories and characters. Additionally,
Angus Fletcher, Allegory: The Theory o f a Symbolic Mode (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1964) 35.
Dean comments, “The distinctiveness of romance depends upon its special ability as a genre to 
absorb and syntliesize otlier literary forms. Regar ding romance in terms of only one of its narrative 
components inevitably leads to a critical distortion of tire fine balance of parts which a successful 
romance must maintain.” Dean, Wanderers, 221.
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because beliefs and ideals are usually connected with the transcendent, romance and 
epic typically include elements of the marvelous. It is tempting to adopt a term like 
heroic romance, or epic romance, epic-heroic-romance or simply heroic or hero story, 
but the term romance, whatever its inadequacies, in the sense given here will suffice if it 
is kept in mind that what is here termed romance is broadly defined as an umbrella term 
very much related to epic. If the two are not siblings they are at least first cousins. 
Given the definition offered here, romance and epic may be seen as variations on the 
hero story. Whatever the outward trappings of tone and presentation, be they 
Odysseus’ journey toward home, the preservation of life and chastity, or tales of 
knights and chivaliy, or the faithfulness of Jesus to his mission, the archetypal pattern 
of the stoiy is essentially the same. To focus on the tone or the narrative trappings of a 
particular time, armed knights and chivalry of medieval romance for example, is to 
mistake armor and lance for what is really at stake: loyalty to and representation of an 
ideal under the pressure of circumstance. In this respect, romance assumes the values 
and ideals it projects, and, whatever the departures fi om its ideals, offers its own vision 
of a unified and coherent cosmos.
In the FG Jesus defines reality; the world is in darkness, under judgment, and 
Jesus is the light. Remaining obedient to the Father, Jesus enters the world but does 
not partake of its sin. Jesus does not need to be integrated into the world and its way 
of doing things. Rather, the world stands in need of redemption and Jesus, the hero of 
a different order than comedy and tragedy, the person at one with the ideal represented, 
is the one who accomplishes this.
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C) ROMANCE MOTIFS AND THE FOURTH GOSPEL
As a way of facilitating a comparison and treating numerous features of Jesus 
and romance in the FG in a relatively compact fashion, recurring motifs of romance will 
be examined.** This kind of comparison is limited in that it merely attempts to note the 
existence of features common to both the FG and romance, but at the same time many 
offers many striking similarities. In any case, the list and comparison is intended to be 
illustrative and not definitive or exhaustive. A more in-depth analysis will follow in 
section III.
Although his primaiy concern is Shakespearean romance. Dean begins his study 
with the Odyssey and offers a comprehensive and detailed suiwey of romance. The 
inclusion of the Odyssey is significant in that it gives Dean’s analysis wider applicability 
that extends to epic as well. He lists the following motifs as characteristic of romance: 
the dramatic qualities of marvel, risk, and triumphant adventure; emphasis on 
generation differences; and abundant use of pageantry; claims to historical relevancy; 
the wandering journey towards ‘home”; the essential piety of the main character; the 
idealized male-female relationships; the protagonists’ mental agility; and ever present 
mingling of blessings and son ows; the directing influence of a supernatural higher 
power; a distinguishing token or scar by which the hero or heroine will eventually be 
recognized; shipwreck or apparent loss; and magical wonders—all of which are bound 
within an interlacing narrative, ending when the disparate strands are drawn together in
In future chapters, close readings of relevent passages will be offered. Given the length of the FG 
and the amount said about Jesus, tliis is not possible here.
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a final reunion scene. An analysis of the FG in light of these motifs will highlight a 
number of similarities.
C.l DRAMATIC QUALITIES OF MARVEL, RISK, AND
TRIUMPHANT ADVENTURE
The prologue initially establishes the theme of the marvelous in the Gospel’s 
discourse through its emphasis on the God of creation being incarnate in the world. In 
the FG, the marvelous is fundamentally related to risk. Risk becomes important when 
the Jews threaten to kill Jesus following his claims to be equal with God arising from 
the Sabbath healing of the paralytic (5:18). Popular attempts to make him king 
resulting from the feeding of the 5000 (6:15) present another risk. Jesus risks being 
misunderstood, whether he was a “good man” or “deceives the people” (7:12) or even 
demon-possessed (7:20, 8:49), a misunderstanding that is at bottom related to 
misunderstanding regarding who Jesus is. The link between risk and the marvelous is 
most clearly seen in the connection between the raising of Lazarus and Caiaphas’ 
declaration that “it is better for you that one man die for the people” (11:50), a key 
background event for the risk of the triumphal entry and the supreme risk of death 
itself. Without the marvelous in the FG, either in deeds or theological claim, there is no 
risk. Adventure implies risk, and the triumphant adventure of the FG originates in 
Jesus’ divine claims as these claims become subject to risk and real consequences in a 
world that fails to accept them.
C.2. EMPHASIS ON GENERATION DIFFERENCES
^ i^bid., 3-4. Dean’s specific concern here is applying tliese motifs to The Odyssey as a means of 
demonstrating tlie Odyssey’s qualities of romance. However, Dean intends tliis list to be 
representative.
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The generation differences in the FG involve differences between the new, 
announced and represented by Jesus, and the old, represented and defended by the 
Jews. The miracle at Cana both affirms the old, marriage and the continuation of life, 
and announces the new, as seen in the implicitly theological action of the new wine of 
Christ being created in the jars used for ceremonial washing. While some of the old 
will be preserved, much will be removed and replaced as the temple cleansing makes 
clear. Jesus’ statement, “Destroy this temple and I will raise it again in three days”
(2:19) implies a replacement theology where one temple will be replaced by another. 
Nicodemus, by birth and privilege the quintessential insider of the old generation, must 
become a member of the new generation by being “born again,” this time a spiritual 
rebirth. The new generation will be comprised of those who believe, children born “not 
of human descent” but “bom of God.” (1:13) Lazams is the eschatological prototype of 
the age come, an age entered into through faith in Christ. (11:25-26) Rejection of 
Lazams relates to rejection of Jesus and his subsequent death. But only through his 
death, resurrection, and going away can the next generation be fiilly realized.
C.3. ABUNDANT USE OF PAGEANTRY
Pageantry and festivals impart a sense of wonder and extra-ordinariness to 
quotidian life. Because of the prominent inclusion of Jewish festivals and because it is 
set primary around Jerusalem, the FG emphasizes this inherently religious aspect. 
Weddings are a social and religious festival, the latter aspect being especially prominent 
and employed for thematic purposes in the wedding at Cana. The temple, the primary 
location of Jewish ceremonial life, is dramatically cleansed at Passover of money­
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changers and sellers of cattle and sheep, those traps and trappings of everydayness that 
festival and ceremony attempt to overcome. Much of the FG’s organization revolves 
around festivals. Jesus’ appearance at the unnamed festival in 5:1 among the blind, 
lame, and paralyzed, itself a carnival of paralysis, leads to the healing of the paralytic, a 
miracle characterized by a sterile response and opposition. The feeding of the 5000 
during the second Passover (6:4) gains additional festive force by the attempt to make 
him king (6:15) and its association with the provision of manna in the wilderness 
(6:25ff). Jesus next attends the festival of Tabernacles (7:2, 14) and then the Feast of 
Dedication (10:22). Having been lavishly anointed, Jesus enters Jerusalem before the 
final Passover in festive triumph. But Jesus’ greatest glory occurs during the 
humiliation of the passion, presented in the FG with a motif of royal enthronement. 
Jesus’ burial is lavish and moving. The resurrection appearances speak of the 
resurrection as a sublime event, a kind of pageantry without ostentation.
C.4. CLAIMS TO HISTORICAL RELEVANCY
Unlike fantasy which may be set somewhere else in a world unlike our own, 
romance is set in a world like our own. While it is beyond the scope of the present 
work to debate the historicity of the FG, however present the maiwelous, the FG 
presents a world that is presented as real and historical. Jesus travels around a 
historically recognizable Palestine and authentically encounters the people, politics, and 
religion of his day. Any treatment of the FG in terms of the history or society of its day 
assumes as much. Rather than narrating events for their own sake, the concrete events 
of the FG are viewed as meaningful and significant within and beyond their specific
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historical context. In any case, the emphasis falls as much on the fact that the “word 
was made flesh and dwelt among us” and its implications as it does the facts o f  the flesh 
dwelling among us.
C.5. THE WANDERING JOURNEY TOWARDS ‘HOME’
The theme of descent (1:10-11, 14, 51) and ascent (7:33, 16:5) is a well noted 
feature of the FG."*® Related to this are references to being sent ( 5:37, 6:57, 7:29,
8:18, 42) or from above (8:23) Jesus’ journey in the FG has two aspects; the journey to 
the cross and his journey back to the Father. In this sense the journey of Jesus is both 
horizontal and vertical; he must return to the Father by way of the cross. (13:1a) Yet, 
like Odysseus’ wandering journey towards home, Jesus’ journey is purposeful. Jesus’ 
departure is meaningful because he goes “to prepare a place for you” (14:2) and so that 
the Holy Spirit can be sent.
C.6. THE ESSENTIAL PIETY OF THE MAIN CHARACTER
The most prominent features of Jesus’ piety are love and obedience, qualities 
which must be manifested in concrete acts. Jesus, the light of the world, does what the 
Father does Jesus’ love is most clearly demonstrated in the raising of Lazarus, the 
footwasliing, comforting his disciples, and supremely on the cross. He is loved, 
honored and worshipped by those around him. Even amidst an honor and shame 
culture, in the FG Jesus is presented as preseiwing his honor in shameful 
circumstances."^  ^ Although possessing power to do otherwise. He suffers unjustly.
most notably, Wayne Meeks, “The Man from Heaven in Johannine Sectarianism,” JBL 91 (1972) 
44-72.
see Jerome Neyrey, “Despising the Shame of tlie Cross: Honor and Shame in the Johannine Passion 
Nairative,” Semeia, 68 (1994) 113-137.
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rejected by friend and enemy alike/^ Jesus is the theological, ethical, and narrative 
center of the FG.
C.7. THE HJEALIZED MALE-FEMALE RELATIONSHEPS
The male-female relationships in the FG aie more developed than in the 
Synoptics. To the extent Jesus relationships with women can be said to be idealized, 
such idealization is done in a profoundly real way. As the disciples’ reaction indicates 
(4:27), the most noteworthy aspect of Jesus conversation with the Samaritan woman is 
that it occurs at all. On Lazarus’ death, Martha and Mary both display faith and 
disappointment, disappointment seemingly consequent on their brother’s death and 
Jesus’ absence. Jesus’ relations with the sisters are intimate and genuine; displaying the 
full depth of his humanity, he shares their suffering and grief. Jesus’ encounter with 
Mary Magdalene is at once close and distant; he approaches her with sensitivity but, on 
being recognized, eschews sentimental and/or physical attachment and insists on factors 
related to his mission being primary.'^*
C.8. THE PROTAGONIST’S MENTAL AGILITY
Often in romance mental agility allows the protagonist to escape from some 
danger, as, for example the “resourceful” Odysseus. Jesus’ encounters with 
Nicodemus, the Samaritan woman, and Pilate are in a sense clever in that he continually 
moves from one level of understanding to another. Most of Jesus’ disputes with the 
Jews are clever, but mostly concern a conflict of two ways of thinking. If teaching has
For a discussion of Jesus as seen positively by elements of Hellenistic culture, see Josephine 
Massyngbaerde Ford, “Jesus as Sovereign in the Passion According to John,” BTB 25 (1995) 110-17.
For Lindars, “The desire to hold Jesus must be restrained, because it is an attempt to recapture the 
conditions of tlie incarnate life in place of the universal and abiding relationship wliich is the object of 
his mission.” Barnabas Lindars, The Gospel o f John (London: Oliphants, 1972) 607.
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anything to do with mental agility, the Jews are amazed. (7:15) The best example of 
Jesus’ mental agility is perhaps 10:33-39 where Jesus uses the OT reference to men 
being called ‘gods’ (Psalms 82:6) to support his claim to be one with the Father.
(10:30) Although the account is not original, Jesus soundly (silently?) defeats those 
attempting to trap him over the matter of the woman caught in adultery. Pilate’s 
encounter with Jesus shows the latter’s mental mastery of the situation even while 
suffering defeat. Jesus is supremely in control of conversations throughout the FG.
C.9. EVER PRESENT MINGLING OF BLESSINGS AND SORROWS
First introduced by John’s statement, “Look the lamb of God who takes away 
the sin of the world.” (1:29), the death of Jesus is a theme throughout the FG. The 
proleptic statement of 2:22, “After he was raised from the dead” makes it clear that the 
death implicit in being “the lamb of God” did in fact occur. But the occurrence of 
Jesus’ death is more than a brute fact, it is a deeply felt loss, a loss given emotional 
depth by being set generally against the beauty of Jesus’ life, and specifically set against 
the presence of Jesus mother and the other women at the cmcifixion (19:25-27) and the 
lavish anointing of Nicodemus. The wedding at Cana and the incident of the Samaritan 
woman show Jesus as someone deeply involved in human life. He is someone who in 
obedience to the Father proclaims himself to be from the Father, and yet is rejected by 
his own. The raising of Lazarus is as remarkable for its picture of humanity as it is for 
the raising itself, one made all the more poignant by its juxtaposition against those 
coldly planning his demise. Mary’s anointing shows that Jesus is deeply loved and 
worshipped, yet the event signals that the sensibilities and loyalties of Judas lie
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elsewhere. The incident of the footwashing places the pathos of the footwashing itself 
and Jesus’ command to love one another against the background of his betrayal and 
impending death. Jesus later prays for all believers, yet is abandoned by two of his 
inner circle, and by the wavering Pilate. As he is put to death, Jesus sees to the care of 
his mother. Jesus’ post resurrection appearance to Maiy mixes profound human 
sorrow with the highest of joys. These incidents, full of love, loss, and joy create a 
mood of authentic feeling and pathos characteristic of romance too easily overlooked 
or avoided in analytical analysis.
CIO. THE DIRECTING INFLUENCE OF A SUPERNATURAL 
HIGHER POWER
The prologue places the mission of Jesus in a profoundly theological context 
with reference to his earthly ministry, the Word made flesh. Conversely, the witness of 
John (1:19-34) places Jesus in a historical context with reference to his theological 
identity, the Son of God (1:34) who “comes after me” but was “before me.” (1:30) 
Jesus adds much understanding to the nature of his mission in 5:19ff. Doing nothing by 
himself, Jesus does only what he sees the Father doing. Jesus thus is directed by a 
“higher power” but not in any mechanistic sense. Having been granted “life in himself’ 
by the Father, Jesus acts on his own, but does so in submission to what the Father does 
even to the point of rejecting Peter’s sword in favor of the cup of the Father. Further, 
the work of Jesus is frequently seen in light of the scriptures, implicitly affirming the 
divine ordering of earthly events.
C .ll. A DISTINGUISHING TOKEN OR SCAR BY WHICH THE HERO
OR HEROINE WELL EVENTUALLY BE RECOGNIZED
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The importance of a distinguishing token or scar arises when a period of time or 
some event separates and casts doubt on the authentic identity of a character which 
must be established with certainty. The famous scar of Odysseus seiwes this function.
In a larger sense, the miracles and signs provide ‘tokens’ by which Jesus might be 
recognized. These aside, the obvious example is the incident of Thomas being shown 
the hands and side of Jesus. For Thomas, as for countless others, a mark or token 
authenticating the identity of someone who reappears is not simply a detail a plot. 
Rather, the mark or token provides an entry into a world transformed by that person’s 
reappearance. The marks and tokens are real enough, but seiwe as real and imaginative 
links to the marvelous, connections between events where no connection seems likely 
or possible. Conversely, as in the story of Judah and Tamar, the tokens of identity 
sei*ve as transforming reminders of a concrete past event. However, in the end, the 
token or mark may establish the identity of the hero, but more importantly, it also 
vindicates the values and ideals for which the hero stands.
C.12. SHIPWRECK OR APPARENT LOSS
The death of Jesus is the central loss in the gospel, a loss that does not occur in 
isolation, one that, without the resurrection, suggests the following scenarios. For the 
disciples it is the death of their leader and friend, one with whom Peter can never be 
reconciled. The death of Jesus reverses the clever irony of the incident of the man born 
blind as the Pharisees were right after all. The life of the resurrected Lazams becomes a 
mocking reminder of what might have been or never was. The triumphal entry 
becomes a foolhardy display of mass optimism. The footwashing becomes a moving
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farewell instead of a living example. The death of Jesus becomes a kind of shipwreck, 
the destmction and loss of something good at the hands of forces hostile and 
capricious. At the same time the death of Jesus vindicates his enemies. Judas’ appears 
to have played the right card. For the Jews, loyalty to Caesar promises to be an 
effective strategy for the future. The apparent loss of Jesus is a moving story in its own 
right.
C.13. MAGICAL WONDERS
Miraculous wonders of various kinds characterize all four gospels. However 
the FG designates some occurrences as “signs.” Unlike most romance, however, the 
miracles and signs of the FG are connected with Jesus as being the agent of their 
occurrence. Jesus performs the miracle of turning of the water to wine, feeds the 5000, 
etc., whereas Arthur or Odysseus merely participate in the magical wonders within a 
magical landscape. The miracles are intimately connected with Jesus as the one sent 
from the Father and bound up with his Christological identity .O thers experience 
miracles through provision, healing, omniscient knowledge, and raising of the dead. 
C.14. INTERLACING NARRATIVE
The FG contains a variety of characters and a variety of incidents, the structure 
of which does not resemble the highly ordered plots of Ruth and Esther, for example. 
Characters come and go, some appear again while others do not. Besides being a 
mixture of narrative and discourse, the narrative emphasis changes between public and 
private; the public ministry of 2:1-12:50 gives way to the private emphasis of 13:1-
see R. Schnackenburg. The Gospel According to John. vol. I. trans. Kevin Smytli (London and New 
York: Burns & Oates, Crossroad, 1980) 515-528; C. K. Barrett The Gospel According to John: An 
Introduction with Commentary and Notes on the Greek Text (London: SPCK, 1978) 75.
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17:26 only to reappear in the cmcifixion narratives (18:41-19:42) then to return to the 
private emphasis as the gospel closes. (20:1-21:25) This aspect will be treated in 
more depth later.
C.15. AN ENDING WHEN THE DISPARATE STRANDS ARE
DRAWN TOGETHER IN A FINAL REUNION SCENE
The final reunion scenes of the FG are mixed and tenuous; the reunion scenes 
are not final. The visit to the empty tomb, appearance to Mary, the ten, and finally to 
the eleven establish the fact of Jesus resurrection, but the story does not end there. The 
fishing expedition of chapter 21 is a bit of an anti-climax, a descent into the real world, 
or, rather, a reminder that the real world and its demands needs to be taken seriously . 
The grand story and events of previous chapters culminating in the resurrection 
inaugurates an eternal eschatological reality, but one that must in the meantime be in 
tension with temporal reality as it presently exists. The story of the FG is at once 
closed, in so far as it concerns Jesus’ earthly ministry, and it is also open-ended; the 
story continues into present, its characters empowered by the promised Holy Spirit.
Assuming the validity of Dean’s characteristics, and allowing for a range of 
similarity with specific characteristics, the parallels between romance and the FG 
nevertheless indicate a more than passing correspondence and provide a basic 
plausibility for the more developed comparison and conceptual analysis to follow.
I ll STRUCTURAL/CONCEPTUAL ELEMENTS: 
SETTING, PLOT/STORY, CHARACTER
45 The nature of the FG narrative is discussed under “story and plot” below.
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A) SETTING: ROMANCE AND REALISM IN THE FG
Analogous to the interpenetrating style of narrative characteristic of romance 
and the overlapping of many of the above characteristics, structural elements of 
romance very much tend to overlap with conceptual elements. Distinctions between 
setting, plot/story, and character are useful but often difficult to maintain, a 
circumstance related to romance presenting, more than any other archetype, a unified 
vision of a coherent cosmos. The prologue of the FG assumes a coherent cosmos “in 
the beginning” but notes the present darkness.
As the narrative moves beyond the prologue, the Baptist announces Jesus to the 
world, which is followed by his meeting with the disciples. When the first disciples 
meet Jesus (1:35-51) and begin to follow him, there is a sense of them being drawn into 
another reality wherein following Jesus as his disciples is synonymous with a change of 
perception. Nathanael’s ruthlessly horizontal perception of anyone from Nazareth 
changes radically on experiencing the wonder of being seen under the fig tree. The 
assumption of the narrative is that Nathanael, however widespread or justified his 
opinion of Nazareth, fails to perceive things as they really are. Although Nathanael 
believed “because I told you I saw you under the fig tree” (1:50), he will see “greater 
things than that.” Jesus’ initial contact with the disciples in chapter one culminates in 
the promise that “you shall see heaven open, and the angels of God ascending and 
descending on the Son of Man.” (1:51) Recalling Jacob’s dream, this reference to 
heaven being opened indicates that the disciples and the reader will, like Jacob, be 
caught up in events wherein the presence and activity of God will, in the manner of
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romance, blur the distinction between heaven and earth. Jacob thought “surely the 
Lord was in this place, and I was not aware of it....How awesome is this place”
(Genesis 28:16), yet later wrestled with God in blindness. The angels of God will 
ascend and descend on the Son of Man; Jesus will become a kind of living ladder, a 
new Israel, a connection between heaven and earth, making himself more like earth and 
earth more like heaven by virtue of his presence in it.'^ '’
The wedding at Cana is the first miracle and Jesus’ introduction on the stage of 
the larger world. The events of the wedding at Cana suggest actual and imaginative 
links between heaven and earth. Weddings then and now are generally happy and 
festive occasions full of decoration, costume, ceremony, love, hope, and the promise of 
human life. The best of human aspirations are transferred to the bride and groom. In a 
very real way, weddings are those occasions where human life comes closest to the 
imaginative fullness of heaven, the union of Christ and his bride being cast in precisely 
these ternis. In this context of space and time at a particular wedding wherein water 
and six stone jars await, Jesus performs the miracle of turning the water into wine. The 
wine, the festive drink appropriate for such occasions, runs out. This mundane detail is 
more than a social gaffe, it is a crack in a crystal glass or a wrong note in a symphony, 
a real and symbolic link to the contingency of everyday of life at a time when the 
wonder of life is at its fullest. By supplying the wine, Jesus restores some sense of 
Eden, suggesting a narrowing of the gap between heaven and earth. And, with
a context discussing the Jacob’s ladder reference of 1:51 and specifically in reference to 3:13, 
Barrett notes, “The par adox of tlie Son of man is that even when on earth he is in heaven; lire 
inytlrical - or historical - descent and ascent is of such a kind that effectively tlie Son of man is in botli 
places at once: the top and tlie bottom of the ladder.” C. K. Barrett, “Paradox and Dualism,” in Essays 
on John (London: SPCK, 1982) 110-111.
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consummate grace, Jesus refuses to allow the mere provision of wine to upstage the 
greater wonder of the wedding. The remarks of the master of the banquet to the 
bridegroom are as sincere as they are naive; the reader looks on, as the servants do, 
with wonder and delight. By restoring the wine, Jesus reaches into that highest part of 
human life and transforms it in a way that slips by so easily unnoticed. The wine is 
water transformed without fermentation and decay and recalls by contrast another 
product of another fruit, one that rotted in the hands of Adam and Eve. The presence 
and actions of Jesus at the Wedding at Cana, an idealized but still flawed event, 
suggests an Edenic world, flawed, but restorable at the hands of Jesus.
In the wedding at Cana, the path between heaven and earth is at its smoothest, 
the link between the two being as seamless as possible. When the incident is subjected 
to the rigors of interpretation and analysis, it is hard to say exactly when the details of 
the wedding and miracle as historical event end and theological interpretation begins. 
The six stone water jars function as containers near at hand and at the same time, 
because they are used by the Jews for ceremonial washing , speak of the transformation 
and fullness of Christ in comparison to the law and possibly of creation’s six days as 
well. In the manner of romance, the objects, like the event, are at once concretely real 
and metaphorically and theologically real. In such a context, the meanings of objects, 
words, and events expands into a greater range of possibilities and associations 
coinciding with the Johannine propensity for double meaning. The wedding at Cana 
functions as a kind of living hermeneutic paradigm for what follows and sets a tone of 
grace and innocence.
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Ftye notes that romance has a “perennially childlike quality...marked by its 
extraordinarily persistent nostalgia, its search for some kind of imaginative golden age 
in time or space.Significantly, the wedding at Cana occurs at the start of the 
Gospel, rather than the end as is typical for the placement of weddings in comedy.'^  ^ In 
so doing the wedding fonctions as a proto-eschatological event, an idealized situation 
or realized romance, a standard from which the rest of the Gospel must inevitably 
depart analogous in romance to the idealized or noble situation set over against its evil 
or demonic p a r o d y . I f  romance is about the ideal, there must be some vision of what 
that consists of. The wedding at Cana grounds the ideal in real space and time, an 
eschatological here and now made so by the presence of Jesus. The marvelous is 
possible, even probable now that Jesus is here.
Significantly, then, temple cleansing follows the wedding at Cana. Here the 
world of romance or the integrated world infosed with the ideal is juxtaposed against 
the world of r ea l ism ,a  world of the here and now devoid of reference to transcendent 
values. As temporal and spatial tokens of the presence of God on earth, the temple and 
its environs at Passover time should by poetic logic continue the sense of the marvelous 
and ideal as the social emphasis of the Wedding at Cana moves to the religious
¥xyQ, Anatomy, 186. Compare, for example, the Edenic atmosphere opening Radcliffe’s Udolpho. 
Stibbe notes this featme, but passes by its association with romance. Stibbe also notes the 
eschatological aspects of miracle. Stibbe, John’s Gospel, 67. cf. Francesca Murphy, The Comedy of 
Revelation: Paradise Lost and Regained in Biblical Narrative (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000) 231. 
''^Fiye, A Natural Perspective: The Development o f Shakespearean Comedy and Romance (San 
Diego, New York, and London: Harcourt Brace Javanovich, 1965) 110.
Richard Bauckham intreprets tlie demonstration in the temple as being directed against tlie 
commercial and explottitive nature of tlie financial apparatus comiected with temple worship; in other 
words Jesus’ actions are directed against realism in its oppressive and exploitative aspects. Bauckham, 
“Jesus’ Denioiistiation in tlie Temple,” in Barnabas Lindars, ed.. Law and Religion: Essays on the 
Place o f the Law in Israel and Early Christianity (Cambridge, James Clarke, 1988) 72-89.
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emphasis of the temple. But Jesus finds the temple courts filled with the trappings of 
realism, “men selling cattle, sheep and doves, and others sitting at tables exchanging 
money.” (2:14). The construction of a whip replaces the creation of wine, judgment 
replaces celebration, mayhem casts out the marvelous. The ideal suggested by a 
wedding gives way to the realistic demands of money, markets, and merchandise. The 
narration of the wedding at Cana incident consists primarily of dialogue or prose 
describing human social interaction, a feature that lends a certain distance from the real 
world. In contrast, the temple cleansing is immersed in realism in all its sights, smells 
and objects; a whip, sheep, cattle, coins, tables, men, confusion, overturning, and 
shouting. The unseen and appreciated miracle of the wine gives way to conspicuous 
confrontation and public judgment. When Jesus says, “Get these out of here! How 
dare you turn my Father’s house into a market!” (2:16) he asserts the romance-like 
primacy of the holy and wonder-full over against the too easily accommodated 
demands of the worldly.
The Jews demand a sign, a miraculous wanant to prove his authority for these 
actions.(2:18) Superficially, the Jews seem to be allowing that he may be a prophet, 
but the request for a miracle has an unbelieving, realistic ring to it. Jesus refuses the 
spirit of the request while he grants the substance of it, saying “Destroy this temple and 
I will raise it again in three days.” (2:19) The literalness of their response exposes a 
wrong kind of thinking, one excessively concerned with reaUstic detail rather than
A similar progression is seen in Luke, where the prophecy, human interaction, poetiy and idyllic joy 
of chapter one give way the hard impersonal realism of taxes, Romans, governors, travel, mangers, 
inns witli no room, and ill timed birtlis in 2:1-7. The account of tlie angels and shepherds tliat follows 
re-establishes tlie idyllic tone and tlie presence of the marvelous.
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spiritual tmth. Yet Jesus is uttering a truth as much real as it is spiritual, that in the 
destmction and resurrection of his body he will replace the temple. By missing the 
point, the Jews exhibit, fairly innocently at this point, a propensity for realism over 
against the freer association of romance.
Rather than being an innovation, the mixture of romance and realism is a
standard feature of OT narrative and characteristic of the Bible as a whole. Ryken
notes, “These stories are both factually realistic and romantically marvelous. They
bring together two impulses that the human race is always trying to join- reason and
imagination, fact and mystery.”^^  Rather than being a characteristic to describe the
text, the emphasis on romance and realism makes a theological statement; that God is
resolutely and personally involved in his creation and in the lives of human beings and
that human beings should interpret their ordinary existence with reference to God. The
inclusion of the marvelous within the “real” and linking it with the activity of God, the
emphasis falls on the personal causality of God. As a general observation on the
ideological perspective of OT narrative, Auerbach comments,
The Bible’s [OT] claim to truth is not only far more urgent than Homer’s, 
it is tyrannical- it excludes all other claims. The world of the Scripture 
stories is not satisfied with claiming to be a historically true reality- it insists 
that it is the only real world, it is destined for autocracy.
The link between realism and romance in the OT is maintained by the ideological 
pressure of an all powerful God assumed by the text. The ideological pressure inherent
^^Leland Ryken, Words o f Delight: A Literary Introduction to the Bible, second ed.. (Grand Rapids: 
Baker, 1992) 39, cf. 35-41.
Erich Auerbach, The Representation o f Reality in Western Literature. (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1953) 14-15.
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in OT narrative finds expression in Jesus himself in the stoiy and discourse of the FG, 
the most narrative gospel The realism and romance held together by the presence of 
God in the OT finds its Johannine unity in Jesus who is both God and man making the 
Father known to the world. Viewed this way, Jesus is “the Word made flesh” in all its 
fullness. The potential for conflict as romance meets realism is obvious. To a great 
extent the FG is the world of realized romance in mortal conflict with the world of 
‘realism’ strictly defined.
Although unique by virtue of its subject matter, the FG’s clash of realism and 
romance is not unknown in world literature. The dynamic appears in Twain’s A 
Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court, and, to a lesser extent. Huckleberry Finn. 
In A Connecticut Yankee, the iconoclastic American realist Hank Morgan is transported 
by time machine to the world of King Arthur, a world Morgan views as absurd and in 
need of renovation through pragmatism and common sense. Huckleberry Finn displays 
romance and realism in tension as the realists Huck and Jim, successful escapees from 
the doomed wreckage of The Walter Scott, are juxtaposed against the failed romance 
of Tom Sawyer, the King and the Duke, and the Grangerford/ Shephardson feud. Like 
the FG, each in its own way manifests the values and norms of one age or way of 
thinking set against those of another.
Employing a similar tactic of juxtaposing the values of one age against another, 
Cervantes’ Don Quixote is the definitive clash between romance and realism. The 
errant knight Don Quixote, avid and unstable reader of Medieval romance, crosses the 
hostile boarder between fact and fiction and invades the modern world of realism with
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predictable results. In doing so, Don Quixote and Sancho Panza embody what Beer
calls “the two permanent and universal impulses of fiction.” '^^  Beer observes,
Quixote presents the imagination cut loose from the world of sense and 
observation, aspiring towards the ideal. This way leads to madness, and to 
the noble simplification and suggestiveness of myth. Sancho Panza is 
preoccupied with registering the everyday signs and accepting their 
authority. His robust life is practicable only in relation to ordinary 
satisfactions and achievements.^^
The basic dynamic of Don Quixote is the world of romance set in opposition to the 
world of realism, a clash seen in both Don Quixote’s relationship with Sancho and with 
his encounter with the actual world. In romance, the hero is the center of the world; 
Don Quixote is an eccentric.
In Don Quixote, A Connecticut Yankee, and Huckleberry Finn, romance and 
realism are set against each other with the preference going to realism. The tendency 
is generally toward polarization. Realism acts as a foil to the excesses of romance and 
the mood is generally comic. The comic tone prevails in large part because romance 
and realism are set over against each other, the distance between them providing a basis 
for conflicting frames of reference.
The FG and its presentation of Jesus represents a Don Quixote in reverse. In 
Don Quixote the world or realism is the standard by which the wandering knight of La 
Mancha is judged whereas in the FG Jesus is the norm, the true reality, against whom 
the world is judged. Jesus’ encounters with his foes are not Quixotic encounters of a
Gillian Beer, The Romance, Critical Idiom, #10 (London; Methuen & Co., 1970) 43.
^ i^bid., 43.
Reflecting the ages in which they live, Cervantes maintains the convention of a romance but sets it 
in a context of realism; Twain uses tlie more realistic convention of tlie novel and sets it in tlie world 
of romance.
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Beer, Romance, 42. 
""ibid., 43.
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misguided soul after the manner of a mistaken eschatological Jesus, but heroic 
encounters with real enemies who fail to understand or believe in him. In so doing, 
they, like Quixote, fail to understand things as they really are. Jesus extends and 
potentially makes plain reality in a fuller sense. Jesus does not represent, as Don 
Quixote does “the idealization of the self, the refusal to doubt inner experience, the 
tendency to base any interpretation of the world on personal will, imagination and 
desire, not upon an empirical and social consensus of exper ience ,but  acts on the 
will of the Father whom he represents in all His fullness. For Adam and Eve, in both 
Genesis and Paradise Lost, for the Redcrosse Knight in The Faerie Queene, and for 
characters in the FG, the “empirical and social consensus of experience” is a danger, an 
obstacle and impediment to faith, not the solution.
As representatives or the opposing tendencies of romance and realism, Don 
Quixote and Sancho Panza are necessary for each other. “They interpret the world for 
each other. They illustrate the interdependence of the impulse to imitate and the 
impulse to idealize.”^^  In Quixote and Panza these tendencies are at once juxtaposed 
arid symbiotic, but in a way that resembles how a blind person might combine resources 
with deaf person to interpret the world. In Jesus the tendencies unite, not iri a tepid 
middle ground, but in an embracing of both extremes. Jesus both embodies an ideal 
and is worthy of idealization but does so in a way that is subject to time, space, grief, 
thirst, and death, preventing abstraction and providing a basis on which he is to be 
imitated. The love of Jesus is not idealized for its own sake after the manner of courtly
and idealized love typical of Medieval romance, but manifested in concrete action in the 
service of others.
Romance and realism are partners always threatening to go their separate ways. 
Romance devoid of realism drifts off into an extrahistorical reality, an aesthetic 
treatment of values without practical purpose. The opposite is the realistic tendency 
to view life without reference to any meaningful values by which life transcends time 
and place. The FG displays these tendencies in the actions of those who surround Jesus. 
Adherence to realism without due attention to romance results in everything from 
misunderstanding to rejection and rebellion. Thus, Pilate represents the dawn and 
premature eclipse of romance in the face of realism. Pilate’s attempts to free Jesus are 
sincere and moving toward true heroism, but flawed, incomplete and ultimately tragic. 
The Jews represent the static qualities of realism who resort to employing realistic 
means for realistic ends. Adherence to romance without due attention to the demands 
of realism results in misunderstanding and folly, as is the case with Peter, a comic figure 
who displays what is essentially over-realized romance, or romance without reference 
to Jesus’ ideals of humility, service, and sacrifice. Jesus transcends the differences 
between realism and romance by uniting the ideals of one with the praxis of the other, 
when washing the disciple’s feet or supremely in the Passion.
Mastery of realism and romance in FG allows a full range of humanity to be 
displayed which at the same time allows for a kind of living theology. Auerbach, 
writes, “It was the story of Christ, with its ruthless mixture of everyday reality and the
Auerbach, Mimesis, 138-142.
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highest and most sublime tragedy, wliich had conquered the classical rule of styles.”®^ 
Similarly, Smith obsei*ves, “It is the genius of the Fourth Evangelist to have created a 
gospel in which Jesus as the representative of the world above visits and really lives in 
this world without depriving it of its verisimilitude and without depriving life here of its 
seriousness.” The FG presents the real as the universal and the universal as the real.
Ultimately, in the FG there is no distance between the world of romance and 
realism or between the ideal and the real in so far as this concerns Jesus himself. Jesus 
refuses to be accepted on any terms other than what he himself claims to be. Jesus 
claims do not allow for either/or as much as they demand both/and. The conceptual and 
literary challenge for the FG is to hold these opposites of romance and realism in 
tension. The solution, and paradoxically the problem, is found in the subject matter of 
the FG; the person of Jesus Clirist, the incarnate logos, both God and man. The 
prologue is at pains to include both aspects. Jesus is thus simultaneously both a figure 
of romance and realism in one person wherein these qualities are not in tension, as in 
Prospero whose powers are external to himself, but in perfect unity. Typically in 
romance, the hero stmggles to maintain an ideal in a fallen world and in this respect the 
FG is no exception. But in the theology of the FG, the struggle is more of a fallen 
world refusing to accept an ideal, and, indeed, lacking the proper mode of thinking or 
fi'ame of reference within which Jesus must be understood.
^ ibid., 555. For Auerbach, the stoiy of Jesus as portrayed in the gospels formed a kind of base line of 
comparison fox Mimesis.
D. Moody Smith, “The Presentation of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel, Interpretation, 1977 XXXI #4 
367-378.
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B) PLOT AND STORY IN ROMANCE
E. M. Forster makes a valuable distinction between stoiy and plot, teims often 
used interchangeably. Forster divides life into two spheres, the life of time and the life 
of value. For Forster, story primarily has to do with events happening in a sequence of 
time and thus relates mostly to the life of time. As such, Forster has a low opinion of 
stoiy (“this low atavistic fbrm”^^  ) for its own sake and notes, “It [story] runs like a 
backbone- or may I say a tape-worm, for its beginning and end are a r b i t r a r y .T h e  
appeal of story lies in curiosity and suspense, a natural desire to find out what happens 
next. Forster enlists Walter Scott for a whipping boy.
Plot, on the other hand, is also a narrative of events but the emphasis falls on 
causality.Forster offers these famous examples, “The king died and then the queen 
died” is a story while “The king died and then the queen died of grief’ is a plot.^  ^ Both 
manifest a time sequence, but in the latter a sense of causality and value transcend the 
temporal sequence. Forster observes, “It is in a story we say ‘and then?’ It is in a plot 
we ask ‘why?’ That is the fundamental difference between these two aspects of the 
n o v e l .F o r s t e r  holds that the two primary elements demanded and assumed by a 
plot are intelligence and m em o ry .T h e  former moves beyond simple curiosity and 
fosters mystery by raising the question “why.” The latter permits connections to be
Forster, Aspects o f the Novel (London: Edward Arnold, 1927) 27. 
''"ibid., 28.
""ibid., 82.
""ibid., 82
""ibid., 83. This distinction transcends the novel.
""ibid., 83.
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made with previous events. While Forster is essentially correct, intelligence and 
memory of a certain type can also function as barriers to understanding.
Forster’s distinction is not without its detractors^^ but remains helpful, if 
slightly ambiguous. If plot and story are seen as tendencies on a continuum and not as 
complete opposites, romance tends to an emphasis on story rather than plot. For 
example, the episodic structure of The Odyssey tends much more toward story than to 
plot. This relates to Auerbach’s famous claim that Homer tends to narrative 
“foregrounding,”^^  a style that does not prompt the question “why?” Shakespeare’s 
Pericles is very much a series of incidents often linked together by the convention of 
the storyteller, although its primary coherence rests on the fact that it is the story of one 
man. Melville’s Moôy Dick, is a simple narrative with often little or no causal 
connection between sections, some of which are purely descriptive and can hardly be 
termed even minimally as incident. The coherence o îMoby Dick and similar works 
rests on its overall success at transfiguring the characters, incidents, and description by 
ideological or thematic pressure.
An emphasis on story rather than plot lends to romance an expansiveness and 
inclusiveness not obtainable when the emphasis falls more on plot. An emphasis on 
plot leads to a corresponding emphasis of causality, self coherence, and a casting off all 
surplus baggage. As Forster notes, “Unlike the weaver of plots, the story teller profits
""Elizabeth Dipple, Plot (Critical Idiom, London; Muthen & Co, 1970).
"'’Auerbach, “Odysseus’ Scar,” chapter 1 h\Mimesis, 3-23.
Moby Dick has met mixed critical success, viewed by some as bombastic, as if the only thing 
swelling tlie sails of tlie Peqiiod were tlie huffing and puffing of Melville himself. Others see Moby 
Dick as tlie great American novel. Forster himself offers a positive assessment of Moby Dick under 
tlie categoiy of what he terms “prophecy”, a work tliat stretches reality and says something beyond 
itself. AJoby Dick illustrates tlie risk inherent to such narratives.
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by ragged ends.”^^  If a story is being told rather than a plot developed, there is ample 
opportunity to pause, take side trips, examine the scenery, make speeches- activities 
less permissible when plot is of primary concern. Likewise, for example, in Cliges, a 
12th century romance by Chretien de Troyes, the story is interrupted, or slowed to a 
crawl, to explore the dynamics of being in love.^  ^ A general tendency of the novel as 
opposed to the romance is a tendency toward a kind of self contained organic 
completeness.^^
In manifesting the characteristics of this type of story, the FG offers a series of 
incidents and stops along the way and expands on this or that aspect. In analyzing the 
FG, Hitchcock follows Aristotle’s Poetics and reads the FG as a drama '^* and in doing 
so fails to account for the FG’s naixative diversity. Windsch rightly rejects reading the 
FG as drama in favor of focusing on certain incidents as drama within a loosely 
structured dramatic whole.Acknowledging a diversity, Windsch proposes three 
major classifications of dramatic narrative; ( 1) the broadly elaborated, dramatically 
presented narratives (the healing of the man born blind, the raising of Lazams); (2) a 
connection between narrative and dispute discourse (the healing of the lame man in
Referring to Scott, Forster observes, “He need not hammer away ail the time at cause and effect.” 
Forster, Aspects, 34.
Vinaver notes the presence of explanation in romance as found in Cliges as a key development as 
compared to the pericope like format of the earlier Song o f Roland. Eugene Vinaver, Rise o f 
Romance, 15-32. A comparison with tlie Synoptic’s relationship to John is interesting.
“But in a Novel, a combination of incidents, entertaining in tliemselves, are made to form a whole; 
and an unnecessary circumstance becomes a blemish, by detaching from tlie simplicity wliich is 
requisite to exliibit that whole to advantage. Thomas Holcroft, Preface to Alwyn: or the Gentleman 
Comedian (1780) in Miriam Allott Novelists on the Novel (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1959) 
46-47.
""F. R. M. Hitchcock, “Is the Fourth Gospel A Drama,” Theology 7 (1923), 307-17; reprinted in Mark 
Stibbe, ed.. The Gospel o f John as Literature: An Anthology o f Twentieth-Century Perspectives 
(Leiden, New York, Koln: E. J. Brill, 1993) 15-24.
Hans Windsch, “John’s Narrative Style,” in Stibbe, Anthology, 25-64.
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chapter five); and (3) the sequence of individual scenes that belong together (the
Baptist narratives and the calling of the first disciples in chapter one). Like Windsch,
Stibbe rightly rejects attempts to read the FG as drama in favor of reading the FG as
dram at ic .But  this distinction has little to do with problems caused by reading the FG
as drama in the sense of it being like actors on a stage, as Stibbe supposes in making his
criticism. Rather, the real issue behind the supei’ficial issue of drama vs. the dramatic is
the emphasis on the nature of causality inherent in plot and drama as opposed to that
emphasized in story.^^
The emphasis on story over plot in romance and the FG is much more than an
empirical fact and much more than a quality that allows for inclusiveness, however
important these qualities are important in themselves. By lessening the emphasis on
causality, the story is much more able to allow and create a state of marvel and wonder
and open the doors to the ideal and transcendent. Beer obseiwes.
One method of disengaging us from our ordinary assumptions is the swift 
smooth elision from adventure to adventure. The lack of causal links is 
again typical of much oral literature or literature based on an oral tradition.
What matters artistically, however, is the range of effects which the 
romance writers create by such means,^*
For example, in Shakespeare’s Pericles there are often no causal links between 
scenes.^  ^ There is no causal transition at all to link Pericles’ arrival at Tharsus with
Stibbe, “Introduction,” Anthology, 8.
Forster observes, “The plot is exciting and may be beautiful, yet is it not a fetish, borrowed from 
drama, from the spatial limitations of the stage? Cannot fiction devise a framework tliat is not so 
logical yet more suitable to its geniusT Aspects, 92-93. Similarly, for Frye, “The essential element of 
plot in romance is adventure, which means tliat romance is naturally a sequential and processional 
form, hence we know it better from fiction than from drama. Frye, Anatomy, 186.
Beer, Romance, 28 
Dean, Wanderers, 234-238.
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ship of wheat for famine relief with anything that proceeded it. Rather, it serves as 
emotional relief from previous depressing scenes and enhances the reputation of 
Pericles. To Cleon, Dionyza, their subjects in Tharsus, and to the viewer, the arrival of 
the grain is completely unexpected and tmly marvelous. With few exceptions, the 
events of the FG proceed in chronicle fashion as if uncaused by previous events, at least 
insofar as Jesus himself is concerned. Why does Jesus go to the wedding (2:1), or up 
to Jerusalem (2:13), or to the Judean Countiyside (3:22), or to Galilee (4:43), or to 
Cana again (4:46) or up to Jemsalem (5:1)' etc.?^ We are not told. On simply 
reading through the FG the effect is striking. We are only told that he went, the 
implication being he went because he chose to. Throughout the FG, Jesus determines 
his own destiny and, although he avoids the Jews (7:1) he continues to confront them 
and places himself at the disposal of the Jews only on his own terms at his own time. 
Only in the events of the passion week does Jesus significantly enter into the causal 
matrix of circumstances, but even there he maintains control, is steadfast to his mission 
(18:11) and asserts his control over the trial e v e n t s . (19:11) True to form, the FG 
closes with its greatest causal aporia, the status of chapter 21 with respect to chapter 
20 and the rest of the gospel. In romance, however inviting the source critical
The incident of the Samaritan woman is only superficially an exception; Jesus “had to go through 
Samaria” and this counts as a reason, but it is a reason linked to Jesus’ choice and contraiy to cultural 
expectation.
Stibbe speaks of much the same thing in his discussions of Jesus as tlie elusive Christ. John’s 
Gospel, 5-31; “The Elusive Christ: A New Reading of the Fourth Gospel,” Anthology, 231-247.
Stibbe also discusses the causal aspects of John’s plot, but has in mind sometliing like the progression 
or stages in tlie development of the story, see John's Gospel, 35-36.
“Jesus does nothing, and nothing happens to him, by chance; and this is nowhere more evident than 
in the accoimt of his death, whether in the passion nai rative proper of in the mtmy references and 
allusions to it tluoughout tlie Gospel. ...Jesus’ own fixity of purpose is contrasted, probably quite 
deliberately, witli Pilate’s uncertainty.” D. Moody Sniitli, “Presentation,” 371.
see chapter four below.
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chasms, they are perhaps better bridged through imagination than explored by some 
other means.
Marvel and wonder happen best when, like the laws of nature, the laws of 
causality inherent in plot are lessened or absent. Links between events can be 
suggestive, imaginative, or thematic rather than being defined and supplied for the 
reader by means of plot. Breaking free of the iron laws of causality is analogous to the 
suspension of the laws of realism, marvelous adventures, angels, fairies, gods, and the 
like being the result. A heavy plot in a closed world is the enemy of wonder, as any 
reader of Hardy’s later novels soon discovers. Equally tme, wonder is the enemy of a 
heavy plot. Tragedy, with its emphasis on plot, leaves little room for the wondeiful. 
The marvelous, and the would be marvelous, those tragic heroes, die with their ideals 
on the twin edges of causality and plot.
Suspending or lessening causality allows the mai*velous and wonderfiil in 
romance and grants something like a state of grace. Indeed, the connection between a 
state of grace and the severing of causality claims theological warrant from the New 
Testament where, supremely, the resurrection breaks the causal authority of death 
itself. On this basis the work of Christ breaks the causal link between sin and death and 
allows the believer to live in a state of grace in which the causal authority of the past is 
broken. Memory, the past, and an intelligence too occupied with the quality of “why”,
Wayne Meeks comments “The major literary problem of John is its combination of remarkable 
stylistic unity and tliematic coherence witli glaringly bad transitions between episodes at many points. 
The countless displacement, source, and redaction theories that litter tlie graveyards of Johannine 
research are voluble testimony to tliis difficulty.” Meeks, “The Man from Heaven in Johamiine 
Sectarimiism,” JBL 91 (1972) 48. The inteipretation of “tlie glaringly bad tiansitions between 
episodes” may be a kind of tiap for the uiiwaiy or hermeutical test; whetlier to intrepret tlieiii 
according to the demands of realism (source criticism) or romance. Prehaps not coincidentally, source 
criticism has preoccupied botli Johamiine scholars and scholars of Medieval romance.
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elements so important to Forster’s analysis of plot, no longer apply. Grace and 
forgiveness reduce the authority of the past and allow “why” to take on a marvelous 
quality free from the kind of “why” fraught with potential negative obsession. In 
romance, “why” becomes “it is.” One enters the state of grace in romance by a step of 
faith wherein things are allowed to relate to each other outside the bounds of strict 
linear causality. Romance, then, has its own form of logic or mode of thought.
In romance, the lessening or suspension of causality is an accomplished fact, 
whereas in comedy it is potential and occurs at or near the end as some sort of 
integration is achieved. In comedy the suspension of causality can be confined to 
something that is technically or realistically possible, as is typical of Austin, or can 
involve all manner of implausible solutions, faiiy god mothers and the like. In the FG, 
the most basic of causal sequences in life, death, is suspended in the end, as might be 
expected in comedy. But in the FG the other basic causal sequence of life, birth, is 
likewise suspended. Jesus, the Word, is already in the world as the Word made flesh, 
poetically and theologically unborn, begotten not made, and fully realized in a way not 
linked with the progression of birth and childhood. The “how” of earthly birth is not 
important. It is significant primarily for its non-occurrence at the beginning. The 
converse of this is that spiritual birth is possible, indeed necessaiy, without reference to 
previous events.
The link between scenes or adventures in romance is both personal and thematic 
related to an ideal. And since it is personal it is related to the ideal held by the hero and 
on this basis the links between scenes are vertical and personal- which in romance are
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one and the same.^  ^ The question “why?” in relation to some sort of linear causality is 
inappropriate and some other “answer” is waiting to be discovered, an answer that is 
on its own terms self evident. The ideal is self evident; a causal answer on any other 
terms is incorrect. For the knight in battle or for the chivalrous lover, no explanation is 
necessary; the presence of the ideal is assumed and is justified on its own teims.
In a discussion of causality and typology in The Great Code, Frye notes, 
“Causality, however, is based on reason, observation, and knowledge, and therefore 
relates fundamentally to the past, on the principle that the past is all that we genuinely 
or systematically know. Typology relates to the future, and consequently relates 
primarily to faith, hope, and vision.”^^  Further, causality is based on or has to do with 
locating the causes and effects on the same temporal plane. For example, “Ascribing a 
disease to the will of God or to the malice of a witch is not causal thinking.” To a 
large extent The Great Code is an attempt to attribute the content and production of 
the Bible, including its typology, entirely to causation in one sphere, i.e. historical, 
social, cultural, factors, etc. But, with reference to its own specific purposes, limitation 
of causation to one sphere is precisely the type of thinking the FG seeks to overcome 
by virtue of incarnational theology. In the FG and in romance, existence or causality in 
one sphere has a relationship to another; water can become wine, the lame are healed, 
dead men rise, Jesus replaces the temple, Jesus works because his Father is working
Culpepper states, “The plot of the gospel is propelled by conflict between belief and unbelief as 
responses to Jesus.” Anatomy, 97. Disregarding the issue of plot/stoiy, Culpepper’s point is not quite 
correct. By initiating the challenge to believe, Jesus propells the story of tlie FG.
""Frye, The Great Code: The Bible and Literature (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982) 82. 
""ibid., 82.
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and, most importantly in the FG, believing grants life/^ (20:31) On the FG’s
conception of things Davies writes,
The Fourth gospel differs from modern histories in one major respect. By 
beginning with the Creator God’s plan for creation, and telling the story of 
Jesus as the most significant contribution to that plan, it not only notices 
the effect of this belief on people within the story, but asserts that God is 
the first cause of all things. The Creator God causes the world and history 
to come into existence and gives eternal life to those people who conform 
to the divine conception of human life. Compared to this primaiy cause, 
the social, economic and political power stmctures play a less significant 
role.^ ^
A different kind of causality, if it can be called that, is in order, one in which “the Son 
can do nothing by himself; he can do only what he sees his Father doing, because 
whatever the Father does the Son also does.” (5:19) Rooted in the Word as creator, 
this kind of “causality” is based God’s present involvement in the world in Jesus Christ 
and on an interpersonal/ inter-Trinitarian relationship manifest in space and time.
In his classic defense of Christianity, Orthodoxy, G. K. Chesterton makes a 
similar point regarding causality. For the materialist, or the madman, (the two are 
synonymous for Chesterton), there is only one form of explanation available, that of a 
strict causal progression.^*  ^ But for Chesterton this is a dangerous limitation, what he 
calls “the clean and well lit prison of one idea.” He observes,
“With the miracles, as witli other elements of tlie tradition, John has seized the Christological 
interpretation wliich is implicit in tlie Synoptics, clarified it and stamped it upon tlie material in such a 
way tliat tlie reader is not allowed to escape it The miracles of tliis Gospel are a function of its 
Christology. Rightly to understand them is to apprehend Cluist by faith (10:38,14:11). The miracles 
once grasped in tlieir tme meaning lead inuiiediately to tlie Christology, since tliey are a manifestation 
of tlie glory of Christ (2:11).” C. K. Barrett, The Gospel According to John: An Introduction with 
Commentary and Notes on the Greek Text (London: SPCK, 1978) 75.
"'’MargaretDavies, Rhetoric, 59.
G. K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy (London: John Lane, 1909) 40. In large measure, Chesterton argues 
tlie case for Christianity by debunking a world view, frame of reference, or mode of tliinking based on 
realism in favor of one based more on imagination and association akin to romance.
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But scientific men do muddle their heads, until they imagine a necessary 
mental connection between an apple leaving he tree and apple reaching the 
ground. They do really talk as if they had found not only a set of 
marvelous facts, but a truth connecting those facts. They do talk as if the 
connection of two strange things physically connected them 
philosophically.^^
They talked as if the fact that trees bear fruit were just as necessary as the 
fact that two and one trees make three. But it is not.^^
For Chesterton, the connection between trees and fruit or between the apple falling and 
hitting the ground is not based on a law, but based upon a continuous, willfiil act of 
God. He notes, “The repetition in Nature may not be a mere recurrence; it may be a 
theatrical encore. T h e  mistake for the materialist is to süppose that a law posited on 
the basis of repetition becomes a law posited as the basis of repetition. '^  ^ The world 
continues at the pleasure of God and therefore it is a place where the marvelous might 
well be expected because its essential everyday continuation is an ongoing marvelous 
act in itself.
Analogous to the embodiment of an ideal in romance, in the FG the willful act 
of God ceases to be an unseen principle and becomes concrete and specific in Jesus 
Christ. A kind of conflict appears in the gospel which might be characterized after the 
manner of Kuhn as conflicting paradigms of interpretation. Kuhn’s remarks with
ibid., 90.
" i^bid., 88, his emphasis.
^ ibid., 107, his emphasis. Richard Swinburne has developed a defense of the teleological argument 
along similai lines, see, “The Argument from Design,” in Philosophy 43,1968, reprinted m.Readings 
in the Philosophy o f Religion: An Analytic Approach, second edition, ed. Baruch Brody (Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1992) 189-201.
In a similar way, Kuhn states, “Given the slightest reason for doing so, the man who reads a science 
text can easily take (lie applications to be tlie evidence for the tlieory, the reasons why it ought to be 
believed.” Thomas Kulin, The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions, seconded. (Chicago: The 
University of Cliicago Press, 1970) 80.
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regard to science are appropriate here; “The proponents of competing paradigms are 
always at least slightly at cross-purposes. Neither side will grant all the non-empirical 
assumptions that the other needs in order to make its case.”^^  To the extent that 
romance and epic are, as Frye remarks about epic, “the stoiy of all things,” *^’ other 
stories or paradigms are incompatible. Romance and the FG simultaneously assume 
and educate in the right paradigm that is for them self evident.^  ^ This is the kind of 
conflict that marks much of Jesus’ conflicts in the FG, especially the tenacious 
opposition of the Jews. For the Jews, the law and Moses have become causal factors 
sufficient unto themselves without due reference to the action of God. Jesus informs 
the Jews, “[I]t is not Moses who has given you the bread from heaven, but is my Father 
who gives you the true bread from heaven.” (6:32) The Jews fail to grant the required 
assumption such that the one who said, “I am the bread that came down from heaven” 
will intractably remain “Jesus, the son of Joseph, whose father and mother we know.” 
(6:42) A related dynamic is present when Jesus informs Pilate, “You have no power 
over me that was not given to you from above.” Jesus being glorified through the 
passion and cross certainly finds no basis within contemporary views of crucifixion.
'’"ibid., 148.
Northrop Fiye, “The Story of All Things,” in The Return of Eden: Five Essays on Milton’s Epics 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965) 3-31. Reprinted in. Paradise Lost: An Authoritative Text 
Backgrounds and Sources Criticism, ed. Scott Elledge (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1975) 
405-422.
In a similar way, Stanley Fish argues that tlie “argument” of Paradise Lost, or Milton’s attempt to 
“Justify the ways of God to man ” is not a argument in the conventional sense. Rallier it is llie 
education of tlie reader’s perceptions such tliat the line of tliought assumed in tlie work, tlie argument, 
will be come to be accepted. See Stanley Fish, Surprised by Sin: The Reader in Paradise Lost, second 
edition. (Hoimdmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, and London: Macmillan, 1997); “Discovery as Form in 
Paradise Lost,’' in same 340-356.
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Point of view with regard to Jesus and scope and limits of perception are of paramount 
importance in the FG.
C) CHARACTERS IN ROMANCE
C.l IDENTITY AND SELF DETERMINATION
While the story of the FG is closest to the archetype of romance, it differs from 
romance and defines itself with emphasis on certain key themes, notably on character 
type. Frye divides characters of all literature into five types that are each characteristic 
of an archetype;^^ 1) if the hero is superior in kind and environment to others, the story 
will be a myth, or stoiy about a god; 2) if superior in degree to other characters and his 
environment, the hero will be typical of romance, wherein the human hero moves in a 
world of slightly suspended natural laws; 3) if superior in degree to others in terms of 
authority, passions, and expression but not to his natural environment and subject to 
the order of nature, the hero will be typical of tragedy and most epic; 4) if superior 
neither to others nor to his environment, the hero is of common humanity and typical of 
comedy and realistic fiction; and 5) if inferior in power or intelligence to ourselves 
resulting in a sense of looking down on a scene of bondage, ignorance, or frustration, 
then the hero belongs to the ironic mode. Of present concern is the distinction between 
myth and romance, which Frye summarizes, “We have distinguished myth from 
romance by the hero’s power of action: in the myth proper he is divine, in the romance 
proper he is human,
Anatomy, 33-34. 
'’"ibid., 188.
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The hero’s power of action is fundamental to romance. If the hero is to be free 
and possess the power to act in the sense Fiye has in mind, then the hero must be free 
from being primarily determined by the exigencies of causality and realism in the sense 
argued above. Freedom from linear causality is not to be free from the principle of 
causality in general. Rather the type of causality in romance is personal causality, 
freedom to determine one’s own destiny in the midst of circumstance and to transcend 
those circumstances by adherence to an ideal. In romance, the knight does not meet 
the enemy to defend himself; he meets the enemy because he is brave. The former 
locates motivation in external cause and effect; the latter within one’s own self and 
one’s adherence to an ideal or belief.
In romance the hero’s actions are bound up with a character’s being what he or
she is that excludes acting in any other way. There is something like a necessary
connection between identity and action so that, whatever the external circumstances,
the hero cannot but act in accordance with certain character defining ideals and beliefs.
Ideals and character are one and the same. Auerbach notes.
Except feats of arms and love, nothing can occur in the courtly world- and 
even these two are of a special sort: they are not occurrences or emotions 
which can be absent for a time; they are permanently connected with the 
person of the perfect knight, they are part of his definition, so that he 
cannot for one moment be without adventure in arms nor for one moment 
be without amorous entanglements. If he could, he would lose himself and 
no longer be a knight.
While the knight meets the enemy because he is brave, his bravery does not allow him 
to do otherwise. Doubt and duplicity are excluded. While the ideal in a particular
Auerbach, Mimesis, 140.
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romance may vary, the principle remains substantially the same; to be untrue to the 
ideal is to be false to one’s self. Jesus, who does what the Father does (5:19), must 
drink the cup given to him; he, like Luther, can do no other.
In contrast, in comedy and tragedy, some tension producing distance always 
exists between the self with its ideals and its surroundings, a tension inevitably leading 
to tension within the self. For example, in Oedipus the King, Oedipus’ character 
requires him to get to the bottom of things and destroys him in doing so. In romance, 
the source of the conflict is not grounded in the protagonist’s stmggle with the self 
coming to terms with one’s surroundings, rather the stmggle is to successfully maintain 
the self and an ideal against the onslaught of circumstances. The conflict in romance is 
thus between the integrated and good world of the hero and the values he/she assumes 
and represents as over against a world of chaos, evil, and darkness, a struggle Fiye 
casts in terms of descent into a lower world followed by an ascent to a higher world.
To depart from the ideal is to destroy the self, call the ideal into question and align 
one’s self with the lower world.
The integrity of the self with one’s actions may be seen, for example, in the 
Medieval French epic The Song o f Roland. The Judas-like treacheiy of Ganelon places 
the hero Roland in a Saracen ambush. Outnumbered, Roland’s companion Oliver 
repeatedly urges Roland to blow the horn and summon help from Charlemagne and his 
army some distance ahead. Roland refuses, saying ‘That would be an act of 
folly,” citing as reasons, the loss of his good name, the reproach to his kinsmen, the
This is a central theme of Fiye’s Secular Scriptures.
The Song o f Roland, translated with an introduction and notes by Glyn Burgess (London: Penguin, 
1990) stanza 83, line 1053.
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reputation of France, and a desire to strike blows against the pagans/®^ Implicitly, the 
honor and reputation of Christianity is at stake. Following these interchanges, the poet 
writes, “Roland is brave and Oliver is wise; both are marvelous vassals.” Roland’s 
bravery is incompatible with the wisdom of Oliver and may seem foolhardy to readers 
not sharing those values. But Roland’s judgment on Oliver’s advice as folly is 
significant. While Roland and Oliver do not share the same point of view, each is true 
to his own values and this matters most of all. And, given the ethos of the poem, the 
antithetical nature of their respective values to which they remain loyal actually 
enhances their stature as heroes rather than calling their respective positions into 
question. Roland dies, but in maintaining bravery in a hopeless situation, he is not only 
loyal to his ideals and those of his society, but in doing so also determines his own 
destiny.
In another variation on presei*ving one’s self in bad circumstances, in 
Shakespeare’s Pericles, pirates capture Pericles’ daughter Marina and sell her into 
slavery in a brothel. But by asserting the rightness of her cause, a cause at one with her 
character, she shames her captors, preserves her virtue, works something of a 
transforming effect on those around her, and vindicates the protection of the gods. The 
threatened virgin convention common to romance (analogous to Penelope’s situation in 
Tlie Odyssey) is not so much an obsession with chastity as it is in essence a test of the 
survival of the self with one’s integrity intact. Frye observes, “What is symbolized as a 
virgin is actually a human conviction, however expressed, that there is something at the
stanzas 83-86. 
ibid., stanza 87, lines 1093-94.
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core of one’s infinitely fragile being which is not only immortal but has discovered the 
secret of invulnerability that eludes the tragic hero.” ”^^  In the cases of Marina and 
Roland, both preserve themselves in the midst of circumstances, however different 
those circumstances and outcomes may be. In the FG, Jesus’ struggle is to display and 
preserve his identity as the incarnate logos, however much others attempt to define him 
on other terms. In comedy and tragedy, the protagonist experiences a change, for 
better or worse, of self and circumstance.
In romance the lessening of linear causality as expressed in plot allows for an 
imaginative space for the hero to rise to prominence. Conversely, the rise of the hero 
suspends linear causality, as is the case with the alteration of Marina’s destiny. The 
hero acting on an ideal is the source and unity of the action, but only to a point. The 
hero cannot always fashion events and must often endure them, but does so under the 
eyes of an implicit or explicit divine providence on the terms of which the worthy will 
be successfial, good will triumph, and evil punished. The choice of Aithur is cast in 
terms of divine approval as evidenced by his removal of the sword and subsequent 
events. The copious victories of the invincible knight depend upon the same principle as 
do the successes of Odysseus.
In a study of Shakespeare’s romances in terms of their own place and time and 
Shakespeare’s development as an author, Mincoff argues that Shakespeare’s turn to 
romance represents, at least in part, something of a reaction against a decline in faith 
characteristic of his age.^^^
’®^Fiye, Secular Scripture, 86.
Marco Mincoff, Things Supernatural and Causeless: Shakespearean Romance (London; and 
Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1992). The title is significant and is taken from Ltifeu in A ll’s
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Since in turning to romance Shakespeare did lay considerable stress on 
“things supernatural and causeless” it thus seems probable that this was a 
least one of the things that attracted him to the genre. Moreover, it seems 
he was definitely interested in suggesting that the strange happenings and 
coincidences one may so easily attribute to a blind fortune are in fact part 
of a wider scheme of things. It is done very tactfully; we are generally led 
to believe not so much in chance as in human causation throughout the 
body of the play, and it is only at a single point in the action, mostly at the 
very end that the interest of superior powers in things human is made 
manifest, and with it the obvious suggestion that what we have taken for 
chance is after all something more than that. Only in The Tempest are we 
faced with the definitely marvelous as a part of the action itself, and there it 
is a question of magic, not of divine interference.^”^
Whatever the merits of Mincoff s qualified and cautious linking of Shakespeare’s use of 
romance to an attempt on Shakespeare’s part to assert something of his own point of 
view in his own day, a point debated in Shakespearean scholarship, Mincoff rightly 
highlights the link between romance and divine providence. In a kind of dance between 
heaven and earth, chance encounters and miscellaneous adventures find a thematic 
unity, as the preservation of Marina in the brothel shows, that is as much related to 
character qualities as it is to divine providence. In romance, the waters of miracle, 
providence, and character, if traced far enough, are seen to flow from the same 
fountain.
Writing in epic-like tone and, as it were, from the other side of orthodoxy, 
Thomas Carlyle argues for the great man theory of histoiy and offers an analysis of
Well That Ends Well, 2.3.1-6, who states, “They say miracles are past, and we have om plillosophical 
persons, to make modern and familial-, tilings supernatural and causeless. Hence is i t , tliat we make 
tr ifles of terrors, ensconcing our selves into seeming knowledge, when we should submit ourselves to 
an unknown fear. Why, ‘tis the rarest argument of wonder that hath shot out in our latter times.” 
ibid., 25.
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several figures ranging from Mohammed to John Knox. Carlyle discerns a central
quality of sincerity in great men. He writes,
[B]ut [he] is first of all in right earnest about it; what I call a sincere man. I 
should say sincerity, a deep, great, genuine sincerity, is the first 
characteristic of all men in any way heroic. Not the sincerity that calls itself 
sincere; ah, no, that is a very poor matter indeed;- a shallow braggart, 
conscious sincerity; oftenest self-conceit mainly,
By sincerity Carlyle means something like “unconscious tmthfülness to one’s self,” 
something that goes beyond merely believing that one believes. For Carlyle, to the 
extent that the great man cooperates with “the great deep Law of the World” he is 
victorious and assured of the rightness of his cause. Religion is important for Carlyle, 
not in any credal sense, but only in so far as it exhibits sincerity and conviction. Doubt 
is synonymous with cultural defeat, for, “No sadder proof can be given by a man of his 
own littleness than disbelief in great men.”^^ ” The rightness of a cause religion or god 
and acting according to one’s beliefs formed an indispensable part of life as doing so 
allowed one to shape events. Significantly, no matter how much his contemporaiy 
world viewed heroic culture as a fading if not distant memory, Carlyle grounded the 
worthiness of the hero in the enduring twin principles of connection with some higher 
principle and tmthfülness to one’s self.
C.2 REPRESENTATION
ibid., 280. 
’^ i^bid., 291. 
"'’ibid., 250.
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Very much related to the hero of romance as embodied ideal, romance and epic 
are fundamentally representational in character. Romance is representational in 
character in more than one sense; in terms of character as embodied ideal, and 
character in terms of a quality or property. Since the hero represents an ideal, the 
archetypal pattern of romance and epic may be viewed tropologically as metaphor in 
which one thing is represented in terms of another. I. A. Richard’s’ widely accepted 
distinction between ‘tenor’ and ‘vehicle’ in metaphor defines tenor as the idea being 
expressed or the subject of the comparison and vehicle as the image by which this idea 
is conveyed or the subject communicated. In romance there is a high degree of 
representation or correspondence between tenor and vehicle. The hero represents 
something in a metaphorical sense, while at the same time what the hero represents is 
bound up with the hero’s person and being. And since the ideals are both represented 
and held by the hero, the hero’s actions display that ideal. Opposition to the hero is 
opposition to the ideal; the triumph of the hero is the triumph of the ideal. Due to the 
FG’s emphasis on realism, history, and the incarnation, tenor and vehicle are united 
such that characters are at once representational and “real.”
The representative quality of romance often leads to an emphasis on the 
fantastic and marvelous. The marvelous elements common to romance tend to allow 
the hero greater scope for the exercise and display of his ideals by a simultaneous 
increase in the hero’s power to do so. In such contexts romance is simply being true to 
what it attempts to do; in romance it is more important that the ideal be represented 
rather than concrete reality. Odysseus, repeatedly designated as “resourceful” is given
ni ‘Metaphor” yt Handbook to Literature, 264-265.
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ample opportunity to demonstrate his resourcefulness through his actions; in a 
reciprocal way his actions display his resourcefulness. The bravery and prowess of the 
knight is exaggerated in marvelous or improbable circumstances within the framework 
of a convention that demands to be taken on its own terms. Chretian de Troyes’ knight 
Eric defeats three knights, then five knights, then survives the treachery of a count with 
one hundred knights, then defeats a few giants, and concludes his adventures with the 
supreme defeat of a previously undefeated knight. The adventures of James Bond or 
any other superhero follows the same dynamic. Often in romance the depiction of a 
hero triumphing over exaggerated villains in a labyrinth of adventures and difficulties 
becomes a kind of end in itself. In such cases self-conscious experiments in form 
triumph over content. To the extent that the bonds of realism are left behind and the 
worth of an ideal (or any ideal) becomes questionable, the romance form becomes 
conventionalized into stock formula and begins the plunge into irony and self parody. 
The ideals of love, adventure, and victory degenerate into sex, violence, and 
incompetence. Thus, the Bond films maintain the convention of the romance, but do so 
ironically and vestigially, without serious reference to significant ideals.
The representative principle applies equally as well to the realistic circumstances 
of characters as diverse as Ruth the Moabitess to the prophet Daniel to Agnes and Mr. 
Pegotty of David Copperfield to Fanny Price of Mansfield Park. Oliver Twist and 
Tiny Tim are variations on the timeless theme of threatened innocence. Whatever the 
limits of circumstance, the hero as embodied ideal characteristic of the archetype of 
romance remains so long as a writer or an audience accepts an ideal and its value as
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possible and worthy of emulation. By way of contrast, in Hardy’s Tess threatened 
innocence becomes ruined innocence, an ideal no longer possible under the demands of 
circumstance. Angel, Tess’ ironically named husband, cannot or will not redeem in 
circumstances of spiritual sterility.
Because he is the incarnate Word, Jesus both operates within and transcends 
the conventional representational boundaries. Jesus is sui generis, human and divine, 
and therefore does not correspond precisely to Fiye’s classification of character types. 
Jesus enters the world as man in space and time and realism and in doing so makes a 
descent from what Frye designates ‘myth’ into romance and beyond. And since Jesus 
is fiïlly human and subject to the order of nature, classification of his character in Frye’s 
scheme extends to epic as well. While doing so Jesus maintains his status as divine and 
Jesus also claims representative status with respect to the Father. Jesus claims to be at 
one with the Father (10:30) and thus a full participant in deity. Jesus is the sent one of 
the Father who perfoims his mission in obedience to what the Father desires. But Jesus 
is distinct from the Father while at one with him. In representing the Father, or 
showing the Father to the world, he displays the Father. Jesus tells Philip, “Don’t you 
know me, Philip, even after I have been among you such a long time? Anyone who has 
seen me has seen the Father. How can you say, ‘Show us the Father?’ Don’t you 
believe that I am in the Father, and that the Father is in me?” (14:9-10) Thus Jesus 
both represents the Father, acting according to the Father’s wishes on the Father’s 
behalf, and, sharing the Father’ deity, re-presents the Father in a medium not inherent 
to either.
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As a human being and as God, and as the Son at one with the Father, Jesus in 
one sense is, as a man, a metaphor for God, and, as the Son, a metaphor for the Father. 
Metaphor is here understood as an imaginative identification of one thing with another. 
In Jesus’ case an “imaginative identification” is precisely what is necessaiy; the normal 
categories of human/divine and God as one in a non-Trinitarian sense have broken 
down. At the same time the identification is not imaginative in the sense of not being 
real; rather imagination (analogous to faith) is the faculty by which the reality is 
apprehended. To see Jesus is to see God, and to see Jesus is to see the Father. The 
incarnation reveals God in that Jesus is God, and reveals something about God in that 
Jesus can claim oneness with the Father and yet maintain a separate identity. In the 
incarnation Jesus reveals God in a metaphorical or representational way in the sense 
that he does so in a way that is not inherent in the nature of God, that is, as a human 
being. At the same time this does not necessarily mean that, however much it remains 
a mystery, the claim that Jesus is a human being is incompatible with the claim that he is 
God. Theologically, Jesus is in one sense the quintessential metaphor, fully one thing 
and fully another, God and man, the degree of correspondence between tenor and 
vehicle in his case being absolute. In another sense, non-theologically, Jesus is first 
cousin to other heroes in romance, heroes who are fully themselves and fully 
representational of something else.
Metaphor can mean or express much or little, depending on an evaluation of 
similarities, differences and degree of correspondence between tenor and vehicle. Jesus 
is both God and man, absolute similarity and difference. Hick’s designation of Jesus as
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“the metaphor of God incarnate” is ironic in that it negates Jesus’ unique claim to 
divinity, the key feature of the way Jesus has been traditionally understood."^ This 
view reduces Jesus to a mere ethical illustration or representation in a way detached 
from his identity. For Hick, tenor and vehicle for Jesus are accidental, not ontological. 
If Hick’s view of things is applied to the conception of the hero as an embodied ideal in 
the case of Jesus or anyone else, the hero represents something other than what he is in 
himself, tenor and vehicle threaten to break apart, stay apart, or bang together, a state 
of affairs more akin to tragedy, irony and comedy than romance.
The conflict in the FG is not simply one of the fantastic meeting the world of 
realism in physical or literary terms; it is the conflict of the personal and ideal, God, 
meeting a fallen world, the integrated meeting the disintegrated, the whole meeting the 
broken. The worlds of tragedy, irony, and comedy are worlds in which the individual is 
somehow estranged from the world and from the self in that both the world and the 
individuals who inhabit it are estranged from God. Jesus is the one who both 
represents the Father by doing as the Father does (5:19) and does so in submission, 
obedience, and freedom as one who has been granted “life in himself’ by the Father. 
(5:26) Jesus is the living embodiment of a unity of faith and knowledge, faith being 
understood as volitional commitment related to love and obedience and knowledge 
understood as complete factual and personal knowledge of God the Father. In the FG, 
“The evangelist stresses repeatedly that Jesus’ knowledge is full and perfect knowledge 
of the Father... of men and of the work which has been given Him to do. Christ’s
112 See John Hick, The Metaphor o f God Incarnate (London: SCM Press, 1993).
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knowledge of the Father is direct and absolute.’" "  Jesus knows and “believes” the 
Father; in their intra-Trinitarian fellowship knowledge and belief are fully realized and 
perichoretic. Faith and knowledge are not reciprocal or in process for Jesus and the 
Father as if one built upon and enhanced the other, but faith and knowledge for Jesus 
and the Father are one, an established state of affairs, an ontological fact. “I and the 
Father are one” (10:30) is a statement of unity and diversity. Jesus is doubly the ideal 
in that he is God and obeys God.
In a fallen world faith and knowledge are at a distance from each other, 
especially in matters relating to God, something reflected in the endeavor of Christian 
theology being often designated “faith seeking understanding”. In this sense the FG 
does not so much present Jesus as making an ethical challenge thi'ough teaching, as is 
more so the case in the Synoptics, but as one who is hilly integrated and realized being, 
both in ternis of integration of identity and in terms of that identity expressed in love.
In this sense, Jesus in the FG follows the romance pattern of identity being at one with 
ideal. Jesus’ challenge to the world is fundamentally ontological. Jesus, as one with 
the Father, is in this sense a folly realized ideal, not in a Platonic sense, but as one who 
lives what he is and what he is identical with God. As such, he exposes the darkness 
and corruption of a world that prefers the darkness of disintegration and rejects the 
light. Again, at its dialectical poles, the conflict in the FG displays the antithetical 
nature of the perspectives of romance and irony as personal points of view. The former 
assumes the possibility and reality of some ideal and the possibility and reality of that
James. M. Boice, Witness and Revelation in the Gospel of John (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1970) 
45.
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ideal actually being worthy of being known, asserted and lived, however difficult and 
dangerous that may be; the latter denies both the ideal and the possibility of knowing 
and living by them, tending instead toward relativism and a “realistic” concern with the 
here and now. The ironic perspective, with its characteristic tendency toward 
detachment and negation, in some formulations very much tend toward faitlilessness, 
accepting as insurmountable givens the fractured and confused aspects of human 
existence. In the FG, romance meets irony and realism in a theologically full way.""^
C.3 OTHER CHARACTERS IN THE FG: LIVING ENCOUNTERS
In romance the hero and all other characters are defined in relation to an ideal. 
As theological and narrative center of the FG, Jesus defines all other characters in 
relation to himself. Jesus does not meet the world in abstraction, he meets others, 
fi-actured people with varying degrees of faith and knowledge. Faith and knowledge as 
cmcial components of all characters in the FG are under challenge and most are in flux, 
giving a certain life to those in transition and producing narrative tension as Jesus 
opposes those who refuse to be moved. In its characterization the FG parallels the 
conventions of romance by giving its characters a universal significance. According to 
Frye, “The characterization of romance is really a feature of its mental landscape. Its 
heroes and villains exist primarily to symbolize a contrast between two worlds, one 
above the level of ordinary experience, the other below it.’" "  In the world of the FG,
’ While irony is manifestly a feature of tlie FG, the FG employs irony as a narrative strategy to make 
its point against a personal perspective that is ftindamentally ironic. This will be explored in chapter 3 
below.
"^Frye, Secular Scripture, 53. “There is, first, a world associated with happiness, security, and peace; 
tlie emphasis is often thrown on childhood or on an “innocent” or pre-genital period of youth, and the
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the being above or below the level of ordinary experience corresponds to a character’s 
response to Jesus/" On the other hand, the FG differs from the conventions of 
romance in that its secondary characters are not static; all must respond to Jesus, 
neutrality is not an option. The FG is noteworthy for the scarcity of characters 
indifferent to Jesus.
Beginning, as it were, in the depths of Biblical criticism, the characters in the 
FG might also be designated minimally as “representative figures.” The difference 
between the two terms lies in the fact that character suggests a living quality while 
representative figure suggests a function as a living embodiment of some other concern, 
although the two overlap. Bultmann saw Peter and the Beloved disciple as 
representing a conflict between the church in Palestine and the Hellenistic Christian 
Church"^ and in doing so located the representative function in the Sitz in Leben of the 
early church. In its strong form this type of approach is virtual allegory, positing as it 
does a reality beyond the text no less fanciful than Origen’s platonic excursions, albeit 
one wearing the figleaf of a theoretically possible empirical referent."^ In another
images oar those of spring and siunmer, flowers and smishine. I shall call this world tlie idyllic world. 
The otlier is a world of exciting adventiu es, but adventure which involve separation, loneliness, 
humiliation, pain, and the tlireat of more pain. I shall call this world tlie demonic or night world. 
Because of the powerful polar izing tendency in romance, we are usually carried directly from one to 
tlie other.” Criticizing and going beyond Frye at this point, Jameson argues that Frye’s upper and 
lower worlds are conceptually informed by the clash between good and evil in a way characteristic of 
romance but not tragedy or comedy. See chapters two and four below.
"^On the importance of faith response, see Elizabeth Dawana, Which Side o f the Line: The Non- 
Jewish Characters in the Fourth Gospel, unpublished Ph.D. diss. University of Durham, 1997. 
’"Rudolf Bultmann, The Gospel o f John:A Commentary, trails. G. R. Beasley-Murray, R. W. N. 
Hoare, and J. K. Riches (Oxford: Blackwell, 1971) 484-5.
See Francis Watson in “Toward a Literal Reading of the Gospels,” in The Gospels for All 
Christians: Rethinking the Gospel Audiences, Richard Bauckham, ed. (Edinburgh: T & T Clark,
1998) 195-217.
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guise, this approach attempts to use the New Testament as a pathway to reconstruct a
historical person beyond the text itself."^
Collins offers an approach that begins to move from the quicksand of the
prehistory of the text to the representative function of the figures within the text
itself."” He writes,
It is my conviction that a process of oral tradition similar to that which lay 
behind the Synoptic Gospels also lies behind the Fourth Gospel. Within 
this homiletic tradition we should place the development of units of 
material, pericopes, in which various individuals appear—precisely as types 
of the point that the homilist was trying to make."^
Selected from this homiletic tradition as representatives of certain responses to Jesus 
within the Johannine church, John’s representative figures are stripped to their essential 
role and function in the FG as type-cast figures to provoke and confirm faith within the 
reader. For example, the royal official, whom Collins does not believe to represent the 
Gentile world, “stands as a representative of those who believe in Jesus’s [sic] word, 
the word which brings life.”"^ By stressing the representative or type quality of those 
appearing within the FG, Collins emphasizes the static quality of each and tends not to 
explore their dynamic potential.
Coupled with the dynamic nature of the secondary characters, the stress on 
realism and concrete detail in the FG prevents a given character from being a cipher for
’"For example, see Raymond Brown, Karl Donfried, John Reumann, eds. Peter in the New Testament 
(London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1974). Tliis book might be better entitled, Peter Outside the New 
Testament.
Raymond Collins, “The Representative Figures of tlie Fourtli Gospel.” The Downside Review 94 
(1976), 26-46; 95(1976)118-132, reprinted in These Things Have Been Written: Studies in the Fourth 
Gospel (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990).
’2’ ibid., 29. 
ibid. 41
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abstract values. Various aspects of representative figures can be explored in the case of 
the Samaritan woman. The narrative begins within the ofi noted framework of the Old 
Testament type scene, wherein a man meets a maiden at a well and in so doing tests the 
waters of courtship. The personal history of the Samaritan woman, being five times 
married and living with a sixth man, parallels and represents the national histoiy of 
Samaria as a whole, a country repeatedly colonized by outside powers and religiously 
coiTupt and, like the Samaritan woman herself, is maiden no more."^ The 
correspondence of the details of her personal life with her country’s history grounds her 
representative function to a particular people in a particular time and place. The more 
that is known about the particulars of Samaria and the details of her life, the better we 
understand her representative function, however difficult that may be 2000 years later. 
But within narrative of the FG, her role expands to represent the one who tells others 
of Jesus and who recognizes Jesus in all his fullness as the savior of the world, a savior 
who transcends national boundaries. The story began in a Jewish context of the type 
scene at Jacob’s well and ends with universal gospel proclamation.
But in addition, the Samaritan woman, estranged by her race, religion, location, 
gender, and conduct, is a universal type, the outsider. And yet whatever her liabilities, 
they present no barriers to coming to Christ. In contrast, Nicodemus is an insider, 
another universal type. His status as a man with all the privileges of race, location, 
wealth, and social position offers no advantage with regard to God. Fitting his remarks
"^Much of the ti eatment of tlie representative role of the Samaritan Woman witliin tlie FG itself 
draws on Craig Koester, “The Savior of the World: John 4:42,” JBL 109 (1990) 665-80. For a helpftil 
treatment of representative figures, see Koester, Symbolism in the Fourth Gospel: Meaning, Mystery, 
Community (Minneapolis: ForUess Press, 1995) 49.
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to Nicodemus and his circumstances and aristocratic birth, Jesus tells him, “You must 
be born again.” Their function as universal types keeps the Samaritan woman and 
Nicodemus from the oblivion of ancient history, while the specific details of their lives 
and circumstances prevent them from becoming mere ciphers for spiritual values, 
bridging the gap between romance and realism. The fact that they must respond to 
Jesus challenges their respective status’ quo and challenges them to insider/outsider 
status with respect to faith in Jesus. Each functions as characters who speak, think, 
misunderstand, respond and act, infusing them with life and vitality.
The FG contains a variety of characters, from the committed to the hostile and 
all shades in between. The centrality of Jesus and the FG’s universal claims about him 
make the characters of the FG seem to live in a way that defies the lack of historical 
information about them. Thomas, Peter, Nicodemus, Pilate, Mary and Martha of 
Bethany, and Mary Magdalene seem to us more as living beings, particular individuals 
yet types of people we know or might know or have met somewhere rather than as 
relics of history whose dust we might comfortably shake from our garments.""^
Regardless of whether their origin is traced to the pre-histoiy of the FG or to 
their use in antiquity or whatever source, the dramatis personae found in the FG or any 
other work of literature cannot help but manifest some representative quality.
O’Conner states that “Any character is....supposed to carry a burden of meaning larger
For a discussion of universality and particulai-itj  ^witli reference to imagination and the “human” 
factor in understanding, see Trevor Hart, “Imagination and Responsible Reading,” in Craig 
Bartlioloniew, Colin Greene, Karl Moller, eôs,.. Renewing Biblical Interpretation (Carlisle: Paternoster 
Press, 2000) 307-334.
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than himself.”"^ There exist only a finite number of qualities, values, or characteristics
of any sort and any character or person embodies various combinations of them. The
particular combination of these makes every person or character unique. On this
matter Chatman writes,
I argue- unoriginally but firmly- for a conception of character as a 
paradigm of traits; “trait” in the sense of “relatively stable or abiding 
personal quality,” recognizing that it may either unfold, that is, emerge 
earlier or later in the course of the story, or that it may disappear and be 
replaced by another.
All characters and all people are representative types of some sort by virtue of a 
common humanity and common human experience without which communication 
between individuals ceases to be possible and literature becomes irrelevant.
The function of characters in the FG is therefore relentlessly particular and 
relentlessly theological and universal. The characters may be compared to Auerbach’s 
interpretation of the typical Medieval function of characters as what he terms 
“/zgura”, a quality Auerbach finds not exclusive to but perhaps best seen in Dante’s 
The Divine Comedy. Normally, figurai interpretation involves viewing one event in 
light of another, the former prefiguring the latter, the latter expanding and fiilfilling all 
within a vertical structure of divine providence, as, for example, in Adam or Joseph 
prefiguring Christ. Auerbach acknowledges this but extends its application. In
"^Flanneiy O’Conner, Mysteyy and Manners, ed. Sally and Robert Fitzgerald (New York: Farrar, 
Strauss and Giroux, 1957) 167.
Seymour Chatman, Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1978) 126.
"^Eric Auerbach, “Figura”, Irans. Ralph Manheim in Scenes from the Drama o f European Literature; 
Six Essays (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smity, 1973) 11-75, esp. 56-76. Auerbach states that his analysis 
of figura in this essay represents a refinement and clarification of an earlier book length analysis of 
The Divine Comedy, Figurai interpretation is also discussed m Mimesis, 73-76; 156-157; 174-202; 
554-557.
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interpreting a character ?ls figura, the historical reality of that character or event is
maintained and seen against a context of the future divine judgment of God, an already
realized eternal event. Auerbach observes,
[T]he figurai interpretation of reality which, though in constant conflict 
with purely spiritualist and Neoplatonic tendencies, was the dominant view 
in the European Middle Ages; the idea that earthly life is thoroughly real, 
with the reality of the flesh into which the Logos entered, but that with all 
its reality it is only umbra and figura of the authentic, future, ultimate 
truth, the real reality that will unveil and preserve the figura. In this way 
the individual earthly event is not regarded as a definitive self-sufficient 
reality, nor as a link in a chain of development in which single events or 
combinations of events perpetually give rise to new events, but viewed 
primarily in immediate vertical connection with a divine order which 
encompasses it, which on some future day will itself be concrete reality; so 
that the earthly event is a prophecy or figura of a part of a wholly divine 
reality that will be enacted in the fiiture. But this reality is not only firture; 
it is always present in the eye of God and in the other world.
It is important to note that this kind of figurai interpretation is not allegory, however 
easily figurai interpretation drifts in that direction or however common allegory was in 
the Medieval world. Auerbach notes, “... the literal meaning or historical reality of a 
figure stands in no contradiction to its profounder meaning, but precisely “figures” it; 
the historical reality is not annulled, but confirmed and fulfilled by the deeper
, ,1 2 9meaning.
In the FG the reality against which other events and characters are judged is the 
incarnate Logos, the earthly and divine Jesus. The judgment of God is seen as 
eschatological and already present, (3:18ft), the presence of Jesus presents a living 
challenge to the status quo, simultaneously bound up in actions and being. A
Auerbach, “Figura” 72. 
"^ibid., 73.
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character’s historical encounter with Jesus becomes di figura of one’s ultimate 
encounter with God, the one no less real than the other. The Nicodemus story in its 
narrative presentation displays the dynamics of a character within the FG being 
vertically integrated with a transcendent reality. The real encounter of Jesus and 
Nicodemus moves theologically upward such that Nicodemus no longer appears and 
Jesus and the entire world are placed in a theological relationship with God. The 
theological reality is the background against which all is interpreted and establishes a 
basis upon which irony in the FG fonctions. Thus, Caiaphas’ statement that “It is better 
for one man to die for the whole people” is understood simultaneously in two contexts. 
Characters can be seen at odds with the vertical dimension, but never outside of it.
Since the theological context of the FG is universal, the reader participates in the same 
challenges posed by Jesus as those in his own particular circumstances.
The universal theological claims of the FG demand that the extraordinaiy 
circumstances presented there remain living with us both theologically and 
imaginatively, animated in no small measure by those who encountered Jesus in their 
day. They are caught up in the same matrix as the reader, one that in the FG cannot be 
limited to encounter with the earthly Jesus. The characters of the FG and the reader 
revolve around a common center, the Incarnate Word and his universal claims. In this 
sense the characters of the FG are infosed with life and significance, they are part of the 
language and grammar by which the FG seeks to convey its message. The characters 
are at once invitations or entry points into the experience, theology and world of the
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FG and points of reference by which to define or change one’s location within that 
world.
The FG reflects and Jesus embodies the tendency of romance toward vertical 
perspective. The resulting tendency is a vertical stratification of characters into heroes 
and villains"” and a tendency to set an idealized or noble situation over against an evil 
or demonic parody of it. In doing so Fiye notes that “romance avoids the 
ambiguities of ordinary life, where everything is a mixture of good and bad, and where 
it is difficult to take sides or believe that people are consistent patterns of virtue or 
vice.”"^ Thus, in order for this polarization to take place, the world of romance 
correspondingly tends to be idealized, in the fullest sense of that term, and depart from 
the ambiguities of realism in some way. The tendency for romance to be set somewhere 
else, in a world not quite like our own, usually in the sentimental or idyllic past. In the 
FG, the idyllic past is the eternal past, before creation, the present is the eschatological 
now, a now that, contrary to a common tendency in romance, takes full account of 
concrete particulars and the vexing circumstance of earthly life. In order for realism to 
continue on its own terms without reference to romance, it must focus on the present 
as it is, get on with the Romans, and cast out the miraculous and ideal; Christ must be 
crucified or the heroes brought into line with the demands of realism.
The hero/villain polarity characteristic of romance and the FG is not established 
on ethical grounds. Since the hero is the ideal, to the extent that others are at odds
130 Frye, Secular Scripture, 50
Fiye Natural Perspective, 110. 
"^Fiye, Secular Scripture, 50.
106
with the hero, they are members of the lower world. Everything depends on the
relationship to the hero. Jameson writes,
We have already suggested the constitutive relationship between romance 
and something like a positional concept of evil, analogous to the function 
of shifters or pronouns in linguistics, where the person standing opposite 
me is marked as the villain, not by virtue of any particular characteristics of 
his own, but simply in function of his relationship to my own place.
Fiye makes a similar comment.
The characterization of romance follows its general dialectic structure, 
which means that subtlety and complexity are not much favored. 
Characters tend to be either for or against the quest. If they assist it they 
are idealized as simply gallant or pure; if they obstruct it they are 
caricatured as simply villainous or cowardly. Hence every typical character 
in romance tends to have his moral opposite confronting him...""*
The FG is like romance with respect to all characters being defined in relation to the 
hero, Jesus, but atypical of romance in that the FG with its emphasis on realism resists 
the tendency toward caricature and stereotype.
In the FG, a character’s ethical dimension develops subsequent to a response to 
Jesus. Although the world is in darkness and rebellion (1:5), and the world is under 
condemnation by virtue of its unbelief and evil deeds (3:18-21), within the confines of 
the narrative in which he, she, or they initially appears each character begins in a state 
of poetic innocence. Fairy tales and romances generally hold a sense of good being the
Jameson, Mag/cfl/ Narratives, 160.
"'*Fiye, Anatomy, 195. Similarly Reardon, who writes “...tlie numerous episodes, individually 
attractive, form not simply a liiieai* series but a momiting climax-and they also people tlie story with a 
wealth of secondary characters against whom the figure of the hero can be measured.” Reardon, 
Greek Romance, 16.
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norm so that, while evil is present, it is an aberration."^ In the FG each character must 
choose, in the terms of romance, to be part of the upper or lower world. But inasmuch 
as it concerns the phenomena of the narratives, as opposed to the overall theological 
statements of the FG, nobody is a “villain” until choosing to be one. Those who 
receive him, those who “believed on his name, he gave the right to become children of 
God” (1; 12; cf 3:16). The Jews, portrayed as questioning but relatively calm 
bystanders of the temple cleansing in chapter 2, are never denounced as hypocrites or 
“open graves” after the manner of the Synoptics. The Jews lapse into active opposition 
with murderous intent only after rejecting Jesus’ implicit claims to divinity (5:17-18), 
the problem being primarily theological rather than ethical. Jesus cautions the disciples 
against attributing the blindness of the man bom blind to an ethical cause, neutralizing 
the issue of sin for the purposes of the nan ative and clearing the way for an emphasis 
on faith response. Pilate appears on the narrative stage innocent and without the tar 
and feathers of other information (cf. Luke 13:1) or historical hindsight, one whose 
genuine but abortive progress toward Jesus later descends into condemnation of an 
innocent man with all its theological and ethical implications. Peter’s denials result 
from a failed response to Jesus of a certain type. Judas commits a betrayal that is as 
much theological as it is ethical.
By classifying the various characters according to their faith response, the 
stratification is at once simplified and expanded. It is simplified by centering on one
The analogy here with tlie FG is with tlie context of “in the beginning” and creation (1:1-4), a state 
of affairs from which tlie world has depar ted into darkness. In tlie FG, Jesus is tlie norm, and tlie 
world, in darkness and at odds with Jesus, is im abberation.
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issue and it is expanded by its exploration of that one issue in all its complexities."^
The issue is singular rather than simple. Commenting on this element in regard to
characterization in the novel, Harvey notes that characters form bits of a central vision.
The central vision is fractured into characters and the characters move around the
central vision in a dynamic fashion. He writes,
[B]eneath the superstructure of the individualized character, we may sense 
those depths in which identity is submerged and united within a greater 
whole. And with the very greatest novels one feels that the individual 
character is thereby immeasurably enriched, that he is not obliterated, or 
dehumanized into allegory or symbol, but filled with an inexhaustible 
reservoir of meaning so that he becomes, as it were, a shaft of light defining 
the greater darkness which suiTounds him."^
Analogously, the trials and tests of realism as experienced by the characters in the 
context of first century Palestine made universal by the presence of Christ become 
universal trials and tests of faith and commitment, or, the relation of one’s ideals to 
one’s actions and experience. In this way the characters of the FG are at once universal 
and particular: universal in that each must respond to Jesus, and particular in that each 
responds differently. And yet universal patterns in particular responses may be 
discerned; Pilate responds to Jesus tragically, Peter comically, and the Jews and 
Thomas ironically. And, Jesus after all responds to the Father and does so obediently 
and heroically. The FG, then, does not simplify on the basis of good or bad, but
A similar move is made, for example, by Dickens in David Copperfield. Edgar Johnson notes tliat 
the dominant tlieme of the novel is “tlie discipline of tlie heart.” To a large extent, tlie char acters 
function as living explorations of tliis tlieme from a variety of perspectives. See David Copperfield 
(New York: Penguin, Signet Classic) afterword by Edgar Johnson, 871-879. Similarly, Martin 
Chuzzlewit explores the themes of selfisliness/ selflessness.
W. J. Harvey Character in the Novel, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1965) 123-124.
"®ibid., 129.
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simplifies according to the issue of faith response and explores those responses in all 
their complexities and consequences.
Pilate, Peter, Thomas, and the Jews meet Jesus in all their particularity and 
universally as various responses to Jesus as defined by the outworking of paradigms of 
faith and knowledge in particular circumstances. Those who encounter Jesus in the FG 
function as living explorations of types of response to Jesus in a way analogous to the 
four soils (souls?) as types of responses in the Synoptic Parable of the Sower. These 
characters are caught in the matrix of the upper world meeting the lower world typical 
of romance, or in the terms more familiar to FG scholarship, as they attempt to 
integrate their beliefs and experience, they are caught in the matrix of Johannine 
dualism. As is typical in the FG, narrative has replaced parable/pericope format of the 
Synoptics as the dominant form. Recall that the four literary archetypes each display a 
discernible pattern of a character’s actions in relation to that characters beliefs or ideals, 
patterns marked by the four patterns of representation, reduction, negation, and 
integration; romance, tragedy, irony, and comedy respectively. Jesus represents an 
ideal in all its fullness; Pilate, the possibility of faith and its reduction of an ideal amidst 
circumstance; the Jews fail to realize the ideal; and Peter fails to properly integrate the 
ideal with his circumstance.
Described in another way, Pilate is knowledge in excess of faith, the Jews are 
faith and knowledge separated from each other with all its consequent sterility, and 
Peter is faith in excess of knowledge. Pilate, like all tragic heroes, exists in a world 
only precariously like romance, one ready to be plunged into the chaos and
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disintegration resulting from the separation of one’s self from one’s beliefs caused by 
the onrush of events. Peter, as archetypal comic figure, stmggles to bring his overly 
ideal vision of the world in line with the kind of realism the world requires. Peter and 
Pilate, who represent the comic and tragic opposites and, significantly, never meet, are 
dynamic characters in process of development or destruction The Jews take on the role 
of representatives of the world of realism, concrete and immovable rejection of the 
world of romance in all its fullness and in this sense are statically integrated in their own 
way. Some of the Jews, like Nicodemus, respond to inner turmoil and sneak across the 
battle lines at night to scout out the other side, but most face no internal stmggle 
occasioned by a mixture of faith and knowledge; since they are without faith, the only 
struggle is external, a struggle for power and control.
rv CONCLUSION
To attempt to fully distinguish between story, character, and setting in romance 
is to a great extent to go against its nature. In contrast to other archetypes, romance 
presents a unified world, an imaginative vision of a world in which story, character, and 
setting comprise interrelated parts of a unified whole, a whole unified within the terms 
of the conception, vision, and the beliefs to which it aspires. Because beliefs and ideals 
are at one with experience, story drifts easily into character, character into setting, 
setting into story in a free flowing exchange. As such it is implicitly confident, 
assuming the values it projects and aspires to in the life and world of the hero.
Romance as an archetype is fundamentally coherentist, presenting a world of values and
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ideals as self evident, without justification, a kind of enacted ontological argument 
wherein the premise, or hero, once accepted, leads to a certain conclusion. Although 
reciprocal, in the FG the prologue formally supplies the premise and the story of Jesus 
its enactment. To apply an alien frame of reference to the FG or romance is to separate 
the hero from ideals and identity, inviting and anticipating an inevitable move toward 
tragedy and irony.
While romance contains departures fiom its unified vision, these departures, or 
the lower, fallen world, provide obstacles to be overcome, test the ideal, display the 
ideal and concentrate the central vision by contrasting it with a kaleidoscopic display of 
its opposites. Archetypal journeys to or fi-om the hero serve to highlight and focus the 
hero and the values represented. As reduction, negation, and integration respectively, 
tragedy, irony, and comedy are fimdamentally explorations and expressions of various 
stages of disunity between a set of beliefs or ideals and the world as it is.
"^Tliis is the move made by Wayne Meeks in his seminal article, “The Man from Heaven in 
Joliamiine Sectarianism,” JBL 91(1972) 44-72. Meeks substitutes a sociological and mechanistic 
paradigm for a tlieological one, a tendency extended into irony and deconstruction by Kelber and 
Moore. See Werner Kelber, “In the Beginning Were the Words: The Apotheosis and Narrative 
Displacement of the Logos,” JAAR 58 (1990) 69-98; “The Birtli of a Beginning: John 1:1-18,” Semeia 
52 (1990) 121-44; reprinted in Stibbe, Ant/îo/ogy; Stephen Moore, “Are There Impurities in the Living 
Water that tlie Johannine Jesus Dispenses? Deconsti uction, Feminism, and the Samaritan Woman,” 
Biblical Interpretation 1 (1993): 207-27; reprinted m Poststructuralism and the New Testament: 
Derrida and Foucault at the Foot of the Cross (Mimieapofis: Fortress, 1994) 43-64; Literary Criticism 
and the Gospels: The Theoretical Challenge (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989).
1 1 2
- 2-
TRAGEDY AND PILATE
‘For in tragedy is imbedded the eternal contradiction between man's weakness and 
his courage, his stupidity and his magnificence, his frailty and his strength. ”
' F. L. Lucas, Tragedy, 76
I INTRODUCTION
For Western civilization, works of tragedy such Hamlet, King Lear, and 
Oedipus the King endure as great works of art and ftinction as key cultural reference 
points. Yet it seems a bit odd, given that tragedy contains so much pain and suffering, 
that tragedy continues to exert the influence it does. Whatever sociological or 
psychological explanations emerge, the power and influence of tragedy as an art form 
resides in its presentation of something true about human life. Falseness of expression 
in art results in a loss of power, ^  and tragedy is virtually without accusation of being 
false or lacking in power.
Tragedy inevitably raises religious and theological concerns related to human 
suffering, the moral order, the presence or absence of God, human freedom and 
responsibility, and others. But tragedy never raises such issues in the abstract. 
Tragedy will not tolerate trafficking in unfelt abstractions. Tragic heroes receive the
 ^Dorothy Sayers, The Mind o f the Maker (London: Methuen and Co., 1941) 74.
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lightening bolts of life like so many lightening rods in a storm.^ Yet tragedy offers no 
answers. Reading tragedy is an object lesson in the wages of sin misses the whole point 
as does seeing tragedy as mere fate in action.^ Literary criticism greatly enhances our 
understanding and appreciation of tragedy as an art fonn through explication of plot, 
character, etc., but is not inclined, if it were indeed able, to provide answers to 
questions raised. Tragedy seems to throw down the gauntlet to theologians.
Theologians often look to tragedy to express something they believe to be true 
of human existence. Human suffering is real and profound and tragedy challenges any 
glib theodicy to take stock of reality.'* Theologians and preachers, those most practical 
of theologians, must address a human situation they deeply understand, a situation 
displayed in all its power in tragedy.^ For redemption to be truly understood and the 
comic aspects of the Christian faith to be appreciated, tragedy, and what tragedy 
expresses, must be fully taken into account.^
A pause here to define terms will prove essential to prevent confusion. Literary 
critics for the most part see tragedy as an art form, a type of drama that flourished in 
ancient Greece and Elizabethan England exemplified by works like Hamlet and 
Oedipus the King. Aristotle’s Poetics provides the basic starting point for discussions
^Northrop Frye, Anatomy o f Criticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957) 207,
^ibid., 209m
see Donald Mackinnon, Borderlands o f Theology and Other Essays (London, 1968); The Problem of 
Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); David Ford, “Tragedy and Atonement.” 
in Christ, Ethics, and Tragedy: Essays in Honor o f Donald Mackinnon, Kenneth Surin, ed., 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 117-130.
 ^George Hall, “Tragedy in the Theology of P. T. Forsyth,” in Justice the True and Only Mercy, Trevor 
Hart, ed. ( Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995) 77-104. Forsytli encouraged his students to view drama as a 
way of appreciating human concerns.
^Fredrick Beuchner. Telling the Truth: The Gospel as Tragedy, Comedy, and Fairy Tale (San 
Francisco: Harper and Row, 1977).
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of tragedy and is here employed in that capacity. While tragedy undoubtedly interests 
theologians on its own terms, many theologians refer to tragedy as something common 
to human experience,^ with the designation “tragedy” being used in a general sense to 
refer to everything from the death of a child to the holocaust. Tragedy as an art form 
follows a general pattern of presentation developed through certain types of plot, 
character, and theme whereas tragedy in common usage generally means anything 
crossing an undefined threshold of suffering or something that ends badly.
This chapter concerns tragedy as an art form in and of itself and as an art form 
in relation to conceptual and theological themes. While it is virtually impossible to read 
an entire Gospel as a tragedy or comedy, it is possible to view a particular character as 
tragic or comic.^ Pontius Pilate as he appears primarily in John’s Gospel will be the 
subject of inquiry as he relates to the role of a tragic character. Following some 
preliminary matters, a narrative analysis of Pilate will be offered, followed by a 
discussion of structural elements of tragedy in relation to Pilate, and concluding with a 
discussion of conceptual matters relating to tragedy. Pilate will be interpreted
’ Beucliner, Ford, Hall, ibid., Mackinnon, “Theology and Tragedy,” Religious Studies (April 1967): 
163-169. Brian Hebblethwaite, “Mackinnon and tlie Problem of Evil,” in Christ, Ethics, and Tragedy: 
Essays in Honor o f Donald Mackinnon, ed. Kenneth Snrin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989) 117-130.
® This raises tlie issue of reading Pilate (or anyone else) as a tragic character when he appears in a 
work tliat is not expressly a tragedy. Beyond tliose offered in tlie introduction with respect to 
archetype, several lines of thought may be suggested here that will be subsequently taken up. Ai istotle 
noted that tragedies may be written about historical characters, an argument tliat applies to the case of 
Pilate to a limited degree because, while Pilate is an historical figure, the FG is not a tragedy nor is it 
about Pilate. Aristotle asserts tliat plot is primary over character in tragedy, a point I argue as well. If 
correct, it follows that a sequence of events, such as those relating to Pilate in the Fourtli Gospel, 
following a plot tliat is similar to plots of recognized tragedies, tlien tlie accomit of Pilate merits 
consideration as a tragedy. In the end, the offered examination of Pilate as a tragic character as tlie 
best defense for treating liim as such in a work not regarded as a tragedy. For a discussion of tlie 
problems associated with reading an entire Gospel as tragedy, see Richard Walsh, “Tragic Dimensions 
in Mark,” B/6//ca/ Theology Bulletin 19 (July 1989) 94-98.
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throughout with special emphasis on his archetypal relation to tragedy within the 
literary and theological kosmos of the FG.
II PILATE IN THE GOSPEL OF JOHN
A) PILATE AS DYNAMIC CHARACTER
John presents Pilate through a series of scenes marked by a change in temporal 
location. This inside/outside, back and forth scheme forms a dramatic, temporal 
reinforcement of the choice confronting Pilate; he must choose not simply between 
Jesus and the crowds on the basis of etliical considerations. The stakes are much 
higher. He must choose his earth bound way of thinking and its temporal realities, or 
he must choose to adhere to Jesus and accept his status as living embodiment and 
testimony of the tmth. The choice between the Jews and Jesus is the temporal 
expression of a much greater question between competing interpretations and 
archetypal paradigms of reality itself.
Fundamental to understanding Pilate in the FG is to follow his progress as a 
character when confronted with the person of Jesus, which in turn reflects the reader’s 
understanding of Jesus as offered in the FG. Just as Nicodemus, the Samaritan woman, 
and others in the FG progress in their understanding of Jesus, so does Pilate. The 
Pilate who steps out to meet the Jews in 18:29 is not the same Pilate who departs 
muttering “What I have written, I have written.” Failure to take the dynamics of the 
narrative seriously leads to a static Pilate against which the narrative is interpreted, an 
approach that tends to be utilized by interpreters relying primarily on historical
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reconstruction. Carson, for example, does this. Early in his discussion of the trial 
narrative he notes.
Both from biblical and extra-biblical sources, historians have come to know 
him as a morally weak and vacillating man who, like many of the same 
breed, tried to hide his flaws under shows of stubbornness and brutality.
His rule earned him the loathing of the Jewish people, small groups of 
whom violently protested and were put down with savage ferocity {cf. Lk. 
13:1).’
For Carson, this Pilate functions as a hermeneutical anchor. Following Rensberger,
Bond contests the basic assumption that Pilate was weak and vacillating, offering
instead a strong, irony practicing Pilate who maintains control throughout, toying with
the subject Jews to extract a confession of loyalty to Caesar. Bond’s strong Pilate,
like Carson’s weak version of the same person, remains static and seemingly
impenetrable by the text, impossible of development as a person, secure from whatever
slings and arrows the outrageous Jesus throws at him.
Yet Pilate is not without his more sympathetic and insight&l interpreters.
Referring to his ancient counterpart, one contemporary politician observes.
The intriguing tiling about Pilate is the degree to which he tried to do the 
good thing rather than the bad. He commands our moral attention not 
because he was a bad man, but because he was so nearly a good man....It is 
possible to view Pilate as the archetypal politician, caught on the horns of 
an age-old dilemma. We know he did wrong, yet his is the struggle
^D. A. Carson, The Gospel According to John (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991) 590ff.
Helen K. Bond, Pontius Pilate in History and Interpretation (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 
1998); David Rensberger, Overcoming the World: Politics and Community in the Gospel o f John 
(London: SPCK, 1989); “The Politics of John: The Trial of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel,” JBL 103/3 
(1984) 395-411. Wliile Pilate is in an ironic relationship to Jesus, tlie Jews, the FG narrative, and the 
reader, he is most certainly not ironic himself; to read Pilate as ironic is to mistake irony for 
ignorance. Further, to read Pilate strictly as ironic manipulator ignores tlie interpretative clue and 
symbolic reinforcement of a struggling Pilate offered by Pilate’s physical movement between Jesus and 
tlie Jews. Finally, in tlie narratives (cf. Jesus’ conversations with Nicodemus and the Samaritan 
woman) and theology of the FG Jesus is in control tliroughout, seriously miderniiiiing attempts to 
place Pilate on a similar standing.
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between what is right and what is expedient that has occuiTéd throughout
history it is not always clear, even in retrospect, what is, in truth, right.
Should we do what appears principled or what is politically expedient? Do 
you apply a utilitarian test or what is morally absolute?**
The basis on which this interpretation operates is important; Pilate must be interpreted 
as a dynamic rather than static character, a man trapped in an authentic struggle making 
a sincere attempt to set Jesus free.*^
B) THE TRIAL NARRATIVE AS INTERPRETATIVE PARADIGM
On a related point, the notion of “trial” in the FG deserves a closer look.
Harvey expands the idea of a trial beyond Jesus’ encounter with Pilate to include the 
whole book.*  ^ Harvey establishes and explores the influence of the Jewish legal system 
on the FG and how this affects a reading of it. In contrast to modern practice which 
seeks to come to a judicial decision by way of establishing the facts in a case and 
offering an interpretation as best fitting the facts and therefore meriting acceptance, the 
Jewish system relied on witnesses wherein a particular witness pro or con was weighed 
in regard to his character. Thus John the Baptist is not so much a witness to the facts, 
but a witness in regard to his character and public standing as a prophet. Procedures of 
doing this could be and often were necessarily informal, such as might occur at the 
gates of a city or in the porticos of the temple area. The precise charges against Jesus 
usually had to do with breaking of the Sabbath, as is usually the case in the Synoptics,
 ^^  Tony Blair, Sunday Telegraph, 1 April, 1996. cited in Ann Wroe, Pilate: The Biography o f an 
Invented Man (London; Jonatiian Cape, 1999) 208.
See Raymond Brown, The Gospel According to John. vol. II (New York: Doubleday, 1966-70) 864. 
A. E. Harvey, Jesus on Trial: A Study in the Fourth Gospel (London: SPCK, 1976).
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but in John the charges are generally that of blaspheme. In a related matter, the Jewish 
understanding of an agent, one who acts on behalf of and with the authority of another. 
Sons were usually the best agents because they could be most relied upon to represent 
the interests of their fathers. Credentials were often necessary to validate one’s claims 
to be an agent of a far off landlord. Thus is the case of Jesus, sent from God as a son 
with the authority of the Father. The signs seiwe to identify him as being who he says 
he is. But the nature of Jesus’ case is unique; his claims to represent God cannot be 
verified, only accepted or rejected; he is either a blasphemer or he is not.
Harvey concludes that, whatever the verdict reached by Jesus’ contemporaries, 
the reader must still make up his or her mind as to the person of Jesus. Directed to 
either or both Jews and Greeks, the Gospel may therefore be evangelistic, producing an 
initial verdict, or strengthening believers in the faith they may already possess. The 
Christian must always be making up his or her mind. Harvey’s argument is persuasive, 
but it is an argument that implies much more than he explicitly states and anticipates 
further expansion. Harvey interprets the trial imagery, loosely defined, primarily as 
judicial rhetoric, that is rhetoric employed to render a verdict on a past event, when in 
fact the rhetoric of John is primarily deliberative, rhetoric employed to support a course 
of future action (i.e. believe in Jesus). Harvey himself would perhaps agree, but does 
not explicitly say so.
The point gathers importance as it relates to the fundamental nature of 18:28- 
19:16, usually referred to as “the trial narrative,” or “the trial of Jesus before Pilate” or 
something similar. In a sense this designation is correct because Jesus is on trial with
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reference to an historical event, but to view this passage primarily as a trial is to view it 
in a certain way foreign to its primaiy, though not exclusive, emphasis. To begin with, 
John contains no account of the formal trial of Jesus before the Caiaphas, a fact that 
begins to erode the interpretative foundation of 18:28-19; 16 as being strictly or 
primarily a trial account. Why give one without the other, especially if the gospel 
contains so many other disputes with the Jews? Further, although the “trial” before 
Pilate opens with legal questions, it soon moves on to questions of kingship, truth, and 
Jesus as the Son of God, hardly strict matters of judicial procedure. When Pilate sits 
on the judgment seat and offers his “verdict” that Jesus is “your king”, the context of 
the narrative has moved far beyond the need for a judicial verdict. But if the 
interpretative paradigm of a trial in a narrow sense is resolutely maintained and 
employed, Pilate will be seen as simply rendering his judicial verdict that Jesus is guilty 
of sedition and Pilate’s threefold affirmation of Jesus’ innocence will have fallen on 
deaf ears. Pilate, like Jesus, seems unable to get a fair trial.
It is at this point in 18:28-19:16 that the “trial” paradigm is weighed in the 
scales and found wanting. Like Pilate, the issues for the reader extend far beyond the 
judicial. And, like Pilate, the reader cannot close the lid on Pandora’s box and read 
Pilate’s actions as if the real question were still a charge of sedition. The issues have 
forever become issues of authority, tmth, and response to Jesus as the Son of God as 
any reading of 18:36ff will demonstrate. Red letter editions of the Bible may prove 
especially useful in this instance. The “trial” functions, not primarily as a trial for its
Concerning tlie Jewish trial in John Bar rett notes, “in fact tliere is really no trial narrative at all.” C. 
K. Barrett, The Gospel According to John (London: SPCK, 1978) 523.
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own sake, but first of all as a narrative vehicle for other issues. In keeping with John’s 
stated theme, (20:31), the trial of Jesus before Pilate is primarily, though not 
exclusively, a vehicle to explore the issues of knowledge, belief, commitment, and 
action, issues characteristic of the tragic archetype. To view Pilate’s encounter with 
Jesus as exclusively or primarily as a trial is a bit like the Samaritan woman supposing 
that her conversation with Jesus is really about getting a drink from a well or 
Nicodemus wondering how to re-enter his mother’s womb. Numerous interpreters 
note the irony of the fact that Pilate is on trial rather than Jesus, but perhaps the real 
irony is to read John’s account as if Jesus really were the one on trial. To note that 
Pilate is on trial rather than Jesus without seriously applying this insight is to grasp the 
sword of irony by the blade and not the handle. Why not make the paradigm shift 
grounded in the prologue that the book of John as a whole and the “trial narrative” so 
obviously demands?*  ^ Jesus is not primarily the one on trial, but Pilate, the world, and 
the reader. Once reconstructions of a static, historical Pilate and a narrowly defined 
“Jesus on trial” as a hermeneutical paraàigms are, like Pilate, dethroned from their 
pretensions of authority, the actual narrative of 18:38-19:16 is able speak more for 
itself.*"
A literary analysis of Pilate’s encounter with Jesus will follow in which 
particular attention will be given to the shifting conceptual contexts and dynamics of 
each scene and how Jesus, Pilate, and the Jews seek to control or respond to the terms 
of the debate. As in his conversations with Nicodemus and the Samaritan woman, Jesus
The point here is not so much want to disagree with Harvey, but to expand the implications of his 
argument.
®^For convenience and ease of reading, the designation “trial” will be retained.
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controls the conversation and puts obstacles to understanding in the path of each, 
obstacles, once surmounted, lead to a greater understanding of Jesus more in line with 
the understand of Jesus set out in the opening of John’s gospel. Pilate will be seen to 
be consistently lagging behind in his understanding of Jesus and of events.
C) NARRATIVE EXEGESIS 18:15-19:22
C.l. PREFACE: THE NARRATIVE CONTEXT 18:15-27
Just as Jesus’ “trial before Pilate” functions primarily but not exclusively as a 
vehicle for other issues, so does Jesus’ appearance before Annas. The scene is quickly 
set in 18:12-13, and 18:14 recalls Caiaphas’ ignorantly knowing advice to the Jews. 
And, like the Pilate narrative, this section features an inside outside structure wherein 
physical location serves to emphasize a dramatic contrast. Peter denies Jesus under 
relatively innocent questioning from a slave girl. Peter descends from a fieiy, sword 
wielding protector to join the ranks of the other shivering mortals around a fire. Inside, 
Jesus denies nothing and brings attention to the public nature of his ministry and the 
fact that others heard him, facts that could prove detrimental if his captors cared to act 
on his suggestions. Outside again, Peter denies Jesus twice more. Peter denials, 
coming from a close fiiend and longtime follower, provides an ironic contrast to Pilate, 
who is neither friend nor follower of Jesus, but champions Jesus’ cause more so than 
anyone else when he had no previous reason for doing so and many present reasons not 
to. Peter’s thi'eefold denial contrasts with Pilate’s threefold affirmation of Jesus’ 
innocence. Significantly, there is no interaction between the inside and outside; Peter,
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the absolute denier, remains outside, while the steadfast Jesus remains inside in 
symbolic reinforcement of their exclusive positions. Pilate, on the other hand, travels 
back and fourth on his voyage of discovery and change. Rather than a strictly literary 
or historical approach, the following discussion will center on the changing conceptual 
contexts as they find expression in narrative form.*^
C.2. SCENE 1: JUDICIAL CONCERNS*^ 18:28-32
In traditional tragic fashion, the protagonist’s encounter with his or her destiny 
is not actively sought after. It more or less happens. The Jews lead Jesus to the palace, 
Pilate comes out to meet them and becomes involved. The Jews want something done 
and must go through Pilate in order to have it accomplished, setting up a dynamic in 
which Pilate is not in control but reacting to a situation, as his concession to meet the 
Jews on their terms indicates. As far as the dynamics of the narrative are concerned, 
Pilate is in a state of innocence and ignorance, comfortably at home in the traditional 
interpretation of reality in terms of political power.
Pilate begins his duties by asking about the charges being leveled against Jesus. 
In doing so, the discussion at this point proceeds on a the basis of legal questions. To 
get to the heart of the matter, Pilate must investigate and in doing so becomes involved 
as an authority figure. Pilate begins an investigation that the reader already knows the
Historically, it may be objected that those living in the New Testament era would not have 
distinguished between judicial, political, and religious matters as is typical in modern times. Wliile 
acknowledging tlieir fundamental unity, is nevertlieless possible to see tliem as slices of the same pie, a 
pie best not taken in all at once, but served one piece at a time tliroughout tlie seven courses of tlie 
drama.
The term “scene” is used merely for ease of reference.
’^Thomas Brodie, The Gospel According to John: A Literary and Theological Commentary (New 
York; Oxford University Press, 1993) 532.
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answer to; Jesus is the incarnate divine word seen by the Jews as a religious and 
political threat. Pilate’s ignorance is in ironic relation to the state of knowledge given 
initially in the prologue and assumed throughout the FG. On Pilate’s thinking, Jesus is 
on trial, whereas in the reality assumed in the FG, Pilate, like the world itself, is on trial.
In response to Pilate’s question, the Jews respond, “If he were not a criminal, 
we would not have handed him over to you.” The “bewildering logic” ®^ of this reply 
assumes the very thing needed to be proven, namely, that Jesus is a criminal. It also 
attempts to displace Pilate as judge because it implies that a verdict of guilty has been 
reached by the Jews and Pilate need only grant their request. The ambiguity of the 
charge leaves open its seriousness and the intentions behind it. Pilate does not wish to 
become involved and dismisses them by suggesting that they take him themselves and 
judge him by their own law. This suggestion may be mockery of the Jews in their 
subject status or it may more likely be a sincere attempt to be rid of a problem that 
Pilate, like Gallio, views as insignificant.
The intentions and desires of the Jews become clearer when they object to being 
dismissed by noting that they have no power to execute anyone. Pilate and the Roman 
establishment must be made to participate in order for the Jews to get what they want. 
This point in the trial marks the judicial/political high point for Pilate. The subject Jews 
are exposed as weak while Pilate as the governor in charge is the one the Jews must 
obey. Pilate also holds the keys of life and death. Now that these elements enter the
^°ibid., 533.
trial, events take on an increasing seriousness. %
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John informs the reader in that this happened so that the words of Jesus 
indicating the manner of his death might be fulfilled. This analeptic comment, proleptic 
from the discourse point of view, brings the guiding hand of God into current events. 
Pilate of course is at present unaware of this additional factor. But by making note of 
the fulfillment of the words of Jesus, Pilate’s authority in the eyes of the reader begins 
its precipitous slide into oblivion.
As is typical in Greek and Shakespearean tragedy, the trial action does not 
proceed far before one knows that something is rotten in the state of Denmark. The 
dynamics of the trial drama are present in this first scene. The Jews desire a 
legal/political solution to what is a religious dispute, albeit one with political overtones 
(11:45“50; 12; 18) and involve Pilate in a dispute he would rather avoid. The final 
outcome of the trial demonstrates that such issues do not allow easy separation, either 
by the Jews or Pilate. The divine order, so prominent elsewhere in John, is not absent 
here either. While the trial of Jesus before Pilate follows the general pattern of the 
encounters of Jesus and Nicodemus and the Samaritan woman, in this instance there 
are key differences. Nicodemus seeks Jesus out to gain a better understanding while 
Jesus provides the initiative in the incident by the well. In contrast, events thrust Pilate 
and Jesus together in a situation not amenable to gradual learning and easy 
conversation.
C.3. SCENE 2: FROM POLITICS TO TRUTH 18:33-38a
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Pilate, with the outward trappings of power, returns inside the palace and 
summons Jesus. Here he makes his first contact with Jesus and asks, “Are you the king 
of the Jews?” (18:33) This statement appears to come from nowhere, having no 
immediately apparent antecedent cause. It is possible to mine the mountains of 
historical reconstruction for an explanation, (although 12:13 rests close at hand on the 
surface), but this tends to slow the forward advance and dynamics of the text. A more 
likely explanation is a narrative one; that the change of location signals a change of 
issues. In any case, regarding the origin of Pilate’s question, Jesus appears to wonder 
the same thing as the reader. But Jesus seizes the initiative and offers his question, “Is 
that your own idea, or did others talk to you about me?” (18:34) as a challenge to 
Pilate. Rather than seeking information, “Jesus deftly turns the trial on Pilate from the 
outset.” *^ In other words, is Pilate a leader or a follower.
Now on the defensive, Pilate here begins his famous habit of evasion. He asks 
“Am I a Jew?” (18:35) in a self imposed ad homimim circumstantial argument as if his 
not being a Jew were an adequate excuse for not knowing the identity of Jesus. 
Equipped with knowledge superior to Pilate, the reader must implicitly beware of 
making the same excuse. Pilate further protests that the whole proceeding was not his 
idea at all. (18:35) The feebleness of Pilate’s remarks at this point renders a reading of 
Pilate as ironic manipulator scarcely credible.
Betraying his ignorance, Pilate asks “What is it you have done?” (18:35) The 
proper question in the context of the FG is not “What have you done?” as if such issues 
were most important, the proper issue is “Who are you?”, a question of identity.
Paul Duke, Irony in the Fourth Gospel (Atlanta: John Knox, 1985) 129.
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Pilate’s question here in scene 2 attempts to move the discussion back into the 
relatively more innocent and manageable judicial context of scene one while events and 
the level of discussion moves inexorably onward. Jesus picks up Pilate’s question 
about his being king of the Jews and transfers it into a new category; a kingdom “not of 
this world.” It is evident from the rest of the Gospel of Jolin that what Jesus says is 
correct, although not in conventional Jewish messianic terms; however, this is not at 
present evident to Pilate. The governor responds, “You are a king then!” (18:37) as if 
his original question (18:33) were getting a belated answer. What Pilate likely viewed 
as something of an admission (“You are a king then!”) on Jesus’ part fails to give him 
any advantage. In making this statement (asking this question?), the context of his 
thinking moves from the judicial context of scene 1 to the political context of scene 2. 
But like Nicodemus and the Samaritan woman, his understanding fails to keep pace 
Avith the discussion. Jesus is not talking about kingship in terms of earthly political and 
military realities. The comically misguided Peter drew his sword to defend Jesus as an 
earthly king, but Jesus informs Pilate that his servants will not fight because “my 
kingdom is from another place.”
Nevertheless, Jesus offers a limited approval to Pilate’s discovery by noting, 
“You are right in saying I am a king.” (18:37) For this very reason Jesus was born and 
came into this world. Jesus’ statement that he “came into the world” is subject to two 
complimentary interpretations: coming into the world as being synonymous with human 
birth; and coming into the world as the divine word made flesh. Although perhaps 
invited to do otherwise, no doubt Pilate understood it to be the foimer. Jesus does not
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allow the conversation to rest on this point and moves the discussion from the political 
sphere to a claim about truth itself Jesus came “to testify to the truth” and challenges 
Pilate, and everyone else, if they are on the side of truth, to “listen to me.” Pilate then 
offers his famous question, “What is truth?” This statement is subject to a variety of 
interpretations, from cynicism, to caviler dismissal to sincere inquiiy. Confusion on the 
matter is to be expected because the nature of truth is precisely the issue at stake. For 
Pilate truth means something like the material and evident facts in the case, whereas for 
Jesus truth is self-referential and self evident; he himself is the truth (John 14:6). Jesus 
is at once the supreme material fact in the case and “the eternal reality which is beyond 
and above the material phenomena of the world, but Pilate is at present unable to 
comprehend him as such. Pilate’s very definition of truth is in the process of change.
The final definitive answer to Pilate’s intentions will forever elude us. What is 
clear is that the reader is in a position to see the irony of Pilate’s question. Jesus, the 
incarnate word, at one with the Father (10:30), the way, the truth, and the life (14:6), 
reveals the truth because he is the truth. However little he may he may have cared to 
ask much less answer his question in the past, Pilate is never closer, physically if not 
spiritually, to the answer than now.
C.4. SCENE 3: RETURN TO INNOCENCE 18:38b-40
On leaving Jesus Pilate asserts to the Jews, “I find no basis for a charge against 
him.”(18:38b) Here Pilate again fails to grasp the context of the issues he is dealing 
with. By announcing to the Jews his verdict that no charges can be legitimately
Barrett, John, 488.
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brought against Jesus, he attempts to move the discussion back into the judicial context 
of scene one. His statement here recalls his initial question to the Jews in 18:29, “What 
charges are you bringing against this man?”
In 18:39 Pilate seems to realize that he is getting nowhere on this front and 
moves to continue the Jewish custom of releasing a prisoner at the time of the 
Passover. He offers, hesitantly, in the form of question, to release “the king of the 
Jews.” In designating Jesus in this manner, Pilate’s context of thinking has moved, 
reluctantly, from the judicial concerns of scene 1 to the political concerns of scene 2. It 
is difficult to determine with certainty the intentions of Pilate here. He may be acting 
out of arrogance, in which case the designation “king of the Jews” amounts to mockery 
of the Jews in their subject status. On the other hand, the release of Jesus may be a 
gesture of genuine good will in which Pilate feels free to designate Jesus as ‘the king of 
the Jews” but is convinced of Jesus’ innocence and sees no haim in doing so. Ironic 
readings of Pilate not withstanding, the latter is preferable because on the basis of the 
actual nan ative here in John, Pilate shows himself to be considerably more pliable in 
the hands of Jesus than in the hands of the Jews. Even though announced to the Jews, 
the context of this statement is more properly taken as having arisen from the crucible 
of his conversations with Jesus than with his interactions with the Jews. Jesus’ real 
innocence, Pilate’s apparent judgment that Jesus is harmless, and the surprising nature 
of Pilate’s conversation with Jesus, may have combined to develop a personal sympathy 
for Jesus that he was unlikely to have for the Jews.
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The unequivocal Jewish preference for Barabbas exposes in shocking fashion 
the naivete of Pilate’s handling of the situation. For Pilate, Jesus posed no political 
threat whereas the rebellious Barabbas was precisely the type of person with whom he 
as governor should have been concerned. Significantly, the FG does not mention 
Barabbas’ release. By not including this detail, the dynamic pressure of the narrative 
continues past the release of Barabbas, whereas in the Synoptics the choice of which 
prisoner to liberate forms the critical narrative divide. Pilate misjudges the Jews and 
the depth of their commitment to be rid of Jesus. At present, Pilate does not see 
beyond the pragmatic issue of disposing with Jesus while pacifying the crowds. 
Because Jesus outraged the Jews by claiming to be God, the reader, unlike Pilate, 
knows that the real issues are theological. The Jewish leaders see Jesus as a 
blasphemer and as political liability and take steps to get rid of him so the controversy 
becomes political. Here again, the reader is aware that Jesus is a new revelation from 
God replacing the old in many respects. The issue is once again theological. Like 
Oedipus, Pilate charges ahead unaware of the true state of things all the while chasing 
an innocence forever ruined by facts and aspects he does not know.
C.5. SCENE 4: DESPERATE MEASURES 19:1-3
Jesus has so far escaped any serious trouble at the hands of Pilate. The neutral 
and pragmatic offer to release Barabbas fails, so Pilate resorts to a desperate measure. 
At first wince, the flogging of Jesus appears to be intended as preparation for 
crucifixion, but later developments cast doubt on this interpretation as Pilate continues
130
to insist on Jesus’ innocence and attempts to release him. The text marks out that 
while Pilate had Jesus flogged, the soldiers perform the placing of the crown of thorns 
and the purple robe, as well as the insults and beatings, thereby creating some narrative 
distance between Pilate and these other misdeeds, however much or little he may have 
been responsible for them. Pilate does not attempt to win sympathy for Jesus, but to 
humiliate him, hoping that will be enough.
C.6. SCENE 5: REVELATION OF DIVINITY 19:4-8
Pilate appears again before the Jews and offers another attempt at conciliation.
In doing so he is weaker and less in control of the Jews, just as he has been shown to 
not be in control of Jesus. Pilate announces to the Jews that he is bringing out Jesus
and offers an interpretation for his actions, “...to let you know that I find no basis for a
acharge against him.” (19:4) Significantly, he prefaces his remark with IÔ8 (“look, 
behold”) so as to set a visual stage for the arrival of Jesus who “came out”, moving 
from not being seen to being clearly visible. Jesus is described in appropriately visual 
terms, with which we are told, “Jesus came out wearing the crown of thorns and the 
purple robe.” (19:5) Pilate says to them, “Here is the man,” perhaps better rendered by 
the traditional, “Behold the man,” as if to say, “Take a look.”
In Pilate’s characteristic attempts at compromise, he intends this to do two 
things. The first is to use the event as evidence of his claim that he finds no basis for a 
charge against Jesus. His ignominious parading of Jesus before the defendant’s would 
be subjects is visible and living proof that he is not seriously thieatened by the notion of
131
Jesus as king. The second intention is to display Jesus as humiliated, shamed, pathetic 
and beaten, offering Jesus as someone who has already suffered enough. If events 
proceed as Pilate hopes, the crowds will be satisfied and disperse.
Pilate’s hopes are soon dashed. Verse 6 opens, “om s ovv stâov amov, ” and 
oDvhere connects their reaction with what happened previously while appears 
early in the sentence for emphasis. On seeing Jesus, the Jews shout for his crucifixion. 
As in the Barabbas incident, Pilate again seriously misjudges the situation. In 
exasperation perhaps combined with mockery, Pilate lashes out with his remark, “You 
take him and crucify him,” a statement that the continuing clash with the Jews 
demonstrates to certainly not have been intended as serious offer. Pilate affirms for 
the third time (18:38, 19:4, 19:6) that he finds no basis for a charge against Jesus as if 
once again he would prefer Jesus to be discussed on the judicial basis of scene 1.
In 19:7 the Jews lay their final card on the table. At long last, they inform Pilate 
that by their law he must die because, “he claimed to be the Son of God.” The judicial 
and political paradigms by which Pilate sought to resolve the crisis no longer apply. 
“Behold the man” for Pilate was synonymous with “Behold a (mere) man,” and stands 
in ironic contrast with the revelation by the Jews that Jesus claimed to be God. Now 
deeply involved, he begins to learn that he has been ignorantly playing with fire, 
something Jesus, the Jews, and the reader have known all along. If it is true that Jesus
^ So Brown, who notes, “The statement is simply an expression of Pilate’s exasperation.” Brown,
John, 877.
For Giblin, Pilate at this point “has become seriously afraid when confronted with a accusation of 
Jesus; asserting divine sonship. This does not fit with his political cast of mind. He could readily cope 
witli ritual requirements or legal restrictions, but seems to be superstitious about matters regarding 
divinity.” Cliarles Giblin, “John’s Narration of the Hearing Before Pilate (John 18:28-19:16a) Biblica 
67 (1986) 231.
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is the Son of God, then Pilate’s attempts to manipulate the situation to a satisfactory 
end appear in retrospect as appalling and ignorant.
C.7. SCENE 6; CONFIRMATION OF DIVINITY 19:9-11
Pilate hears this new information and it makes him more afraid.^  ^ Although the 
trial narrative thus far shows Pilate reacting to events while he supposes himself to be 
in control, during this scene his illusions of control dissipate as he moves in reaction to 
events.
After the manner of his “What is truth?”, Pilate asks Jesus “Where do you come 
from?” Unlike Pilate, who is denied an answer and must make inferences from shifting 
information in unstable circumstances, the reader knows the answer from previous 
information given in the FG. By refusing to answer, Jesus remains in control. 
Ignorantly, Pilate declares his power to free or crucify and thereby implicates himself in 
Jesus’ death. But this assertion is increasingly in doubt on purely pragmatic grounds as 
events threaten to overwhelm his power to control them. Jesus undermines Pilate’s 
pretensions to power completely by informing him, “You would have no power over 
me if it were not given to you from above.” (19:11) This could refer to Pilate’s power 
over Jesus in this situation, or it could refer to the divine sanction given to human 
government in general of which Pilate is a representative. There is no reason these two 
aspects must exclude the other. Pilate acts as an individual in his particular 
circumstances and, unavoidably, as a representative figure for human government to
^ Brown lists various reasons for this fear but neglects the one most obvious and the one most in 
keeping witli tlie stated pmpose of tlie FG (20:31): tliat Pilate had some sort of real encoimter witli 
Jesus on tlie basis of who he claimed to be. Brown, John, 877-878.
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some extent. In the former, Pilate himself must act and make a decision of a legal 
nature, and in the latter, he must exercise the power of the institution he represents to 
carry out his legal decision. But in both cases, his power is derived from a source 
above and beyond the Roman establishment.
The context of his decision goes far beyond the Roman establishment as well. 
Jesus sets the present events in the context of sin and responsibility when he says, 
“Therefore the one who handed me over to you is guilty of a greater sin.” Pilate must 
understand that the issues before him are no longer merely pragmatic, but real, where 
real responsibility and real guilt obtain. Judas initiated the betrayal of Jesus which 
resulted in the present situation, whereas unwanted events descended upon Pilate, yet 
guilt and responsibility cannot be avoided. Whereas Pilate previously fimctioned with 
information inferior to the Jews in that he did not know the real charges they brought 
against him, now having encountering Jesus for himself he operates with equal to 
superior knowledge and must attempt to act upon his knowledge in circumstances not 
amenable to easy solutions.
C.8. SCENE 7: CAPITULATION 19:12-16^"
Pilate responds in 19; 12 by trying to exercise his power and set Jesus free, his 
first attempt to do so without resort to pragmatic maneuvering.^^ The imperfect 
(gf^ Tlxsi) may suggest continued attempts to do so, or it may mean simply that Pilate’s
^ It is unclear from tlie text if  Pilate is inside or outside at tliis point. Thus scene 7 could begin at verse 
12 or verse 13. The story would favor the former, while tlie discourse favors the latter. It makes little 
difference.
At this point even Rensberger is forced to admit this is a sincere attempt to set Jesus free. David 
Rensberger, Overcoming the World, 94; “Politics,” 103/3 (1984) 405.
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attempt(s) to release Jesus were merely unsuccessfiil. In any case, there is a certain 
interpretative messiness connected with judging the sincerity and motivations of 
Pilate’s attempt to release Jesus not unlike the ambiguous process that occurs when 
reaching a required decision between two problematic alternatives.
The Jews respond by linking a potential course of action, releasing Jesus, to a 
real conclusion, that Pilate would demonstrate himself to be no “friend of Caesar.” By 
making this move, the Jews go over Pilate’s head, letting liim know in no uncertain 
terms that he is under the authority of someone far greater than himself. But as far as 
Pilate, the reader, and the nanative dynamics are concerned, bringing in Caesar at this 
point has the effect of either 1) removing the debate from the context of the 
supernatural and placing it again in the context of political reality, or, 2) raising the 
specter of the divine claims of Caesar. Pilate showed himself to be most vulnerable to 
Jesus and the most courageous champion of his cause when he, however brightly or 
dimly, sees events as the FG presents them, as transcendent realities with Jesus 
superior to Caesar. By noting that “Anyone who claims to be a king opposes Caesar,” 
(19; 12) the Jews once again place Jesus on the same terra firma as Caesar, insofar as 
Pilate is concerned. Or, conversely, the Jews place Caesar on the rather more elevated 
terra firma of Jesus. By raising the issue, the Jews insure that, for Pilate, Caesar will 
increase and Jesus will decrease in relation to each other. The divine Jesus commands 
no self evident earthly power or pretensions to political power, while Caesar, whatever 
his pretensions to divinity, certainly has his divisions.
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The occupant of the judgment seat in 19:13 is open to debate. If the matter is 
cast in terms of a historical question, then either Pilate or Jesus sat on the judgment 
seat, in which case the view that Pilate sat on the judgment seat is preferable on 
historical grounds. Strictly for grammatical reasons, taking ^KaGioev intransitively, in 
which case Pilate sits on the judgment seat, is to be preferred.^^ But given a certain 
amount of grammatical ambiguity granted legitimacy by the transitive/intransitive 
debate itself, the FG’s acknowledged use of double meanings elsewhere and, as noted 
earlier, the fact that Pilate is on trial rather than Jesus, a double meaning of SKaGiasv 
in the nan ative is certainly allowable if not required.^** Thus, however much grammar 
and history favor Pilate sitting on the judgment seat, the wider theological and literary 
context of the FG as a whole allows the reader ample imaginative room to see the irony 
of Jesus sitting on the judgment seat and Pilate declaring judgment on himself by virtue 
of his rejection of Jesus, (c.f. 3:16-19)
Departing from the immediate concerns of the narrative, 19:14a notes “It was 
the day of Preparation of Passover Week, about the sixth hour” and functions as 
implicit commentary on Jesus’ fate as the lamb being made ready for the sacrifice. 
Whatever Pilate’s intentions at this point, this signals that Jesus’ fate is all but sealed. 
Possibly from the judge’s seat, Pilate renders an opinion, “Here is your king” and in 
doing so indicates his movement from the divine to the political to the judicial. This 
hardly means that he has found Jesus guilty of anything; nothing indicated in the text
^ Giblin views the scene as judicial farce, relying on an insincere Pilate to do so. Giblin, “Narration,’ 
235.
^  Carson, John, 607.
Similarly, Duke, Irony, 134-135.
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before his presentation of Jesus as king supports this. Rather it means that Pilate may 
in fact believe that Jesus is king but is in the process of capitulating to the demands of 
the crowds. Rather than a judicial verdict, “Here is your king” can be taken as some 
sort of personal statement of Pilate’s own opinion uttered in a context of lost innocence 
and defeat.
Two options can follow this line of thought. First, Pilate’s actions following 
19:14b manifest a growing weakness. Pilate’s conviction to release Jesus melts like ice 
in the sun. “Here is your king” and “Shall I crucify your king” are merely the final 
shots, albeit sincere ones, in a battle that is all but lost. Second, Pilate’s conduct from 
19:14b onward can be seen as strong and defiant. Pilate presents Jesus as king as 
something he is inclined to accept, which must be the case if his interactions with Jesus 
are taken seriously at all. But he also knows that the Jews are winning the political and 
judicial victory. Pilate offers Jesus as king sincerely as far as he himself is concerned, 
but also as a taunt and insult to the Jews. Here he returns to his roots as political 
manipulator, offering a king to a subject people and leading them into proclaiming 
themselves loyal to Caesar above all. In doing so he becomes a kind of Samson who 
brings about the simultaneous destruction of himself and his enemies.^* The cmcifixion 
of the honorable Jesus results only after both sides force each other to sacrifice their 
integrity.
Thus Pilate is a divided man, knowing that Jesus is innocent and that he is in 
some sense divine, but he as mler faces pragmatic realities and begins to move away
Allowing for a complex of motivations perhaps too readily simplified, tliis interpretation offers the 
advantage of reconciling elements of Rensberger and Bond’s strong Pilate with the sincere but failed 
Pilate offered here.
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from Jesus insofar as his public stance is concerned. Pilate sits on the judgment seat and 
returns to the judicial context of scene 1, but without the relative innocence of the early 
stages of the trial. Events move Pilate from innocence to experience and knowledge, 
yet his beliefs as manifested in actions fail to keep pace. Pilate is quintessentially a man 
at odds with his circumstances, whether theological or political or personal, for in the 
end he is at odds with himself.
However unclear the pathway between them may be, the Pilate of 19:12 who 
tries to set Jesus free becomes the Pilate who hands Jesus over to be cmcified in 19:16. 
What is clear is that, like Nicodemus and the Samaritan woman, Pilate interacts 
significantly with Jesus and his understanding about Jesus increases significantly as a 
result. Circumstances combine with personal weakness in Pilate's case to fatally 
prevent his movement from knowledge to enacted faith.
C.9. EPILOGUE 19:22
Pilate places a notice above the cross reading, “Jesus of Nazareth, the King of 
the Jews.” The chief priests protest to Pilate, urging a change stating that this man 
claimed to be king of the Jews. Although compromised and defeated, Pilate refuses, as 
if to make a last stand of some kind, one that likely includes a mixture of bitterness at 
being out maneuvered, defiance, and something of his own reflections. However
Giblin notes, “Pilate’s apparent political victory in the last scene of tlie hearing and in writing the 
title on the cross will have to be considered by the reader as a personal tragedy. Pilate has missed the 
moment of tioith, especially in cutting off tlie witness as soon as he himself has raised tlie apposite 
question.” Giblin, “Narration,” 226. But by failing to accept Pilate’s encounter with Jesus as 
authentic, Giblin caimot extend the notion of tragedy to Pilate’s assessment of himself and must 
confine it to tlie perception of tlie reader. Assessing liiniself, Pilate may have preferred the victory of 
Pyrrhus to his own.
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contracted the circle of his authority, Pilate holds his ground on this point and in doing 
so gets in the last word.
Typical of tragedy, Pilate confronts a world of shifting interpretation and 
circumstance, where, however much beliefs and interpretation may have adequately 
accounted for past conditions, they no longer continue to do so.
I ll TRAGEDY AND PILATE
Having given an exegesis of the Pilate nan ative, Pilate will now be examined as 
an archetypal tragic figure in order to explore ways in which his character may be 
illuminated. Consideration of Pilate as a tragic character will occur in conjunction with 
a discussion of tragedy as an archetype and its relation to theological concerns.
The study of tragedy may be usefully divided into three stages. The first stage 
centers on tragedy’s effect on the audience. The emphasis centers on common 
elements derived fi om the audience's reaction to tragedy, rather than on the work of 
tragedy itself. If certain reactions fail to be present in experiencing a certain work, that 
work does not constitute a tragedy. The second stage focuses on common elements 
within the play itself. Various works widely recognized as tragedies, usually the 
products of ancient Greece and Elizabethan England, contain reoccumng elements and 
themes structured in a similar way. Because these form a body of literature known as 
“tragedy,” they can be analyzed for similar properties in archetypal fashion. Once 
isolated these properties can be analyzed and compared. The third stage is concerned 
with the deep structural patterns that provide the ground without which tragedy could
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not exist. Rather than focus on the audience reaction or common elements within the 
works themselves, the emphasis goes deeper, exploring the conceptual foundations that 
make tragedy possible. The common elements of the second approach serve as 
vehicles to exhibit the underlying foundations of the third approach, often producing a 
common reaction in an audience, noted in the first approach.
As should wisely be expected, a particular writer will often include elements of 
more than one approach, perhaps using elements from all three. For example, 
Aristotle’s notions of catharsis and fear and pity belong to the first, while his ideas 
regarding the tragic hero as being neither too good nor too bad and possessing some 
hamartia, or tragic flaw, belong to the second. In spite of a particular writer on 
tragedy perhaps never fitting neatly into one category, this three fold approach remains 
valid as a usefiil way of dealing with the material written on the subject. To abandon 
these or similar classifications altogether would result in a babel of confiision, 
comparing one writer’s views with another when they may share none of the same 
concerns. In this way apples and oranges may be kept in their separate baskets.
A) ELEMENTS OF AUDIENCE REACTION
A.1 FEAR AND PITY
Fear and pity comprise the two most commonly recognized elements of 
tragedy.^^ First isolated by Aristotle, they form essential elements of audience 
reaction. Aristotle sought to find the source of pleasure in tragedy and believed it
Clifford Leech, “The Implications of Tragedy.” in Tragedy: Modern Essays in Criticism, eds. 
Laurence Michel and Richard Sewall (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1963) 163.
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rested in a combination of these elements. The action of the tragic hero generates fear 
as we distance ourselves from it. Yet the corresponding sense of pity prevents us from 
creating too much distance through an identification with the tragic hero as a 
representative of the human race. Debate continues as to the precise meaning of 
Aristotle’s terms (phohos and eleos) and presents a road best not taken here.^ "^  A 
discussion of phobos and eleos in relation to tragedy offers more potential than a 
discussion of these terms in relation to Aristotle.
Questions inevitably arise regarding phobos and eleos. After all, these terms 
represent Aristotle’s attempt to clarify the source of pleasure in tragedy. Because 
pleasure derived from tragedy is a subjective quality, any attempt at objective 
clarification will certainly be disputed. Kaufmann notes that the transitive nature of pity 
implies an object.^  ^ Any attempt to identify the object of pity in Sophocles’ 
Agamemnon results in confusion as Agamemnon, Clytemenstra, and Cassandra all 
compete for our pity. However, it remains possible that collectively and individually 
they merit pity. In the case of eleos Kaufmann prefers the stronger and less localized 
term “ruth.” For phobos he follows a similar path and prefers the more stronger but 
more general term “terror” over the usual “fear,” which like pity implies an object. But 
moving away from identification with elements within a tragic work itself implies a 
corresponding movement towards abstraction and experiential response. Viewing fear 
and pity, or ruth and terror as primarily experiential phenomenon produced by tragedy
For a careful exegetical study see, Gerald Else, Aristotle‘s Poetics: The Argument (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957).
Walter Kaufmaiui, Tragedy and Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968) 43-52. 
Kaufmann takes tliis approach in liis discussion of fear and pity.
^®ibid., 44-45.
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locates significance with the reader or object. Tragedy becomes something like a 
dramatic thrill ride, lighter on meaning and heavier on experience.
On the other hand, tragedy can never be divorced from experience. The 
experience of tragedy happens in a certain way, primarily through personal 
identification. Pity is experienced through personal imaginative identification with a 
character or characters as they are caught in and contribute to a situation, an 
identification occuring by means of a shared humanity. Othello fimctions as an object 
of pity through our feeling for him as a person, not through an identification with him 
as a military leader. Fear obtains through an imaginative identification with a situation 
as it impacts the life of the character involved.. We do not fear Oedipus himself or his 
particular situation as if we could fall prey to a similar mistake; rather fear results from 
the mere possibility of ignorantly doing the thing one most wants to avoid. Ignorance 
as expressed in Oedipus provides the common element between his circumstances and 
ours. Fear, then, primarily concerns identification with circumstances, while pity 
occurs through identification with a common humanity as expressed in character as 
both are manifested in the twists and turns of a particular plot.
Through the character of Stephen Dedalus, James Joyce offers the following
treatment of terror and pity.
Pity is the feeling which arrests the mind in the presence of whatsoever is 
grave and constant in human suffering and unites it with the human 
sufferer. Teiror is the feeling which arrests the mind in the presence of 
whatsoever is grave and constant in human sufferings and unites it with the 
secret cause.^^
James Joyce, A Portrait o f the Artist as a Young Man, ed. R. B. Keislmer (Boston: Bedford Books of 
St. Martin’s Press, 1993) 178. Wliile it is possible that tins statement is ironic, it will be taken here in 
straightforward fashion.
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Here human suffering is connected with the experience of pity through the agency of 
the human sufferer. In the case of tragedy this would be a character in the drama, one 
who becomes a representative symbol of human suffering. Human suffering is 
connected with the experience of terror through the agency of “the secret cause,” taken 
here to mean the situation, setting, or plot. The events and characters combine to 
produce fear and pity in a work of tragedy.
Aristotle’s Art o f Rhetoric includes a detailed analysis of fear and pity by 
which Pilate can be examined. For Aristotle, fear is “...a kind of pain or disturbance 
resulting from the imagination of impending danger, either destructive or painful.”^^  
Fear depends on the proximity of the frightening.^ ^® Pilate has plenty to fear in his 
situation: unjust power, in the form of the cliief priests who threaten to report him to 
Caesar; insulted virtue with power, in the form of Jesus Christ the creator of the world; 
those who have been wronged in the form of the Jews Pilate mistreated in the past; 
rivals for advantages that both parties cannot simultaneously enjoy in the form of the 
power hungry high priests; superiors in the form of Caesar himself; fearsome things 
made the more fearsome by not being able to rectify the error in the form of Pilate’s 
too late discovery of the Jews’ true motive, the level of hatred of the Jewish leaders 
against Jesus, and the true identity of Jesus; having no assistance, seen in the fact that 
Pilate is alone and receives no help from anyone including his wife, Herod, or Jesus.
Aristotle. The Art o f Rhetoric, trails. H. C. Lawson-Tancred (New York: Penguin Books, 1991) ii.5, 
p. 153-156.
^^ibid.
"""ibid.
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Pilate also generates fear through his being caught between justice and personal 
integrity on the one hand, and expediency and political survival on the other.
Yet these fears remain remote and harmless as long as they belong to Pilate 
alone. The reader experiences the fears of Pilate by means of identification with his 
situation as he functions as a representative figure of human beings generally. While 
Pilate’s role as the Roman governor confronted with the decision of whether or not to 
execute the incarnate Son of God is unique, certain elements of his predicament 
transcend time and circumstance. Conflicting loyalties, public pressure, lack of timely 
information, unwanted and unavoidable situations, irreversible circumstances, 
implacable opponents, fear of superiors, concern for career, knowledge of past wrongs, 
isolation, lack of assistance, violating one’s own conscience; these common experiences 
of life provide a bridge to Pilate and his situation.
For Pilate, the most fearful of his circumstances is confrontation with Jesus 
Christ, creator and mler of the universe. The identity of Jesus extends the 
consequences of his actions beyond this life as the demands of the temporal conflict 
with the demands of the eternal. While argued above that Pilate was aware of Jesus 
being divine in some sense, the state of his knowledge is ultimately beside the point. In 
the FG the state of the reader’s knowledge is all important."^  ^ Just as the reader or 
playgoer, both ancient and modem, commands superior knowledge about the 
circumstances of Oedipus’ life then he does as a character, by means of the prologue 
and preceeding narrative the reader of the FG knows more about Jesus than Pilate.
R. Allan Culpepper, Anatomy o f the Fourth Gospel: A Study in Literary Design (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1983) 89.
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The irony of the situation makes the reader unwittingly more identified with Pilate than 
perhaps desired. Like Pilate, the reader’s awareness of being involved over one’s head 
in a circumstance comes too late for escape. The reader, aware of the FG’s claims to 
Jesus’ divinity and further disarmed by the knowledge of Jesus’ resurrection, confronts 
the crucified Christ with less protection than Pilate. Loathing of Pilate in his weakness 
becomes self incrimination.
But given his presentation by John, Pilate is difficult to dismiss through simple 
loathing for other reasons. Returning to the Rhetoric for his analysis of pity, Aristotle 
defines pity as,
...a certain pain occasioned by an apparently destructive evil or pain’s [57c] 
occurring to one who does not deserve it, which the pitier might expect to 
suffer himself or that one of his own would, and this whenever it should 
seem near at hand. [2.8]
The objection naturally arises that Pilate’s actions demand guilt and that he therefore 
deserves his suffering, which is of course true. But seeing Pilate only as one deserving 
of suffering requires a blindness to other positive aspects of his character and 
circumstances. On the other hand, a too positive reading of Pilate avoids the question 
of real guilt. Unlike the greedy, initiative taking traitor Judas, circumstances catch 
Pilate in a situation he would desperately rather avoid. Pilate escapes the charge of 
calculated malice that hangs about the Jews who implacably oppose Jesus in spite of 
his teaching and miracles. Operating with far less knowledge, Pilate makes a sincere 
but futile attempt to set Jesus free. Whatever knowledge Pilate gains of Jesus comes
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too late to take prudent action and avoid the plunge of current events/^ As if to 
highlight the desperate plight of friendless Jesus, Peter disowns Jesus immediately prior 
to the Roman trial whereupon Pilate emerges as one of the few people to defend Jesus. 
Pilate takes sides with Jesus and champions his cause more so than anyone else and 
suffers most for doing so. Paradoxically, it may be the case that Pilate appears weak 
only because he stood up for Jesus at all. A simple approval of the Jewish request 
might have preserved his obscurity. Pilate’s positive actions coupled with the terror 
induced by identification with Pilate’s situation deters any attempt on the reader’s part 
to pass Pilate by on the other side of the road.
Significantly, Aristotle devotes much of his attention to a discussion of the 
situation of the pitier, rather than the object of pity. Aristotle writes “For it is clear 
that a man must think that he is such as to suffer something bad either in himself or in 
one of his friends.”"^  ^ Those too miserable do not pity, because they expect no more 
suffering, and the exceedingly happy or arrogant do not pity because they consider 
suffering impossible for them. As applied to Pilate, the miserable might consider the 
consequences of Pilate’s actions while the arrogant might consider Pilate and the New 
Testament witness of the risen Christ. Most readers fit neither of these categories. 
Most have suffered and consider its reoccurrence a possibility, or think about suffering 
as possible through reflection.
Steiner observes, “The tragic personage is broken by the forces which can neitlier be fully 
understood nor overcome by rational prudence. This again is crucial. Where tlie causes of disaster are 
temporal, where tlie conflict can be resolved tlirough technical or social means, we may have serious 
drama, but not tiagedy." George Steiner, The Death of Tragedy (London; Faber and Faber, 1961) 8.
Aristotle, Poetics, ii.8, p. 163-165.
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Considering the people who are pitied, Aristotle observes that one pities people 
close to one’s self, such as acquaintances or friends. But if too close, as is the case 
with children, terror soon overwhelms pity. Pilate’s position as a ruler and the 
circumstances he encounters provides the basis for taking him as a serious character; 
yet his all too human responses ensure that he remains an object of pity. Our common 
humanity and the universal claims of Christ inevitably link Pilate and the reader 
together in a common predicament. Unlike Barabbas there is no escape by fiat. With 
fear and pity we recognize in ourselves the potential to act in a similar fashion.
However much Pilate arouses ten or, the corresponding tendency to pity prevents the 
reader from washing the hands of him completely.
Terror and pity together fonn a kind of tragic equilibrium.' '^  ^ I. A. Richards 
notes, “Pity, the impulse to approach, and Terror, the impulse to retreat, are brought in 
Tragedy to a reconciliation which they find nowhere else...”'^  ^ In a similar way, Joyce’s 
Dedalus observes.
The tragic emotion, in fact, is a face looking two ways, towards terror and 
towards pity, both of which are phases of it. You see I use the word 
arrest. I mean that the tragic emotion is static. Or rather the dramatic 
emotion is. The feelings excited by improper art are kinetic, desire or 
loathing. Desire urges us to possess, to go to something; loathing urges us 
to abandon, to go from something. The arts which excite them, 
pornographical or didactic, are therefore improper arts. The esthetic 
emotion (I use the general term) is therefore static. The mind is arrested 
and raised above desire and loathing...'*®
Leech, “Implications,” 164ff. Leech finds that, “tlie equilibrium of tragedy consists in a balancing of 
Terror with Pride, p. 171.
1. A. Richards, Principles o f Literary Criticism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1924) 245. On 
the combination of fear and pity Richards obseives, “Their union in an ordered single response is the 
catharsis by which Tragedy is recognized, whether Aristotle meant anything of this kind or not.” 
JoyQQ, Portrait, 178-9.
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If correct, all proper art produces or demands serious thought rather than producing 
action. Tragedy leads to contemplation rather than action. Othello is more than an 
object lesson in serpents and doves. Of course, the mind’s being arrested may result in 
prudent action, but this is a secondary effect.
As argued above, the FG presents a complex portrait of Pilate. The Roman 
governor is not so easily dismissed as a bad example alone. As 20:31 indicates, the FG 
clearly possesses a rhetorical purpose, a purpose given greater depth and power 
through the character of Pilate, a purpose not demeaned by creating a straw man out of 
Pilate and setting him alight. The full dignity, gravity, and awfulness of the human 
situation as confronted by the person of Jesus Chi ist is laid bare in Pilate.
A.2 CATHARSIS
Aristotle connects terror and pity with catharsis.'*  ^ Else remarks concerning 
catharsis, “‘Catharsis’ has come, for reasons that are not entirely clear, to be one of the 
biggest of the ‘big’ ideas in the field of aesthetics and criticism, the Mt. Everest or 
Kilimanjaro that looms on all literary horizons.” In spite of Else’s concern to 
reconnect the catharsis debate to Aristotle, his remark shows that the debate has 
forever escaped. The debate about catharsis presents a mountain best not climbed here, 
while a gaze is certainly in o r d e r . “Catharsis” in Aristotle is usually taken to mean
Aristotle, Poetics, vi.2, p.61.
Argument, 443.
A. D. Nuttall, Why Does Tragedy Give Pleasure? (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1996). see also, F. L. 
Lucas, Tragedy: Serious Drama in relation to Aristotle's Poetics (London: Cliafio and Windus, 1928). 
For a cogent survey of representative views, see Mark Packer, “Dissolving the Paradox of Tragedy,” 
7he Journal o f Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 47 (Summer, 1989) 211-219.
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something like ‘purgation’ or ‘purification,’ often thought to be dependent on a medical 
use of the term/® Nuttall offers a defense of this view and believes that Aristotle 
followed Plato in holding the emotions in low regard/* On this view, tragedy does not 
then purge something out of the emotions, but purges out the emotions themselves. 
Relying primarily on a linguistic argument. Else sees Aristotle’s ‘catharsis’ in relation 
to fear and pity, which Else, mistakenly, takes to be structural elements of the drama 
itself and confuses them with the dramatic effects/^ Lucas doubts that catharsis needs 
to be taken in the sense of purification or purgation and notes that Aristotle wrote the 
Poetics in the shadow of Plato’s negative remarks on poetry and drama. If this is the 
case and catharsis can be shown to have a positive social effect, tragedy in Aristotle’s 
day becomes much safer from attack. Leaving Aristotle behind, Lucas himself thinks 
the phenomenon known to us by the label ‘catharsis’ relates to an intensification of 
feeling or re-awakening of slumbering emotions. For Lucas, catharsis purges nothing 
but apathy.
Parts of these views may be constructively combined. If Nuttall’s reading of 
Aristotle is followed, fear and pity or any other emotion remain important only through 
their absence. This seems implausible in theory and impossible to accomplish in reality. 
Yet tragedy drains the emotions in some way. It seems better to see tragedy as purging 
certain elements of the emotions, more particularly certain types of fear and pity. Pity 
easily degenerates into sentimentality, a self-centered emotional reaction
^ Geoffrey Brereton, Principles o f Tragedy: A Rational Examination o f the Tragic Concept in Life 
and Literature (Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami Press, 1968) 28.
Nuttall, Tragedy, 8.
Argument, 230. The relevant sections in Aristotle’s Poetics are; ix. p. 70; xiii.2, p. 75.
53 Lucas, Tragedy, 50.
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disproportionate to the events involved. Likewise, fear often occurs out of proportion
to the object, either too much or too little. Tragedy purges the sentimentality from pity
and strips away insignificant fears by the presentation of an exceedingly fearful situation
in which fear and pity are directed to objects and situations of real fear and real pity.
The emotions undergo catharsis and are thereby refined through a furnace of reality
rather than through esoteric contemplation. Jaspers takes this a step fiirther and sees
tragedy as a “catharsis of the soul.” He writes.
It [tragedy] makes him more deeply receptive to reality, not merely as a 
spectator, but a man who is personally involved. It makes truth a part of us 
by cleansing us of all that in our everyday experience is petty, bewildering, 
and trivial—all that narrows us and makes us blind.
Incorporating Lucas’ idea of emotional reawakening , the ultimate effect is one of 
purification resulting in emotional and aesthetic vivification.
While remaining a historical figure, Pilate becomes symbolic for the impossible 
circumstances of the human race. Events relentlessly move him to an untenable 
position, one not possible to relieve by means of governmental skill. Yet Pilate’s 
desperate weakness does not allow us to forget that he is human. Through terror and 
pity characteristic of tragedy, Pilate attracts and terrifies, removing the insomnia of 
living thi'ough the fire of reality.
B) STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS OF TRAGEDY
“^^Karl Jaspers, “The Tragic: Awareness; Basic Characteristics; Fundamental Interpretations,” in 
Tragedy: Modern Essays in Criticism, ed. Laurence Michel and Richard Sewall, (Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1963) 12.
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There is no set mechanical structure for tragedy. If there were, creativity in 
tragedy writing would be something like filling in the blanks and turning a crank.
Indeed, The Poetics has been taken to be just such a literary ten commandments.®® 
Nevertheless, certain elements appear often and strongly enough in tragedy to merit 
their being designated as elements of tragedy. If taken in the weak sense of the word, 
such elements comprise what may be termed the “mechanics” of tragedy. In this sense, 
the discussion has moved from the audience to an analysis of what occurs on the stage 
itself, primarily composed of plot and character.
Concerned as it is with reoccurring elements in tragedy, a discussion of this 
type tends to be presented in the foim of a list. This is so because each element is listed 
and analyzed on its own terms in isolation (so far as is practical) from any relationship 
to the whole. Writers inevitably combine elements or present themes in various ways, 
yet the same elements or themes frequently reappear. To distinguish at all between 
particular works and to include a diversity of works in a single genre requires this to be 
the case. The various elements of tragedy differ in importance, but all fijnction as ways 
of getting things done rather than what tragedy attempts to do, means as opposed to 
ends. The discussion will proceed with an interaction with Aristotle’s Poetics and 
recognized tragic works as a way to move through a discussion of tragedy in relation to 
Pilate.
B.l PLOT
Steiner, Death, 18. Steiner notes tliat neoclassic tragedy, especially as seen in Racine, relied heavily 
on the authority of Aristotle’s Poetics.
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Most of The Poetics may be safely viewed as an analysis of elements of tragedy,
rather than a metaphysical analysis of what tragedy says about human life/® Aristotle
believed that every tragedy consisted of six qualities; plot, character, thought, diction,
spectacle, and song/^ Aristotle’s remarks on fear, pity, catharsis, the nature of the
tragic hero (neither wholly good or wholly bad) remain important in contemporary
discussions of tragedy as do the additional elements of recognition, the tragic error, and
action more important than character, which are all related to plot/^ As noted,
Aristotle held plot to be the most important. He offers three reasons for the supremacy
of plot over character.
But most important of all is the structure of the incidents. For Tragedy is 
an imitation, not of men, but of an action and of life, and life consists in 
action, and its end is a mode of action, not a quality.®^
Again, if you string together a set of speeches expressive of character, and 
well finished in point of diction and thought, you will not produce the 
essential tragic effect nearly so well as with a play which, however deficient 
in these respects, yet has a plot and artistically constructed incidents. 
Besides which, the most powerful elements of emotional interest in 
tragedy—peripeteia or reversal of the situation, and recognition scenes— are 
parts of the plot.®®
The Plot, then, is the first principle, and, as it were, the soul of a tragedy: 
Character holds the second place. A similar fact is seen in painting. The 
most beautiful colors, laid on confusedly, will not give as much pleasure as 
the chalk outline of a portrait. Thus Tragedy is the imitation of an action, 
and of the agents mainly with a view to the action.®*
‘^’Kaufmann, Tragedy, 3Iff.
Aristotle, Poetics, vi.7, p. 62. 
^ Brereton, Principles, 27. 
Aristotle, Poetics vi.9, p. 62. 
ibid., vi. 13-14, p. 63. 
‘"4bid.,vi.l5, p. 63.
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Defending Aristotle, Cornford states, “That action is primary, character secondary, 
seems to be true of any drama, ancient or modern, that can be called tragedy.”®^ 
Although plot must be connected in some way with the personalities of the characters 
to be tragic, the driving force of personality serves only to move the action down a 
certain path.®^  It must be observed that the Greeks emphasized plot over character 
more so than Shakespeare, who breathes into his characters a pervasive vitality.®'* The 
looseness of Shakespeare’s plots as compared to the Greek writers is a common 
observation, but even in Shakespeare plot is primary. Separation of character from plot 
transforms the chai acter into a separate personality abstracted from the confines and 
purposes of the text. If one cared to follow this path and imagine Hamlet strolling 
about Elsinore Castle arm in arm with his wife Ophelia, this fairyland Prince of 
Denmark ceases to be tragic altogether.®® Like Hamlet, one can scarcely imagine 
Oedipus apart from the events of the play’s plot.
Although differing in their precise formulations, both Hegel and Scheler see 
tragedy in terms of a clash of values or powers.®® Any clash must necessarily occur
Francis Cornford, The Origin o f Attic Comedy (London; Edward Arnold, 1914) 196.
Brereton, Principles, 46, notes the indissoluble connection between plot and character.
^ George Hegel, Lectures on Fine Art, vol. II. bans. T. M. Knox, (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1975) 1176-77.
Largely ridiculed today, this type of criticism gained influence through the work of A. C. Bradley. 
See A. C. Bradley, Shakespearean Tragedy: Lectures on Hamlet, Othello, King Lear, and Macbeth 
(London: Penguin Books, 1904). L. C. Knight offers a famous attack on Bradley in How Many 
Children Had Lady Macbeth, (Cambridge: The Minority Press, 1933). For a balanced discussion of 
the Bradley/anti-Bradley debate, see Dorthea Krook, Elements of Tragedy (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1969) 2 Iff. Otlier aspects of Bradley’s work remain important and influential. 
See A. C. Bradley, “Hegel’s Theory of Tragedy,” in Oxford Lectures on Poetiy. London; Macmillan, 
1919; 70-95.
Hegel, Aesthetics, 1158-1153. Kaufmami disputes Hegel’s notion of tragedy as a “collision of 
equally justified powers. Tragedy, 200-210. Max Scheler, “On the Tragic,” in Tragedy: Modern 
Essays in Criticism, ed. Laurence Michel and Richard Sewall, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 
1963) 27-44. Hegel and Scheler will be discussed in more detail below.
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within a relationship of events brought to life by means of plot. For Hegel, the inner 
qualities of an individual spring to life as “the actual execution of inner intentions and 
aims.”®^ Drama occurs during a clash of two such parties so that “the action has to 
encounter hindrances from other agents and fall into complications and oppositions 
where both sides struggle for success and control.”®^ Scheler notes, “It [tragedy] 
appears in the realm of changing values and circumstances. Something must happen 
for it to appear. There must be a period of time in which something is lost or 
destroyed”®® Brereton argues that tragedy is an exploration of the question of power 
by means of the tragic hero as exploratory agent. Tragedy necessarily takes the form 
of narrative sequence of events occurring through a duration of time. Indeed, an 
interesting story of any kind requires conflict, and conflict requires a plot. Without 
conflict there is no tragedy.
The greater importance of plot over character may be seen in the fact that some 
works of tragedy lack a clear central character. Leech wonders “whether, or to what 
extent, tragedy needs a tragic hero” and notes that “the tragic burden can be shared.” *^ 
For example, in Antigone, Creon rivals Antigone for our attention while Agamemnon 
offers Clytemenstra, Cassandra, and Agamemnon as tragic characters. In both cases 
these works are clearly tragic because the situation and turn of events, or plot, requires 
it.
Aesthetics,^. 1161. 
^ibid. 1162.
^Scheler, “Tragic,” 30.
Principles, 116ff. 
Leech, Tragedy, 43,46.
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The ascendancy of plot over character, however slight in some cases, is of no 
small importance when interpreting Pilate. John presents Pilate in a carefully structured 
way as if to emphasize the importance of plot and events. The outside/inside back and 
forth scheme allows John to use the carefully mark the discourse development and to 
control character development. Some interpretation of Pilate appears similar to 
Bradley’s treatment of Shakespeare’s characters in abstracting Pilate from a structured 
order of events as presented in the FG.^  ^ Seen fi om the end result of his conduct 
alone, especially when viewed through the safety of time, Pilate appears weak and 
reprehensible. The sequence of events revealed in the plot functions to both expose 
Pilate’s weakness and vulnerability in the face of powers he neither knows or 
understands and to reveal his strength as he grows in knowledge and understanding of 
these very forces as they threaten to destroy him. Unlike the hero of romance who 
commands events thi ough strength of character, events for Pilate reveal his naked self 
and drive him to ruin. Had Pilate been completely weak he would have folded 
immediately. If character were more important than plot in this case, Pilate’s character 
qualities would drive the movement of events, and this is manifestly not the case.
Aristotle notes that a tragedy must be complete and whole, by which he means 
having a beginning, middle, and end.^  ^ He writes, “A beginning is that which does not 
itself follow anything by causal necessity, but after which something naturally is or 
comes to be.” '^* In the case of Pilate, the reader needs to know nothing about him until 
events burst through his door. The story of Pilate is in this respect self contained, yet
see above and note 52. 
Aristotle, Poetics, vii, pp. 65-6.
74 ibid., 65.
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the story in which Pilate finds himself begins much earlier. On the terms of John 1:1 
the stoiy began in eternity past.^ ® Information available then and now about the Pilate 
of history further complicates the question of a beginning point.
Any work of literature assumes a certain body of knowledge and this is 
particularly true in the case of tragedy. Greek tragedies often used familiar materials, 
usually drawn from the Greek epics, with each author shaping the material for his own 
purposes. Shakespeare explicitly relied on familiar historical material for many of his 
plays, for example Julius Caesar and Antony and Cleopatra, and made general use in 
other cases, for example m. Macbeth. However helpful, the mere fact of historical or 
literary precedence need not demand the reader’s awareness of them. A thorough 
knowledge of the real Macbeth adds little to an appreciation o i Macbeth the tragedy.
As noted above, knowledge of Pilate derived from historical reconstruction can cmsh 
an appreciation of the FG’s presentation of that same figure. At the same time a 
knowledge of the FG’s claims about Jesus is essential. If the rest of the FG, or even 
the canon of Scripture as a whole, is taken as analogous to the background the epics of 
Homer supplied for Greek tragedy, the tragedy of Pilate may be said to begin with his 
encounter with Jesus at his trial. For, as Hegel notes, eveiy action may have numerous 
presuppositions but the real action begins when the conflict actually breaks out.^ ® In 
terms of dramatic structure and the FG’s presentation of Pilate, the story begins at the 
trial.
Culpeppper notes “....historical analepses in John enrich the narrative by extending it back to the 
beginning of time and by tying it to tlie central events in tlie larger biblical story.” Culpepper, 
Anatomy, 58.
Hegel, Aesthetics, 1169.
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Continuing his discussion of plot, Aristotle writes “An end, on the contraiy, is 
that which itself naturally follows some other thing, either by necessity, or as a rule, but 
has nothing following it. A middle is that which follows something as some other thing 
follows it.”^^  The determination of an ending point in the story of Pilate in the FG is 
more problematic. The end in the drama of Pilate is best located in 19:22 where Pilate 
peevishly responds to the Jewish leaders’ request to change the sign with, “What I have 
written, I have written.” Beyond this, Pilate ceases to be the center of any dramatic 
action. Although dramatic on its own terms, the crucifixion is in a sense anticiimactic 
because, after the trial, (or after Gethsamane), nothing remains to be decided. Pilate is 
mentioned later in connection with the request of the Jews to remove the crucified 
bodies before the Sabbath and in connection with Joseph of Aiimathea’s request for the 
body itself. In both cases he appears removed fi-om the action and says nothing, merely 
the locus of perfunctory bureaucratic authority.
Although comprising only 35 verses and therefore relatively brief, John presents 
Pilate with an economy, structure, and precision that demands thoughtful reflection. 
Aristotle notes that a tragedy should be neither too brief nor too long; if too brief the 
events will seem to never gather their power, if too long the events will loose a sense of 
unity. But these requirements have more to do with the concentration of emotional 
effect rather than with the nature of tragedy itself. The account of Pilate with its 
definite structure and sequence of events certainly has the potential for a play. As 
noted, Shakespeare made frequent use of historical material. Aristotle observes “And
Aristotle, Poetics, vii.3, p. 65.
ibid., vii.4-7, p. 66. Kaxifmann in his definition of tragedy calls for tiagedy to be about two to four 
hours long and the experience to be “highly concentrated.” Kaufmaiui, Tragedy, 85.
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even if he [the poet] chances to take an historical subject, he is none the less a poet; for 
there is no reason why some events that have actually happened should not conform to 
the law of the probable and possible.. It does no violence to John’s Gospel if its 
presentation of Pilate happens to be material readily suited for tragedy.
Concerning sequence, Aristotle wrote, “I call a plot ‘episodic’ in which the 
episodes or acts succeed one another without probable or necessary sequence.” ®^ For 
all its structure, John’s account of Pilate cannot be said to be merely episodic as might 
be said of a sequence of pericopes characteristic of the Synoptics. Unlike romance, 
event produces event within a definite cause and effect relationship until the action 
reaches completion when Pilate capitulates.
Surely to the delight of Aristotle, the events of the trial unfold in such a way so
as to effect a reversal and a recognition. For Aristotle,
Reversal of the situation is a change by which the action veers round to its 
opposite...Recognition is ...a change from ignorance to knowledge...The 
best form of recognition is coincident with a reversal of the situation, as in 
Oedipus.^ ^
Pilate begins as the person in charge, Caesar’s appointed agent ruling with all the 
authority of Rome. From him the Jews seek permission to punish one of their own in 
regards to a religious dispute. However well intentioned and innocent his action, 
Pilate’s fall from power begins as soon as he agrees to the Jew’s request to meet them 
on their turf. Here he makes initial contact with the sticky web of circumstance that 
will be his doom. As he proceeds to investigate the charges against Jesus, Pilate, like
’^Aristotle, Poetics, ix.9, p. 69.
®°ibid.,ix.lO, p.69.
81 ibid., xi.1-2, p. 72.
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Oedipus, begins an ignorant quest for the truth. As events proceed, Pilate unwittingly 
moves from investigating the truth of what he thinks is something else, (i.e. the charges 
against Jesus), to an investigation of which he himself is the subject. Like Pilate, 
Oedipus begins by searching for the source of the curse on the city only to have himself 
and his life’s circumstances revealed. Through his questioning of Jesus regarding 
Jesus’ status as a king, Pilate exposes himself as one who is not really the ruler in 
charge. Beuchner writes, “...and what Jesus hits Pilate over the head with is Pilate 
himself. Jesus just stands there in silence in a way that throws Pilate back on his own 
silence, the truth of himself.”®^ The situation is precisely the opposite of what Pilate 
supposed. As events press the matter frirther, Pilate finds himself unable to cope, not 
only with the truth itself, but with questions about the truth as well. However 
comforting an enabling they may have been, the past paradigms by which Oedipus and 
Pilate lived their lives no longer function as adequate.
Worst of all, Pilate discovers too late that the man upon whom he must pass 
judgment is in some sense divine, entitled by birth and divine right to be “King of the 
Jews.” No doubt Aristotle would have delighted in this element of surprise and reversal 
being simultaneously bound up in the recognition of a person’s true identity. Pilate’s 
recognition of Jesus and the impossible nature of his own true situation occur at the 
same time, a time too late to extricate himself from the situation. The Roman ruler 
who began in a position of authority is undermined from below through the
Culpepper, 95. Larry Bouchard. Tragic Method and Tragic Theology: Evil in
Contemporary Drama and Religious Thought (University Park and London; The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1989) 35.
^^Buechner, Telling the Truth, 17.
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manipulations of the subject Jews, undermined from above by the divine authority of 
the one who gave him his authority from above mediated through the Roman 
establishment, and undermined from within by his own ignorance and failure to manage 
the situation to a satisfactory conclusion. More horrible than Oedipus, whose actions 
are past and therefore irrevocable, Pilate confronts future participation in the death of 
his own ‘Father,’ God himself come in the flesh. Pilate’s reversal is complete.®'*
In a similar fashion, the trial sequence brings about the reversal of the Jews.
The Jews, presumably, begin in a position of opposition to Pilate and Roman rule. As 
heirs of the Old testament law they recognize the ascendancy of God alone and enjoy a 
special relationship with him as a “kingdom of priests.” As adherents and zealous 
practitioners of the law of God, they wish to avoid ceremonial impurity during the 
Passover and request Pilate to meet them on their own ground. But in their desire to 
prosecute their claims against Jesus, they implicate themselves. They reject Pilate’s 
offer of the true king of the Jews and choose in his place the infamous Barabbas. 
Having chosen poorly once, Pilate offers them a second choice, Christ or Caesar, a 
choice that events have forced an unwilling Pilate to make for himself. In presenting 
the Jews with their leader as he invites them to “behold your king”, Pilate is fully aware 
of his actions and offers their king in part as a taunt.®® The Jews respond with 
enthusiastic self implication, “We have no king but Caesar,” in effect claiming to be 
more loyal to Caesar than Pilate. The Patriarch Abraham initiated a long history of
Commenting on peripeteia, or tragic reversal, Lucas notes, “the tragic effect of hmnan effort 
producing exactly tlie opposite result to its intentions, this irony of human blindness...” Lucas, 
Tragedy, 113.
^^Duke,/ra«y, 135.
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Jewish conflicts with the secular gentile rulers; ironically his descendants proclaim 
loyalty to the very king who dominates them while disowning the long promised 
Messiah.
The position of the Jews is completely reversed but no recognition occurs. 
Unlike Pilate, the Jews never waver and fail to realize the irony of their declaration of 
loyalty to Caesar. Pilate begins in ignorance and ends in knowledge while the Jews, 
who should have begun in knowledge, persevere in their ignorance to the end. Pilate 
begins in power and ends in weakness while the Jews begin in weakness and end in 
power. Yet Pilate appears somewhat noble in defeat, having offered some display of 
integrity, justice, and appropriate feai*, while the Jews achieve a victory that the author 
and reader know to be ashes in their hands.
Having seen how the story of Pilate fits with a Aristotelian conception of 
tragedy and plot, Pilate may be seen as similar to Shakespearean patterns of tragedy as 
well. Frye notes three pervading patterns of Shakespearean tragedy, patterns that may 
usefirlly be applied to the present discussion of plot and will serve to illustrate the 
complexity of Pilate’s situation.®® In the first pattern, tragedies of order, an authority 
figure is killed by a rebel figure who is then pursued by a nemesis figure. The central 
figure of the tragedy may vary among categories. For example, Hamlet is a nemesis 
while Macbeth is a rebel. Pilate fits this pattern if events are viewed as potential with 
Christ being the authority figure, the Jews being the rebels, and Pilate the nemesis.
Like Hamlet, Pilate proves inadequate as a nemesis; the rush of events overwhelm both
Northrop Frye, Fools o f Time: Studies in Shakespearean Tragedy (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press. 1967).
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and erodes their untenable neutrality. Neither finds the rush of events a convenient 
time to explore questions of philosophy or theology.
Frye’s second pattern, tragedies of passion, feature a conflict between the world 
of passion and the world of order. For example, Antony and Cleopatra depicts 
Antony’s struggle between the order of Rome and the passion of Egypt. Pilate fits this 
category provided one requires no romantic interest and sees him as caught between 
the passion of the crowds outside and the inside order controlled by Christ. Antony 
and Pilate are both real Roman rulers governing subject countries who physically move 
between two worlds, Antony between Rome and Egypt and Pilate between the Jews 
and Jesus. Both toil under the ever present gaze of Caesar. Each tries to have it both 
ways: Antony attempts to ease his situation by marrying Caesar’s sister yet continues in 
his desire for his “Egyptian dish”; Pilate attempts to ease his situation through the 
release of Barabbas and the flogging of Jesus yet persists in his desire to placate the 
Jews. Perhaps against their training and better judgment the Dionysian defeats the 
Apollian.®  ^ For both men, the world of order refuses to go away. Christ, like Caesar, 
demands ultimate loyalty.
The third pattern in Frye’s scheme, tragedies of isolation, present the central 
figure as misunderstanding the inner workings of the world resulting in isolation and 
destmction. For example, Lear reaps the consequences of bestowing his kingdom on 
his treacherous daughters and Timon of Athens manifests the consequences of 
unguarded generosity. Timon, Lear, and Pilate display inadequate knowledge of the
Frederick, Nietzsche, The Birth o f Tragedy, tians. Shaun Whitside (Penguin Books, 1993). 
Nietzsche saw tragedy as tlie fusion of the Dionysian world of passion with tlie Apollian world of 
order.
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true inner workings of the world. Consequently, the world passes them by and crushes 
them in the process. A profoundly theological world confronts Pilate who employs 
futile pragmatic means to manage events. Awareness of the past, planning for the 
future, and ad hoc management of current human events comprise critical skills for the 
management of one’s own life and for civilization itself. When confronted with real, 
transcendent realities, these skills prove useless for Pilate and by implication, for others 
who would employ them for similar ends.
B.2 CHARACTER
While difficult to remove entirely from a treatment of plot, character merits its 
own separate discussion. It was noted above that a tragedy need not have a single 
tragic figure. While this is true, it remains true that most tragedies have one central 
figure who commands most of our attention. Thus, the notion of a tragic hero remains 
important for our discussion. Aristotle believed that the tragic hero to be of a certain 
type, neither too good or too bad and discusses the suitability of four types for tragedy 
based on their conformity to a certain type of plot.*  ^ First, the change in fortune of a 
virtuous man moving from prosperity to adversity is unsuitable because it “merely 
shocks us.” Second, a bad man passing from adversity to prosperity possesses no
^ MacRae observes, “In any case Pilate plays tlie role of an ironical figure. Here I do not refer 
primarily to his famous question, “Wliat is truth?” (18.38), which may or may not be sarcastic. Indeed 
if one sees in Pilate a symbol of tlie power of tlie state it might be better miderstood as not sarcastic at 
all but as reflecting the incapacity of tlie state to deal witli issues involving tlie truth as Jesus reveals it 
from the Father.” G. MacRae, “Theology and Irony in the Fourth Gospel” in Mark Stibbe ed. The 
Gospel o f John as Literature: An Anthology o f Twentieth-Century Perspectives, NT tools and studies 
17. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993, 110.
Aristotle, Poetics, xii, p. 75-77.
^  Lucas quips “The objection to perfect characters is not that tlieir misfortunes aie unbearable; it is 
rather that they tend to be unbearable themselves.” Lucas, Tragedy, 30.
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quality of tragedy because “it neither satisfies the moral sense nor calls fourth pity or 
fear.” Third, the destruction of a villain is unsuitable for tragedy because it would 
“satisfy the moral sense, but it would inspire neither pity nor fear.” Judas Iscariot is an 
example of the third type; his actions are terrible and inspire little or no pity. Regarding 
the fourth type, Aristotle notes that “There remains, then, the character between these 
two extremes—that of a man who is not eminently good and just, yet whose misfortune 
is brought about not by vice or depravity, but by some error or f ra i l ty .Given  this 
criteria, Jesus can hardly be considered tragic.
The first three character types fail as tragic heroes because they all express a 
certain one dimensional view of human existence. The first two express a character 
who retains all essential elements of his or her character and moves through a 
progression of circumstances in which the inner of qualities of the character need not 
be expressed at all. For example a good and just farmer may be ruined by drought 
while a corrupt and dishonest one may be blessed with abundance. The inner qualities 
of the individuals remain divorced from their own involvement in their external 
circumstances. In other words, character remains aloof from plot. These do not make 
for suitable tragic heroes. The villain, the third type, is rightfully blamed for his or her 
own conduct. The fourth type of character, neither too good nor too bad, cannot be 
easily dismissed by being entirely responsible for his or her own actions nor be merely 
the victim or beneficiary of circumstances entirely beyond their control. Aristotle 
believed plot to be more important than character, yet in stressing that a tragic 
character be neither too good nor too bad he ensures that the character will be
Aristotle, Poetics, xii.3. p. 76.
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somehow involved with the plot through inner generation of his or her own actions. 
Indeed, Aristotle offers his comments on character in the context of a discussion of 
plot. The tragic hero must respond to and be in some degree responsible for a situation 
and its development.
So far it has been argued that Pilate deserves to be called tragic on the basis of 
plot and that in tragedy, plot is to varying degrees more important than character.
Given Aristotle’s character types, Pilate certainly does not fit the first two; he is 
certainly not a virtuous man moving from prosperity to adversity nor is he a bad man 
moving in the other direction. And it is difficult to see Pilate as a villain alone, for 
villains do not make sincere attempts to fi*ee an innocent man and do so contrary to 
their own earthly self interest. While there is plenty of room to debate the degree to 
which he does so, Pilate clearly fits the fourth categoiy best. The Roman governor can 
neither be entirely blamed nor exonerated for his actions. The more clearly blame can 
be traced to its definitive source, the more fleeting is the presence of tragedy.^^ 
Character and plot mix in Pilate’s case as he finds himself caught in a situation and yet 
moves it along as his character is expressed and revealed.
The tragic hero is usually a person of high degree, one who in Aristotle’s words 
is “highly renowned and p r osper ous . Gi ven  their increased responsibility, authority, 
and potential consequences of their actions, kings and rulers provide more appropriate 
subjects for tragedy than persons of lower status in society. Frye observes that in all 
tragedies there is the presence of a heroic quality in the central figure or figures, a great
^ Scheler notes tliat to the extent a clear and definite answer exists to the question “Who is guilty?”, 
corresponds to the sense of the tiagic being absent. Scheler, “Tragic,” 38.
Aristotle, Poetics, xii.3. p. 76.
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capacity for doing and action. This heroic action “is above the normal limits of 
experience” and “suggests the infinite imprisoned in the f in i t e .Elsewhere  Frye 
notes,
If superior in degree to other men but not to his natural environment, the 
hero is a leader. He has authority, passions, and powers of expression far 
greater than ours, but what he does is subject both to social criticism and to 
the order of nature. This is the hero of the high mimetic mode, of most 
epic and tragedy, and is primarily the kind of hero that Aristotle had in 
mind.^ ^
Frye’s assessment reflects widely held assumptions about tragedy. And herein lies the 
greatest obstacle to Pilate’s status as a tragic character, Pilate may be seen to lack 
adequate power of action, lack power of authority, and lack adequate powers of 
expression. For someone in a position of authority and at least potentially above and 
beyond the ordinary, Pilate seems all too human, a man unsure of his authority, unsure 
of Ms real power, unsure of himself.
This assessment of Pilate is at least partly due to the nature of the plot in wMch 
he is featured. The action has already begun (as seen in John and the Synoptics and 
the fact that the Jews bring Jesus to Pilate) and Pilate is swept away by events. 
However firmly or weakly he holds them, Pilate’s pretensions to power and authority 
stand ready to be ripped fi"om his hands. Pilate appears weak only when no 
consideration is given to how others might have fared when facing similar challenges. 
Pilate finds himself in médias res as do Oedipus and Hamlet. In consequence, events 
destroy Pilate and expose his weakness without the mediating effect of character
'^'Fiye, Fools, 5.
^^Frye, Anatomy, 33-34.
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revelation expressed in antecedent action. Pilate appears without benefit of 
sympathetic glimpses into his personal life wherein the reader might have witnessed 
discussions with his wife regarding her propensity to dream or his personal anguish 
over the intractability of Herod.
Additionally, ambiguities of character manifest in Pilate are precisely the stuff 
that tragedy is made of. The mixed nature of the tragic hero allows for the tragic 
expression of the ambiguities, paradoxes, and contraries inherent to human life. 
Characters with no such ambiguities are either nearly or completely good or bad and 
therefore inappropriate for tragedy. In this respect Pilate is no different than the 
hesitating Hamlet or the faltering Macbeth. Pilate confronts Jesus and his accusers 
with inadequate knowledge, a growing knowledge to be sure, but his knowledge grows 
at a rate behind the growing demands of his circumstances. Pilate might well have 
profited fi*om Nietzsche’s dictum that “Understanding kills action, action depends on a 
veil of illusion. Instead he fails to act in the meantime in which ignorance might 
have been a blessing. Like Hamlet and Oedipus, Pilate is caught in the twilight zone of 
knowing both too much and too little and is all the more human and all the more tragic 
for being so.
B.3 HAMARTIA
Aristotle mentions the much discussed notion of the tragic flaw or haniartia in 
a context primarily treating plot but having a significant discussion of character as
^Nietzsche, Birth of Tragedy, 39
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well.^  ^ In this respect the discussion of hamartia offers another appropriate 
transitional link between plot and character. Hamartia is generally taken to be some 
sort of moral failing or an error with no explicitly moral connotations. The fact that the 
New Testament uses hamartia to designate “sin” has complicated discussions of 
Aristotle as many have sought to flood the Greeks with Christianity via that lexical 
porthole. Else notes that most moderns prefer the interpretation of hamartia as error 
when used in a Greek context.^^ He begins by noting that Aristotle’s mention of 
hamartia occurs in a discussion of plot, although, as mentioned above, character is 
significant here as well.^  ^ Arguing on the basis of Aiistotle’s Ethics, Else believes that 
Aristotle had in mind actions resulting from ignorance, in particular actions stemming 
fiom ignorance of details rather than ignorance of general principles.^ ®® For Else, 
then, hamartia is a detail of plot.
Like the debate about catharsis, debate about hamartia rages in flagrant
disproportion to what Aiistotle actually wrote about it. It is perhaps best to take an
approach like Kaufinann’s. He writes,
And his (Aristotle’s) main point probably was that the suffering that evokes 
our phobos and eleos should neither be patently deserved nor totally 
unconnected with anything that those stricken have done; the great tragic 
figures are active men and women who perform some memorable deeds 
that bring disaster down upon them; they are not passive and, in that sense, 
innocent bystanders. But they are more good than bad and hence stir our 
sympatliies.^®^
Aristotle, Poetics, xiii. 
^ Else, Argument, 378.
^  Aristotle, Poetics, xiii.4-6, p. 76.
°^®Else, Argument, 383. For example, Otliello is ignorant of lago’s treachery and liis wife’s innocence 
and not ignorant of general principles, laws, or social customs prohibiting tlie killing of one’s wife. 
Kaufmann, Tragedy, 68-69.
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Likewise, Lucas sees hamartia as more of a “false step taken in blindness.” ®^^ Taking 
hamartia in this manner allows it to be thought of as something within or done by the 
character of the tragic hero that allows the plot to proceed as it does. Without 
something being amiss somewhere in the character or the history of his or her actions, 
nothing remains to be tested or exposed, and the doom of the hero is made to appear 
arbitrary and capricious. Ultimately, tragedy does not depend on the moral status of 
the tragic hero.^ ®^
Pilate’s hamartia may be seen as his ignorance of the true identity of Jesus 
rather than ignorance of general principles or blatant immoral behavior. The Jews 
strategically allow Pilate to continue in ignorance of Jesus’ claims of Divinity. Only 
when well into the encounter do they announce “We have a law, and according to that 
law he must die, because he claimed to be the Son of God.” (19:7) The fact that Pilate 
proceeds in ignorance is not to say that he escapes blame; Pilate is ultimately 
responsible for his own actions. Rather, as the trial of Jesus as presented in the FG 
begins, Pilate enters this situation in a state of relative ignorance and innocence. As a 
gentile ruler, Pilate may be excused for not being thoroughly familiar with what he 
considers a Jewish religious dispute. Speculations about what Pilate may or may not 
have known about Jesus are inconclusive and foreign to the purposes of the FG.
But as Pilate grows in knowledge, the more he responsible becomes. As noted, 
the basis of his involvement moves from initial questions of a political/judicial nature 
(ruling on simple guilt or innocence; 18:29-32) to questions regarding authority (the
Lucas, Tragedy, 130. 
Anatomy, 38.
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fact and nature of Jesus’ kingship and authority; 18;33-37a) to philosophical (questions 
about truth with Jesus claiming to be on the side of Truth 18:37b) to metaphysical and 
theological (the source of power and the true divine nature of Jesus Christ; 19:7-11). 
While the Jews control the demands on the outside, Jesus controls the course of the 
conversation inside, all the while moving Pilate along in his understanding. As Pilate’s 
knowledge and involvement increases, likewise his level of desperation rises as he 
attempts to be rid of Jesus and avoid a real choice. He begins by rejecting 
responsibility for Jesus altogether (“Take him yourselves and judge him by your own 
law.” 18:31); then in a serious misreading of the situation he offers the Jews the choice 
of Jesus or Barabbas (18:38-40); and finally in pathetic desperation he has Jesus 
flogged and permits his mocking (19:1-5). Pilate’s growth in knowledge moves him 
from the Greek sense of hamartia as ignorance or “false step taken in blindness” to 
more of a Christian sense of hamartia as sin or moral choice.
B.4 TRAGEDY IN GREEK AND CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE
In his treatment of Greek tragedy in general, Hesla seeks to compare and 
contrast some of the important elements of Greek and Christian tragedy. He notes 
that in Greek tragedy, the hero inhabits a moira, a sphere of influence governed by a set 
of laws, or dike. The frequently reckless pursuit of arete, or excellence, often leads one 
to commit a hamartia, an error. The plot commences when a clash occurs between 
various moirai. Hesla notes, “Being finite and ignorant, mortals cannot know in
David Hesla, “Greek and Clirlstian tragedy: Notes Tow^d a Theology of Literaiy History.” ed. 
Robert Detweüer {JAAR Thematic Studies XLIX, 1983) 71-87.
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advance the limits that dike has set to their m orai”^^  ^ One can probe the limits of life 
and answer its questions only through experience and thereby gain wisdom. One’s 
ignorance can be exposed through action and result in shame. Hesla notes that in 
contrast, the Christian tragedy presents the hero with a fairly well defined choice 
between good and evil, a circumstance seen most clearly in Macbeth’s decision to 
murder Duncan. Pilate spans Hesla’s conceptions of both Greek and Christian tragedy. 
The Roman governor’s hamartia rests on his unavoidable and ignorant foray into a 
world where God becomes all too real. And having once entered this world he 
confronts moral and metaphysical choices that cannot be divorced from the world he 
left behind.
Developing a thesis similar to Hesla’s, W. H. Auden offers his own comparison 
and contrast of Greek and Christian tragedy. For Auden, Greek tragedy is the 
tragedy of necessity while Christian tragedy is the tragedy of possibility. Thus,
Oedipus the King stirs the response “What a pity it had to be this way,” while Macbeth 
prompts one to ask “What a pity it was this way when it might have been 
otherwise. In the case of Pilate, the Greek sense that “it had to be this way” stems 
from the fact that Pilate held the reins of human power while the Jews brought Christ 
liis way to be crucified. And because his decision lies in the future in the terms of the 
story itself, Pilate’s ultimate betrayal of Jesus provokes Auden’s Cliristian response to
106 W. H. Auden, “The Christian Tragic Hero; Contrasting Captain Ahab’s Doom and its Classic 
Greek Prototype,” in Tragedy: Modern Essays in Criticism, ed. Lamence Michel and Richard Sewall, 
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1963) 234-238.
‘'’’ ibid., 234.
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tragedy by making one ponder that “it might have been otherwise.” Given Auden’s 
analysis, Pilate is tragic in both a Greek and Christian sense.
Auden also compares and contrasts the differing Greek and Christian
conceptions of hubris or the tragic flaw. He writes.
The hubris which is the flaw in the Greek hero’s chatacter is the illusion of 
a man who knows liimself strong and believes that nothing can shake that 
strength, while the corresponding Christian sin of Pride is the illusion of a 
man who knows himself weak but believes he can by his own efforts 
transcend that weakness and become strong.
Thus, Oedipus’ secure position as mler of the city and husband to Jocasta is destroyed 
while Macbeth’s attempt at worldly advancement betrays the weakness inherent in his 
character. Pilate is somewhere in the middle. As the Roman ruler he begins in a 
position of strength, but given his later display of weakness, the reader is free to 
wonder how secure Pilate believed himself to be. Yet he does begin as the man in 
charge even though events expose the depth of his weakness. Rather than trying to 
transcend his weakness and become strong, Pilate wishes to maintain the illusion of 
strength to the Jews, Romans, and Jesus- and to himself.
Although doubtless more could be said in regard to Pilate and elements of 
tragedy, the proceeding discussion is sufficient to show that Pilate may be rightfully 
called an archetypal tragic character. The very nature of his situation, moving from 
ignorance to having to condemn or release the incarnate God, certainly commands 
attention as offering great potential for tragedy. Beyond the general facts of the 
situation, Pilate possesses a tragic flaw and undergoes a tragic recognition. Tragedy has
108 ibid.
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a certain effect on the audience and achieves this through certain common elements of 
structure. The essential elements of tragedy are present in the FG’s portrayal of Pilate.
C CONCEPTUAL ELEMENTS OF TRAGEDY
C.l. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
In discussing tragedy so far, elements of audience reaction have been 
considered followed by a discussion of the elements of tragic drama itself. In other 
words, we have moved from the audience to the drama as it might appear on stage.
This section moves to an examination of the conceptual stage on which the drama is 
performed. If tragedy is to be more than simply an art form that follows a general 
format to achieve a certain effect, it must express something true about the world. And 
to do so in a way that is recognizably “tragic,” it must treat common tragic themes. A 
discussion of the conceptual elements in tragedy attempts to make explicit through 
criticism and analysis what is implicit in most works of tragedy. Such a discussion is 
necessarily more interpretive and more widely disputed. It need not imply metaphysical 
and theological concerns or transcendence, but need not avoid them either.
In proceeding in a conceptual study tragedy something needs to be said about 
procedure. In her book, Elements o f Tragedy, Krook offers some helpful preliminary 
remarks on method."® She notes the common criticism of any attempt to find the 
common elements of tragedy that finds any such attempt to result in clumsy, trivial, or
Preston Roberts, “A Cliristian Theory of Dramatic Tragedy,” The Journal o f Religion, 31 (January, 
1951) 1-20. Roberts notes tliat tragedy makes tlie implicit explicit and tlie explicit implicit.
“ '’Krook, Elements, 1-7.
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false generalizations/" Circularity of knowledge, that recurring problem, raises
another obstacle, concerning which Krook observes: “For we cannot come to our
search for the universal elements of tragedy without some notion, however imperfectly
grasped and analyzed, of what tragedy is; and we cannot make our selection except in
the light of this notion.’" "  Studies of natural science suffer the same limitation. In
response Krook notes the following,
[a distinction] derived from Plato, between “knowledge” (“science”) and 
“opinion,” where opinion is a body of intuitive, unanalyzed perception and 
judgment which is transformed into knowledge when and only when it has 
been fully articulated, analyzed and systematized....It [Krook’s study] 
attempts to articulate more frilly, precisely, and systematically the elements 
we in practice (as opinion) recognize as the universal elements of tragedy; 
and insofar as it succeeds in doing so, it renders explicit the implicit criteria 
we employ in judging this or that work to be tragic..."^
Thus any study beyond a mere empirical list must at some point make a connection 
between two or more relevant facts in such a way as to be illuminating beyond the 
brute facts themselves. At the same time the integrity of each discrete unit must be 
maintained.
A purely phenomenological approach to tragedy is inadequate in the sense of 
being incomplete. This approach typically sees tragedy as simply the display of human 
suffering or discussion of the mechanics of drama. Kaufmann may be taken as broadly 
representative of this kind of approach. Writing in Tragedy and Philosophy, Kaufinann 
stresses an empirical approach, one that analyzes many individual works of tragedy and
“ ‘Raymond Williams makes tliis claim, (discussedbelow), mModem Tragedy (London: The Hogarth 
Press, 1966, 1992)
Elements, 5.
“ ^ibid. 6.
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arrives at limited conclusions verified by their applicability. Kaufinann’s definition of
tragedy is as follows,
Tragedy is (1) form of literature that (2) presents a symbolic action as 
performed by actors and (3) moves into center immense human suffering,
(4) in such a way that it brings to our minds our own forgotten and 
repressed sorrows as well as those of our kin and humanity, (5) releasing 
us with some sense (a) that suffering is universal-not a mere accident in our 
experience, (b) that courage and endurance in suffering or nobility in 
despair are admirable-not ridiculous- and usually also (c)that fates worse 
than our own can be experienced as exhilarating. (6) In length, 
performances range fiom a little under two hours to about four, and the 
experience is highly concentrated.""^
An empirical description coupled with existential concerns form the substance of 
Kaufinann’s definition. Reflecting an ongoing concern for emotional aspects of life, 
elsewhere he writes of his suspicion of theology as a whole and philosophy removed 
fiom personal experience."^ Consequently, Kaufinann offers no ideas derived from 
tragedies that may, in his opinion, divorce tragedy fi om experience. At the same time 
he offers no theory that may illuminate the tragedies themselves. While Kaufinann 
carefully supports his definition, it is in the end mere description, perhaps accurate, but 
unhelpful in advancing our understanding of tragedy as a genre in any significant 
degree. Kaufinann’s definition lacks the penetration and illumination characteristic of a 
good theory and displays the weakness of too great a stress on experience. Elsewhere 
he offers, for example, a cogent interpretation of Oedipus the King that moves beyond
“ '‘Kaufmann, Tragedy, 85.
Walter Kaufmann Critique o f Religion and Philosophy London: Faber and Faber 1958; Religions 
in Four Dimensions: Existential, Aesthetic, Historical, Comparative (New York: Reader’s Digest 
Press). Commenting on his Critique he writes that he argued that “the importance of beliefs was 
widely overestimated, that tlieology was one of the worst aspects of religion, and that it was wrong to 
dissociate religion from experience...” Four Dimensions, 14.
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the empirical and phenomenological while his definition itself remains restricted and 
limited.
Nevertheless, the existential aspects and audience response aspects of tragedy 
remain important, especially regarding evil and suffering. But at what stage do they 
become important and why are they significant? A critical divide in the study of 
tragedy may be expressed by the following two questions: does tragedy merely express 
the brute facts of evil, suffering, human nature, and the human condition and thereby 
make us more existentially aware of them? Or, does tragedy express something about 
the way things are in and of themselves that cause events to result in evil and 
suffering?"^ More comprehensive, the second approach sees the concern for audience 
response as derivative of rather than divorced fi'om the conceptual and will be the 
approach taken here.
The attempt to analyze tragedy in a conceptual way meets with other problems
and objections. Writing from a Marxist point of view, Williams opposes any attempt to
abstract tragedy from the particular circumstances that produced it. He writes,
Tragedy is then not a single and kind of fact, but a series of experiences 
and conventions and institutions. It is not a case of interpreting this series 
by reference to a permanent and unchanging human nature. Rather, the 
varieties of tragic experience are to be interpreted by reference to the 
changing conventions and institutions. The universalist character of most 
tragic theory is then at the opposite pole from our necessary interest."®
“ ‘’Kaufnianii, Tragedy, 102-133.
Reflecting this division in approaches to tragedy, Palmer separates critical approaches to tragedy 
into tliree groups; tliose emphasizing audience response, tliose emphasizing some sort of dualistic 
chasm, and tliose tliat see tragedy as the flowering of tlie human spirit. See, Tragedy and Tragic 
Theory: An Analytical Gidde, (Westport, Coimecticut: Greenwood Press, 1992).
Williams, Modern Tragedy, 45-46.
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For Williams, tragedy is not something that can be abstracted from a particular time, 
place, and intellectual milieu. To isolate tragedy in this fashion and say “this is tragedy” 
reflects the ideological stance of the person and age making that claim. Rather, tragedy 
and its interpretation displays a developing, organic quality bound up in its times, a 
reflection of a changing cultural and intellectual climate. By connecting tragedy with its 
context, Williams sees tragedy itself and the fluctuations of the interpretation of tragedy 
as reflecting ideological and social concerns of the age that produced them. Any 
attempt to isolate “the tragic” reduces tragedy to an assertion of ideology reflecting 
concerns of that particular age."^
In response, it must be noted that Williams’ own assertions are inevitably 
ideological and reflect his own Marxist concerns, thereby falling prey to his own 
criticism. If Williams’ thinking is taken to its logical conclusion, any assertion at all 
about tragedy falls under a cloud of suspicion. In order to discuss tragedy the category 
of “tragedy” must be recognizable, an ideological claim in itself. This is further 
complicated by asserting that some particular element occurs in a significant way in two 
or more tragedies. Raising the red flag of ideology in treatments of tragedy 
unproductively moves the discussion from the explanatory powers of particular 
assertions to an analysis of the writer and the concerns of a particular age he or she 
may reflect.
“ i^bid. 62.
Williams makes tliis claim when he states, “The ages of comparatively stable belief, and of 
comparatively close coiTespondence between beliefs and actual experience, do not seem to produce 
tragedy of any intensity, though of course they enact the ordinary separations and tensions and the 
socially sanctioned ways of resolving tliese. The intensification of tliis cqnuiion procedure, and tlie 
possibility of its permanent interest, seem to depend more on an extreme tension between belief and 
experience than on an extr eme correspondence. Important tragedy seems to occur, neither in periods 
of real stability, nor in periods of open and decisive conflict.” Modem Tragedy, 54.
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Nevertheless, Williams’ emphasis on the historically particular nature of tragedy 
is well taken, but cannot be absolutized in a way that his own writing contradicts. The 
value of any theory of tragedy cannot be reduced to an expression of particular 
concerns and instead rests on its own comprehensiveness, internal coherence, and 
explanatory powers, as does any theory in any other discipline. A Christian point of 
view, as is adopted in this study, offers the potential to demonstrate these three 
elements because, on the terms of the beginning of Genesis and the end of Revelation, 
Christianity claims a comprehensive framework for interpreting all of history. One 
need not adhere to Christianity to accept that Christianity, given its own terms, offers a 
potential framework for a treatment of tragedy in the same way that one need not be a 
Marxist to appreciate Williams’ otherwise compelling analysis.
C.2 THE TRAGIC CLASH
A few basic conceptions of tragedy may be helpftilly analyzed. Harold Watts 
seeks to explore the perennial question of the relationship between religion and drama, 
although our particular concern here is tragedy."^ Watts argues for two kinds of 
religious myths or nan atives, the cyclical and the linear. Humans find comfort in the 
cycles of life such as planting and harvest. But a more profound insight is that, 
however comforting the natural patterns of life, individual humans are linear beings. 
Each will be born and each will die. Watts identifies these contradictory patterns as the
Harold H. Watts, “Myth and Drama.” in Tragedy: Modern Essays in Criticism, ed. Laurence 
Michel and Richard Sewall (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1963) 83-105.
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comic and the tragic, the cyclical and linear respectively."^ In comedy, however much 
one is at odds with life in a particular situation, the comforting cycles of life will 
reassert themselves and one will be reconciled to one’s circumstances. In contrast, 
tragedy is profoundly linear. Each individual will die regardless of the existence and 
reassurance of cyclical patterns, A linear world view implies real choices, unalterable 
choices that must be made and lived by. These real choices offer no hope of asserting 
imaginative control over the world as is possible in comedy.
Aside from his dubious assumptions about the liistory and development on 
religions on which his analysis is based, Watts offers an analysis of tragedy and 
comedy and their relationship to religion that is at once simple and profound. The linear 
nature of tragedy may be seen in the inevitability of destruction as events plunge 
towards a conclusion. Although tragedies may perhaps end happily, something is lost 
or destroyed in the crush of events and the linear aspect dominates the circular. For 
Pilate the rush of events moves him unwillingly downstream. Pilate’s assertion of 
Jesus’ innocence, presentation of the choice of Barabbas, and his efforts to set Jesus
‘^^Frye notes a similar pattern in liis distinction between tlie pattern of increasing isolation from 
society in tragedy and tlie pattern of integration into society in comedy. Frye, Anatomy, p. 35.
Watts offers no supporting argumentation. However, Gilbert Murray and others of the Cambridge 
School of Classical Antliropologists traced the origins various elements of tragedy to Greek rituals. See 
Gilbert Murray, “An Excursus on the Ritual Forms Preserved in Greek Tragedy,” in Jane Harrison, 
Themis, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1912) 341-363. Francis Ferguson, who generally 
accepts this account of tragedy’s origin, notes tliat, “Professor Murray is interested in the ritual forms 
in abstraction from all content; Sophocles saw also the spiritual content of the old forms: understood 
them at a level deeper than the literal, as imitations of an action still “true” to life in his sophisticated 
age.” See Fergusson, The Idea o f a Theater (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949) 33.
Williams criticizes attempts to find tlie liistorical origins of tr agedy as derived from religion. He 
writes, “Tlie detailed and complicated argument about the origin of tragedy (made more complicated 
tliough not less detailed by the extreme scarcity of evidence) is inevitably specialised.” Modern 
Tragedy, 42-43. Critical of Murray, Gerald Else offers a critical interaction and review of 
representative views of the origin of tragedy in The Origin and Early Form of Greek Tragedy 
(Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvaid University Press, 1965).
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free, all represent his attempts to reassert the given cycles of life as he knows them 
(political realities) through ad hoc manipulation of events. But by the time Pilate 
symbolically and literally steps out of his palace to meet the Jews, events have already 
started toward their inevitable conclusion. The Jews have rejected the teacliing, claims, 
and miracles of Jesus while Jesus himself, as the “sent one” come from God and having 
overcome whatever human struggles with his mission in the Garden of Gethsamane, 
remains ultimately in control of the situation and informs Pilate of this very fact.
(19:11) Jesus seems somehow at home in the governor’s palace while Pilate seems a 
stranger. Pilate faces a situation of the profoundest kind, the incarnate Son of God 
offering himself as a sacrifice on behalf of sinful humanity, that will not respond to 
political solutions. Events are irrevocably linear and out of his, the Jews’, and Caesar’s 
understanding and control.
The linear nature of tragedy leads to an inevitable dramatic clash. Usually 
tragedy leads to the ultimate linear clash; the clash between life and death, which for 
Pilate means a clash between spiritual life and death. All significant drama of any kind, 
both comedy and tragedy, must include some sort of plot complication as failure to do 
so leads to reporting a static state of affairs or a mere chronicle of discrete events.
The fact of plot complication and dramatic clash are undisputed; precisely what the 
clash of tragedy is made up of remains to be seen.
A few examples are in order. In Pilate’s case, there is a clash between 
knowledge and ignorance and between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of man. 
The clash between ignorance and knowledge presents itself in Oedipus the King.
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Hamlet displays the struggle between action and inaction delicately nuanced with 
questions of being or non-being and knowledge and ignorance. Antigone shows the 
ongoing struggle between private and public duties as represented by Antigone’s love 
of her brother Polynices and Creon’s obligation to treat him as a rebel. Macbeth 
wrestles with loyalty and duty, qualities he had previously excelled at, and personal 
ambition. Othello wavers between love and jealousy. The Bacche contrasts the 
Apollian formalism and restraint with Dionysian pleasure and experience. Timon of 
Athens moves between open generosity and vengeful cynicism.
In each case the opposing sides in the dramatic clash, whether represented by a 
clash between individuals or within individuals,""^ may be legitimately justified in some 
way. However imperfectly manifested, each side carries with it some moral capital. Of 
these examples, perhaps Macbeth is most clearly in the wrong, but Shakespeare 
balances his murder of Duncan with other factors; demonstrated loyalty, the unsolicited 
prophecies of the wicked sisters, the urging of his resolute wife, the genuine desirability 
of being king, a certain weakness of character, all combine with easy opportunity to 
lend Macbeth a certain understandability and sympathy in his actions within the terms 
of the drama itself. lago, Judas Iscariot, Polynices, and Hamlet’s uncle Claudius, each 
causally significant in the initiation or development of the dramatic action, receive little 
or no such balance in their characters to morally justify their actions. Timon and Lear 
simply act foolishly but do so with noble intentions. Agamemnon chronicles a series of 
ills each being justified in some measure by some preceding action.
Sutherland notes that in tragedy, tlie individual often “becomes the battleground of two competing 
patterns of tliought, imderstanding, and action.” Stewai t Sutherland, “Christianity and Tragedy,” 
Journal o f Literature and Theology (July 1990) 162.
1 8 1
Hegel broke new ground in the study of tragedy by positing a dramatic clash 
and explaining it in terms of a clash between two equally justified powers, a theory that 
largely follows his familiar basic scheme of thesis, antithesis, synthesis. For Hegel, 
drama has “developed into the most perfect totality of content and form... the highest 
stage of poetry and art generally.”"^ This is because speech is the only “element 
worthy of the expression of spirit.”"^ Drama itself works in a particular way. Unlike 
epic with its all encompassing qualities and leisurely presentation of external 
circumstances, drama concentrates the activities of the individual in specific and limited 
circumstances."^ And rather than a purely “lyrical emotional situation” in which 
deeds are described without participation in them, drama displays the individual and his 
inner life through concrete activity."® Hegel observes, “For a drama does not fall apart 
into a lyrical inner life and an external sphere as its opposite, but displays an inner life 
and its realization.”"^ Drama combines the action of the epic with the interior 
reflection of the lyric and forms a middle ground between them.
Hegel thus inseparably links plot and character as the inner life of the character 
is revealed in action. He writes, “...in drama a specific attitude of mind passes over into 
an impulse, next into its willed actualization, and then into an action.”"® The action 
proceeds fiom the character and has “its repercussion on his character and 
circumstances.... and now his whole being must take responsibility for that the issue is in
‘ ^  Hegel, Aesthetics, 1158.
see also Aldous Huxley, “Tragedy and the Whole Trutli,” reprinted in Tragedy: Developments in 
Criticism, ed. R. P. Draper (London: MacMillan, 1980) 151-157 
‘ ^  Hegel, A esthetics, 1161.
‘^ i^bid., 1160.
‘^ibid., 1161.
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the external world.”"^ The character is responsible for and responds to his own 
works, or, “himself picks the fruit of his own deeds.’" "
Hegel’s discussion of character and its relationship to action is preliminary to a 
discussion of the nature of action within the drama as a whole. The action and aims of 
the individual become drama only when “it calls up in other individuals different and 
opposed aims and passions.”"^ The inner qualities and motivations of both characters 
or sides displayed in action involve dramatic collisions “so that the action has to 
encounter hindrances from other agents and fall into complications and oppositions 
where both sides stmggle for success and control.”"^ This explains drama as it relates 
to human motivations.
Drama also contains a metaphysical element. Hegel connects the dramatic 
opposition with the display of external powers, or what is “essentially moral” or “divine 
or true.” The Divine does not appear as removed and tranquil, but in community 
where collisions and drama take place. Thus the Divine is made immanent in the 
action. As the unity of the Divine forces its way into real situations it is particularized 
and expressed through individual agents, these command “reciprocal independence” 
and oppose each other in a justifiable way. If taken by itself, each side can justify itself. 
Hegel notes, “...each can establish the true and positive content of its own aim and 
character only by denying and infringing the equally justified power of the other.’>136
ibid.
ibid.
^ i^bid., 1162. 
^ibid.
^ i^bid., 1162, 1196. 
^ibid., 1196.
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Because each side infringes on the other, each is involved with guilt and blame and 
must answer for i t / "
Whatever the concrete collisions, for Hegel the drama ultimately stems from the 
Divine, In consequence no ultimate collision is possible and everything must be 
resolved. He writes, “Therefore the drama, no matter in what way, must display to us 
the vital working of a necessity which, itself self-reposing, resolves every conflict and 
contradiction.”"® The onesidedness of each opposing side ultimately dissolves into a 
unity in the tragic conclusion as each side adapts to working together harmoniously.
For Hegel, the appearance of Fortinbras at the end oiHamlet hints at such a resolution.
Hegel’s view entails that the divine be present in a presumably pure state in 
individual characters who each manifest the divine within temporal circumstances. This 
results in a dramatic clash in which each side opposes the other. Thus, a clash of 
opposites derives from problems associated with temporality itself, not from any 
particular state of affairs within the temporal world. Presumably, any intrusion of the 
divine into the world is doomed to produce opposing forces, Hegel does not take into 
account the mixed nature of human existence, both in the world itself and within 
individuals, manifested in drama as setting, and character set in motion by plot. For 
Hegel, the divine retains its ultimate unity even though expressed in opposing actions as 
if a housed divided against itself stands firm. On this view, Pilate faces no conflict 
extending beyond his temporal circumstances, the various oppositions being ultimately 
reconciled in the divine.
‘"’ ibid., 1196, 1198. 
‘" i^bid., 1197.
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The metaphysical nature of Hegel’s theory renders it untestable by an appeal to 
examples and it can be critiqued only on the basis of a theological or conceptual 
analysis. The mixed nature of human existence (and human nature) is better 
understood as derived from conditions inherent within the world (and human beings 
themselves) rather than the presence of the divine at odds with itself within a temporal 
context. In Christian terms, Hegel is wrong on two major points. First, the presence of 
the divine (setting aside for the moment the obvious differences between Hegel and 
Christianity on this issue) in the world does not inevitably lead to conflict. Temporality 
by itself is not the issue. Genesis presents God and human beings in harmonious 
relationship within the temporal world. The problem extends beyond temporality to 
include the will, something not inevitably a problem as seen in the harmonious 
relationships of the Trinitarian God. Second, Hegel fails to acknowledge or take into 
account the effects of the fall. On a Christian understanding the mixed nature of 
human existence with its inherent conflicts reflects vestiges of a once harmonious 
relationship tainted by the ongoing effects of human sin.
Scheler offers a theory of the tragic collision broadly similar to Hegel’s but with 
key differences, the most important being the absence in Scheler of an appeal to the 
divine. Tragedy for Scheler, rather than being merely an art product, is “an essential 
element of the universe itself’"^ and thus intimately connected with the temporal. 
Scheler purposely avoids what he deems surface concerns such as speculations on why 
tragedy gives pleasure. Instead, he offers an analysis of basic elements that make 
tragedy possible. He thinks the experience of tragedy varies greatly with historical
139 Scheler, “Tragic,” 27.
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context, while the essence of tragedy does not. Scheler stresses the importance of 
defining the tragic before proceeding with any significant discussion of it. He writes, 
“But to know where the tragic has its source, whether in the basic structure of 
existence or in human passions and unrest, is to know already what the tragic is.”"®
This need not preclude a discussion of “the basic structure of human existence,” but 
requires that the tragic be made explicit if it is to be related to such a structure.
For Scheler, tragedy exists only in the area of values and their relationships."^ 
Tragedy itself is not a value; it appears only through the interplay of values within a 
fi-amework of time. Values inevitably conflict, which in tragedy results in the 
destruction of a positive value by a lesser one."^ The values in conflict must be of 
“high positive value” such that a high positive value destroys another high positive 
value rather than a conflict between inherent opposites like good and bad, or beautiful 
and ugly. The more evenly balanced the conflict, the greater the tragedy. Such balance 
leads to a certain sense of grief, one in which one side of the conflict is not clearly to 
blame. Scheler notes, “The great art of the tragedian is to set each value of the 
conflicting elements in its fullest light, to develop completely the intrinsic rights of each 
party.”"® The greater the sense that one side of the conflict is clearly to blame, the less 
the tragic effect.
The destruction of a high positive value by another one combines with a sense 
of inevitability to produce what Scheler terms “the tragic knot.” By this he means the
29. 
ibid., 29ff.
‘'’^ This contrasts witli Hegel’s idea tliat tlie tragic clash be between two equally justified powers. 
‘""Scheler, “Tragic,” 31.
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way in which positive values conflict and are destroyed. The tragic knot occurs when
the expression of a high positive value produces its own destruction. He writes.
If we are observing a certain action which is realizing a high value, and 
then see in that same action that it is working towards the undermining of 
the very existence of the being it is helping, we receive the most complete 
and the clearest of tragic impressions.
For Scheler, the tragic knot needs to be pulled tighter yet. The destruction of one 
positive value (often including the person holding that value) by another positive value 
be done in such a way that the destruction be made to seem at once necessary and 
completely unpredictable, inevitable yet subject to variable circumstances. In this way 
the value relationships combine with causal relationships. The tragic occurs only 
when “in one glance we embrace both the causality of things and the exigencies of their 
immanent values.”"^ The causality of things and the expression of values are often not 
aligned in ordinary affairs, such as when the rain falls on the just and unjust. In 
tragedy, values and circumstance are at once independent and absolutely combined. 
Scheler notes, “The tragic comes into sight only when this independence of the two 
elements becomes embodied in a concrete event.”
ibid., 34. Tliis relates to the natme of tlie tragic reversal. Henri remarks “The reversal arises when 
tlie action which we take to safeguard ourselves betrays us and brings about our downfall. The 
recognition corues when we realize how we have been deluded (this is the mental kind); or when in a 
physical demonstration, we recognize by a material evidence tliat a tiling is so. In the one case there is 
an awakening from tlie ‘strong delusion’ tliat has brought us to belief in tlie lie; in the second, a 
physical event produces a specific kind of knowledge.” T. R. Henn. The Harvest o f Tragedy (London; 
Methuen & Co, 1956) 18. While noting their close connection, Muecke notes that Scheler is viewing 
wliat is generally taken to be irony as tragic. As will be seen, tliis is not tlie key element in Scheler’s 
theory. D. C. Muecke. The Compass o f Irony. (London: Methuen & Co., 1969), 48.
Scheler, “Tragic,” 35.
‘" i^bid.
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Scheler himself offers only limited examples of his theory as it applies to actual 
tragedies. A few more extensive examples may be supplied to illustrate and to test the 
viability of Scheler’s ideas expressed so far. In Hamlet’s case, the conflicting positive 
values of action and thoughtful reflection combine with the initially unrelated events of 
his father’s murder and his mother’s “o’er hasty marriage” to his murderous uncle. 
Depending on one’s point of view, Hamlet’s clumsy attempts at action destroys his 
detached reflection on a messy situation, or his propensity to philosophize destroys his 
ability to act decisively. Antigône’s private loyalty to her brother clashes with Creon’s 
public duty to protect his city and punish wrongdoers through the chance event of 
Antigone’s brother attacking Creon’s city. The positive value as seen in Creon’s 
rulership remains intact while his private world is destroyed along with Antigone 
herself. The values of love and honor collide as the wicked lago, by chance Othello’s 
trusted advisor, enflâmes his leader’s jealousy and sense of being wronged so that 
Othello smothers his cherished Desdemona. In Pilate’s case, the contingent events of 
history provoke a clash between worldly survival on the one hand and personal 
integrity and eternal divine values on the other. Given these interpretations of these 
particular works, Scheler’s theory offers a compelling interpretation of tragedy.
Continuing, Scheler sees “tragic guilt” as something other than moral or ethical 
blame. Tragic guilt does not occur as the result of a moral choice wherein one chooses 
between a clearly recognized good and evil For guilt to be tragic, everyone must be 
seen as having done his or her duty. The tragic misdeed is that which “silences all 
possible moral and legal powers of judgment” whereas the untragic is where “by moral
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and legal lights it is seen to be obvious and simple.” "^^  ^ The tragic hero moves above 
non tragic guilt because the rest of the world possesses an inadequate view of things. 
Thus, Jesus is tragic because he acted according to his own knowledge and obligations 
and suffered accordingly. For Scheler, “Moral or ‘guilty guilt’ is based on the act of 
choice; ‘tragic’ or ‘unguilty guilt’ is rather based on the sphere of choice. . .and so the 
tragic hero ‘becomes guilty’ while doing a guiltless thing.” Scheler believes that 
tragic guilt obtains because tragedy has “its ultimate roots in the essential makeup of 
the world itself. It is this which clears away all sense of culpability or responsibility” 
Here Scheler’s ideas become murkier and more problematic. As noted above, 
the dramatist may balance the competing sides in a dramatic balance, such as when 
Shakespeare roots lago’s hatred of Othello in lago’s suspicion that his wife has been 
unfaithful with the general. Yet it remains doubtful that moral and ethical judgments 
may be entirely suspended, however difficult they are to make. Nor does this need to 
be the case for something to be tragic. Scheler takes his ideas too far in suggesting that 
one may be free from moral guilt and yet experience tragic guilt. This implies that one 
may be guiltless, or completely good, and yet tragic, a notion at odds with Aristotle and 
with the overwhelming majority of centuries of writers and critics. Scheler connects 
the tragic only with setting, or “the essential makeup of the world” to the exclusion of 
character, insofar as the ideal of tragedy is concerned. Scheler offers Jesus as the 
paradigm tragic figure, the one the world destroys and whose goodness becomes
^^’ ibid., 39.
''’"ibid., 43.
ibid., 33. Scheler’s statement here is correct by itself; tragedy is related to the essential makeup of 
tlie world. But in context, Scheler is incorrect, as discussed below.
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apparent at a later time. The crucial mistake here is to confuse the tragic with romance 
and suppose that Jesus is in fact tragic. Lacking crucial ambiguities resulting from 
being a mixture of the good and bad, Jesus is heroic, aware of his destiny, in full 
control of events, and selflessly proceeding to the cross. However much the tragic 
hero may or may not enjoy a point of view superior to others, the tragic hero shares the 
common condition of humanity in having a view of things that is ultimately and 
necessarily inadequate.
The strength of Scheler’s theoiy is its ability to combine the values held and 
expressed by a character and the values and circumstances of the surrounding world 
through a casual nexus expressed in plot in a way that Scheler himself does not explore. 
Scheler seems content to place his emphasis on values as expressed in setting to the 
detriment of values inherent in a given character, meaning that something amiss in a 
character may exacerbate something amiss it a given situation.. Moving beyond 
Scheler, the events of a plot expose qualities and values latent in setting and 
character, Here again Aristotle’s contention of plot being superior to character in 
tragedy comes into importance because plot unites character (and values represented 
by that character) and setting (primarily values latent in that setting) in a causal series 
of events. The ambiguities, ironies, and inconsistencies of a given situation combine in
Chatman notes, “Unlike events, traits [referring to tiaits tliat make up a character] are not in tlie 
temporal chain, but coexist witli the whole or a large portion of it. Events tr avel as vectors, 
“horizontally” from earlier to later. Traits, on tlie other hand, extend over the time spans staked out by 
the events.” Seymour Chatman, Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1978) 129. Chatman’s statement regarding tlie atemporality of 
character traits may be extended to tliose traits (values, ideals, etc.) found in a particular cultural or 
ideological setting. Plot, then, does not determine character or setting (as tliese are already explicit or 
implicit in character mid setting), but rather forms the temporal pathway on wliich character and 
setting are expressed.
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a certain way in a plot with the ambiguities, ironies, and inconsistencies of a particular 
character or characters to produce what we call tragedy. Tragedy is then not rooted 
only in character, but also in the setting. By extension, the roots of tragedy penetrate 
to the soil humanity in general as expressed in individual characters and to the soil of 
world itself, the way things are.
Approaches to tragedy centering on character to the exclusion of setting or 
situation and vice versa are inadequate. In critiquing Scheler’s position, it has been 
shown that Jesus can never be tragic because he lacked the ambiguity witliin his 
character to be reasonably blamed for his death even though the situation around him is 
one filled with ambiguity and relative values. The Romantics proposed an optimistic 
secular version of this tendency in seeking to exalt the intrinsic potential of human 
beings and de-emphasize humanity’s inherent flaws and limitations. Responsibility for 
evil lay with society, reform of which would allow for full development of the 
individual. In this way blame is transferred from character to setting with a 
corresponding emphasis on the self On the other hand, Adam fails to be tragic 
because blame is not transferable to the past and his surroundings. The fi-acturing 
and relativization of values in both character and setting are necessary for tragedy. The 
fanatic makes a poor candidate for tragedy^^  ^ because he or she irrationally commits to
Steiner, Tragedy, 116ff. Steiner notes “If the romantic movement inherited from Rousseau his 
presumption of natural goodness and his belief in tlie social rather than metaphysical origins of evil, it 
inherited also his obsession with tlie self.” p. 136.
'^^Frye notes in a discussion of irony that “Tragedy is intelligible because its catastrophe is plausibly 
related to its situation.” He sees Adam as “inevitably ironic” and Jesus as “incongruously ironic” and 
tlie tragic hero, in this case Proniethus, as about halfivay between. Anatomy, 41.
Oscai Mandel notes, “And it is incontestably true that fanatics do not make tragic figures.” Mandel, 
“Tragic Reality,” in Tragedy: Modern Essays in Criticism, ed. Laurence Michel and Richard Sewall 
(Westport, Comiecticut; Greenwood Press, 1963), 63.
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and expresses a cause without adequate appreciation of shortcomings inherent in the 
self or in the way things are.
Uniting character and setting with the ambiguities and contradictions inherent to 
both in a causal nexus as expressed in plot allows a plausible explanation of the 
ambiguous nature of assigning responsibility to a character or a set of circumstances.
To the extent that the blame for a certain course of events can be transferred from 
problems inherent in a setting to a particular character or group of characters, the 
characters are responsible. At the same time, responsibility can be transfened from a 
character to a situation because of difficulties and incongruencies inherent in the 
situation itself. This can only be convincingly accomplished in a situation where the 
value relationships are united with the causal relationships by means of plot. A 
properly formed tragic plot forms an open-ended conduit of exchange between 
character and setting, and necessity and contingency. Oedipus, Hamlet, and Pilate 
can be seen as villains or victims and neither interpretation is really convincing insofar 
as it excludes the other contradictory interpretation. Fear and pity as classic elements 
of audience response also depend upon this two way ambiguity; fear arises by an 
imaginative identification with the situation and the consequent transfer of blame to the 
person; pity arises by an imaginative identification with the person and the consequent 
transfer of blame to the situation. Neither side merits complete or exclusive
This helps explain the similarities and differences between tlie Greeks and Shakespeare regarding 
tlie tension between fate and free will. Notions of fate emphasize the power of a situation to compel 
certain actions, a Greek tendency, wliile tlie dynamics of free will emphasize the power of an 
individual to malce free moral choices and thereby control events, more characteristic of Shakespeare 
and his Christian milieu. These generalities, albeit useful ones, indicate tendencies rather tlian 
dichotomies. The connection in a causal nexus expressed in plot as argued here helps explain tlie 
inviolable connection between tlie two.
see “Elements of Audience Reaction,” above.
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justification so an unresolved dynamic tension obtains between fear and pity, attraction 
and r e v u ls io n /T h e  particular value clashes exhibited in tragedy occur in such a way 
that renders both sides a measure of justification and vilification, a situation that can 
only exist in a world fractured by relative values and the Fall. Tragedy, then, explores 
the difficulties of relating beliefs to experience.
C.3 RELATIVE VALUES: KNOWLEDGE AND IGNORANCE IN 
TRAGEDY
Much of the previous discussion assumes that values can and do exist in relative 
relationship to each other, a situation prima facie tme. Presumably, there exists a 
possible state of affairs in which positive values do not conflict as is the case within a 
Trinitarian understanding of the Christian God wherein each of the three separate 
persons of the Godhead possess equally and fully the attributes of God within a fully 
united single being. Within a temporal framework a possible state of affairs that 
includes free contingent beings in which positive values do not conflict is, at best, 
precarious.
By allowing one positive value to be placed in conflict with another, ignorance 
and its consequent ambiguities and contradictions forms a crucial part of tragedy.
These qualities exhibited in tragedy provide key elements that make tragedy itself 
possible. Ignorance in tragedy can take the forms of ignorance of fact and ignorance of
Meyers argues tliat good and evil achieve an aesthetic balance in tragedy, but does not argue why or 
in what way tliis is achieved. Henry A. Myers, “The Tragic Attitude Toward Value,” in Tragedy: 
Modern Essays in Criticism, ed. Laurence Michel and Richard Sewall (Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 1963)45-59.
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value implementation. In the first, Oedipus lives in ignorance of a set of true and 
significant facts about his own life, a set of circumstances that makes the whole drama 
possible. Elsewhere, as in Sophocles’ Women o f Trachis, a series of strategic 
ignorance’s on the part of the central characters moves the plot along and precipitates 
its tragic conclusion. But rather than being merely plot devices, the character’s 
ignorance of particular facts says something about life itself, that one can never know 
or grasp things adequately and that such a situation is filled with dangerous 
possibilities.
In Sophocles’ Electra, certain characters operate in ignorance of potentially 
important information. But here the significant ignorance displayed is collective 
ignorance regarding the ignorance of all characters, and all humanity as well, as to the 
proper implementation of a value, in this case justice. The carefully balanced claims of 
each competing party prevents any one character from occupying the undisputed moral 
high ground. The rival claims to justice in Electra seem at once a bizarre combination 
of intractable self-centeredness and a plausible appeal to a larger principle. In 
Shakespeare, Lear’s relatively dove like innocence manifests ignorance of snake like 
values realized in the world as facts of character in the persons of his daughters. 
Macbeth shows an adequate grasp of the value clash entailed by his murder of Duncan, 
but displays ignorance of what the fiiture may actually be like once the murder is 
committed and one value is set against the other. In Romeo and Juliet and Antony 
and Cleopatra, the major characters ignorantly underestimate the danger of the value 
clash between the public order of family loyalty and personal passion inherent in their
157 The wicked sisters’ predictions furtlier Macbetli’s delusions about the future in precisely this way.
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circumstances. Hamlet combines ignorance of facts with ignorance of value 
implementation as he walks a delicate line of ignorance/knowledge linked with action/ 
contemplation. Pilate combines ignorance of facts with ignorance of implementing 
values which he assumes to be entirely relative. Ignorance of value clashes, either 
potential or actual, makes the world a dangerous place.
Ignorance of the type generally found in tragedy is of a particularly insidious 
kind. Factual omniscience would of course be useful, but remains impossible for 
mortals. In Agamemnon and Electra factual omniscience would prevent this or that 
death but would not solve the problem of the implementation of values in a world 
where positive values inevitably conflict. While certainly important to Hamlet’s 
uncertainty, it remains an open question as to whether or not more information would 
solve Hamlet’s dilemma of whether “to be or not to be,” a dilemma bound up in a 
quandary about whether and when to act or not. An onmiscient wisdom directing the 
implementation of values may provide help regarding the choice of one course of action 
as compared to another, but in the end this provides only part of the answer. Oedipus 
and Pilate are both at heart men of action, and each would rather solve the problem 
through material means, but their particular dilemmas do not allow them to do so. 
Hamlet differs in that he is not a man of action but must find his way through the maze 
with careful reflection.
Ignorance in an inert state presents few difficulties. But the progress of time 
renders the easy comfort of ignorance as precarious as dawn before the advance of the 
sun. Events force the condition of ignorance out into the open where the complexities
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of life may result in a tragic collision. On the other hand events may pass harmlessly to 
the side as might have happened had Duncan spent the night somewhere other than 
Macbeth’s castle. The particularly maddening quality of ignorance is that such a 
condition can never be fully alleviated. The dilemma is such that Oedipus, Hamlet, and 
Pilate, compelled by inner and/or outer forces with the need to know, face a situation in 
which their increase of knowledge results in a situation, from their perspective, 
arguably worse than the one in which they began. Given present realities, ignorance is 
a necessary part of the human condition. Humans remain ignorant and time and events 
will force new potential clashes into reality.
The condition of partial ignorance gives rise to several other qualities important 
to tragedy. Ambiguity, paradox, contradiction, and irony form key elements of 
tragedy^^  ^ and operate only in states where a given state of knowledge contains 
elements somehow at odds with each other. Ambiguity results from incomplete or 
incorrect knowledge; paradox operates when two states of affairs or ideas conflict in a 
way not resolvable within a given framework of knowledge; irony obtains only when a 
given state of knowledge, intentions, or pomt of view is at odds with another superior 
or inferior to itself. Contradiction differs fi om the other three in that two items may 
contradict within a unified and complete state of knowledge, for example 2 + 2 = 4
Richai’d Sewall notes that “Basic to the tragic form is its recognition of the inevitability of paradox, 
of unresolved tensions and ambiguities, of opposites in precarious balance.” See Richar d B. Sewall, 
“The Tragic Form,” in Tragedy: Modern Essays in Criticism, ed. Laurence Michel and Richard Sewall 
(Westport, Comiecticut; Greenwood Press, 1963) 120.
Norman Knox observes “...the structure of irony always contains a deceptive conflict between two 
points of view...” Knox, “On the Classification of Ironies, ’’Modern Philology, 70 (1972) 58. See 
also; Norman Knox, “Irony,” in The Dictionary o f the History o f Ideas, vol. II (Charles Scribner’s 
Sons: New York, 1973), 626-634; Wayne C. Bootli, The Rhetoric o f Irony. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1974); Muecke, Compass, especially 14-39, 151-158; Paul Duke, Jrowy, 13-18. The 
point is discussed in chapter tliree below.
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necessarily contradicts all other possibilities. The contradiction in view here may be 
referred to under the more general term of ambiguity, the type that obtains when two 
sides appear to be equally justified and yet contradict in the assertion of their separate 
interests. The ambiguities, paradoxes, ironies, and contradictions derived from 
ignorance allow the tragic artist the very means by which two opposing sides can 
appear justified in their implicit or explicit assertion of values. Only in a fi actured 
world can one positive value be set over against another. Tragedy as an artform uses 
the ignorance inevitable in a fractured world to function as a drama, and in doing so 
says something about the world itself.
Ignorance important for contingent human beings most commonly found in 
tragedy is inevitably connected to the past. Persons may be excused from blame if the 
future turns out to be othei*wise than what might reasonably be expected. Blame may 
also be lessened if present events lie beyond the scope of what someone might 
reasonably be expected to know. The past presents another situation in that the range 
of what someone might reasonably be expected to know about the past is considerably 
larger. And given that the present necessarily finds its roots in the past, the need to 
know about the past is much greater. A thorough knowledge of the past may lead one 
to alter or continue various courses of action in a positive way. Yet a comprehensive 
knowledge of the past and its collective wisdom serves only to heighten the scope of 
the problem; more is known all the time and tragic collisions will still occur. 
Furthermore, given the time difference between past and present, the past is subject to 
a greater variety of convincing interpretations than the present or future. Tragedy casts
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doubt on the assertion that “The one who is ignorant of history is condemned to repeat 
it.”
Tragedy happens when the past comes roaring to life into the present in a 
particular way.^^  ^ Like a rock thrown from the past shattering the tranquillity of the 
present, a chance event can place positive values which foimerly may have existed in 
relative harmony in opposition to each other in ways not easily anticipated, or if 
anticipated, not easily managed. Ignorance and the qualities derived from it comprise 
key elements of a world where positive values may be found in opposition to each 
other.
C.4 ABSOLUTE VALUES: MORAL ORDER IN TRAGEDY
Given the difficulty of adequately knowing and responding to the past, much 
less to the present and fiiture, it does not follow that one is without responsibility for 
particular actions. Whatever conflicts may arise fi om ignorance and the fractured state 
of knowledge and the consequent relativization of values, judgments between one 
course of action and another must nevertheless be made. Courts of law attempt to 
establish the relevant facts in a particular case and offer competing interpretations 
based on an appeal to established values embodied in law. An appeal to ignorance of 
the law exonerates no one completely because, presumably, a law is a particular 
embodiment of a larger principle generally accepted as valid.
Although he does not connect tlie past with ignorance as here, T. R. Henn sees the past as a net 
closing in on the present. See Henn, Harvest, 35-42.
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Morality in tragedy is not inherently fluid; rather it is difficult to implement. In 
tragedy, the careful balancing of opposing forces does not imply that no standards exist 
by which actions may be judged. On the contrary, the very fact that certain actions 
may be legitimately justified in some sense implies in itself the existence of a moral 
order against which opposing actions may both be opposed or defended. The 
legitimacy of a point of view inevitably involves an appeal to a larger principle either 
directly through an accepted formulation of a particular value, or indirectly through a 
principle formulated for the common good. The source of the moral order, whether in 
divine command, natural law, or social convention, remains in dispute. The present 
discussion requires only the simple acknowledgment that two opposing sides or forces 
may command roughly equal moral justification within the moral order itself, while at 
the same time acknowledging that not all actions approximate moral parity.
As Krook shows, a tragic work inevitably contains some violation of the moral 
order. For Krook, the existence of a moral order provides the basic framework for 
her analysis of tragedy. The four elements in Krook’s understanding of tragedy will
be treated below, the first and fourth being the most important for the present 
discussion. First, an act of shame, wherein an objective, real act, universal in 
significance, is committed that precipitates the action of the tragedy. This violation of 
the moral order need not be committed by the main tragic character, as in Macbeth’s 
murder of Duncan, and may be committed by someone else as, for example, Claudius’
Krook, Elements o f Tragedy, 8-34. Henn presents a view broadly similar to Krook. Heim uses the 
imagery of tlie spring and tlie trigger, tlie spring being a potential conflict and tlie trigger being the 
event that brings about the conflict. Hemi, Han>est, 59-64.
'^ibid., 15,17.
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murder of Hamlet’s father/^^ The violation of the moral order must arise “out of the 
fundamental human condition” and be “necessarily universal,” usually acts of betrayal 
and rejection/^'^ In Pilate’s case, the act of shame and violation of the moral order is 
the betrayal of Jesus by Judas Iscariot, a single act that sets in final motion the larger 
clash between the Jews and Jesus. Krook’s notion of the “act of shame” is precisely 
the same kind of event that in Scheler’s analysis links the value relationships into a set 
of contingent circumstances and sets them at odds with each other. In tragedy, 
separate positive values move from being in latent potential conflict to actual conflict 
by means of a violation of the moral order.
In the second element in Krook’s analysis, intense, deeply felt, real suffering 
ocçurs that is related to and commensurate with its cause. The suffering must be 
conscious and felt to be undermining and destructive of the human vessel, ojflen 
resulting in death. For Pilate, loss of his personal integrity and his pretensions to 
power result in suffering and spiritual destruction, but not in physical death. Third, 
knowledge must be gained regarding some aspect of the human condition, not by the 
characters in the play, but by the audience. In this way tragedy serves a didactic 
fiinction. Ultimately this coincides with purpose of the FG, to initiate and strengthen 
belief in the risen Christ on the part of the reader by means of knowledge of and 
response to certain facts. Pilate’s state of understanding and belief, although it
A violation of tlie moral order must be distinguished from a hamartia. The former is an intentional 
act conmiitted by someone, while the latter is “false step taken in blindness” (Lucas) usually 
consequent on a flaw latent witliin a the main character ready to be exposed through challenges within 
tlie plot.
Krook, Elements o f Tragedy, 10-11.
Note tlie examples given to test Scheler’s theoiy wherein a contingent event unites tlie opposing 
values in a plot relationsliip. See above.
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progresses, must be judged to be incomplete and therefore a negative example. The 
reader gains the knowledge about the human condition, learning that temporal solutions 
may conflict with theological realities in a way that forces one to choose between them.
Fourth, building on Aristotle’s idea of catharsis, Krook believes that an
affirmation must result in an affirmation of “the objective moral order which at once
incoiporates the human and transcends it.”^^*’ The stature of the tragic hero is such
that his or her suffering expiates the violation of the moral order and in doing so
restores the integrity of the moral order. For Krook,
The final “affirmation” of tragedy springs from our reconciliation to, or 
acceptance of, the necessity of the suffering rendered intelligible by the 
knowledge; by illuminating the necessity of the suffering, the knowledge 
reconciles us to it; by being reconciled to (“accepting”) the suffering as 
necessary, we reaffirm the supremacy of the universal moral order; and by 
this act of recognition of and submission to the universal moral order, 
which the reaffirmation of its supremacy implies, we express and affinn the 
dignity of man and the value of human life.^ ^^
The presence of the moral order ultimately reaffirms human dignity rather than human 
dignity being derived firom some other source. The greatness inherent to the tragic 
hero may be connected to the hero’s worthiness as a sacrifice expiating the moral order 
as a representative figure for the human race. But, like all tragic heroes, Pilate is 
grossly and pathetically inadequate for the task, a foil highlighting the worthiness of 
Jesus as the one who does in fact expiate humanity’s collective violation of the moral 
order.
The presence of the moral order in the world is connected to the presence of 
some sort of divine or supernatural element to human life. H. D. F. Kitto asserts that
Kiodk, Elements o f Tragedy, 15.
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tragedy contains a necessary religious element regardless of the ability of the individual 
or age to see it properly. The religious dimension in tragedy is that the moral order 
of the universe, the fact that one exists being a religious concern, is reaffirmed in 
tragedy. However much an individual or group may find itself in confusion and be 
destroyed, the moral order of the world is intact. The gods or moral order need not be 
present in a particular work for this to be true; the order is everywhere implicitly 
present. As evidence, Kitto asserts that however well drawn and interesting a character 
may be, that character ‘never absorbs all our attention,” meaning that a drama raises 
issues and questions beyond itself. Furthermore, “Only when the human drama is seen 
against the background of divine action is the structure and significance of the play 
truly seen.”^^ ° In so doing, the tragic artist combines seeming contraries; “sharpness of 
detail and the greatest possible generality” which allows the characters in tragedy to 
become concretely realized representative symbols of the human condition.
Richard Sewall cautiously attempts to say something about the tragic form by 
noting three areas of discussion: first, the cosmos and man’s relation to it; second, the 
nature of the individual and his relation to himself; third, the individual in society. In 
the first, Sewall notes that man is a part of this world, that tragedy is humanistic by
*^ ’ ibid., 17.
D. F. Kitto, Form and Meaning in Drama, (London; Methuen & Co., 1956) See esp. chapter 8, 
“Religious Drama and its Interpretation,” 231-245. Reprinted in Tragedy: Modern Essays in 
Criticism, ed. Lauience Michel and Richard Sewall, (Westport, Comiecticut: Greenwood Press, 1963) 
147-160.
'^ibid., 238.
'’‘'ibid.
Sternberg argues tlie same tiling in relation to biblical (Old Testament) characters. He notes, 
“...each biblical character is sui generis, a luiique combination of miiversals and idiosyncrasies.” Meir 
Sternberg, The Poetics o f Biblical Narrative: Ideological Literature and the Drama o f Reading 
(Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 1985) 253.
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virtue of being focused on an event in this world. Yet tragedy “assumes man’s super- 
sensory or supernatural, or metaphysical being or p r in c ip l e . . .T h e  tragic view is 
never purely naturalistic or mechanical. The tragic cosmos is one preoccupied with 
evil, not evil in isolation, but in relation to and in tension with the good, a tension that 
insures that man is not the measure of all things and that the universe remains a 
mystery. In the second, on tragic man, Sewall lists some of the various ambiguities 
and paradoxes inherent to the human condition: not divine nor fully of the earth, neither 
fated nor free, both creature and creator, guilty and innocent. In this confusion tragic 
man, animated by pride, suffers on a high level, more so than the immature, bmtish, or 
extreme optimist or pessimist. Suffering is part of the human condition, and in 
suffering the tragic hero comes to be identified with humanity at large. Third, tragic 
man in relation to society chooses to rebel, question, and act, rather than quit, be silent, 
or cynical. This puts the tragic hero in “a head on collision with the forces that would 
oppress or frustrate. Conscious of the ambiguities within and without, which are the 
source of his peculiar suffering, tragic man accepts the conflict.”^^  ^ By proceeding, the 
tragic hero learns and is transformed and in being transformed, transforms those 
around, leading to a higher vision, yet the old paradoxes and ambiguities remain.
In The Death o f Tragedy, George Steiner surveys tragedy through its history 
and offers a simple argument; tragedy and tragic poets need an intellectual climate 
infused with known beliefs and assumptions about life that includes a strong theological 
or transcendent element, allowing the issues to transcend the temporal. Steiner writes, 
“Tragedy is that form of art that requires the intolerable burden of God’s presence. It
Sewall, “Tragic Form,” 121.
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is now dead because His shadow no longer falls upon us as it fell on Agamemnon or 
Macbeth or Athalie.”^^"^ The intellectual and theological milieu present in ancient 
Greece and Elizabethan England allowed tragedy to flourish. Steiner argues that the 
lack of a transcendent order in more recent times accounts for the decline in tragedy as 
an artform.
The presence of the divine or a moral order fomis a key part of each writer’s 
analysis. Kitto’s argument is the most one sided in that it lacks a clear presentation and 
account of the evil in the world. Steiner and Sewall make the presence of evil and the 
incongruities of life very much part of their analysis. Sewall is perhaps more optimistic 
than Steiner in that he believes that the tragic hero marshals an inherent pride and 
stands against “the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune.”
For other critics, the moral order, by whatever term it is known, need not 
necessarily be connected to the divine. For Williams the moral order may be connected 
to the divine in particular historical situations, but its source is ultimately fluid and 
changes with the progress of history. Thus Shakespeare drew upon a Christian 
world view, while later dramatists like Ibsen relied on society itself, and in modem 
times the order advanced is the individual himself/herself. Increasingly, however,
” ^ibid., 126-27.
Steiner, Death of Tragedy, 192.
Steiner notes, “When tlie new world picture of reason usuiped the place of the old tradition in the 
course of the seventeentli centuiy, the English tlieatre entered its long décline.” Death o f Tragedy, 23. 
Kaufmann disputes Steiner’s analysis by noting, “Are tliere not millions of believers today?” Tragedy 
and Philosophy, 192. Kaufmann confuses the particular and tlie universal. However many believers 
exist today is irrelevant to the fact that a comprehensive tlieological world view no longer commands 
adherence as it did in Shakespeare’s time.
Williams, Tragedy.
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tragedy, if possible, is restriced in scope such that it becomes experience being set 
against experience.
The fractured state of the world and the ignorance consequent upon it seems at 
once to converge and diverge with the presence of a moral order. The moral order 
functions as an ethical force preventing arbitrary acts resulting from the fractured state 
of knowledge and the relativization of values; at the same time the fractured state of the 
world of experience and knowledge about it can prevent one from adequately grasping 
or implementing the ethical norms suggested by the moral order. The tragic hero is 
obligated by the presence of the moral order to grasp and/or implement the moral order 
in a world situation divided by ambiguities and contradictions. This does entail 
ethical nihilism and that nothing ethical can be accomplished or ought not to be 
attempted; it only means that the potential exists that two positive moral values can be 
moved from an inert state into open conflict by some violation of the moral order. In 
this sense tragedy recapitualtes the fall and renders a state of affairs that is the fertile 
ground for tragedy.
It may be noted as an historical fact, as Steiner does, that the greatest tragedies 
were produced in times when the presence of the divine was deeply felt as a moral 
order, yet an order beginning to unravel. The Middle Ages, when the moral order 
tended to be absolute, was the age of romance and produced veiy little if anything 
normally designated tragedy. In comparison, the late modem and post-modern world 
presents values relativized to such an extent that appeals to an absolute moral order
'’’ Myers observes, “Tragedy represents supplementary  ^elements of relativity and absoluteness in 
values.” Myers, “Tragic Attitude,” 49.
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seem strangely out of place, being much more at home with the ironic. Conflicts of 
positive value, such as there are, typically emerge from an assertion of the personal 
rights of an individual or group, as opposed to an implicit or explicit appeal to moral 
order ordained by God. Neither the tendency toward absolute values of the Middle 
Ages nor the tendency to relative values of recent times has proved to be a prolific 
environment for the production of tragedy. The ages most productive of tragedy are 
those where the absolute values of one age in transition and in open conflict with the 
relative values another. To the extent that Christianity provided a coherence to 
beliefs and experience, Pilate stands at the dawn of this age while Hamlet and Dr. 
Faustus signal its decline.
Perhaps nowhere does the clash between relative and absolute values appear in 
sharper focus than in the case of Pilate. The function of human government, in the 
Bible sanctioned by God as a way to implement order and good upon the earth, is 
largely one of the implementation of positive values and the restraint of negative values. 
Any government’s ability to achieve this is inevitably relative. In the time of Christ, 
Pilate stood as the one empowered in that instance to implement this role. As a ruler in 
his or any other era, Pilate’s position inevitably required mastery of the relative values 
of political intrigue and ad hoc management of current events. Pilate’s confrontation 
with Jesus, through whom “all things were made (1 ;3), highlights the inevitable 
limitations of any system or any person employing relative values. In contrast to Pilate
'’"For an illuminating analysis of the progress of intellectual history witli respect to tianscendent and 
“sensate” values and their expression in art and science, see Pitiim Soroldn, Ihe Crisis o f our Age 
(Oxford: One World, 1941,1992).
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(What is truth?), Jesus (I am the way, the truth, and the life) represents and embodies 
absolute adherence to absolute values. In doing so Jesus is at once true to the absolute 
moral order ultimately derived form God himself, and, as a member of the Godhead, 
true to himself; Pilate belongs to an order of relativized values that ultimately defies 
anyone to be true to it.
IV CONCLUSION
In tragedy, the coherence of romance gives way to a world in fundamental 
conflict with itself and anticipates the arrival of irony in which the disjunction between 
beliefs and experience is most fully realized. Sharing many of the characteristics of 
other tragic characters, Pilate may likewise be viewed as an archetypal tragic character. 
Further, to a great extent tragedy as an archetype is concerned with a widening 
disjunction between humans and their environment, between absolute values and their 
enactment in experience, and between humans and the gods or God. However 
concentrated and brief, the matrix of theological and structural variables that make up 
tragedy occur profoundly in the FG’s portrayal of Pilate.
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3-
IRONY, THOMAS, AND THE JEWS
‘'Stop judging by mere appearances and make a right judgment
John 7:24
I INTRODUCTION
Irony in the FG has been the focus of much attention in recent years. But rather 
than simply identifying and classifying examples of irony in the FG according to 
standard categories, the present work will explore irony in the FG as it relates to the 
perspectives embodied in the characters of Thomas and the Jews. In this way, 
variations of irony may be explored in a more dynamic fashion than has otherwise been 
done and is in keeping with the tendency of the FG to utilize characters to explore 
various relationships to Jesus. Additionally, irony will be explored in relation to values 
and beliefs inherent in its use and perception of its use rather than in relation to 
classification of its specific use as is normally done. In relation to the values and beliefs 
employed in its use and perception, irony may be divided into positive, equivocal, and 
negative irony, which will be discussed below. By combining the two aspects of irony 
as seen in relation to values and beliefs together with its embodiment in character, irony
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may be explored as a mode of perception and thinking. Separate literary readings of 
Thomas and the Jews will be offered.
Thomas, it will be argued, embodies a kind of equivocal irony, (to be explored 
in detail later) wherein the application of beliefs to specific circumstances renders those 
beliefs problematic. This famous disciple is “the personification of an attitude,”  ^ an 
ambiguous Erasmian character whose very ambiguity mirrors the perspective of the 
perceptive yet ambiguous ironic reader. Additionally, because he is a disciple, Thomas 
is an exploration of irony from within.
The Jews will be seen as representative of negative irony, a perspective 
characterized by the collapse of perception into a two dimensional view of reality. The 
Jews are the polar opposite of Jesus and the character (collectively) most frequently 
ironized. While no doubt of paramount historical importance to the story of Jesus, the 
fact that they are so frequently Jesus’ conversation partners and so frequently ironized 
within the FG as a work of literature establishes their status as representative of and 
vehicles for a certain point of view.^ The Jews in the FG, it will be argued, embody the 
perspective of negative irony with its characteristic negation of any belief or ideal, in 
this case the vertical action of God in Christ in favor of the demands and perspective of 
present experience. In this sense, the Jews represent a perspective that is perennial, one
' Raymond Brown, The Gospel According to John vol. 2. (New York: Doiibleday, 1966-70) 1031. 
Brown’s comment refers to Thomas in 20:24-29.
 ^In one sense tliis is a kind of stereotyping, but in anotlier more accurate sense it simply reflects a 
certain level of historical reporting. For example, tlie combatants of tlie English civil war, whatever 
the nuances and complexities of their respective positions, are known today simply as the roundheads 
and cavaliers. The extent to wliich “the Jews” are stereotyped in the FG is in direct proportion to tlie 
possibility that liistorical reconstructions of the Jewish milieu of tlie NT era may actually obscure their 
meaning and function within the FG itself. The issue of the Jews representative status is treated at 
greater length below.
209
that transcends charges of anti-Semitism by virtue of the fact that the same perspective 
with respect to the perception of Jesus haunts much of Christendom as well. This does 
not mean that the Jews are successful ironists in their own right, merely that they 
manifest an attitude of mind characteristic of one dominated by negative irony. With 
reference to the four archetypes as defined in the present work, in the FG the Jews are 
the location at which negative irony is itself ironized.
II THOMAS AND THE JEWS IN THE FOURTH 
GOSPEL: Variations on the ironization of irony
A) THOMAS AND THE mONIZATION OF THE IRONIST:
Seeing and not seeing and seeing
Interpretation of Thomas naturally centers on his post-resurrection encounter 
with Jesus in 20:24-29. The length of the narrative alone, six verses in comparison with 
two isolated comments in 11:16 and 14:3, coupled with the fact that Thomas is here 
the primary character, serves to direct attention on Thomas in his last appearance in the 
NT. And Thomas’ actions within this narrative, namely his steadfast refusal to believe 
in the risen Lord on the basis of the testimony of his fellow disciples, naturally 
dominates interpretation of his character. Given this reality, several things about this 
pericope may be noted that will be of assistance for the inteipretation of Thomas in 
11:16, and thus in gaining a better grasp on the character of Thomas as a whole.
The first is that “doubt” is not an accurate description of Thomas’ actions. If 
doubt is take to mean “uncertainty” then doubt in itself does not accurately describe
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Thomas’ actions in the resurrection narrative. Certain in his unbelief, doubt is precisely 
the thing Thomas never does. Jesus’ admonition to “Stop doubting and believe” is 
probably better understood as “Stop being faithless or unbelieving (aTCiaxos) but 
instead be frith-ful or believing (Tuaxos). A definite contrast is indicated. “Doubt” can 
of course mean faithless in English, but this is not its normal meaning. Translation 
aside, the narrative itself indicates something of the nature of Thomas’ unbelief.
Thomas rejects the enthusiastic testimony of the disciples out of hand (20:25) and 
places fixed conditions on which he will believe in Jesus’ resuixection. Significantly, a 
week passes between Thomas’ rejection of the disciples’ testimony and his beholding of 
the risen Lord. No doubt during this week the disciples continued to insist on the 
reality of the resurrection and that Thomas with equal fervor continued to deny it. The 
disciples’ exasperation might well have been matched or exceeded by Thomas’ 
displeasure at suffering a choir of fools. The context is one of absolute intractability 
rather than skeptical debate.
The second thing to be noted is that Thomas is both included as one of the 
disciples and distinguished from the rest. Even the expression “one of the Twelve” 
(20:24) shows elements of inclusion and exclusion, although this in itself does not mean 
much.^ Thomas is notably absent from the other disciples and does not witness the 
risen Lord.^ He is thus physically distinguished fi*om the rest which veiy likely
" However, Brodie observes tliat “one of the twelve” is used elsewhere in the FG only in relation to 
Judas. (6:71) Thomas Brodie. The Gospel According to John: A Literary and Theological 
Commentary (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) 570.
'’Dorothy Lee argues tliat the absence of Thomas here is only a literary device and tliat Thomas is no 
more doubtful than the other disciples. Both assessments are disputed here. Lee reads Thomas in 
isolation from liis other appearances and allegorically with reference to the “Johannine Community.”
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indicates that he is to be distinguished in other matters as well. The other disciples are 
in a locked room “for fear of the Jews” while Thomas is elsewhere and, by virtue of 
simply being elsewhere, perhaps roaming the streets in public, he is not to be painted 
with the same brush. Thomas’ demonstrated idiosyncratic individuality over the 
rejection of the disciples’ testimony when combined with the fearfulness of the 
disciples, may well indicate a certain distance and disdain for their hiding away. The 
appearance of Jesus to the disciples emphasizes the relief of these fears. Jesus’ first 
tells them “Peace be with you” and then invites them to examine the evidence. Fear is 
nowhere directly associated with Thomas, for whom evidence is of primary concern. 
When Jesus appears to Thomas and the other disciples a week later, the doors are again 
locked, but inclusion of this detail calls attention to the fact that Jesus passed tlirough 
walls with no mention being made, as previously, of fear of the Jews. While the 
primary purpose of the Thomas incident within the context of the pericope itself is to 
emphasize the importance and validity of believing without having seen (20:29), to one 
extent or another Thomas is distinguished from the other disciples.
Having established that doubt is not part of Thomas’ character and that Thomas 
is distinguished from the other disciples on the basis of temporal location and lack of 
fear, his other appearances can be analyzed with this in mind. Thomas first appears in 
the FG in the early stages of the Lazarus narrative of chapter 11. Thomas’ comment 
“Let us also go, that we may die with him” (11:16), it will be argued, is of central 
importance for seeing Thomas in all his ironic glory and interpreting his character as a
See Lee, “Partnership in Easter Faith: The Role of Maiy Magdalene and Thomas in John 20,” JSNT 
58 (1995) 37-49.
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whole. On receiving word that Lazarus is sick, Jesus, who had promised that “This
sickness will not end in death” and who “loved Martha and her sister and Lazarus”
(11:5), inexplicably tarries two more days. The disciples greet Jesus’ intention to
return to Judea with fear by noting “A short while ago the Jews tried to stone you, and
yet you are going back there?” (11:8) After some confusion over the status of Lazarus,
Jesus tells them plainly, “Lazatus is dead, and for your sake I am glad I was not there,
so that you may believe. But let us go to him.”
Thomas enters the narrative immediately following; “Then Thomas (called
Didymus) said to the rest of the disciples, “Let us also go, that we may die with him.”
Again the pattern of 20:24-29 appears, fear of the Jews on the disciples’ part, Thomas
distinguished from the rest of the disciples by a show of courage. Normally Thomas’
remark is interpreted with reference to the dangers of returning to Judea voiced
previously in 11:8. Carson’s comments are representative of critical opinion,
On this occasion Thomas reflects not doubt but raw devotion and courage, 
even though it was courage shot through with misunderstanding and 
incomprehension: misunderstanding, in that he had not grasped the 
assurance implicit in w . 9-10, and incomprehension, in that the death Jesus 
had to face as the Lamb of God (1:29,36) could not possibly be shared by 
his disciples. Yet there is another sense in which Thomas, like others in 
this Gospel, spoke better than he knew: his words have become a clarion 
call to would-be disciples, after the resurrection, to take up their cross daily 
and follow Jesus.^
^D, A. Carson, The Gospel According to John (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991) 410. Similarly, C. K. 
Barrett, The Gospel According to John: An Introduction with Commentary and Notes on the Greek 
Text (London: SPCK, 1978) 394; G. R. Beasley-Murray, John (Waco: Word Books, 1987) 189.
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On this basis Thomas is interpreted in straightforward fasliion “heroically” as someone 
willing to follow Jesus to death after the manner of Peter, naive perhaps, but no less 
dedicated.
But there is another possible interpretation of this statement. Rather than being 
interpreted as heroically naive, it is possible to interpret “Let us also go, that we may 
die with him” as a kind of pessimism with overtones of fatalism or as a kind of mature 
courage. It remains a statement of dedication but one tempered by realism, facing the 
full force of the difficulties ahead with no illusions, like a hardened soldier ready for 
battle. Context offers little help in adjudicating between these conflicting 
interpretations.^
And there is yet another possible interpretation, one more like the latter, but 
derived from a different exegetical base. The issue concerns the antecedent of the 
pronoun “him” (aoxou) in Thomas’ statement “Let us also go, that we may die with 
him.” The two above interpretations both make the straightforward assumption that 
“him” refers to Jesus, but is this necessarily the case? The other possibility is that 
“him” refers to Lazarus. The two possibilities are as follows:
A- “Let us also go, that we may die with Jesus''
or,
B- “Let us also go, that we may die with Lazat us."
 ^In discussing this verse, a fellow doctoral student noted that the naive or heroic interpretation had 
never occurred to him and that he had always read it in terms of mature, if pessimistic, courage. Since 
perceiving tlie different interpretations of tliis verse as a teenager, I have never accepted the “naive” 
Thomas.
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The former is assumed without question by virtually all commentators, the latter almost 
never mentioned. Bultmann mentions it but rejects it out of hand, while Michaels 
confines his remarks to an admission that the latter is grammatically possible.^ And yet 
the latter merits consideration simply by virtue of its immediate proximity to a possible 
antecedent of someone whose identity, if conceptually unpalatable, is unmistakable, 
namely Lazarus. Jesus ends his statement in 11:15 with “But let us go to him” and 
“him” (auTov) here without question refers to Lazarus. In contrast, six verses separate 
Thomas’ remark from mention of returning to Judea wherein going “to die with Jesus” 
would be an appropriate interpretation. Additionally, both Jesus and Thomas use 
similar language (“Let us go” and “Let us also go”) when referring to the intended 
journey of returning to Lazarus. Had Jesus explicitly stated “Let us go to Lazarus”
(11 ; 15) the person to whom Thomas refers would at least be in some doubt, Lazarus, 
on this scenario, being a readily apparent possibility. Rejection of Lazarus as the 
antecedent of auxou in 11:16 has less to do with exegesis and much to do with its 
simply being an unpalatable interpretation and/or one without an adequate frame of 
reference in which such an interpretation seems acceptable or reasonable.
An ironic Thomas offers a better option. Unlike his fellow disciples who 
suppose “if he sleeps he will get better,” Thomas sees the real problem and offers a 
more perceptive commentary. The deconstructionist Thomas cleverly detects an aporia 
in the logic of Jesus’ messiahship apparently missed by the other disciples. The 
sickness that “will not end in death” (11:4) has done exactly that. A vast gulf exists
’ BulUnaiin offers his comment in reference to Zalin, who held tliis position. Rudolf Bnlünann, The 
Gospel o f John: A Commentary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1971) 400, note; J. Ramsey Michaels, John 
(Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1984) 189.
215
between Jesus’ promises and his performance. Thomas might well have thought,
“What good are all these miracles and healings and all this commotion if he can’t help 
his friend? And where does that leave us?” Potential trouble in Judea, the Jews with 
their sticks and stones, so important to the other disciples, are incidental to the story in 
comparison with the fact that Lazarus is dead. If Thomas is being ironical, the other 
disciples may well be the victims of it. And Thomas’ recognition of the difficulty posed 
for Jesus by the death of Lazarus undercuts his own position as a disciple and renders it 
ironic and equivocal.^ Thomas remains, yet in doing so he can to a significant degree 
only pretend to go along. “Doubting Thomas” might well describe him at this point. 
Thomas, now as later, clearly perceives the difficulty but fails to see the possibility of 
resurrection, and in doing so fails to allow for the possibility of the direct action of 
God.
An analysis of other comments on Jesus’ tardiness within the narrative of 
chapter 11 offers additional support for reading Thomas’ comment in 11:16, and 
therefore his character, as ironic. Rather that reflecting the fears of the disciples 
expressed in previous verses, (recall the separation of Thomas from the other disciples 
and their fears in chapter 20), Thomas’ comment instead anticipates similar comments 
to come. With slight differences in Greek, Maitha and Mary both tell Jesus, “Lord, if 
you had been here, my brother would not have died.” (11:21, 32) Unlike Thomas,
^Muecke comments, “The ironic attitude of a ‘General Ironist’ is complicated by his own equivocal 
position. On the one hand his sense of irony implies detachment, and since tlie irony he perceives is 
General Irony, as I have defined it, he will be detached from life itself or at least for that general aspect 
of life in which he perceives a fundamental contradiction. On tlie other hand, tlie picture he sees of an 
ironic world must show himself as a victim.” Muecke, D. C. The Compass o f Irony (London: Methuen 
& Co., 1969) 122.
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Martha affirms the reality of resurrection but only as something to be realized in the 
future. Although uttered no doubt with understandable pathos and expressing greater 
faith, the sisters make the same point as Thomas: Jesus could have prevented the death 
of Lazarus but did not. Running the emotional gamut from oversentimentality to cold 
detachment, the conflicting currents of opinion among the Jews express the same 
dilemma, “Then some of the Jews said, ‘See how he loved him!’ But some of them 
said, ‘Could not he who opened the eyes of the blind man have kept this man from 
dying?”’ (11 ::36-37) Whatever their position relative to Jesus in a hierarchy of faith, 
(perhaps, in descending order Martha, Maiy, Thomas, the Jews) all express 
substantially the same thing. Only Thomas, however, does so from a mixed 
perspective, as someone firmly on the inside, loyal (he remains a disciple) but ironic, 
equivocal, believing yet unbelieving, perceptive to the same extent that he is blind.
Given this reading of Thomas, Carson’s comments bear repeating and highlight
the altered interpretative context.
On this occasion Thomas reflects not doubt but raw devotion and courage, 
even though it was courage shot through with misunderstanding and 
incomprehension: misunderstanding, in that he had not grasped the 
assurance implicit in w . 9-10, and incomprehension, in that the death Jesus 
had to face as the Lamb of God (1:29,36) could not possibly be shared by 
his disciples. Yet there is another sense in which Thomas, like others in 
tliis Gospel, spoke better than he knew: liis words have become a clarion 
call to would-be disciples, after the resurrection, to take up their cross daily 
and follow Jesus. ^
If read in light of the ironic Thomas, Carson’s comments aie seen to be themselves 
“shot through with misunderstanding and incomprehension” because Thomas did
 ^Carson, John, 410. Lindars, likewise referring to fiiture discipleship, designates Thomas’ remark as 
“unwitting irony.” Barnabas Lindars, The Gospel o f John (London: Oliphants, 1972) 392.
217
indeed grasp “the assurance implicit in w . 9-10” and astutely applied this insight. 
Thomas, it appears, knew better than he spoke. The clarion call is perhaps muted or 
sounding the wrong note.
The point illustrated here is important because it suggests that the mode of 
thought inherently related to archetype is very much related to proper interpretation; to 
read Thomas as naively heroic or to read Pilate ironically is to fundamentally 
misinterpret both characters. To adopt an ironic frame of reference for Thomas, at least 
provisionally, allows the reader to enter into and explore his world and allows the 
theology and world view of the FG to interact with and evaluate this point of view 
from within this point of view itself. Additionally, the interpretation of Thomas being 
advanced here provides an overall coherence to Thomas’ character within the FG 
narrative and theology otherwise lacking.
The naive heroic Thomas has come half circle. The disciples’ and readers’ (or 
commentator’s) own naivete has been skewered and Thomas, at least for now, is 
having the last laugh. The altered interpretative context offered for Carson’s analysis 
illustrates the importance of point of view with respect to irony; by interpreting 
Thomas ironically, this interpretation has likewise been subjected to an ironic 
deconstmction or negation. Yet, to the same degree that this interpretation is adopted 
(or relished), the reader likewise identifies himself/herself with Thomas as practicing 
ironist and runs the risk of participating in Thomas’ blindness and folly. In the FG’s 
conception of things, sharing insights with Thomas is, like irony, risky business. Self 
exposure is as possible as insight. In this way, equivocal irony as seen in Thomas
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becomes a kind of trap in its double-mindedness. Thomas might well be known as 
“Didymus” (or the twin) for reasons having little or nothing to do with his family 
status. For Thomas, perception of Jesus’ failure to act in the life of Lazarus both 
prefigures and precipitates a failure to accept even the possibility of God acting in 
human affairs to raise Jesus from the dead. “Let us also go that we may die with him” 
marks a perceptive descent into blindness.
Thomas next appears in 14:3 in the context of the beginning of Jesus’ farewell 
discourse. Jesus tells the disciples, “You know the way to the place where I am 
going.” (14:4) Thomas replies, “Lord, we don’t know where you are going, so how 
can we know the way?” (14:5) The comment is at once perceptive and blind. 
Perceptive in that it asks an obvious question related to realistic circumstances, blind in 
that the answer to both parts of the question has been provided in the preceding verses. 
Alternatively, descending into that slimy slop of irony again, Jesus is being ironic and 
knows that they don’t know, or Thomas is being ironic and calling into question Jesus’ 
connection with anything beyond houses, rooms, coming and going. Recalling such 
interpretative conundmms as “destroy this temple” “bom again” and “living water,” the 
fact that there is nothing in 14:1-3 that, given a certain frame of reference, cannot be 
taken as literal reference to physical objects complicates the issue. Is this figurative 
language or not? What is he talking about? What narrative is to be employed? While 
Jesus’ words as normally understood within the larger context of the FG certainly refer
Barrett mentions this possibility. “It is conceivable, though not probable, tliat Thomas appears as tlie 
doubting disciple on account of liis name. Aiôupos, a natural rendering of J)(Thoma’, a ‘twin’), 
means primarily ‘double’, ‘twofold’.” Barrett, John, 571. The fact that only John includes “Didymus” 
(twice) strengtliens the possibility.
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to heaven, in Thomas’ context or frame of reference this is not self-evident. Notably, 
Thomas’ question forms a counterpart to Jesus final words to his disciples in chapter 
16 where Jesus states, “1 came from the Father and entered the world: now I am 
leaving the world and going back to the Father.” The disciples, relieved, reply, “Now 
you are speaking clearly and without figures of speech.” (16:28-29) Characteristically, 
Thomas in 14:5 was the first to perceive the difficulty and may not be so thick after all. 
Or he may be the thickest of all. Here, as in the Lazarus narrative and indeed much of 
the FG as a whole, the present and future connection between heaven and earth, the 
action of God in the life of Christ, and the person of Christ with respect to the Father, 
combine to form a complex of related issues related to the frame of reference occupied 
by both character and reader. If there is no connection, then Thomas has put his finger 
on the problem; if there is a comiection, and 14:6 states that there is, then Thomas is in 
the dark. Thomas in 14:5 may be very perceptive, or he may have descended from the 
sophistication of irony into pedestrian misunderstanding. Thomas and Jesus are at a 
draw but destined for a showdown.
Given his past performance, Thomas’ rejection of the disciples’ resurrection 
testimony in chapter 20 is entirely predictable. If the death of Lazarus casts doubt on 
Jesus, the death of Jesus himself raises the same problem to an infinitely higher degree. 
The resun ection of Lazarus may have proved to be a short lived and ill founded hope, 
for the one who raised Lazarus from the dead is himself dead. How can Jesus be “the 
way, the truth, and the life” if he is dead? And what of “No one comes to the Father 
except through me?” A sorry hope indeed. Fear of the Jews, so important to the other
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disciples here and in the Lazarus narrative, for Thomas is incidental to the fact that 
circumstances have rendered a fundamental promise impossible of accomplishment.
The disciples’ report is the braying of fools in the ears of Thomas, who won’t get 
fooled again. Read in this light, Thomas’ list of conditions appears entirely reasonable.
Thomas’ perception is equally the cause of his blindness. The ironist, often the 
first to see, at the same time risks premature closure. Irony rests on differences and 
oppositions, qualities which threaten to become ends in themselves. Double vision 
becomes myopia. In the FG, Thomas’ irony also prevents him firom making a sustained 
vertical connection between Jesus and the plan of God and between Jesus and his 
relationship of divinity with the Father. Glitches in the progress of the story threaten 
the connection between beliefs and experience. Circumstances threaten to negate his 
theology and his irony. The solution Jesus offers to Thomas is to “Put your finger 
here; see my hands. Reach out your hand and put it into my side. Stop doubting and 
believe.” (20:29) The verse contains two elements; physical reality and belief. Belief, 
and the escape firom irony and misunderstanding, involves placing physical reality into 
some larger context, in this case the context of the activity of God in the incarnation 
and the connection of God and earth and God and humanity consequent on the 
incarnation. Thomas is paradigmatic of this move. In the end, ironically and yet 
predictably, Thomas, that most blind disciple, comes to see most clearly of all.^ ^
B) THE JEWS AND THE mONIZATION OF TRONY: Seeing without seeing
“ Lee correctly concludes, “The character of Magdalene and Thomas draws the implied reader, 
tlu ough misunderstanding, along tlie pathway of faitli which in this Gospel is tlie journey to the 
center of life.” Lee, “Partnersliip,” 49.
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B.l. “THE JEWS” AND SYMBOLIC NARRATIVE
The various ways in which oi^Ioi>6aioi (hereafter “the Jews”) is employed has 
been analyzed by Fuller/^ He notes that “the Jews” in the FG can be used in five 
ways: 1) as a term contrasting to the gentiles; 2) as a term contrasting to the 
Samaritans; 3) as a term used in relation to explanations of Jewish customs; 4) as a 
term designating the Jerusalem populace; and, most importantly, 5) as a term referring 
to a group increasingly and consistently hostile to Jesus and the disciples. The first 
three concern only clarification of detail and may be ignored. Fuller lists 5:10, 15, 16, 
18 as referring to the Jerusalem populace, but, because these references occur in a 
context where “Pharisee” might be expected (cf. 2:18, 20), and because they occur in a 
context of unbelief (see below), they belong to the last category. Analyzing the last 
category. Fuller notes a number of occasions where other designations are transposed 
into “the Jews.”^^  For example, the “crowd” of 6:22, 24 becomes the “Jews” in 6:2, 
41,52; the “Pharisees” of 9:15 becomes the “Jews: in 9:18, returning to “Pharisee” in 
9:40; and, significantly, in the Pilate narrative only the term “the Jews” appears. Fuller 
concludes.
Thus the “Jews” become for the evangelist the quintessential expression of 
“unbelief’“by which he means the acceptance of Jesus as the final bearer of 
God’s revelation. Thus, too, for him “the Jews” have the same attributes 
as the kosmos in the distinctive Johannine sense of the word. '
Reginald Fuller, “The Jews in tlie Fourth Gospel,” Dialogue 16, (1977) 31-37. cf. R. Alan 
Culpepper, Anatomy o f the Fourth Gospel: A Study in Literary Design (Philadelpliia: Fortress Press, 
1983) 125-132.
^ i^bid., 32.
^"ibid., 31-37. 
ibid., 36.
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Furthermore, Fuller notes that in the FG Jesus’ conflicts with the Jews, rather than 
being anti-Semitic, are fundamentally Christological/^ Significantly, in most cases 
Fuller links the use of “the Jews” to theological concerns and in doing so provides a 
basis on which “the Jews” may be viewed as a character in a collective sense 
representative of a certain point of view. However, Fuller offers no extended narrative 
analysis.
Dorothy Lee examines a series of similar narratives she terms “symbolic
narratives.” These six narratives are; 1) The Story ofNicodemus (3.1-36 [2.23-
3.36]); 2) The Story of the Samaritan Woman (4.1-42); 3) The Healing at the Pool
(5.1-47); 4) The Feeding of the Five Thousand (6.1-71)^^ ; 5) The Healing of the Man
Born Blind (9.1-41); and, 6) The Raising of Lazarus (11.1-12.11).^^ While each
contains unique features, Lee notes a common progression of five stages:
Stage 1 : Foundational Image or ‘Sign \ such as bread, water, or the healing of an 
individual or feeding of a crowd.
Stage 2: Misunderstanding; the central character interprets the sign in relation to 
material reality. Consequently, Jesus is interpreted the same way.
Stage 3: Struggle fo r Understanding; the struggle usually takes place in dialogue with 
Jesus.
’®ibid., 36. Similarly, Culpepper notes, “Through the Jews, John explores the heart and soul of 
unbelief.” Culpepper, Anatomy, 129. Brown explains “the Jews” in a more restricted sense; “the 
Fourth Gospel uses “Hie Jews” as almost a technical title for the religious authorities, particularly 
those in Jerusalem, who are hostile to Jesus J  Brown, John, LXXI (his emphasis). Whether “the 
Jews” is general or specific and technical, Brown, in any case, agrees witli tlie general point; “‘[T]he 
Jews’ belong to “the world,” that is, tliey aie part of that division of men who are in dualistic 
opposition to Jesus and refuse to come to him as the light. (John is not anti-Semitic; the evangelist is 
condemning not race or people but opposition to Jesus.”) ibid., LXXII.
Dorothy Lee, The Symbolic Narratives o f the Fourth Gospel: The Interplay o f Form and Meaning, 
JSNTSS 95, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994.
^^ Paul Anderson offers a similar literaiy analysis for tliis passage. Anderson attempts to integrate his 
reading witli specific events in tlie Sitz im Leben of the “Johamiine conimmiity.” Anderson, “The Sitz 
im Leben of the Johannine Bread of Life Discourse and its Evolving Context,” in R. Alan Culpepper, 
ed. Critical Readings o f John 6 (Brill: Leiden, New York, Kohl, 1997) 1-59.
^ i^bid., 12-13.
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Stage 4: Attainment or Rejection o f Symbolic Understanding; attainment of a symbolic 
understanding representing the attainment of faith, or, the movement away from faith in 
which the symbol is interpreted on materialistic terms.
Stage 5: Confession o f Faith or Statement o f Rejection. The climax of stage 4 in which 
a commitment is made, (the Samaritan woman), or Jesus is explicitly rejected.
In each narrative the sign or symbolic action functions as an interpretative obstacle to 
be overcome so that “Symbol and narrative operate together in a cohesive and 
integrated way.”^^  The key element is whether the sign and Jesus are seen according 
to the flesh (aap^) or according to divine glory (Ôo^a). Significantly, in each of the 
four narratives in which the Jews play an important role as a collective character, (the 
healing at the pool, the feeding of the five thousand, the healing of the man born blind 
and the raising of Lazarus), they manifest a materialistic understanding that is shown to 
be inadequate. For Lee, as for Fuller and the present work, the primary emphasis falls 
on the Jews as a collective character representative of a certain point of view or fi-ame 
of reference, rather than on the Jews as Jews in any national or ethnic sense.
Unfortunately, whatever the many strengths of her literaiy analysis, Lee’s 
theological premises and conclusions are inadequate. Lee utilizes the specific 
circumstance of the use of “symbolic nan atives” in the FG as a means to build faith in 
Jesus and transfers it into a general principle of the world’s general symbolic value to 
represent divine reality without taking into account the effects of the fall and the 
uniqueness of the incarnation. She writes.
^®ibid., 227.
This is generally llie view of Stibbe in his analysis of 8:31-59, which he classifies as satire. Mark 
Stibbe, John’s Gospel (London and New York: Routledge, 1994) 105-131.
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The value of the created order lies in its capacity to be the bearer of divine 
reality. In its symbolic function, the world gains new value and dignity 
coming from its intrinsic relationship to God. In this symbolic view, 
creation is neither exploited nor given absolute significance nor 
undervalued. On the contraiy, the meaning of eternal life is to be found in 
a transformed understanding of the true, symbolic value of natural life.^
Lurking in the background of Lee’s analysis is a deficient Christology and an inflated 
doctrine of creation. Her Christology is one that sees only that “in the human flesh of 
Jesus, the divine pneuma is radically present.”^^  For Lee, it seems that, if the divine 
pneuma is present in the flesh of Jesus, it is present in the same way elsewhere in 
creation. But if the created order in its present state is able to be the bearer of divine 
reality, what was the purpose of the incarnation? Was Jesus put to death by reason of 
literal/metaphoric linguistic confusion? For Lee, the stress falls on creation rather than 
Jesus as creator (contra 1:3). While the FG affirms human life by virtue of creation and 
the incarnation (1:14), its emphasis is to radically transpose present earthly life into the 
larger theological context of heaven and God the Father as defined by one’s faith 
relationship to Jesus. The difiference is one of kind rather than degree, one requiring, in 
Kuhn’s term, a paradigm shift. The Jews saw themselves in symbolic or sacramental 
tenus as the bearers of divine reality of a certain type, as “descendants of Abraham” 
(10:33) and claimed further that “The only Father we have is God Himself.” (10:41) 
But this in itself is insufficient. In the new order, all who believe can become children 
of God. (1:12-13) To their credit, the Jews often understood Jesus’ claims to be God 
(5:18, 8:58-59, 10:30), and, for the Jews, “eternal life” doubtless consisted of much
^Lee, 234-35. 
^Lee 160
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more than, as Lee supposes, “the true, symbolic value of natural life.” However well 
Lee has understood these narratives as narrative, she has failed to understand them 
theologically. In the symbolic narratives of the FG, linguistic or narrative confiision is 
theological confusion.
These differences aside, Lee’s analysis is largely correct and is broadly similar 
to the one followed here. However, here an analysis of the Jews in 4:43-6:71 will be 
offered with special emphasis on their archetypal relation to negative irony within the 
literary and theological kosmos of the FG. For the Jews at this point in the FG 
narrative, the possibility of faith offers a dynamic missing from later narratives where a 
relationship of entrenched opposition to Jesus prevails.
B.2. THE JEWS IN 4:43-6:71: THE IRONIZATION OF IRONY
Although they do not begin that way, the Jews become the consistent 
opponents of Jesus in the FG and the group/character most consistently ironized. The 
situation of the Jews in the FG abounds in ironies. To the extent that they claim to see 
most clearly they show themselves to be most blind. They manipulate their Roman 
rulers into putting their messiah to death by claiming (“We have no king but Caesar”) 
to be more loyal to Caesar than Pilate. And their foray into power politics succeeds 
only because Jesus willingly places himself into the historical matrix that brings about 
his death. Their very success unwittingly coiresponds to the purposes of God. By 
establishing the primacy of one point of view, the Jews are seen to frequently speak 
better than they know (for example, 11:49). But these ironies are established in
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relation to choices made and actions taken and are not inherent to the situation of the 
Jews at the beginning of the FG.
As noted, however great their eventual opposition and rejection of Jesus, the 
Jews begin the FG in a state of relative innocence. The priests and Levites sent from 
Jerusalem to investigate John the Baptist serve more as neutral questioners whose 
question and answer session with John establishes that John is not the Christ and that 
Jesus is the Christ. (l:19fif) Following the temple cleansing, the mood is slightly 
adversarial but of a kind more characterized by incredulity and misunderstanding than 
anything else. The Jews ask for a sign by which to prove his authority, Jesus replies 
“Destroy this temple, and I will raise it again in three days.” (2:18-19) In a manner 
prefiguring the major characteristic of the Jewish response to Jesus in the FG, the Jews 
negate this outrageous statement by interpreting it with reference it to realism and 
concrete experience. Impossible on the terms of what is immediately apparent, 
“Temple” and its associated references form an invitation to move to some other 
context of interpretation. What is in one context nonsense, in another is at least 
ambiguous (If he does not mean X, then what is Y?), and in another context, that of the 
cross and the FG narrative, makes perfect sense. What is called for is a hermeneutic of 
integration wherein interpretive obstacles are transposed into some other frame of 
reference. Characteristic of the Jews, lack of comprehension of this type is consistently 
ironized. Unlike the double-minded and equivocal Thomas, the Jews display persistent 
misunderstanding as their dominant characteristic.
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Aside from the private visit from Nicodemus the Pharisee, '^* the Pharisees are
mentioned in neutral terms in 4:1 where it is noted that “The Pharisees heard that Jesus
was gaining and baptizing more disciples than John.” The Pharisees, previously
interested in John the Baptist (1:24), now have reason to be more interested in Jesus.
In response Jesus returns to, Galilee, via Samaria, but the issue is not explicitly one of
danger. The overall sense of Jesus’ ministry form 1:19-4:54 is that it is going pretty
well. Culpepper observes,
These [early] chapters have a powerful “primacy effect,” that is, they firmly 
establish the reader’s first impression of Jesus’ identity and mission. The 
reader is led to accept the evangelist’s view of Jesus before the antithetical 
point of view is given more than passing reference.^^
The healing of the paralytic (5:1-15) and his failure to demonstrate any faith signals a 
decline from previous good fortune. The healing of the paralytic and the healing of the 
man bom blind are similar in many respects^^ and form narrative bookends to Jesus’ 
open-ended battles with the Jews which increasingly dominate 5:17-8:59. The 
similarities end as the paralytic’s lack of faith is juxtaposed against the triumphant faith 
of the man bom blind in chapter 9.
Significantly, the paralytic’s lack of faith is also set against the backdrop of the 
faith of the royal official immediately preceding (4:43-54). The healing of the royal 
official must be taken into account for the healing of the paralytic to be seen in its
'^'For Lee, “Nicodemus...represents the ‘Jewish’ leadership, which, at tliis stage of the Gospel, is still 
theoretically open to Jesus.” Lee, Symbolic Narratives, 56.
^Culpepper, Anatomy, 91. cf., Stibbe, John's Gospel, 111.
Raymond Collins notes, “[BJotli tlie lame man and the blind man are representative figures in the 
tradition of the Fourth Gospel, but they are antithetically symbolical to the point that one cannot be 
understood witliout the other.” Collins, “Representative Figures in tlie Fourth Gospel,” Downside 
Review, 43; cf. Bultmann, John, 329; J, Louis Martyn, History and Theology in the Fourth Gospel, 
New York 1968, 49-50.
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proper narrative context. The official hears of Jesus’ presence and seeks liira out to 
come and heal his son. A kind of obstacle or test, Jesus’ response, “Unless you people 
see miraculous signs and wonders you will never believe” (4:48) is not encouraging but 
the man persists. In a step of faith, he departs and his servants meet him on the way to 
tell him his son is healed . The time corresponds to Jesus words, and in response he 
and all his household believed.
The details of the story are worth a closer look especially with regard to the 
nature of the inner logic of the events that resulted in faith. In one sense it is not at all 
clear that the royal official’s response is justified. A doubter might raise the following 
issues: How did the royal official know the reports about Jesus he had heard from 
others were true and not simply a rumor? Was his son seriously ill after all? Had his 
father panicked as parents often do? Was the fever about to break anyway? Was the 
timing of the healing simply a coincidence? How could they be sure about the 
coincidence of the time? What of the distance involved? Was there another healer in 
the area? Did the son’s recovery impel the royal official to overreact? Did his joy 
simply get the best of him? Did his belief have proper waiTant? Yet in spite of these 
Humean aporias, to his credit he believes. Whereas Jesus’ encounters with Nicodemus 
and the Samaritan woman followed a linear progression of vertical steps toward faith 
(although the faith ofNicodemus is unclear), in the case of the royal official an
For Sclmackeiiburg, tlie fact that the healing confirms the fullness of faith casts a cloud over the 
royal official in light of 4:48. Rudolf Sclmackenburg, The Gospel According to John. vol. 1, trans. 
Kevin Smytli (London and New York: Burns & Oates, Crossroad, 1968-82) 468. But tliis objection 
fails to consider perseverance of the official in spite of the potential rebuke of 4:48 and fails to allow 
for faitli to develop as a reciprocal process of challenge, action and confirmation. Compare the faith 
dynamics of challenge, action, and confirmation in the account of the man born blind or the story of 
Gideon.
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interconnected complex of events taken as a whole confirms, tests, develops, and 
provides the interpretative basis for triumphant faith. For the royal official, events 
themselves function as a network of invitations and confirmations of faith while they 
could just as easily function as obstacles, fimctioning as invitations or obstacles in the 
same way that “born again” “living water” and “bread of life” do for others in the FG.
The events of the healing of the paralytic and his (lack of) response contrast in 
almost every way with the royal official. Set in Jerusalem during the time of a feast 
(5:1), the situation is thoroughly Jewish. The five colonnades and the thirty-eight years 
of invalidity could mean much (corresponding to the law and the 38 years of wilderness 
wandering, Deut. 2:14) or l i t t l e . B u t  given the overwhelmingly Jewish context of 
5:1-10:42 and beyond and the paradigmatic fimction of this incident as introducing this 
section, much is more likely than little. In any case, being an invalid for thirty-eight 
years contrasts with the ambiguous illness of the official’s son and renders the healing 
of the paralytic prima facie much more remarkable. Unlike the healing of the official’s 
son, and offering a potentially more secure basis of faith, this healing by Jesus is 
immediate in terms of time and location and establishes the causal connection between 
Jesus and the healing as virtually certain. But with these advantages, the healed 
paralytic does not respond with anything beyond physical healing. Jesus’ words to the 
royal official, “Unless you people see miraculous signs and wonders, you will never 
believe” (4:48) provide ironic commentary in this context. The immediate and distant
^^For opposing views see Carson, John, 241-42; Lindars, John, 213-214 (con) and Brodie, John, 238- 
240 (pro).
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juxtapositions of the royal official and the man born blind with the paralytic form a 
narrative based irony that reinforces the overall ironic structure of the FG.
The incident precipitates an open conflict with the Jews over the issue of the 
Sabbath.^^ Responding to their objections, Jesus states, “My Father is always at his 
work to this very day, and I, too, am working.” (5:17) If the theology on which this 
statement is based is understood and accepted- that God works on the Sabbath and the 
fact that Jesus designates God as his Father, if true, entitles him to work on the Sabbath 
like the Father- Jesus offers an adequate explanation. Jesus’ working on the Sabbath is 
an interpretative obstacle to be overcome, an occasion for increased understanding.^® 
The Jews understand the theological importance of Jesus claiming God as his Father, 
which implies Jesus’ equality with God, but despite Jesus’ acceptance of and 
elaborations on tliis assessment (5:19-23), they reject the conclusion that follows. If 
Jesus’ reasons for working on the Sabbath are not considered as anomalies to their 
present frame of reference, however skeptically and provisionally, no amount of 
explanation will improve matters. While the Jews might well be forgiven for 
misunderstanding Jesus’ reference to “temple” (2:19), the decisiveness of the 
paralytic’s healing ought to have produced more fruit. Whatever the positive 
inducements offered by the paralytic’s healing and Jesus’ provision of an intei*pretative 
context, the reaction is one of negation. Double-mindedness at this point might have 
proved helpful. In Kuhnian terms, the invitation to make a paradigm shift has badly
Culpepper observes, “The conflict with unbelief escalates in chapter 6. There are no other 
significant conflicts in John, no conflict witli demons or nature, no conflict witli himself, and little 
sustained conflict with the disciples.” Culpepper, Anatomy, 91.
^®Lee writes “[T]lie second level meaning...emerges once the contradiction in the first level meaning is 
exposed.” Lqq, Symbolic, \\2 .
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misfired. The Copernican revolution has failed; the earth does not revolve around the 
S o n /i
The healing of the paralytic and its aftermath inaugurates a new phase in the 
narrative of Jesus’ ministry and represents a missed opportunity of singular importance. 
Although in the near future there is at least some interaction, from now on Jesus’ 
relationship with his opponents inexorably deteriorates. From 5; 19 on Jesus proceeds 
to insist on the connection between himself and the Father (5:19-31) and to insist on 
the validity of his own testimony (5 :31-47) as well as to denounce the Jews for the first 
time (5:39-40, 45-47). Jesus casts the Jews as seeking eternal life in the wrong place, 
diligent study of the scriptures (5:39) rather than in himself. The issue is not simply 
one of place or activity; it is to locate eternal life, like Jesus, in the wrong sphere of 
causality.
The next event in the nan ative is the feeding of the five thousand, a group 
gathered “because they saw the miraculous signs he had performed on the sick.” (6:2) 
After the feeding, the crowds, (destined to be designated “Jews”), identify Jesus as “the 
Prophet who is to come into the world” (6:14), a view that is at once conect and
Regarding Johannine dualism and paradox in relation to its theology, Barrett notes that, ratlier than 
John’s dualism being a static dualism as found in gnosticism, “The distinguishing feature of John’s 
dualism is its mobility; it is dualism in motion, in becoming. For the keyword is the egeneto of 1:14.” 
( C. K. Barrett, “Paradox and Dualism,” in Essays on John, C. K. Barrett, ed. (London: SPCK, 1982), 
106. As an example, Barrett observes, “Jesus enters the realm of deatli and by doing so transfers men 
out of it into life. Again, tlie dualism is not static but in motion.” (ibid., 107) In a tinly static dualism 
contradiction obtains and paradox is impossible, paradox having a certain living quality of mysteiy 
and potential lacking in tlie dead incoherence of a contradiction, as in, for example, a square circle. 
Although Barrett’s precise concerns lie elsewhere, his insights regarding tlie dynamic of paradox 
might be applied to tlie present instance of the Sabbatli healing. The Sabbatli healing functions in the 
same way as statements such as “You must be born again,” “whoever drinks tlie water I give him will 
never thirst,” “I am the bread of life,” and “My kingdom is not of this world”. Each on its own and in 
context calls for further exploration and interpretation tliat can only begin to be achieved in a context 
beyond surface incongruencies.
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grossly wide of the mark.^  ^ The crowds understand him horizontally as one related 
somehow to Moses and Deuteronomy 18:18, but fail to integrate their understanding of 
Jesus into a proper vertical or theological context. Jesus moves away, physically and 
theologically, from those who would grasp him in this manner. Removed from the 
crowd, the disciples experience the tempest on the lake. In a kind of living parable of 
faith, the disciples “were willing to take him into the boat” based on Jesus’ simple 
words of self identity, “It is I; (iyco si|Lii) don’t be afraid” and immediately they reach 
the salvation of the opposite shore.^  ^ In contrast, through some diligent empirical 
detective work amidst confiision (6:22-34), the crowds boat across the lake 
undisturbed, find Jesus physically on the other side of the lake, and that is all.
Refusing to answer the question as to when he arrived, Jesus instead challenges 
their reliance on miracles throughout 6:26-33. The crowds ask for manna as if (again) 
Jesus is another Moses, but offer a promising link between heaven and earth when they 
state “it is written: ‘He gave them bread from heaven to eat.’” (6:31) In response,
Jesus affirms the Father as the source or cause of the manna and not Moses. On the 
back of this association of the manna with the action of the Father, Jesus transfers these 
associations to an as yet unspecified “he"; “the bread of God is he who comes down 
from heaven.” (6:34) The reply, “from now on give us this bread” is neutral as to what 
constitutes the bread, specifying neither manna nor calling attention to the
The miracle of the feeding, notably more compressed than those in the Synoptics, seives as a 
parabolic introduction to tlie discussion that follows. Whatever tlie actual makeup of the crowds, the 
content and context of 6:25-59, set in a synagogue (6:59) is thoroughly Jewish.
Commenting on the symbolic qualities of this incident Brodie remarks, “...while the disciples were 
indeed going to Capernaum, they were also going somewhere else- to union witli tlie divine Jesus. He 
was their “land.” tlieir ultimate goal, and once tliey had accepted the tlieophany, tliey had, in a sense, 
already arrived.” Brodie, John, 265, 290. cf. Lindars, John, 248.
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personification of the bread as “he"  Bread at this point is an open invitation to a 
conception of bread in terms of synecdoche- bread needs to be understood within a 
broader frame of reference in the same way that “crown” refers to all aspects of 
kingship. In a sequential way, Jesus associates bread with manna and manna with the 
action and provision of God in the past. Wlien fully understood, eating bread functions 
within the context of the FG as a metaphor for belief in Jesus.
The request of 6:34 and Jesus’ response in 6:35-40 form the climax of this 
passage; the give and take of previous verses becomes a torrent of theology in 6:35-40 
that fills in the content of “bread of life.” Jesus is the bread of life, the “he” or “that 
which” or “the one who” of 6:33, (à Kaxapaivcov), has “come down from heaven” 
(6:38), the one who “does the will of him who sent me”, the Son who, if looked to and 
believed, provides eternal life. (6 :40)^ "^  As with the case of Jesus healing on the 
Sabbath, these statements make perfect sense if seen within the proper frame of 
reference. The resulting misunderstanding is profound; Jesus is “the son of Joseph, 
whose father and mother we know” who, on eaithly logic, did not come down from 
heaven but came from a location rather more close by. Significantly, at this point and 
not before, the crowd is designated “the Jews.” (6:41)^^
In spite of further statements, including Jesus’ attempt to reconnect himself 
with bread and manna (6:48-51) and advance on this basis (i.e. eating manna resulted in
^ Anderson notes, “Throughout w . 6-15 and w . 25-40 the crowd is tested as to whether it will see 
beyond the bread winch Jesus gives to tlie “bread” which Jesus is.” Anderson, im Leben f  in 
Culpepper Critical Readings o f  John 6, 5.
Painter views the change for “the crowds” to “the Jews” in static categories, indicative of “a change 
of audience and a change of time,” rallier than an indication of a failed response. John Painter, “Jesus 
and tlie Quest for Eternal Life,” in Culpepper, Critical Readings of John 6, 61-94.
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death; believing in Jesus results in eternal life), the response of the Jews remains 
visionless. They reply “How can this man give us his flesh to eat.” (6:52) While 
technically best designated misunderstanding,^® the responses of the Jews represent a 
radical form of ironic negation. Ii ony relies on a potential or recognized conflict of 
understanding, while misunderstanding tends more toward simply not understanding. 
The border between misunderstanding and irony in these and similar cases is blurred if 
not crossed. In misunderstanding, the two levels of understanding characteristic of 
irony is rather flattened out into one- and this is exactly the point. The promising 
association of bread, manna, and the action of God in human affairs with Jesus himself 
collapses, negated through an distinctive preoccupation with material reality.
On being told that “no one can come to me unless the Father has enabled him” 
(6:65), a form of radical transcendent causality, many disciples desert Jesus. When 
Jesus asks the twelve if they wish to leave too, Peter replies, “Lord to whom shall we 
go? You have the words of eternal life. We believe and know that you are the Holy 
One of God.” (6:68-69) Significantly, Peter connects Jesus with eternal life and 
identifies him in teims which, if less than a full affirmation of deity, affirms that Jesus is 
greater than a prophet. Unlike the Jews, Peter connects heaven and earth; “eternal life”
misunderstanding, see D. A. Carson, “Understanding Mismiderstandings in the Fourtli Gospel,” 
Tyndale Bulletin 33 (1982) 59-91. For Carson, misunderstandings are generally consequent upon 
temporal sequence in salvation history ratlier than a historical Sitz im Leben of tlie early church, the 
latter view being tlie target of much of tlie article. Complete understanding of Jesus occurs only after 
the cross and resurrection have illuminated previous events. Thus, Carson locates tlie 
misunderstandings in tlie context of the story (using Chatman’s terms), rather than in tlie theological 
and rhetorical context of tlie discourse. This is to a certain extent correct but neglects a significant 
point. Wliile a post resurrection stance is important, a post resurrection stance in and of itself cannot 
be sufficient basis for an understanding of Jesus, and, derivative of this, a post resurrection stance in 
and of itself cannot fully explain tlie use of misunderstandings in tlie FG. The natme of the 
misunderstandings is often ontological and theological and transcends whatever increase in 
understanding can be gained from temporal sequence in the gospel events alone.
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connects earth with heaven and designating Jesus as “the Holy One of God” connects 
heaven with earth. Rooted in the incarnation itself, heaven and earth as well as God 
and creation, however estranged, are seen as interpenetrating and inseparable. The 
stairway to heaven, referred to in 1:51, is envisioned as bearing two way traffic.
The narratives of the paralytic and the feeding of the five thousand and their 
ensuing discussions both follow a similar pattern: a miraculous event giving rise to an 
exchange ultimately centered on the frame of reference with which it is to be viewed.
In both cases the Jews fail to make the required transition from one frame of reference 
to another. The materialistic perspective of the Jews prevents them from making the 
transition to a greater theological reality, one that includes their very material existence. 
The issue of heaven (or God) or earth as the source and sphere of causality is of 
primary importance. The Jews limit causality to only one sphere: the material, or if not 
material, to the past, whereas for Jesus, the ‘cause’ of his actions is vertical, heavenly, 
of the Father, whose actions Jesus performs. The vertical causality so inlportant to 
romance is intolerable to this kind of thinking characteristic of negative irony. The 
decision to put Jesus to death by making use of the realistic means of political 
manipulation is the natural outcome of one of two radically different ways of viewing 
things, an incipient conflict rooted in the early stages of the FG’s narrative.
m  CONCEPTUAL ISSUES IN IRONY
A) SURVEY AND CLASSIFICATION OF STUDIES OF IRONY IN THE FG
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The presence and use of irony in the FG is a well established feature of literary 
analysis of the FG during the last several decades. Irony in the FG is a major concern 
of MacRae, Wead, Culpepper, Duke, O’Day, and Staley, with Duke’s/roMy in the 
Fourth Gospel being the standard and best work.^^ While Duke is certainly 
theological, his primary concern is an applied study of irony as a literary structure and 
device to which the present work is indebted. Duke’s comprehensive classification of 
irony in the FG need not be repeated here. Like Duke, Culpepper is generally content 
to explore the presence of irony as a literary phenomenon.
With mixed success, O’Day attempts to move beyond the literary and link 
narrative mode and theological claim. O’Day notes that for irony to function at all, it is 
necessary to have two states of knowledge that are in opposition to each other. To see 
the irony of a situation is to see things with a state of knowledge, one believes, superior 
to that which is immediately apparent. Irony draws the reader in by requiring the 
reader to make a series of right judgments in regard to the proper state of knowledge. 
To illustrate, O’Day offers a detailed analysis of this principle at work in Jesus’ 
encounter with the Samaritan woman in John 4. For O’Day, revelation in the FG is not 
to be connected with existential encounter with Jesus as revealer or connected to 
propositions; rather, revelation occurs in one’s encounter with the text and being drawn 
into it through irony. She observes, “The locus o f revelation is thus seen to lie in the
CvAy&pXiex, Anatomy; Paul Duke, Irony in the Fourth Gospel (Atlanta; John Knox Press, 1985); Gail 
O’Day, Revelation in the Fourth Gospel: Narrative Mode and Theological Claim (Pliiladelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1986); David Wead, The Literary Devices in John's Gospel, (dissertation, Basel, 1970); 
George MacRae, “Theology and Irony in tlie Fourth Gospel,” in The Gospel o f John as Literature: An 
Anthology of Twentieth-Century Perspectives, Mark Stibbe, ed. (New York: E. J. Brill, 1993) 103-113; 
Staley, The Prints First Kiss.
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biblical text and in the M>orld. created by the words o f that text. Thus, for O’Day, 
narrative mode is a theological claim.
O’Day correctly to draws attention to the interplay of nan ative mode and 
theological claim, but reverses the proper order. Rather than narrative mode, in this 
case irony, making and establishing a theological claim, the theological claims of the 
FG work themselves out in a narrative that inevitably makes use of i r o n y . T o  argue 
the reverse is to a bit like supposing a tennis net supports the posts that hold it up. The 
eternal divine word coming into the world as flesh and dwelling among us is a new way 
of thinking at odds with present reality. This is a theological claim. The prologue 
makes the initial presentation of this claim that is supported and worked out afterwards 
in the narrative. Irony, with its conflicting states of knowledge, may well be the 
expected result. As will be argued later, while irony rests on values, beliefs, and 
perceptions and challenges them, it does not establish them."^ ®
Wead notes the author’s point of view, both in terms of physical position and 
mental understanding, as it relates to irony and other literaiy devices.'^  ^ The fact that 
the author’s understanding of the characters and events is superior to those within the 
gospel allows irony to work; thus, “The “godlike” position of the author is one of the 
key marks of irony. Wead also comments on need for a “union of thought between
O’Day. Revelation, 47. her emphasis.
contrast, O’Day states, “Johannine irony provides the overarching categoiy through which to view 
Johannine dualism.” ibid., 8.
O’Day makes an astute distinction by noting that Johannine irony can be approached in two ways: as 
a literary device, (Culpepper, Duke) or with reference to John’s theology, (O’Day, MacRae). O’Day, 
Revelation, 3-6. Here irony will be approached in a more general manner related to questions of value 
and belief, which inevitably involves questions of theology.
Literary Devices, 1-12. 
ibid., 50.
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the author and his audience” in order for irony to be recognized and employed, a union
that finds its foundation in the prologue. He writes,
John acts upon the assumption that his readers have superior knowledge 
from his prologue, the information he has given them in the entire gospel, 
and other traditions known to Chiistians. This superior knowledge forms 
the basis for the “reality” upon which irony depends.'^^
Wead rightly connects irony with the superior point of view and understanding of the 
author, an author who wishes to put forth a transcendent theological reality and bases 
his irony upon it.
Staley offers a variation on Johannine irony in his contention that the implied 
reader is victimized. He comments, “In the prologue, the implied author establishes 
the implied reader’s sense of control over rudimentary aspects of the story, only to 
undermine the implied reader’s superior position through victimization in chapters 4, 7, 
11, 13, and 21.”'^ '^  The incidents Staley refers to are: the Samaritan woman (4:1-42), 
where one is led astray by supposing this parody of a type scene will turn out other 
than it does; Jesus declining his brothers’ suggestion that he attend the feast only to 
attend anyway (7:1-10); the Lazams incident, including the two Bethanys (10:40- 
11:18); the introduction of the heretofore unmentioned beloved disciple (13:1 -30); and 
the continuation of the book following its assumed ending in 20:31. Assuming Staley is 
correct, however much the implied reader is led astray firom an insider’s position set 
out initially in the prologue, the irony in the FG remains generally stable so that the
^ i^bid., 67-68.
Staley, First Kiss, 116.
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implied reader’s victimization is limited/^ It may be noted, however, that what Staley 
sees as dead ends are perhaps better taken as detours and rough spots. Staley’s reader 
response methodology is notably horizontal and linear in its emphasis. Thomas as a 
character embodies the kind of equivocal irony analogous to that outlined in Staley’s 
narrative analysis. To use E. M. Forster’s categories in this instance, Staley’s reading 
is notably a “flat” reading, whereas, Thomas provides a “round” exposition of this type 
of irony.
Moore and Kelber challenge the stability of Johannine irony by arguing that 
John’s irony collapses into paradox as Jesus, the source of living water to the 
Samaritan woman, becomes the one who thirsts on the cross. Culpepper frames the 
issue as follows,
The issue in dispute between those who read John’s irony as stable and 
those who read it as unstable hinges on whether the narrative context and 
intertextuality of John 19:28 collapses the distinction between the physical 
and figurative senses of thirst. Does the text allow the reader to find a 
vantage point fr om which the figurative sense is stable or does the text defy 
such interpretations?"*^
Culpepper reads Staley as holding to a Johannine irony that, however provisionally unstable, is 
stable in the end. see Culpepper, “Reading Johannine Irony," in Exploring the Gospel of John: In 
Honor ofD. Mooody Smith, R. Alan Culpepper and C. Clifton Black, eds. (Louisville: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 1996) 198-199. see Staley, First Kiss, 95-118. Charles Giblin offers an alternative 
reading of the incidents of Jesus brothers and the death of Lazarus. Namely, these pericopes, together 
with tlie changing of tlie water into wine (2:1-11) and the healing of the official’s son (4:43-54), show 
tliat Jesus will act on liis own terms and not in response to tlie merely hmnan concerns of others, see 
Giblin, “Suggestion, Negative Response, and Positive Action in St. John’s Portrayal of Jesus,” NTS 
26, 197-211.
Stephen D. Moore. Literary Criticism and the Gospels: The Theoretical Challenge. (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1989) 159-63; “Are There Impurities in tlie Living Water tliat tlie Johannine 
Jesus Dispenses? Deconstruction, Feminism, and the Samaritan Woman,” Biblical Interpretation 1 
(1993): 207-27; reprinted in Poststructuralism and the New Testament: Derrida and Foucault at the 
Foot o f the Cross (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1994) 43-64. Werner H. Kelber, “In the Beginning Were tlie 
Words: The Apotheosis and Narrative Displacement of the Logos,” JAAR (1990), and “The Birtli of a 
Beginning: John 1:1-18,” Semeia 52 (1990) 121-44. reprinted in The Gospel o f  John as Literature: An 
Anthology o f Twentieth-Century Perspectives, ed. Mark Stibbe (New York: E. J. Brill, 1993) 209-230. 
'’’ R. Alan Culpepper, “Reading Johannine Irony,” 203-4.
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Culpepper defends the stability of irony in this instance by noting; (1) that the reader is 
prepared for the “1 thirst” by Jesus statement “Am I not to drink the cup that the 
Father has given me?” (18:11); (2) Jesus fiilfills what the Father has given him, 
hungering and thirsting for tliis fulfillment (4:34); (3) “I thirst” fulfills scripture and 
figuratively announces his own death; (4) Jesus the dying man might reasonably be 
expected to be thirsty. Well worth a closer look, Culpepper’s defensive strategy is to 
nuance the senses in which living water and thirst might be used and in doing so must 
inevitably move beyond the confines of the narrative itself; Moore and Kelber, on the 
other hand, in effect base their argument for the collapse of irony on what is in reality a 
collapse of the various uses of water into one sense. Theological collapse becomes 
narrative collapse. Culpepper interprets the text vrith all its intertextual and prophetic 
hills and historical valleys; Moore and Kelber see only water in all its flatness,"*^  which 
may indicate that each side is question begging to some extent. Interpretation becomes 
a matter of perspective to a significant degree and in this sense one is forced to make 
clear the paradigm one wishes to employ or, alternatively, one’s interpretative 
paradigm is exposed. However imposing the theology of John may be, Moore and 
Kelber prefer the two dimensional fiatland of deconstmction. Even Culpepper’s 
defense is notably non-theological.
Moore might well agree and say this is precisely his point. Regarding tlie attempt to clearly 
differentiate between tlie figmal and literal in the Samaritan woman narrative, he notes, "To draw a 
clear line between them, as Jesus attempts to do, is about as effective as drawing a line on water.” 
Moore, 62.
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From this sui*vey of treatments of irony in the FG, the broad outlines of 
classifications of irony begins to emerge, classifications of irony based on values and 
beliefs and applicable to any context. For Duke, Culpepper, Wead, and O’Day, irony 
in the FG operates fiom a stable narrative and theological position. For Staley, the 
irony is stable, but tliis does not prevent the reader from being taken for a bit of a ride. 
For Moore and Kelber, the irony of the FG is radically unstable if not completely 
collapsed. These three variations on irony will be respectively termed positive, 
equivocal, and negative irony and may be located on the chart below.
ROMANCE
JESUS
SUMMER
REPRESENTATION
BELIEF OR IDEAL
COMEDY
PETER
SPRING
INTEGRATION
A- POSITIVE IRONY 
B- EQUIVOCAL IRONY 
C- NEGATIVE IRONY
TRAGEDY
PILATE
FALL
REDUCTION
REALITY OR 
EXPERIENCE
IRONY
JEWS/THOMAS
WINTER
NEGATION
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The content and nature of each type of irony will be developed in detail below. For 
now it is enough to note the difference in perspectives and observe that in the various 
treatments of irony in the FG themselves, these intei*preters manifest distinct 
perspectives. But first, use and perception of irony in whatever form, as will be seen, is 
related to beliefs, values, and world view.
B) VALUES AND BELIEFS IN IRONY
Irony is a slippery concept, difficult or impossible to grasp fiilly and yet an 
important aspect of any sophisticated discourse. While it is beyond the purpose and 
scope of this work to provide a comprehensive classification and definitions of the 
various types of ironies, a basic fi-amework and definition of irony will be offered as a 
starting point for further discussion. Muecke’s delineation of the tliree elements of 
irony (followed by Duke) will be used,"*^  however much it must be admitted that any 
definition of irony is pregnant of a thousand qualifications.
The first is that irony is double layered. For irony to be present, two levels of 
understanding must be possible, for “Irony...needs and looks for contradictions and
''^Duke, Imny, 14-18. Muecke, The Compass o f Irony, 19-21. Stibbe notes, “Irony itself is an 
oppositional structure wliicli tlirives on two orders of meaning contrasting witli one another. For a 
word, a phrase or a sentence to be ironic, it must be possible to imagine someone or some group 
interpreting something superficially and missing completely the deeper dimension of tmtli.” Stibbe, 
Storyteller, 120. Norman Knox offers a similar definition; “Irony may be defined as the conflict of 
two meanings which has a dramatic structure peculiar to itself; initially, one meaning, the appearance, 
presents itself as tlie obvious truth, but when tlie context of tliis meaning unfolds, in-depth or in time, 
it surprisingly discloses a conflicting meaning, the reality, measured against which tlie first meaning 
now seems false or limited and, in its self-assurance, blind to its own situatibn. (liis emphasis) Norman 
Knox, “Irony.” in Dictionary o f the History o f Ideas, v. II (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1973) 
626-634. For a incisive evaluation of Muecke, see Knox, “On the Classification of Ironies,” Modern 
Philology 70 (1972) 53-62.
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dualities.”^^  In a famous example, when Mark Antony states that “Brutus is an 
honorable man,” his seemingly straightforward statement when repeated is intended to 
be taken ironically and to mean precisely the opposite. Thus, irony is often defined as 
“saying one thing and meaning another,” often, but not always true. This relates to the 
second element, that, irony presents opposition. There must be some perception of at 
least some degree of opposition between what is said or done and some other possible 
meaning. Irony cannot be merely double layered, for many statements may be double 
layered without being in opposition, as, for example, in allegory. In stable irony, the 
opposition between layers will result in one of the layers being negated in favor of the 
other. The third element is that irony usually contains an element of unawareness 
giving rise to someone being victimized. The victim varies according to context and 
according to the perceptions of the reader. The victim may even be the author.
These three elements of irony suggest that irony is also absolutely related to 
values, beliefs, and perceptions; irony is not simply a literary device. Several things may 
be observed. Minimally, the presence of irony intended or not indicates other ways of 
perceiving something and/or calls something into question and, maximally, irony clearly 
negates one meaning in favor of another. The difference relates to Booth’s familiar 
designations stable and unstable irony,^* or irony characterized by negation and 
questioning respectively. The stability or instability of irony is bound up with the 
perceptions of its use and perception, which, again, relates to values and beliefs. When 
considered abstractly as a literary structure, device, or methodology, irony is value
Muecke, Compass, 129.
Wayne Booth, The Rhetoric o f Irony (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1974).
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neutral But to confine irony to the status of literary device is to confuse its particular 
form and manifestation with its relationship to values and beliefs. The actual use of 
irony and perceptions of its use are absolutely bound up with values, beliefs, and ideals, 
or at least the presence of irony raises the issue of values and beliefs. ‘Double 
layered’ is a useful conception of irony, but misleading insofar as it casts irony as a 
neutral two layered structure after the manner of a cake or a house. While irony is 
double layered with opposition between the two layers and is in this sense trans- 
ideological, both the content of each layer and the position of each layer relative to 
each other rests on perceptions and beliefs of the ironist and those of the audience. 
According to Hutcheon, “Irony is always (whatever else it might be) a modality of 
perception- o r , better, of attribution- of both meaning and evaluative attitude.”^^  
Referring to irony as “double layered” provides a convenient way of referring to 
something inherent to irony, but irony can never be only that.
On encountering irony, the actual choice of one layer over another inevitably 
involves questions of value or belief. The “superior” position implied by the ironist 
may not be shared or accepted by an audience. In terms of its perception, Mark 
Antony’s designation of Brutus as an honorable man affirms, questions, and then 
negates the notion of Brutus being an honorable man. But Brutus might just as easily 
have made the same speech about Mark Antony. Or, with regard to values and beliefs, 
to the extent one perceives Brutus to actually be an honorable man, the irony may
This is tlie major argument of Linda Hutcheon, in Irony's Edge: The Theory and Politics o f Irony 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1994), and figures prominently in Booth. Hutcheon obseives, 
....irony can and does function tactically in the service of a wide variety of political positions, 
legitimating or imderculting a wide variety of interests.” ibid., 10.
^^ibid., 122
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perhaps be missed or taken as a self-mdictment on the part of Mark Antony. However
strong the tendency to do so, perception of irony does not imply acceptance of the
values implied in its use. On values in irony and its perception Booth observes,
Even if an author presents no argument or position, claiming strict 
objectivity, indifference to the reader, or aesthetic impassivity, the reader 
will find himself choosing , perhaps unconsciously, to accept or reject the 
pose, or stand, or tone, or claim to poetic craft. But irony dramatizes this 
choice, forces us into hierarchical participation, and hence makes the 
results more actively our own.^ "*
But it is also clear by now why irony causes so much trouble. An 
aggressively intellectual exercise that fuses fact and value [my emphasis], 
requiring us to construct alternative hierarchies and choose among them; 
demands that we look down on other men’s follies or sins; floods us with 
emotion-charged value judgments which claim to be backed by the mind; 
accuses other men not only of wrong beliefs but of being wrong at their 
very foundations and blind to what these foundation imply-all of this 
coupled with a kind of subtlety that cannot be deciphered or “proved” 
simply by looking closely at the words: no wonder that “failure to 
communicate” and resulting rjuarrels are often found where irony dwells.
Booth argues that decisions about irony inevitably rest on “knowledge of value” and 
faults Fiye over his eschewal of such judgments in literary criticism. Even simple 
understatement or overstatement involves a value judgment. The ironist takes a risk in 
being perceived correctly, at least to the extent that being perceived correctly is a 
desired intention. Irony also opens up and exposes the beliefs and values of the reader 
or perceiver who may or may not make the same interpretative moves as the ironist.
Booth, Irony, 41. Booth employs tlie example of Mark Antony but does not mention tliat perception 
of tlie irony does not entail an alignment with Mark Antony’s assessment of Brutus.
^ i^bid., 44.
^ibid., 193.
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Given the value laden nature of irony, and the many forms in which irony 
appears, the classification of irony as positive, equivocal, or negative, follows naturally. 
The reference to irony as double layered suggests as much. The terms positive and 
negative are of course hardly neutral, the application of these terms in the present work 
being itself a value judgment, one guided by both a Christian perspective and these 
terms as might be traditionally conceived.
C) POSITIVE, EQUIVOCAL, AND NEGATIVE IRONY
C.l. POSITIVE IRONY
In positive irony, a known, accepted, or offered belief or standard is assumed or 
affiimed by which departures from it are ironized or negated. Positive irony is 
manifestly present in the overall theological structure of the gospel and is the primary 
type of irony used in the FG. Supremely logocentric, the FG has a definite theology 
and point of view to which it aspires to cultivate belief (20:31) and negate unbelief 
(3:18). Introduced and grounded theologically in the prologue, Jesus is the ideal of the 
FG and the center of its function as romance; it is on the basis of who Jesus is as “the 
Word made flesh” that most of the irony in the FG operates. Because he is God and 
because he is human, Jesus ironizes this heretofore unbridged dichotomy between ideal 
and experience, between God and a fallen world. The treatments of Johannine irony by 
Duke, O’Day, and Wead assume the position of positive irony. The FG contains
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positive, equivocal, and negative irony, the latter two having been explored in relation 
to Thomas and the Jews respectively.
The theological basis on which irony in the FG operates as positive irony very 
much relates to the familiar “dualism” of the FG. The dualism of the FG has less to do 
with an upper world meeting a lower world as much as it has to do with a proper 
understanding of Jesus, earthly life included, in light of who he claimed to be. While 
irony in the FG is a matter of perceiving it in its various literary foims, such as those 
identified by Duke, it is much more a issue related to perception, faith and belief, and 
theological understanding of Jesus. In the FG perception of Jesus as the Word, the 
“Holy one of God,” or as “My Lord and my God” is a matter of faith and belief; yet 
belief and faith consist of a proper perception and understanding of Jesus as the Word, 
the “Holy one of God,” or as “My Lord and My God.” The dualism suggested by 
darkness and light, blindness and sight, etc., forms the basis for an analogy with irony. 
The dualism of the FG relates to the frequent use of irony and relates to conflicting 
interpretation of the same data. The advantage offered by the prologue is a two-edged 
sword; to perceive the irony without belief is a radical form of self indictment.
Exhibiting positive irony in another form, Swift’s A Modest Proposal offers the 
ostensibly serious proposal for solving the problem of poverty and hunger among the 
Irish by using surplus Irish children as table delicacies for the rich. The problem of 
“What can we do to relieve the poor? is transposed into “What can we do to be 
relieved of the poor?”^^  The true value structure assumed is based on the sanctity and 
value of human life and is employed ironically to expose and negate its opposite.
Muecke, The Compass o f Irony, 74.
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mistreatment of the Irish. The value structure of A Modest Proposal is polarized and 
much of its power stems from feigning the exact opposite of what it proposes, hiding 
its satire behind the straight face of irony. The greater tone of militancy and invective, 
or the greater the emotional element, the more irony moves toward satire.^ ** Although 
it works by negation characteristic of irony, the type of irony employed by Swift is 
positive irony in that it assumes a recognized value or belief, one whose value remains, 
whatever the particular circumstance, in order to negate its opposite. Swift’s “Modest 
Proposal” bridges the gap between the eternal and present by employing a principle 
assumed to be of enduring validity and directing the application of this principle to a 
specific circumstance.
C.2. EQUIVOCAL IRONY
Irony in other works is not so straightforward and occupies the swampy middle 
ground of equivocal or unstable, or paradoxical irony. For example, in Erasmus’ “In 
Praise of Folly,” Folly is the name given to a personification of a certain kind of 
wisdom on which the world operates. No one gets married or attempts anything 
without Folly working her spell. While the work is ironic in that it contains irony, the 
extent of its irony is difihcult to determine. Affirmation and negation, principle and 
experience, are mixed like so much iron and clay, painted as a kind of wisdom, and 
presented to the reader for evaluation. Folly deserves a measure of respect, but to 
adopt Folly as a comprehensive explanation of things would be folly of an ill-informed 
kind. In a similar vein, Thackeiy’s Vanity Fair, an ambiguous but value affirming 
ironic novel, one without heroes, also affirms and negates: Becky Sharp is at once
Fvye, Anatomy, 223.
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subject to criticism and sympathy, responsible for her actions yet an indictment of her 
society and times/^ Irony of this type relies on an appreciation of opposites, an 
approach having similarities to the critical realism of Reinhold Niebuhr.
The book of Esther displays equivocal irony of another sort. Whereas “In 
Praise of Folly” can be said to be intended to occupy a middle ground, Esther presents 
a case where an interpretative dilemma obtains. Wliile Esther does not explicitly 
mention God, an implicit theology seems to affirm the sovereignty of God over human 
af fai rs .What  is most unclear is the relationship of Mordecai and Esther to the plans 
and actions of God of which they, presumably, are a part. Or are they? Is their attempt 
to save themselves and their people one of heroic, courageous, and principled action or 
are they unwitting secular instmments of the sovereignty of God? The issue is 
therefore not of a middle ground, but of polar opposites with each interpretation vying 
for conti ol. One interpretation negates the other, but which one is correct? The matter 
is further complicated by whether this interpretative oscillation was intended by the 
author or not. Is this the clever strategy of a genius to draw in the reader, mitigate 
opposites, or shnple authorial bungling? Credit or blame are equally plausible. And, 
once recognized, the reader is inevitably sucked into a debate involving judgments of 
value and belief. The ironic/heroic dilemma also affects interpretation of Shakespeare’s 
Henry V, Marlowe’s Dr. Faiistus, Flannery O’Conner’s Wise Blood, John’s treatment 
of Pilate, and countless others. Even Do» Quixote, ironic and satirical but sympathetic
A. E. Dyson, The Crazy Fabric: Essays in Irony (London: Macmillan and Co., 1965) 72-95, esp. 90- 
91.
see Frederic Bush, Ruth, Esther (Dallas: Word Books, 1996) 325-326. For a survey of issues related 
to irony and theology in Rutli see, K. Larkin, Ruth and Esther (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 
1996) 58-69. Stan Goldman, “Narrative and Ethical Ironies in Esther,” JSOT 47 (1990), 15-31.
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to its victim, may be read as an indictment of a society that has lost its ideals. The 
mixed reception of Esther by both Jews and Christians no doubt reflects something of 
these interpretative difficulties. Esther and “In Praise of Folly” may be classed as 
equivocal, although their ambiguity is of a radically different kind.
Equivocal irony can also be expressed by means of a naive speaker uttering 
ironies unawares. Commenting favorably on the life of Uncle Silas Phelps and his 
preaching in particular. Huckleberry Finn observes, “He never charged nothin’ for his 
preaching, and it was worth it, too.” Near the conclusion of The Tempest Miranda 
observes, “O brave new world that has such people in it.” Miranda refers to 
“beauteous mankind” but her words can be taken ironically, as Aldous Huxley did for 
the title of his negative utopia. Recalling the tendency of the FG toward double 
meaning, Thomas’ statement to go that “we may die with him” may be of the same 
cloth; a statement presented in the narrative as ostensibly naive, as it is usually taken to 
be, but one that on further examination means something entirely different, functioning 
as a trap laid out for the clever. On this reading, Thomas is presented, like Socrates, as 
something of an eiron, as one only pretending to be naive or presented as such, but one 
who, unlike Socrates, in the end is ironized in his irony.
In Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice, a work, like the FG, of shifting 
perceptions and judgments explored through character, Mr. Bennet is similar to 
Thomas in that both are archetypal ironized ironists. From the detachment of his 
library, Mr. Bennet presides over his silly wife and five daughters, some of whom are 
silly and some not. The absurdities of life and wife supply a feast of irony. The arrival
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of his cousin Mr. Collins becomes an event of particular enjoyment. Prompted by Mr.
Bennet to comment on his “talent of flattering with delicacy,” Mr. Collins offers
suitably inane remarks. We then read,
Mr. Bennet’s expectations were fijlly answered. His cousin was as absurd 
as he had hoped, and he listened to him with the keenest enjoyment, 
maintaining at the same time the most resolute composure of countenance, 
and except in the occasional glance at Elizabeth, requiring no partner in his 
pleasure.
Whether or not Elizabeth shares his pleasure, the narrative presents the reader with an 
invitation to do so. Unlike Thomas, whose irony is easily passed over, the effect of this 
interchange is to establish Mr. Bennet as someone on the inside, someone in the know 
with whom sophisticated readers might well identity. But to exchange glances with 
Mr. Bennet is to run the risk of (not) seeing as he does.
Mr. Bennet’s irony and detachment fall under scrutiny on the scandalous 
departure of his daughter Lydia with the unscrupulous Mr. Wickham. Concluding an 
unsuccessful search for them in London, he returns home, saying nothing of the affair. 
But prompted by Elizabeth, who cautions him “not to be too severe on himself,” he 
remarks, “...No, Lizzy, let me once in my life feel how much I have been to blame. I 
am not afraid of being over-powered by the impression. It will pass away soon 
enough.” The remark is at once sincere and an escape, the irony being that the 
impression does “pass away soon enough,” perhaps too soon. Mr. Bennet regains 
something of his resolute composure of countenance and, turning his wit on his 
daughter Kitty, threatens to lock her away from society.
Kitty, who took all these tlireats in a serious light, began to cry.
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‘Weil, well,” said he, ‘do not make yourself unhappy. If you are a good 
girl for the next ten years, I will take you to a review at the end of them.’
To the extent that the reader has earlier feasted at the table of irony with Mr. Bennet, 
this series of exchanges is perhaps lighthearted and funny, propelling the reader over 
the real irony when Mr. Bennet’s irony and wit are perhaps wearing a bit thin. At the 
very least, Mr. Bennet at this point is an equivocal figure, the human qualities and 
sensitivity the situation demands having been exchanged, like a birthright, for the 
pottage of irony’s detachment and superior perspective. To exchange glances with him 
at this point is to risk seeing one’s self in the mirror.
Mr. Bennet’s descent into blindness reaches its nadir during the events 
immediately preceding Darcy’s engagement with Elizabeth. He has no knowledge at all 
of Darcy’s efforts in patching up Lydia’s marriage to Wickham and no knowledge of 
Darcy and Elizabeth’s past involvement or their growing affection, recalling only his 
daughter’s past disapprobation of the man. Lady Catherine, Darcy’s aunt, calls on the 
Bennets to denounce the match, but being detached, the meaning of this event passes 
him by. Mr. Bennet reads Mr. Collins’ letter concerning the inadvisability of the 
marriage of Elizabeth to Mr. Darcy ironically and satirically and with exquisite delight, 
painfiilly inflicting his wit on his daughter. For Elizabeth, “It was necessary to laugh, 
when she would rather have cried. Her father had most cruelly mortified her...she 
could do nothing but wonder at such a want of penetration. . . ” In so doing he fails, like 
Thomas, to perceive or accept the obvious clues to the wonder-full nature of present 
events, in his case that particularly social phenomenon of love and marriage. The scene
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is one of extended irony, an irony made more effective by Mr. Bennet having traded 
places with Mr. Collins as ironic victim and being equally or less perceptive than his 
silly wife. Yet through Elizabeth’s reactions, the reader is cautioned against ironizing 
with indelicacy because of its social effects.
There are a number of parallels between Mr. Bennet and Thomas. Paradigmatic 
of an equivocally ironic point of view, both make astute observations on their 
respective situations from a position of superior insight and, while both remain within 
their social context, do so with relative ambiguity and detachment. From this position, 
both descend through positions of equivocal interpretation on into misunderstanding 
and blindness at which point both fail to perceive events as they really are. Further, 
both fail to accept evidence to the contrary, no matter how obvious or compelling.
But, within the respective works in which they appeal', both Mr. Bennet and Thomas 
are redeemable, experiencing a reversal of circumstances through the efforts of others. 
The difference between them concerns the nature and content of the worlds in which 
they operate; in the FG the world is one dominated by theological concerns related to 
present experience, in Pride and Prejudice, the world is profoundly social. Thomas 
and M'. Bennet must operate within their respective worlds; for Thomas his ironic 
perspective has theological consequences whereas social consequences obtain for Mr. 
Bennet. Yet it is worth noting that both function as social misfits, each to a certain 
degree strangers in their own worlds. For Thomas though, deliverance happens as 
theology is reintegrated with experience. For M . Bennet deliverance occurs on social 
terms through his daughter’s marriage to Darcy and through it the restoration of the
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family fortunes. However different the contexts or narratives in which they occur, both 
are experiments in equivocal irony in character form. And through a similar process 
both Mr. Bennet and Thomas present the same thing; the ironization of ironist.
Thomas instead sees too early, his observations, like Austen’s Mr. Bemiet, also 
paradigmatic of an equivocally ironic point of view, are astute and premature. 
Undershooting the mark, Thomas is an ironic character with comic tendencies who fails 
to anticipate the glory to follow. In contrast, Peter overshoots the mark and fails to 
anticipate the sorrows and defeats consequent on circumstance and experience.
Thomas is to some degree and ironized eiron, while Peter is analogous to the alazon, 
or braggart. For Thomas the resunection delivers hope while for Peter the cross brings 
restoration and temperance.
C.3. NEGATIVE mONY
With respect to values and beliefs, another type of irony exists which may be
characterized as negative irony. In this type of irony, a known, accepted, or offered
belief or standard is negated or rendered absurd by applying it to a difficult
circumstance. Present experience proves decisive over any assertion of transcendent
beliefs, as, for example, in Voltaire’s reaction against the providence of God related to
the horrors of the Lisbon earthquake or similar reactions to the evils of the twentieth
century. White comments.
The archetypal theme of Satire [or irony] is the precise opposite of this 
Romantic dramaof redemption; it is, in fact, a drama of diremption, a 
drama dominated by the apprehension that man is ultimately a captive of 
the world rather than its master, and by the recognition that, in the final 
analysis, human consciousness and will are always inadequate to the task of
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overcoming definitively the dark force of death, which is man’s unremitting 
enemy.
Negative irony tends to be parasitic; without some belief or value, even if held only by a
few, it has no two levels to set against each other and hence nothing to ironize.^^ In its
negation of some belief or ideal without offering some other in its place, negative irony
is a form of deconstruction, a radical negation of any pretensions to two levels of
meaning. If two levels of meaning are allowed, they cannot be integrated in any
meaningful way. Irony of this kind is the archetype of the anti-hero in which persons
holding a belief or ideal worthy of acting upon are viewed as naive, phoney, dangerous,
or any combination thereof. Booth comments,
[A] good deal of literary controversy [exists] today in which critics, unable 
to believe that an author could really contradict their own beliefs, conclude 
that he is being ironic. Pious authors cannot possibly have meant their 
piety, defenders of authority must have been kidding....Jane Austen must 
have been ironic in her treatment of Fanny Price in Mansfield Park 
because- well, because the Crawfords whom she takes to be so deficient 
morally are really-to us- so much more interesting.^^
The preference for the morally deficient Crawfords sheds more light on the views of the 
interpreter than the novel itself. In recent American politics, this hero/anti-hero polarity 
goes a long way toward explaining the admiration of some for either Ronald Reagan or
White, Metahistory, 9. n.b. “diremption” means “forcible separation.”
^  Gans notes “...by its very expression, irony resentfully affirms tlie autliorify of the form it has denied. 
The ironic deconstmction of the hierarchy between words and things pays homage to this liierarchy by 
implying tliat it presides over its own deconstmction.” Eric Gans, Signs o f Paradox: Irony,
Resentment, and Other Mimetic Structures (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997) 68.
Bootli, Irony, 82. It is wortli noting in passing tlie main characters of Mansfield Park generally 
correspond to tlie four aichetypal patterns: Fanny Price as romance, Mariali Bertram as tragic, tlie 
Crawfords as ironic, and Edmund Bertram as comic.
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Bill Clinton, an admiration that usually and predictably corresponds to loathing for the 
other.
Negation fonctions in these simple verbal ironies. Job comments, “No doubt 
you are the people and wisdom will die with you” he negates the conventional wisdom 
of his friends, “wisdom” and “friends” being ironic notions in themselves in this case.
A recent entertainment magazine offered a cover story entitled “Party Politics,” a title 
referring to scandal of a certain type that resulted in the fall of Harold Macmillan’s 
government. An opinion page article entitled “America: Always a Class Act” 
highlighted the existence of a class system in America. In both cases, a standard or 
natural meaning assumed from the context of wider use and on which the irony rests is 
negated, effecting a complete reversal as the original meanings of “party” and “class” 
are transposed into ironic commentary.
On a larger scale, James Joyce’s Ulysses offers an ironic transposition of the
Homeric epic. The lengthy homecoming of Odysseus the hero becomes one day in the
life of ordinary Dublin in all its glory, the unfaithful Molly replaces the steadfast
Penelope, and the stylistic performance of language becomes and end in itself.
Certainly aware of what he is doing, Joyce also speaks for his times. Muecke observes,
For most ‘serious’ writers, whether poets, novelists, or dramatists, irony is 
now much less often a rhetorical or dramatic strategy which they may or 
may not decide to employ, and much more often a mode of thought silently 
imposed upon them by the general tendency of the times.^ "*
When folly realized, it is in negative irony of this type that irony and negation become 
part of a habit of thinking and world view characterized by concern for the
Muecke, Compass o f Irony, 10.
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contradictions and problems of the immediate here and now within a context of 
isolation, frustration, and limitation. What Steiner calls “the wager on transcendence” is 
seen a bet not worth m a k i n g . T h e  metaphysics of absence banishes the metaphysics 
of presence. The indecipherabilities of life, and language, always present, become 
decisive, comprising a context in which the work of God becomes unrecognizable.
There is perhaps no better example of this kind of perspective than Beckett’s 
Waiting fo r Godot. In contrast to the hero of romance who acts upon and displays an 
ideal, for Estragon there is “Nothing to be done.” Stasis supplants the quest. Whatever 
“happens” in the play shows that nothing happens, the situation is static and sterile.^ *’ 
Typical of irony, there is no plot and only the barest story. The hero, Godot, whoever 
or whatever he is, never arrives so as to render the lives of Estragon and Vladimir 
meaningful, nor is he at all likely to, rendering mere reference to his anival absurd and 
meaningless. The waiting is absurd, but so is travel. Williams remarks, “Pozzo and 
Lucky belong to the world of effort and action; Vladimir and Estragon to the world of 
resignation and waiting. Neither response is more significant than the other, in any 
Ultimate way; the travelers fall and the tramps wait in disappointment.”^^
Beckett forever seeks to keep the present radically in front of the audience or 
reader to enforce the “directly communicated experience” of waiting. Whenever the 
dialogue threatens to “mean” something and transcend circumstance, it is negated by
George Steiner, Real Presences: Is there anything in what we say? (London and Boston: Faber and 
Faber, 1989) 214.
^ Chatman notes, “Joyce, Woolf, Ingmar Bergman, and other modern artists do not treat plot as an (
intricate puzzle to be solved. It is not a change in the state of affairs, but simply the state of affairs |
itself.” Seymour Chatman, Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film (Ithaca, NY: |
Cornell Universily Press, 1978) 92. i
Raymond Williams, Modern Tragedy (London: The Hogarth Press, 1992) 154. I
Raymond Williams, Drama from Ibsen to Brecht (London: The HogîU'th Press, 1993) 303.
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some means, prolonging and intensifying the sense of waiting. Estragon’s 
incomprehension and indifference negates Vladimir’s attempt to talk of the two thieves, 
or the Savior. Contrary to expectation, Godot is never identified, let alone arrives, 
focusing attention on his ever present non-arrival. Near the end, the building desire to 
leave and wander in the Pyrenees, idyllic and hopefiil, is deflated with a scatological 
remark, stifling hope within the bounds of present r eal i ty .Even suicide, that most 
final of all commentaries made on life, to some degree sublime in its sadness, is 
impossible of accomplishment. Estragon removes his belt to hang himself and his 
trousers fall down. Dialogue does not always follow or flow, interrupted with silence, 
frustrating expectations. Even the instances of comic dialogue and repartee serve to 
ground the action radically in the present, counterbalancing any attempt to consider any 
other situation or fi-ame of reference wherein one might search for meaning. The play is 
focused in the here and now, even to the point of calling attention to the stage and the 
performance as performance as a means to accomplish this. After one interchange, 
Vladimir and Estragon also comment on themselves,
Estragon: “That wasn’t such a bad little canter.”
Vladimir: “Yes, but now we’ll have to find something else 3770
At one point Estragon leaves the stage to relieve himself. Lucky, perhaps the most 
philosophical character, is weighted with baggage and roped by his neck, jerked, as the 
audience is, held fast by this constant reminder of present experience.
Samuel Beckett, Waiting for Godot: A Tragicomedy in Two Acts (London: Faber and Faber, 1965) 
81
™ ibid., 65.
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The central emphasis of frustrated waiting in Godot is very much the same as 
the waiting of the man at the pool in John chapter 5. The pool itself, as a potential but 
sterile source of hope, functions as ironic commentary analogous to the tree in Godot 
Jolin 5:3 describes the scene, “Here a great number of disabled people used to lie-the 
blind, the lame, the paralyzed.” None can move well and some not at all. In any case, 
and unlike the royal official, they do not move but lie about in a scene of static 
hopelessness. Perhaps the addition of 5:4 was an attempt to insert some hope into this |
dismal scene and make sense of it. Estragon and Vladimir wait- as does the paralytic- 
who waits, and has waited, for a Godot like deliverance from some ill-defined healing 
not available at the pool. In a Catch-22, because he is lame, the paralytic cannot enter 
the pool yet to enter the pool is his only hope of being cured; his hopes and waiting 
endlessly fr-ustrated. Yet, because the dubious healing cannot be accessed, its 
effectiveness can never be tested and proved false or true. Waiting of tliis kind renders 
life at once meaningful and absurd. For the tramps and the paralytic alike, deliverance 
on the terms they live by is impossible of accomplishment. They can only pretend.
Both continue in a condition of unstated negative irony. When Jesus asks, “Do you 
want to get well?” (5:6), in disjointed fashion the answer supplied by the paralytic does 
not really apply to the question. By failing to integrate his healing into the meta- 
nan ative of the FG, for the paralytic, the healing, however fortunate, is meaningless.
The reader is implicitly cautioned: without faith the advent of the messiah and the offer 
“to get well” may result in nothing more than blindness, or, as Jesus cautions the 
paralytic (5:14), something worse.
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Whereas the FG relentlessly demands that its characters and readers take into 
account the transcendent world and its claims to render this world meaningful, Godot is 
equally relentless in terminating these moves. In Godot the fallen world or radical 
experience continues its triumph over the world of wonder and grace. In the FG, the 
cross achieves something whereas in Godot it is a means of ironic commentary. 
Representation, in the sense of ‘this means this and that’ characteristic of romance, in 
Godot has broken down; in Godot, this is all there is. In such an environment, 
metaphor itself survives as a tenacious and unwanted weed and then only precariously. 
The hero is banished because there is nothing to stand for. The arrival of the messiah in 
the FG both contrasts and coincides with the non-arrival of Godot, for some, the arrival 
of the messiah is seen to the extent that he is placed into the proper meta-narrative, the 
messiah and his meta-narrative being inseparable; for others, failure of the meta­
narrative coincides with his rejection. For the latter, life is reduced to Godot like 
waiting.
By its combination of temporal waiting and negation of the transcendent, Godot 
reduces life to a kind of one dimensional view of reality. This can be interpreted with 
reference to the end of modernity, with its angst over the (non)arrival of meaning, or 
the incipient arrival of post-modeinity with its acceptance and unconcern that Godot 
will never arrive. Nealon interprets Godot as transitional. On Lucky’s think he 
comments.
The text of Lucky’s speech is akin to the product of taking all the great 
works of Western thought, putting them through a paper shredder, and 
pasting them back together at random....Lucky’s think... is a narrative
Jeffrey Nealon, “Samuel Beckett and The Postmodern; Language Games, Play and ‘Waiting for 
Gadot,” in Steven Connor, ed. Waiting for Gadot and Endgame (London: Macmillan, 1992) 44-53.
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that disrupts and deconstructs all notions of universal, ahistorical, 
consistent meta-narrative - all Godots/^
For Nealon, Godot is the tyranny of meta-narrative. Citing the following dialogue, 
Nealon argues that Vladimir and Estragon are “on the verge of a deconstructive 
breakthrough, but their dependence on the meta-discourse of Godot holds them 
back.”^ ^
Estragon .. .Lets go far away from here.
Vladimir We can’t.
Estragon Why not?
Vladimir We have to come back to-morrow
Estragon What for?
Vladimir To wait for Godot...
Estragon ... .And if we dropped him? {Pause) If we dropped him?
Vladimir He’d punish us.^ "*
For Nealon, Godot implies or anticipates the move toward postmodernism and the 
rejection of meta-narrative. The breakthrough Nealon argues for, the one separating 
the modern from the postmodern, is the rejection of grand narratives in favor of the 
celebration and freedom of language games.^  ^ In such contexts, however, the 
meaning-fullness of language tends to decline. For Jesus and the Jews, because they do 
not share the same meta-narrative or frame of reference, the conversation tends to 
move away from any sort of serious dialogue and more toward a talking past each 
other. At one point Jesus admits as much, saying “Why is my language not clear to 
you?” (8 :43) In such situations of antithetical paradigms, the only recourse is to satire
'' i^bid., 47.
’^ibid. 50
’‘’Beckett, Godot, 93. 
ibid. 51.75
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and a radical denunciation of the opposing side/^ The healing of the paralytic and its 
immediate aftermath cast a long shadow over succeeding chapters. The ensuing 
narratives are narratives of frustration. To fail to enter the meta-narrative or frame of 
reference of the FG is to participate in the blindness of the Pharisees and ultimately to 
place one’s self by the pool.
Irony, whether positive, neutral, or negative, because it rests fundamentally on 
values and beliefs and not narrative structure is characterized by the possibility of 
narrative disembodiment and narrative stagnation. While irony may be embodied in and 
carried by a character, as is the case with Thomas and Mr. Bennet, there is no 
necessary reason why this must be so. Irony may be found in situations requiring a 
narrative progression, as for example in tragic irony, but this need not be so for irony to 
be present. In this sense, irony tends to be more of a state of mind or perception more 
easily removed from narrative progression than the other archetypes, or, looked at 
another way, any narrative progression in irony tends to be borrowed fr om tragedy or 
comedy. Romance, tragedy, and comedy each require embodiment in a character and 
some form of narrative progress whereas irony does not.^  ^ A tragedy without character 
where nothing happens remains unthinkable whereas the same thing cannot be said 
about irony. In this way, the characteristics of irony as an archetype requiring neither
’^Answering charges of anti-Semitism, Stibbe correctly casts the FG’s polaiized polemic at this point 
(8:31-59) in terms of satire. Stibbe, John's Gospel, 107-131. Significantly, Stibbe notes a number of 
binary oppositions: truth/error, freedom/slavery, divine/demonic, hearing/not hearing, obeying/not 
obeying, life/deatli, honor/shame, and knowledge/ignorance, ibid., 124-125.
In comedy this is true to a lesser but nonetheless significant degree. For comedy to be “tiansitive” 
ratlier than “intransitive” (see chapter on comedy) embodiment in a narrative progression is required.
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character nor movement correspond to associations of irony with isolation, 
detachment, and sterility.
IV CONCLUSION
In summaiy, whatever the actual form irony takes, be it verbal, dramatic, 
situational, etc., (the classifications are endless) irony necessarily involves issues of 
belief or value at some level of perception. With this in mind, irony may be 
characterized as positive, equivocal, or negative with reference to the values and beliefs 
on which it operates. Insofar as their respective value structures are accepted, both 
positive and negative irony are stable whereas equivocal irony is unstable or 
ambiguous.
In romance, the world of experience is integrated into some system of belief and 
affirmation and is therefore meaningful in terms of and beyond present experience. In 
positive irony, the belief or ideal remains constant but it is recognized that experience 
has departed from it. The stable belief or ideal forms a basis on which to evaluate 
present experience through irony and satire as, for example, when the mercy of God 
forms the position against which Jonah is satirized. Negative irony forms the polar 
opposite of romance and the two are virtually incompatible. Tragedy and comedy may 
each contain irony, but of a kind that tends to be based on a situation and tends to resist 
polarization over questions of value or ideology. The actions of Agamemnon, Oedipus, 
and Hamlet tend to be ambiguous because all experience the tension between ideals and 
circumstance. Characteristic of tragic heroes, Hamlet waivers between irony and
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romance, inaction and action, and philosophic detachment and social involvement. 
Likewise, Pilate waivers between Jesus and the Jews with similar dilemmas. In 
romance and also in positive irony, an ideal or belief is assumed by which experience is 
to be governed or interpreted; in negative irony any such value or belief is negated by 
its inability to govern or interpret present experience or render it meaningful. In 
romance the concern is for the transcendent and eternal; for tragedy, the past, while in 
irony the concern lies in the temporal and present. With it emphasis on possibility and 
hope, comedy is the archetype of the future.
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4
COMEDY AND PETER
\.M comic character is generally comic in proportion to his ignorance o f himself 
The comic person in unconscious. ”
'BQVg&on, Laughter, 16
I INTRODUCTION
A literary analysis of Peter’s series of encounters with Jesus follows, in which 
particular attention will be given to the dynamics of each scene, the growth of Peter’s 
understanding of Jesus, and the dynamics of their relationsliip with a view to laying the 
groundwork for the study of Peter as an archetypal comic character. Like all 
characters in the FG, Peter must be understood in relation to Jesus. The story of Peter 
is less about his encounter with Jesus and his faith response, as is the case with 
Nicodemus, the Samaritan woman, or Pilate, and more about the possibilities and perils 
of that faith in action. The growth of Peter’s understanding of Jesus will be traced in 
relation to his knowledge as it reflects that outlined in the prologue and in its 
application to concrete reality as taught and exemplified by Jesus liimself. Peter 
exhibits the archetypal comic pattern of moving, with mistakes, toward an integration 
of beliefs and reality.
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II PETER IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL
A. PETER AS FOLLOWER
The prologue tells us that “the word became flesh and dwelt among us” (1:14) 
and that this Word was testified to by John the Baptist (1:6-7, 14-18). Jesus in the FG 
appears in maturity without benefit of birth accounts that mark him out as different and 
designate him in any way, yet we are told that “he was in the world” (1:10). In 1:19-25 
the Baptist’s task is to resist identification of himself as the Christ, Elijah, or the 
Prophet. Then in 1:26-28 the Baptist makes known to those in his hearing the fact that 
this special person is among you, “One whom you do not know.” If the logic of the 
prologue is allowed to play out in the text, the question is not that Jesus of Nazareth is 
the Messiah, as is emphasized in Matthew and Luke, but that this “Word made flesh” 
this one who “comes after me [who] is greater than me because he was before me”, this 
mystery man is Jesus.^ The Baptist, we are twice informed (1:31, 33), “did not 
recognize him.” The Baptist’s lack of recognition, a telling fact in its own right, is 
overcome by Jesus being designated by the Spirit through the Spirit’s descending and 
remaining upon him in 1:32, an event which is linked to the testimony of the Father, 
“the one who sent me to baptize with water.” In the Johannine discourse, the historical 
witness of the Baptist merges with the discourse witness that the “word made flesh” is 
Jesus, simultaneously the “Iamb of God” and “Son of God.”
' Carson discusses this issue more widely in, D. A. Carson, “The Purpose of the Fourth Gospel: John 
20:30-31 Reconsidered,” JBL 108 (1987) 639-651.
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1:35-51 narrates the decrease of the Baptist and the increase of Jesus as the 
former’s disciples become followers of the latter as they move from the Baptist’s own 
witness to encountering Jesus for themselves. Two of John’s disciples hear John speak 
and follow Jesus (1:37). Filling out the story narrated in 1:38-39 a bit by combining the 
details of the separate verses, it may be surmised that these two disciples spent a 
significant amount of time with Jesus and were taught by him. One of these two, 
Andrew, finds his brother Simon Peter and informs him, “We have found the Messiah.” 
It may be that they found the Messiah on the basis of looking for him based on the 
witness of the Baptist, or in general terms from the Old Testament itself, or, most likely 
both.^ Thus Andrew, the Baptist’s disciple and instructed by him, is in turn instructed 
by Jesus himself and designates the Messiah as Jesus to his brother Peter. The point 
here is that on the terms of both story and discourse Jesus is presented to Peter by his 
twice taught brother Andrew as the Messiah. Whatever the precise content of Peter’s 
understanding of Jesus at this point, the fact remains that in the FG it may be 
reasonably inferred that Peter begins with significantly developed knowledge of Jesus, 
being more or less aligned with the designation of the Messiah as Jesus right from the 
start. Significantly, Peter in this passage is passive, the initiative coming from Andrew 
and, more importantly, Jesus himself.  ^ Like his call, Peter is to learn that his mission 
must be defined and directed by Jesus himself.
 ^The term “Messiah” is found in the New Testament only here and 4:25. Bruce notes that, while the 
term in tlie Old Testament referred to the roles of prophet, priest, and king, at tlie dawn of tlie 
Cliristian era messianic expectation term took on a predominately royal form. See F. F. Bruce, The 
Gospel o f John (Basingstoke, U. K.; Pickering Paperbacks, 1983) 57. As will be seen, Peter veiy 
much displays tliis understanding.
^Brodie observes, “...the call of Peter... is like the call of David, the outsider who, by sheer choice on 
tlie Lord’s part, was brought in and given a position of leadership.” Thomas Brodie, The Gospel
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1A final confession of faith from Peter’s own lips does not occur until 6:68-69. 
Peter’s statement is in many ways equivalent to his confessions in Mt. 16:16, Mk. 8:28 
and Lk. 9:20.^  ^ The differences, however, are more striking than the similarities, first of 
all in regard to the differing narrative contexts of the Synoptics and John. The 
Synoptics present Peter’s confession as a high point, the culmination of what has gone 
on before that indicates a new level of understanding. The situation in John 6 is quite 
different. Following the feeding of the 5000 and the walking on water, Jesus confronts 
the crowds with his teaching that he is the bread from heaven, a difficult teaching that 
gives rise to numerous misunderstandings. To those who grumble or find the teaching 
difficult to understand or accept, Jesus offers further challenges culminating in his 
statement that “This is why I told you that no-one can come to me unless the Father 
has enabled him.” (6:65). Jesus’ statement is deliberately provocative, having its 
intended effect of separating the committed wheat from the uncommitted chaff. (6:66) 
As many leave, Jesus asks, “You do not want to leave too, do you?” (6:67) Peter’s 
reply follows. As compared to the Synoptics, Peter’s statement comes as the result of 
a challenge, as the passing of a test by the denial of a negative course of action and 
remaining loyal when others turn away.^ Indeed, the notion of testing might be 
extended back to everything that has happened since the disciples calling and extended 
forward to future events as well.
According to John: A Literary and Theological Commentary (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1993) 161-2.
See Raymond Brown, The Gospel According to John, vol. 1 (New York: Doubleday, 1966-70) 302. 
^Rudolph Schnackenburg, The Gospel According to John, vol. 1, tians. Kevin Smyth (London and 
New York: Burns & Oates, Crossroad, 1968-82) 75.
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The content of Peter’s statement in John differs significantly from the 
Synoptics. Peter’s rhetorical question, “Lord, to whom shall we go?” excludes other 
possibilities. The designation “Lord” can mean much or little, but in this context 
probably means much.® Jesus offers “words of eternal life” implying that all other 
words are of a different and lesser category. In the FG, Peter does not say that Jesus is 
the Christ, or Messiah, or a teacher sent from God, as does Nicodemus, but that he is 
“the Holy One of God.” The designation “Messiah” has already been connected to 
Peter, albeit indirectly, and the designation “Holy One of God” likely includes and 
advances these concepts.^ By naming Jesus in this manner, Peter places Jesus 
alongside God himself as over against those who saw Jesus as a second Moses and 
would make him King earlier in chapter 6.
In line with the theology and rhetoric of the FG discussed earlier, 6:69 presents 
a Johannine epistemology in miniature. Peter says, “And we have believed and have 
come to know that you are the Holy One of God.”(NASB) Significantly, both verbs 
appear in the perfect tense. On the terms of the FG, belief, however mature or 
immature, cannot be separated firom knowledge and vice versa.^ Peter’s belief allows 
him to come to know certain things about Jesus, although parts of his belief will prove
*^ Leon Morris. The Gospel According to John (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1971) 389.
’ Moloney states, “For fire first time in fire narrative a character has expressed faith in Jesus for fire 
right reason: His origins. The holiness of Jesus comes from the fact fiiat he is o f God.” (his emphasis) 
Moloney’s specific point is debatable, but is in line with tire more general point argued here. Francis 
Moloney, The Gospel o f John (Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1998) 229.
 ^Carson notes, “Kirowledge in the Fourth Gospel is frequently personal (it is knowledge of God aird of 
Jesus Christ that constitutes eternal life, 17:3), but it is no less frequently prepositional (as here: the 
disciples know that Jesus is such aird such.” See, D. A. Carson, The Gospel According to John (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991) 303, Iris emphasis. Carson (303) and Barrett (8 Iff) note that knowledge and 
belief are virtually synonymous. C. K. Barrett, The Gospel According to John: An Introduction with 
Commentary and Notes on the Greek Text (London: SPCK, 1978).
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to be in excess of his knowledge. Pilate, on the other hand, illustrates the dangers of 
knowledge in excess of belief and of attempting to isolate the two.
These accounts of Peter in 1:41-42 and 6:68-69 together place Peter firmly on 
the inside, as one with a significant and developed understanding of Jesus coupled with 
a tested devotion to him. As if to emphasize the point, Peter’s statement of belief is 
juxtaposed against the mention of Judas as betrayer immediately following. At the 
same time, the separating out of Judas as betrayer offers a corrective postscript to 
Peter’s ail too inclusive “We” of 6:69.
B. PETER AS LEADER 
B.l PETER m  CHAPTER 13
Chapter 13 signals a change in emphasis in John. Tovey notes “...the focus 
shifts from the public arena of proclamation, where the foremost questions have to do 
with Jesus’ identity and status and response to him, to the inner circle of the believer, 
where the issues are discipleship and bearing witness.”  ^ But at least one participant in 
the story fails to make this same move. In this context Peter reappears and figures 
prominently in the narratives of the footwashing and predictions of denials. While the 
incidents overlap, with respect to Peter the discourse moves from one emphasis to 
another. Peter begins the chapter as a firmly committed follower of Jesus, one who has 
persevered through some trials with his faith and commitment intact. But in chapter 
13, a rift appears between the kind of discipleship Jesus has in mind for himself in
 ^Derek Tovey, Narrative Art and Act in the Fourth Gospel (JSNTS 151, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic 
Press, 1997) 107.
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relation to the Father and for his followers as over against the kind of mission and 
discipleship Peter himself has in mind for himself and for Jesus. Peter plans a mission 
of triumph while Jesus intends one of semce leading to death. Peter is firmly a 
follower of Jesus insofar as his understanding of Jesus is concerned, but is mistaken in 
his conception of how being a follower of Jesus works itself out in time and space, 
representing “faith without understanding.” ®^
Having concluded its narration of Jesus’ public ministry, the FG now turns its 
attention to Jesus’ concern for his followers. Jesus knows that his hour is at hand 
(13:1) and seeks by the symbolic action of washing the disciples feet to demonstrate the 
kind of self giving love they should have for one another. Peter makes the obvious 
conclusion that the Jesus’ action implies even before Jesus explains it later (13:13-17); 
namely, that if Peter is to be a follower of this Lord and master and if this Lord and 
master performs acts of menial service to others, it implies that 1) this Lord and master 
is demeaning himself in the eyes of his followers, and/or 2) that if Peter is to follow this 
Lord and master he himself is expected to perform similar acts. Neither prospect 
appeals to him.
Incredulous, Peter asks Jesus, “Lord, are you going to wash my feet?” (13:6) 
Jesus’ reply is instructive, saying “You do not realize now what I am doing, but later 
you will understand.” (13:7) Understanding or the lack of it is an important Johannine 
theme, but the lack of understanding Jesus informs Peter of is not one of theological 
identity, which Peter seems to understand, but of the nature and object of his mission - 
sacrificial love and death. Jesus statement functions as a warning to Peter not to persist
Barnabas Lindars, The Gospel o f John (London: Oliphants, 1972) 450.
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with this course of action. Peter persists. Jesus tells him that “Unless I wash you, you 
have no part with me.” (13:8) Having no desire not to be a part with Jesus, Peter 
takes the opposite tack of making the task more difficult by asking that his hands and 
head be bathed as well.
With iron logic, Jesus explains his actions in 13:12-17. He asks if they 
understand (13:12), then tells them that they themselves call him “teacher and Lord”, 
thereby aligning the disciples themselves with Jesus by their own admission. Jesus also 
designates himself as “teacher and Lord.” (13:13). And if Jesus is their teacher and 
Lord, then they ought to follow his example and do likewise. (13.14-15). Jesus offers 
an aphorism to reinforce this message by adding that “no servant is greater than his 
master, nor is a messenger greater than the one who sent him.” Jesus concludes by 
adding that “you will be blessed if you do them.” These, then, establish the conditions 
on which one is to follow Jesus. Just as Jesus offers “words of eternal life” (6:68) and 
is the only way to the Father (14:6), following Jesus necessarily entails service. Service 
to others after the manner of Jesus is a necessary part of being on the inside.
Peter persists in his own understanding. It will be useful to cast a backward 
glance over the pages of the FG to suggest why this is so. His persistence can be 
viewed as stubborn blindness or even willful disobedience. But whatever warnings 
Jesus puts in Peter’s way, it is nevertheless true that Peter’s actions are justified to a 
significant degree. Jesus’ miracles of turning the water into wine, healing the official’s 
son, healing the invalid at the pool, feeding the 5000, walking on the water, healing the 
man bom blind, and triumphantly, the raising of Lazams, may be taken as having
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occurred before the eyes of Peter. The raising of the dead of the last day, which 
Martha affirms, is brought forward into the present in the raising of Lazarus. Jesus 
claimed to exist before Abraham, be sent from God, have God as his Father, be at one 
with the Father, claims, or similar claims, that repeatedly fell upon the ears of Peter.
The raising of Lazarus followed by the triumphal entiy comprised a grandiose 
experience of the first order. In such an environment the opposition to Jesus and 
threats of death might well be ignored or taken as a challenge waiting to be met to one 
inclined to do so. Peter well understood Jesus’ own predictions of death as contingent 
on the actions of others (Judas’ betrayal) and therefore preventable. In any case, Jesus’ 
predictions of his own death and his symbolic foot washing seems to have fallen on 
deaf ears and blind eyes.
The scene continues with the issue of betrayal rising to prominence. The 
context of eating a meal with one’s own group suggests intimacy, a mood broken by 
Jesus’ declaration that, “I tell you the truth, one of you is going to betray me.” (13:21) 
Peter, notably designated here as Simon Peter (cf. 13:6), asks “this disciple” to inquire 
which one he means. (13:24) On being asked, Jesus dips the piece of bread and gives it 
to Judas Iscariot, notably designated here as “son of Simon.” (13:26, cf. 13:6) Beyond 
these references to the common name lies a larger point; in this passage Peter and Judas 
are at once linked together and distinguished, each departing from the Lord but each in 
his own way. For Judas, the reception of the bread fi*om the hand of Jesus marks him 
out as The betrayer and initiates his departure into the night.
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Keeping with the Johannine concern to portray the crucifixion as glorification 
rather than humiliation, in 13:31-33 Jesus certainly refers to the cross, but not everyone 
understands it that way. The speaker and one of his hearers have in mind two different 
scenarios. Observe Jesus words in 13:31-32, “Now is the Son of Man glorified and 
God is glorified in him. If God is glorified in him, God will glorify the Son in himself, 
and will glorify him at once.” By all indications, events are moving to the climax of 
Jesus’ final glorification. Jesus says this glorification of the Son of Man will occur 
“now” and “at once” (vov, so0us). Variations of the verb glorify (do^aCjo) occur four 
times. “  Whatever the precise meaning of “Son of Man” as used by Jesus in the FG, in 
this context it would certainly call to Peter’s mind Daniel 7:13-14 with all of its triumph 
and glory. God figures prominently in this glorification; now the Son of Man is 
glorified and God is glorified in him. And if God is glorified in him, a given fact, God 
will glorify the Son in himself. Unlike the better informed reader, Peter’s attitude may 
be construed as, Tf God is for us, who can be against us’ and God is unquestionably 
involved in this instance. Whatever the danger, the situation is certain to end in 
triumph and Peter wants to be there and be a part of it. On the contrary, Jesus 
indicates that what he has to do he must do alone, summed up by his statement that, 
“Where I am going, you cannot come.” (13:33)
“ Although given a “C” rating, tlie phrase in question (si o Gsos sSo^aaGq sv auTco) receives a 
positive endorsement by Metzger. Bruce Metzger, A Textual Commentary on the Greek New 
Testament (London: United Bible Societies, 1975) 242. Even if omitted, three repetitions of “glorify’ 
provides nearly tlie same effect as four.
'^The debate about the meaning of “Son of Man” only proves the point; it is an equivocal term 
understood differently in tliis single example.
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Having made his point about himself, Jesus changes the focus to the disciples in 
13:34-35. As if to reinforce the message of the footwashing, Jesus stresses that love is 
essential; it stems from Jesus himself (13:34a), governs their relations with one another 
(13:34b), and testifies to their being Jesus’ disciples (13:35). Peter pays little attention 
to these instmctions. Rather Peter replies, “Lord, where are you going” (13:36) and in 
doing so moves the discussion back into the context of glorification and going away of 
13:31-33. Jesus replies, “Where I go, you cannot follow now, but you will follow 
later.” (13:36) The emphasis falls not so much on the fact of glorification as on its 
timing and its precise nature. A glorification of the type Peter has in mind will occur, 
but not now; and the glorification Jesus has in mind at present, death on the cross, will 
certainly be followed on by Peter. Persisting in his misunderstanding and yet being 
blindly correct in his assertion, Peter asks, “Lord, why can’t I follow you now? I will 
lay down my life for you.” (13:37) As Jesus has explained it, the specific conditions of 
being a disciple involve service to others and love (13:13-17, 3L33), in contrast to 
Peter who would rather “follow you right now” and promises to lay down his life for 
Jesus. Responding, Jesus predicts that Peter will deny him three times and thereby 
moves the discussion yet further back to the context of Judas and denial. Rather than 
moving ahead with Jesus, Peter will regress toward Judas. Peter, this strutting 
rooster, is destined to have his wings clipped.
The thrust of chapter 13 precludes any reduction of Peter’s defense of Jesus in 
the garden to the mere spontaneous defense of a friend. Peter carried a sword and
Brodie obseives, “...within chap. 13 as a whole, his [Peter’s] darkness of mind is cast in the context 
of the Satanic darkness of Judas (13:2, 21-38). Here too [18:10-11] he shows shades of Judas.” 
Brodie, John, 527.
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intended to use it. While Peter is a committed and loyal disciple, Peter and Jesus 
depart for the garden with very different ideas of what should take place. The reader 
may with justification wonder how Peter is to be blamed for his mistake, given that 
many of Jesus’ statements are riddled with mysteiy. But this perception only serves to 
underscore the responsibility of the reader not to do likewise.
B.2 PETER IN CHAPTER 18
Chapters 11-13 display a sense of the historical, event-like quality being very 
much in the foreground, insofar as the discourse itself is concerned. This quality fades 
into the background in chapters 14-17 as the teaching element of the discourse is 
highlighted. Events return suddenly in 18:1, a verse that informs the reader of Jesus 
leaving with his disciples, crossing the Kidron Valley, and entering the garden. Into 
this previously safe and intimate temporal and spatial setting, one analogous to places 
of innocence in romance, Judas enters as betrayer and brings to a head the ongoing 
conflict between Jesus and his opponents. Lurking danger becomes active as the mob 
of soldiers and others arrives bearing torches, lanterns, and weapons, the trappings of 
those who walk in darkness and of temporal earthly power, pathetic in comparison to 
the light and power of Jesus. In spite of the threat, Jesus appears in full control. 
Jesus knows “all that was going to happen to him” (18:4) and yet offers himself up. In 
addition, Jesus’ position of ultimate control is reinforced as his utterance of “I am He” 
(Eyco si[ii, 18:5-6) compels his hearers to draw back and fall to the ground. Soldiers
''^Francis Moloney observes, “But such love flows from a radical following of Jesus and never from an 
imposition of one’s own worldview on God’s designs.” Moloney, John, 386.
See Brown, John, 809, 817; Brodie, John, 524.
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and weapons pose little threat as compared to the power and words of Jesus. Seeking 
to bring closure to the scene, Jesus tells his pursuers to “let these men go.” (18:8). The 
discourse likewise moves toward closure, noting, “This happened so that the words he 
had spoken would be fulfilled: T have not lost one of those you gave me.’” (18:9)
But the scene is not over. As an unwanted addendum Peter draws his sword 
and cuts off the ear of Malchus, the high priest’s servant. The act is at once brave and 
fool hardy, daring and pathetically ineffective as Peter succeeds only in separating a 
seiwant from his ear. In wielding the sword Peter hopelessly opposes the collective 
temporal power of the mob and opposes Jesus and the purposes of God the Father 
himself. While ostensibly intending otherwise, Peter is thus aligned with the methods 
and purposes of the veiy enemies he seeks to combat. Consequently, Peter is placed at 
some narrative distance from Jesus. The sword is an offensive instrument held in the 
hand for use on others; the cup is a hand held container for something one voluntarily 
gives to one’s self Ironically, Peter the friend of Jesus seeks to thwart the plans of 
God while Judas, the betrayer assists their accomplishment.
The openness and confiision of the garden gives way to confinement and order 
of the high priest’s courtyard. Having given himself up, Jesus is in the hands of the 
High Priests who will unknowingly execute the plan of God. Peter continues as 
outsider, well meaning but opposed to the plans of God, an assumption given symbolic 
reinforcement here by Peter’s exclusion from the center of the action. The other 
disciple, twice mentioned as being known to the high priest (18 :15,16), acts to bring 
Peter into the high priest’s courtyard. The fact that Peter is brought in by the other
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disciple, known by the high priest most likely as a disciple of Jesus, and that tliis other 
disciple speaks to the girl at the door on behalf of Peter, makes it patently obvious that 
Peter is among the disciples of Jesus/® Yet when asked by the girl at the door, 
presumably the same person who gave him entrance, Peter denies being a disciple, a 
denial made more pathetic and disgracefiil by the unlikelyhood of its being believed. As 
the scene ends, Peter joins the officials and servants around the fire, fades from 
prominence as an individual, and becomes closely identified with the group and his 
surroundings. Jesus the true light of the world is replaced by the natural but false light 
of the world.
The scene shifts to the inside where Jesus is questioned about “his disciples and 
his teaching.” (18:19) Jesus denies nothing. On the contrary, he states that he has 
“spoken openly to the world,” teaching “in the synagogues or at the temple, where all 
the Jews come together.” (18:20) Jesus “said nothing in secret” and thereby makes all 
his hearers potential witnesses against him. Carrying this line of thought to its 
conclusion, Jesus asks, “Why question Me? Ask those who heard me. Surely they 
know what I said.” (18:21) The scene ends inconclusively with Jesus being taken to 
Caiaphas.
Meanwhile, outside, there is one follower, one of “those who heard me,” one 
who surely knows what Jesus said, still warming himself by the fire. But when asked if 
he is “one of his disciples,” Peter denies it, negating the key feature of Jesus’ 
statements before the high priests. The narrative juxtaposition of Peter’s denials with
Brodie makes the plausible and interesting suggestion that the other disciple is Judas. Brodie, John, 
529. cf. Brown, John, 822.
Brodie, John, 530.
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the steadfastness of Jesus highlights the primacy of the theme of denial vs. standing 
firm.
Peter’s final denial differs fi’om the other two. Although asked in historically 
specific situations, the first two questions put to Peter concern his denying that he is a 
disciple of Jesus, a general and wide-ranging question. In contrast, note the specific 
historical details of 18:26: “One of the high priest’s servants, a relative of the man 
whose ear Peter had cut off, challenged him, ‘Didn’t I see you with him in the olive 
grove?” Peter is hereby linked by a specific person (both fellow servant to the high 
priest and relative to Malchus) to a specific time and place (the garden where Peter cut 
off the ear of Malchus). By implication, if Peter is to deny this queiy he must not only 
deny Jesus, as he has twice done before, he must deny his own actions on Jesus’ behalf. 
To deny Jesus this time entails denying himself as well. In blindness or not, Peter 
plunges ahead and the rooster crows.
The difference between the sword wielding Peter of the garden and the 
shivering Peter of the high priest’s courtyard deserves some attention. The usual 
explanation for this change is that Peter’s courage evaporates with the arrest of Jesus. 
But it may be equally possible, given his desire to go with Jesus and see the triumphant 
glory of God (13:31-33), that Peter does not so much become a coward as he sheathes 
his courage in bewilderment. In retrospect, as the mob approaches the garden, Peter is 
quite willing to fight for a triumphant Christ, but he is unwilling to offer a show of 
loyalty for a man whose condemnation is highly probable. In a reversal of roles, Peter 
may not see himself so much as denying Jesus as he does Jesus denying Peter, the cause
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of Israel, and possibly the cause of God himself by abandoning the garden revolution.
It is time for Peter and Jesus to carve their names in the pages of Israel’s history just as 
Moses, Joshua, Ehud, Gideon, Samson, David, and Judas Macabee have done. The 
fact that Peter, as has we have seen, is perceptive to a certain degree but consistently 
misinterprets the situation and ignores warnings to the contrary, renders this scenario 
all the more appropriate.
If the crowing rooster may be allowed to be part of the hermeneutical milieu of 
this passage and seen as an image of Peter himself, Peter’s denials might be taken not 
strictly as a sheepish and cowardly response to danger but also as an expression of real 
denial of Jesus over the shame of Jesus’ conduct. Thus, when Peter says, “I am not [a 
disciple]” he is less a coward more of a disgruntled leader. Jesus denied Peter by 
denying Peter’s cause. In either case, Peter is courageous in defending his version of 
Jesus, his own cause of which Jesus is a part, a soldier, a reciuit; Peter is most 
vulnerable to denial when he must confront those who question his connection to Jesus 
rather than Jesus’ connection to him. In any case, Peter’s threefold denial separates 
Peter from Jesus such that if the relationship is to be reestablished, it must be done on a 
different basis than before.
As in the Synoptics, Peter’s denials end with the crowing of the rooster. (Mt. 
27:74-75; Mk. 14:72; Lk. 22:61) The Synoptics record a recognition on Peter’s part 
followed by weeping. Significantly, John omits this; the rooster crows and that is all. 
The negative effects of the denial remain unmitigated by contrition. Recall that Peter in 
the FG, although carefully distinguished, is veiy much paired with Judas. The fact that
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bitter weeping does not follow Peter’s denial underscores the seriousness of this denial 
and the danger of the type of misguided discipleship Peter represents. Personal soITow 
is not enough; a radical reorientation in thinking is in order. Although this phase of 
Peter’s appearance in the FG ends on a decidedly negative note, the rooster’s call 
announces the morning and the first glimmers of new light to come.
B.3 PETER IN CHAPTER 20
It is first necessary to retreat into chapter 19 to properly focus Peter’s role in 
the resurrection appearances of chapter 20. Much has been made o f20:30-31 with its 
editorial comments as the natural end of the FG and chapter 21 forming an appendix. 
But the same thing might be said for 19:35-37 with its testimony and summary as 
forming a natural end to the story of Jesus, an ending soon to be shown premature.
The end comes as Jesus dies and the scripture is fulfilled. The concern over the 
correspondence of the details of Jesus’ death to the fulfillment of scripture fades into 
the background as Joseph of Arimathea asks Pilate for the body of Jesus in 18:38. The 
movement from history and its relationship to scripture to history by itself emphasizes 
the brute fact of Jesus death in itself. The account details two phases of the burial 
process; (1) the wrapping of Jesus’ body and its anointing by the seventy-five pounds 
of spices supplied by Nicodemus, according to Jewish burial customs albeit to a lavish 
degree, and (2) the placing of the prepared body into the new gai den tomb, supplied by 
Joseph. If Jesus is dead, he must be buried can also mean, when viewed fi’om another 
perspective, that if Jesus was buried, he must have been dead. Like Dickens’ emphasis
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on Marley being “dead as a doornail,” care is taken to show that Jesus is likewise dead 
as that piece of ironmongery.
Chapter 20; 1-9 builds on and from the certainty of the death of Jesus. The 
narration of the resurrection of Jesus must undo what has been done. Mary and the two 
disciples function transitionally as witnesses to the death of Jesus in their expectation 
of an occupied tomb and as witnesses to the empty tomb on finding it so. The account 
opens with Mary Magdalene’s discovery that the stone had been removed from the 
entrance, news that she hurriedly reports to Simon Peter and the other disciple. Mary’s 
report, (“They have taken the Lord out of the tomb, and we don’t know where they 
have put him!” 20:2) does not admit the possibility that Jesus has risen from the dead. 
Peter and the other disciplp arrive at the tomb and likewise discover it empty. With 
characteristic eagerness Peter enters the tomb first, and, presumably with the other 
disciple, sees the grave clothes. Thus the placing of Jesus in the tomb in 19:41-42 is 
reversed and his burial preparations narrated in 19:39-40 are reversed as well.
As 20:1-9 concerns Peter, the passage must be taken primarily as foregrounding 
Peter’s role as historical vritness as over against any kind of symbolic function wherein 
Peter and the other disciple are played against one another. Along these lines Quast 
observes.
Contrary to what might be expected, the capacity in which Peter performs 
is actually heightened by not being linked to any response of faith on the 
part of Peter pertaining to the significance of what he saw. Peter did not 
immediately understand the significance of what he saw, therefore his 
witness can be regarded as an objective report of the actual physical 
situation.
Kevin Quast, Peter and the Beloved Disciple: Figures for a Community in Crisis (JSNTSS 32, 
Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1989) 117.
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This, coupled with the fact that neither Peter nor the other disciple says anything allows 
for little character development. Yet the other disciple “saw and believed,” and this is 
not indicated of Peter, but here it most likely refers only to the fact of Jesus’ 
unexpected resurrection. It is noted that “They still did not understand from Scripture 
that Jesus had to rise from the dead.” (20:9) Despite Peter’s denial, the fact that Mary 
reported to Peter and that he ran to the tomb indicates that he remains an important 
figure and subtly begins the process of his reestablishing his relationship with Jesus.
C. PETER AS FOLLOWER AND LEADER
C.l PETER IN CHAPTER 21
Chapter 20 closes with the status of Jesus being resolved as worthy of belief as 
one raised from the dead. In contrast the position of Peter with respect to Jesus 
remains unresolved, his threefold denial lacking any kind of narrative mitigation.
Chapter 21 opens by setting the scene on the Sea of Tiberias where Jesus appears 
again to his disciples. Peter, named first in 21:2, fonctions as leader of the group, 
announcing “I’m going out to fish.” The others follow. This nighttime fishing 
expedition may represent a lapse into quotidian existence, but more importantly it 
represents the failure of Peter’s leadership. They catch nothing. Peter fails as leader in 
two contexts, disciple and fisherman. Jesus appears early in the morning and suggests a 
more successful way of fishing. Jesus is master over the grave and over fishing, Peter’s 
own area of expertise. Yet by offering Peter spectacular success at fishing, albeit on
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Jesus’ terms, the negative effects of Peter’s occupational failure are forgotten as is 
indeed fishing itself.
Peter’s plunge into the water recalls his characteristic impetuous plunges into 
other activities but with a difference; Peter here returns to Jesus. The narrative 
movement of 21:1-14 suggests several themes; want to plenty, night to day, separation 
to union, cold to warm, work to worship, ignorance to knowledge, sea to land, and 
Peter to Jesus. The fire of burning coals recalls the fire in the high priest’s courtyard, 
this time the fire is prepared by a friend, while the provision of fish sei*ved by the hand 
of Jesus recalls the meal in chapter 13, this time given to the tme disciples. The 
comment that, “None of the disciples dared ask him, ‘Who are you?”’ coupled with the 
absence of any two way conversations in verses 7-14 builds into the scene a quality of 
wonder and reverence. Jesus the risen Lord is firmly in charge yet continues his 
example of humility by serving the meal. The actions and tone of 21:1-14 place the 
final abasement of Peter and the beginnings of his reinstatement on the gentlest of 
terms. Verse 14 offers a summary and draws this phase of the narrative to a close.
For the first time in this scene, Jesus engages in a significant and personal 
conversation. Jesus thrice refers to Peter as “Simon son of John” (21:15, 16, 17) and 
recalls Peter’s first contact with his Lord (1:42). If John is the name of the beloved 
disciple, (either the son of Zebedee or the Elder) as well may be the case and any reader 
of the FG cannot help but speculate on this person’s identity, then Jesus’ reference to 
“Simon son of John” is significant if read over against Simon Peter’s connection with 
Judas son of Simon in 13:24-26. The respective narrative contexts of these name
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associations would indicate this to be the case. In both cases, Peter is moving from 
being allied with the traitorous Judas to being allied with something altogether more 
positive.
The focus changes in 21:15 as Jesus engages Peter in a sustained personal 
conversation, in a limited way following the familiar Johannine pattern of event ( fishing 
and meal) followed by discourse. Jesus first asks Peter, “do you love me more than 
these?”, a question that may refer to either the other disciples or to the fishing gear and 
the ordinary life it represents. The foimer is to be preferred^^, but the meaning is 
ambiguous enough to accommodate both. Peter’s reply is instructive in that it makes 
no comparisons, differing significantly from the form of the question and showing 
something of a new found maturity of thought, (compare Mark 14:29) Jesus’ second 
question to Peter is perhaps more difficult. Jesus asks, “do you tmly love me?” The 
element of comparison having been dropped, the issue becomes Peter’s love for Jesus 
in and of itself without reference to others. The scene as a whole is deeply personal, as 
Jesus’ posing of the question a third time evokes an emotional response in Peter.
Peter’s appeal to Jesus, “Lord, you know all things; you know that I love you,” affirms 
the omniscience of Jesus and implicitly testifies to the truthfiilness of Peter’s assertions. 
Peter, whatever his mistakes, truly does love Jesus.
Quite the opposite of flashing a sword to prove his love, Jesus instructs Peter to 
“feed my lambs.” Herding sheep calls to mind images of pastoral activity rather than 
grandiose achievement. The references to tending sheep recall Jesus’ teaching that he is 
the good shepherd. (10:1-21) On the terms of that passage, Peter is a hireling who
19 Barrett, JoM  584,
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runs away and abandons the sheep to the wolves. Jesus’ instruction to Peter to feed his 
sheep gives to Peter the role of shepherd. Peter’s earlier question to Jesus, (“To whom 
shall we go?” 6:68) refen*ed to Jesus in that context, but might be expanded upon here 
by the reader to include other issues as understanding moves into action and doing.
The flock will hereafter hear his voice and respond, the implicit assumption being that 
Peter will not “run away because he is a hired hand and cares nothing for the sheep.” 
(10:13) Peter’s association with sheep also recalls Jesus’ teaching that he is the good 
shepherd and that “the good shepherd lays down his life for the sheep.” (10:11) It also 
anticipates Jesus’ words to Peter concerning the death he would die.
Peter’s designation as shepherd by Jesus entails in turn following Jesus, a 
course of action that will lead to being led “where you do not want to go.” (21:18-19) 
Peter’s desire to “follow you now” (13:37) means, contrary to Peter’s previous 
attempts at following, that he will not be master of his own fate. Jesus challenges 
Peter to “Follow me” (21:19) may be read as “follow me now” and to do so with the 
knowledge, gained from Jesus himself (20:18-19), that following Jesus means giving up 
control of his life. The sword of self-will must be forever put away. If Peter is to 
shepherd the sheep of Jesus, he must likewise follow the voice of the Good Shepherd.
If this were a western movie, it could well be imagined that Peter and Jesus 
would saddle up and ride off in the sunset together. But it is not to be. Peter seems to 
accept the role Jesus outlined for him, but “turned and saw” the beloved disciple 
following as well. Peter’s query “What about him?” seeks to locate his own following 
of Jesus with reference to others rather than simply following Jesus with reference to
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Jesus alone. For Peter, and other would be followers, being a disciple of Jesus cannot 
mean pursuing one’s own vainglorious visions of discipleship, nor can it mean 
following the way of the cross on any terms but its own.
D. OTHER ISSUES
D.l PETER AND THE STATUS OF CHAPTER 21
Chapter 21 is often thought of as comprising an appendix to the rest of the FG, 
with 20:30-31 forming the natural ending as it offers a statement of purpose for the 
whole gospel. The arguments for and against the unity of John and the related 
questions of divergent traditions and redactions in themselves lie outside the scope and 
object of the present work.^^ The question of the unity of John is of concern as it 
relates to Peter and will be explored on a limited basis in with this in mind.
Some hold that chapter 21 forms an integral part of the gospel as a whole. 
Minear offers an excellent case for including chapter 21 with the rest of the gospel, but 
probably errs in restricting the concluding verses of chapter 20 to chapter 20 itself 
Brodie argues that 19:35-37, 20:30-31, and 21:24-25 fit a larger pattern of conclusions 
with separate emphasis on witness, writing, and witness and writing, respectively.^^ 
Tovey offers a broader argument based on the thematic unity of chapter 21 with 
previous themes in the book, a unity that he regards as decisive for including chapter 21
^°For a survey of the issues, against unity, Brown, John, vol. 2, 1077-82; for, Carson, John, 665-8. 
Paul S. Minear, “The Original Functions of Jolin 21,” JBL 102/1 (1983) 85-98.
22 Brodie, Jb/irt, 574-582.
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in the original gospel/^ For Tovey. the FG displays two great themes or movements. 
The first has to do with the public proclamation where the issues concern Jesus’ 
identity and response to him and culminates temporarily in 12:44-50. The second 
theme begins in 13:1, (a widely acknowledged division point), and concerns the inner 
circle of believers where the issues are discipleship, bearing witness, and remaining in 
Jesus. The first theme reaches its climax in chapter 20 with Jesus’ encounter with 
Thomas whereas chapter 21 completes the second theme of discipleship and witness as 
it centers on Peter’s rehabilitation and commission.The treatment of Peter offered in 
the present work, that Peter displays this twofold movement in himself, coiTesponds to 
Tovey’s overall argument.
Additionally, the false ending of 20:30-31 could be a bit of staged misdirection,
a misunderstanding handed to the unwary for the purpose of breaking up stock
response. Staley writes,
But just like the disciples who, at the stoiy level, make wonderful 
confessions (1:41-51) only to discover later on that following Jesus entails 
much more than knowing the proper words (6:60-71; 16:28-33), so too the 
implied reader, at the discourse level, is forced to realize through his 
victimization (20:30-21:1) that there is more to his journey of faith than 
mere confession.
To see the FG as ending in 20:31 runs the risk of seeing Jesus as Peter saw him at the 
height of his folly; as the Holy One of God abstracted from duties and responsibilities
Derek Tovey, Art and Act, 106-115. See also, B. R. Gaveiita, “The Archive of Excess: John 21 and 
the Problem of Narrative Closme,” in R, A. Culpepper and C.C. Black, eds., Exploring the Gospel o f 
John (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996) 240-252.
Tovey notes, “Peter is a representative type of discipleship and belief in Jesus...” and, “Suffice to say 
that the rehabilitation of Peter resonates witli teaching found in the farewell discourse and elsewhere.” 
Tovey, Art and Act, 112, 113.
^ See Jeffrey Lloyd Staley, The Print’s First Kiss: A Rehetorical Investiation o f the Implied Reader in 
the Fourth Gospel, SBL Dissertation Series 82 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988) 112.
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and failing to account for the necessity of discipleship within the confines of earthly 
life. Chapter 21, then, is not extricable fi"om the very heart of the FG itself. The 
Synoptics echo the discipleship theme; each account of the confession of Peter is 
followed by a section predicting Jesus’ death which is in turn followed by a section 
detailing the cost of discipleship. (Mt. 16:13-26, Mk. 8:27-38, Lk. 9:18-27) Whereas 
the Synoptics connect Jesus’ identity with the theme of death and discipleship by simple 
narrative proximity, in the FG Peter embodies the perils of not connecting Jesus as 
Lord and God with a more sober and enlightened view of what that means.
D.2 PETER AND THE BELOVED DISCIPLE
Because they appear so often together, the role of Peter in the FG must 
inevitably take into account the role of the beloved disciple. For Bultmann, the 
beloved disciple represents the Hellenistic Christian Church while Peter represents the 
Jewish Christian church .The  most common view is that the beloved disciple 
represents a kind of ideal disciple, one who is steady and perceptive and functions as a 
foil to Peter. Collins speaks for this view when he comments, “he [the beloved 
disciple] is the representative figure, the one who epitomizes all that faith in Jesus 
implies.”^^
^^Quast provides a helpful survey of the various options. Quast, Peter and the Beloved Disciple, 8-13. 
Throughout this discussion, it will be assumed tliat tlie beloved disciple and the nar rator refer to tlie 
same person.
Rudolph Bultmaim, The Gospel o f  John: A Commentary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1971) 685.
Raymond Collins, “The Representative Figures of the Fourth Gospel,” The Downside Review 94 
(1976), 132. Reprinted in These Things Have Been Written: Studies in the Fourth Gospel, (Grand 
Rapids: Berdmans, 1990. his emphasis.
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This view is helpfully critiqued by Bauckham/^ who argues that the beloved 
disciple is not to be seen as the ideal disciple for the following reasons: (1) The BD 
may function as ideal disciple, as do others (Nathanael, Mary Magdalene), but this fails 
to account for the majority of what is said about him; (2) His privileged access to Jesus 
places him in a unique position that is precisely not representative; (3) Most 
significantly, the role of the BD as ideal disciple is not stated or even emphasized in his 
last appearance (21:20-23) where it would be most expected even though the BD has 
hitherto been portrayed in a more positive light. For Bauckham, the BD is superior to 
Peter only in so far as they each “represent two different kinds of discipleship: active 
service and perceptive witness. The beloved disciple functions primarily as witness 
by virtue of (1) his special intimacy with Jesus; (2) his presence at key points in the 
story; and (3) his perception and spiritual insight into the meaning of the Gospel 
events.^  ^ The BD’s role as ideal witness allows him in turn to be the ideal author. 
Recalling Harvey’s discussion of the role of witness in Jewish culture and in the FG,^  ^
it may be added that the beloved disciple’s closeness to Jesus and liis singular status as 
one named “the beloved disciple” establishes him as a witness as regards his character 
and in addition gives him the important status of an agent. The beloved disciple’s 
closeness to events establishes him as a witness as regards his position as personal 
eyewitness to the facts.
Richard Bauckham, “The Beloved Disciple as Ideal Author,” JSNT 49 (1993) 21-44.
^®ibid., 35. his emphasis, 
ibid., 36-37.
See chapter 3 above,. A. E. Hatvey,. Jesus on Trial: A Study in the Fourth Gospel (London: SPCK, 
1976).
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in literary terms, the beloved disciple is very much a flat character, one far less 
interesting than Nicodemus, the Samaritan woman, the man born blind, Mary, Martha, 
and almost everyone else in the Gospel including Caiaphas. Indeed, his ambiguous 
identity provides his most interesting feature.^^ He is generally passive, for instance in 
his being prompted by Peter to inquire of the betrayer’s identity or being entrusted with 
the mother of Jesus. He speaks little, saying only “Who is it?” (13:25) and “It is the 
Lord.” (21:7) This kind of flat presentation easily leads to idealization in much the same 
way that it is easier to read personality traits into a quiet person than a loud one 
because one’s perception of a quiet person’s character often remains uncontested for 
lack of evidence to the contrary. The beloved disciple in the FG might be better seen as 
a window rather than wonderful, neutral rather than ideal. Yet it is precisely this type 
of presentation that suits the role of the BD as witness, theologian, and reliable 
narrator. By appearing in the narrative itself, the BD avoids the trap of being at an 
ironic distance from his subject matter, and by (not)appearing as a flat character, the 
BD avoids the necessity of developing liis own character and having to account for the 
resulting self-conscious intmsion of his own perspective. '^^ This problem is more acute 
in Jolin, where characters are more developed, than in the Synoptics, where the 
pericope format inherently provides a certain narrative distance. Whereas the other 
characters respond to Jesus in a variety of ways, the BD in his function as author 
presents the common center, Jesus Christ the Logos, to which eveiyone must respond.
On anonymity in the FG see, David Beck, “The Narrative Function of Anonymity in Fourth Gospel 
Characterization,” Semeia 63 (1993) 143-155.
For a discussion of tiiese issues see W. J. Harvey’s treatment of Esther in Bleak House, in W. J. 
Harvey, Character and the Novel (Itiiaca, New York; Cornell University Press, 1965) 89-99.
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I ll THE COMIC AND PETER
Comedy forms a natural conversation partner to tragedy, a mirror image in 
many respects. At the most basic level, comedies end happily and tragedies end badly. 
Both comedy and tragedy endure as significant forms of cultural expression. Yet there 
are important differences. Comedy seems more at home in the present world and in 
numerous expressions, such as TV and film, continues as a significant form of 
expression. Tragedy, on the other hand, has fallen on hard times. Yet certain tragedies 
of the past, notably Oedipus the King, Prometheus, Hamlet, King Lear, and perhaps 
Antigone, provide widely influential cultural reference points in a way that individual 
works of comedy do not. Even Shakespeare’s best known comedies, perhaps 
Midsummer Night’s Dream, or Twelfth Night, fail to command as much attention as 
certain tragedies. Aristophanes languishes in obscurity compared to Sophocles. 
Comedy in life and art is ubiquitous, while individual comedies are not. Tragedies are 
more like mountains while comedies are more like the plains; perhaps not as 
spectacular or commanding, but all the more livable for being so.
Tragedy attracts more widespread critical attention than comedy as seen in the 
number of attempts to give a theory of tragedy, balanced in many respects by the 
rejection in principle of any such theories. No doubt the critical attention given to 
tragedy stems from the influence of Aristotle’s Poetics which provided the starting 
point for any discussion of tragedy and remains influential today. Critical discussion of 
tragedy has thus had a standard conversation partner through the ages which comedy
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has always lacked. It is possible that Aristotle wrote a similar critical work on comedy 
no longer extant. Lane Cooper sought to correct this in his book An Aristotelian 
Theory o f Comedy^^ in which he attempted to give what Aristotle might have said 
based on a synthesis of what he did say in other sources, making some educated 
guesses, and miiroring the issues and format of the Poetics.
The lack of a standard critical work on comedy is a fact of history. But what is 
not clear is whether or not that contingent historical fact should be taken as the primary 
reason critical theory of comedy appears less developed than tragedy, however diverse 
theories of tragedy may be. A more compelling explanation lies in the veiy nature of 
comedy itself and its subject matter. Comedy includes much that is unexpected, thereby 
breaking the link of expected causal relationsliips and rendering a theory of comedy in 
many respects more difficult to come by. Although widespread in life, comedy often 
appears to be mysterious and just beyond our grasp.
Comedy requires a fundamentally different kind of theory than tragedy. For the 
present the differences can be summarized by stating that tragedy concentrates while 
comedy integrates. Tragedy concentrates certain forces so as to bring about the 
reduction and/or destruction, physical or otherwise, of individuals. Thus, tragedy 
requires a theory that clarifies how this thematic and dramatic concentration takes 
place, precisely the kind of explanation offered in Aristotle’s Poetics. The exposition 
of tragedy offered above follows the same approach. Comedy, on the other hand, is a 
more general phenomenon, and is expansive in the sense of moving toward a new and 
integrated arrangement of things, one perhaps not immediately apparent at the start.
35 Lane An Aristotelian Theory o f Comedy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1924).
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And, discussions of comedy inevitably involves a discussion of jokes, humor, wit, and 
related issues. A theory of comedy, therefore, needs to be more general in nature, yet 
still be specific enough to yield some explanatory value.
A ELEMENTS OF AUDIENCE REACTION 
A.I. COMIC EMOTIONS: SYMPATHY AND RIDICULE
Sympathy and ridicule form the comic counterparts to fear and pity in tragedy. 
Although usefiil designations, they do not possess the same stature and authority that 
fear and pity do in tragedy, partly do to the absence of Aiistotle’s influence. Weighing 
emotions is difficult, but should not be avoided where appropriate, as is the case here.
Sympathy and ridicule function the same way that fear and pity do in tragedy; 
they provide a balance between closeness and distance in the reader’s emotional 
relationship to a character. Ridicule proceeds only where there is little or no emotional 
involvement with a given character, whereas too much sympathy for a character tends 
to prevent any sort of objective evaluation of a character. The amount of sympathy and 
ridicule obviously vary, but these elements must be in approximate balance if a comic 
tone is to be maintained. For example, in A Comedy o f Errors, the mix-up caused by 
having two sets of identical twins causes all sorts of ridiculous complications, but we 
never see the characters as objects of ridicule because they are acting in accordance 
with what they might reasonably suppose to be true and so we feel a corresponding 
amount of sympathy with them. The tendency toward ridicule is not too pronounced, 
so the need for sympathy is not very strong either.
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Peter is different altogether in that the tendency toward sympathy and ridicule 
are both very strong, although the tendency toward ridicule is often missed by readers 
so inclined for confessional reasons or out of reverence for the Bible. Additionally, the 
FG presents Peter as a sympathetic, developed character with virtually no tendency 
toward caricature. Yet, Peter’s actions and statements consequent on his understanding 
of Jesus, coupled with the pre-crucifixion events taken by themselves and seen in a 
certain light, hold Peter up to severe ridicule, a feature especially notable in the 
contrast of Peter’s sword wielding defense of Jesus as contrasted to his three-fold 
denial. Peter’s pretensions far outstrip reality to the point where the divergence 
between them moves beyond the ridiculous toward becoming painful. The Synoptics 
mitigate the effects of this incident by immediately narrating the fact of Peter’s bitter 
remorse (Mt. 26:75; Mk. 15:72; Lk. 22:62). In addition to contrasting Peter to 
himself, John makes Peter’s denial all the more painful by contrasting it with the 
steadfastness of Jesus before Annas, (sandwiched between Peter’s denials), and Pilate’s 
thi'eefold declaration of Jesus innocence. In John, Peter’s restoration comes not 
through tearftil repentance, but through reinstatement and commissioning by Jesus 
himself
In both the Synoptics and in John, the tendency to sympathy balances the 
ridiculous quality of Peter’s actions. Peter is real, well intentioned, and transparent, 
someone with endearing qualities sufficient to even cover over his Quixotic mistakes. 
Unlike the dark and thieving Judas, Peter is someone with some moral capital to spend. 
Judas’ betrayal is inherent to his character; Peter is merely blind to himself. At the
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same time, Peter’s denial is painful, but its veiy painfulness shortens the emotional 
distance and prevents Peter from being held up for ridicule alone. Had Peter been 
merely naive, his denial would have been too close emotionally, unexpected and 
shocking in the wrong way, malicious on the part of those who might have prevented 
it. On the other hand, Peter’s comic excess, most apparent in his uneven encounter with 
Malchus, is of a kind that needs to be brought under control if Peter is to be useful.
The reader, like Jesus, can almost see it coming and has the sense of it being justified in 
some way, however distressing its arrival may be. Without pathos, Peter veers toward 
farce; without a ludicrous dimension, Peter careens toward tragedy, a theme to be 
explored later. Only by steering a middle course can an emotional tone suitable for 
comedy be maintained. And only through sympathy and ridicule in strong doses does 
the FG’s account of Peter acliieve an emotional depth characteristic of serious comedy.
A.2. LAUGHTER
Laughter is the most obvious element of audience reaction in comedy and may 
be viewed as the comic counterpart to catharsis in tragedy. But, as noted above in 
reference to sympathy and ridicule, laughter, however much it is associated with the 
comic, is not a necessary requirement of it. Yet, laughter is common enough so that it 
transcends the borders between jokes, wit, satire, humor, and the comic.^^
Henri Bergson, Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning o f the Comic, tians. Cloudesley Brereton 
(London: MacMillian, 1911). Bergson’s treatment is a case in point. His work is wide ranging and 
moves naturally between relevant topics. Koestler begins liis treatment of creation with a discussion of 
laughter. Artliur Koestler, The Act o f Creation (London: Hutcliinson, 1964) 27-49.
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Although catharsis in tragedy may well manifest itself physically, laughter has
an obvious biological aspect and is physically apparent in a way that catharsis in
tragedy is not. Hauser describes it as follows,
Laughter is produced through a complex interplay of anatomical structures 
and physiological processes, and these are brought into operation by 
culturally conditioned behavioural and emotional stimuli in normal, healthy 
individuals.^^
Hauser also offers a technical description of laughing which explains, among other 
things, differences between smiling and laughing. Significantly, she notes that laughter, 
whatever its biological manifestations, brought into operation by certain conceptual and 
emotional stimuli.
Bergson examines the conditions under which laughter occurs. He observes,
...the absence o f feeling which usually accompanies laughter. It seems as 
though the comic could not produce its disturbing effect unless it fell, so to 
say, on the surface of a soul that is thoroughly calm and unruffled. 
Indifference is its natural environment, for laughter has no greater foe than 
emotion.
For example, Peter is a comic character, yet we do not laugh at him precisely because 
the reader is emotionally engaged such that he or she is not “thoroughly calm and 
unruffled.” There is generally too much sympathy for Peter to laugh, 13:9 being an 
exception. In a similar way, works of comedy in which the characters themselves face
Gertrud Hauser, et. al. “The Biology of Laughter. Medical, Functional, and Antliropological-Huinan 
Etlmological Aspects,” in Laughter Down the Centuries vol. Ill, Siegfried Jakel, Asko Timonen, and 
Veli-Matti Rissanen, eds. Turku, Finland: Turun Yliopisto, (1997) 9.
Bergson, Laughter, 4. In his famous definition of tlie comic, W. H. Auden makes a similar 
observation: “A contradiction in the relation of the individual or the personal to the universal or the 
impersonal wliich does not involve the spectator or hearer in suffering or pity, wluch in practice means 
tliat it must not involve tlie actor in real suffering.” Auden, “Notes on tlie Comic,” in Robert 
Corrigan, ed. Comedy: Meaning and Form (Scranton, Pemisylvania: Chandler, 1965) 61.
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too much emotional turmoil do so at the expense of laughter. For Bergson, laughter
must originate in some aspect of our humanity. He writes.
To produce the whole of its effect, then, the comic demands sometliing like 
a momentary anesthesia of the heart. Its appeal is to intelligence, pure and 
simple.^^
Bergson does not mean that the comic resulting in laughter involve a conscious mental 
process. Bergson correctly regards laughter as an appeal to intelligence, while the 
mental processes involved are often sudden and unconscious. Like good food, a joke is 
better experienced than explained.
Attempting to integrate the physical and biological, Freud regarded the process 
of joke formation as a kind of “psychic compression” or economy of expression 
wherein the psychic energy needed to express something is compressed into the form of 
a joke.'^ ® This basic idea of compression can take several forms, such as condensation, 
multiple use of the same material, or double meaning .The  compression into the form 
of a joke often allows psychic or social barriers to be overcome. On reception, this 
compressed psychic energy is released and laughter results. The psychic release 
manifest in laughter corresponds roughly to the amount of psychic energy conserved 
during the joke’s formation, working as a kind of thermodynamic law of laughter. 
Laughter, then, is something like a psychic safety valve.
These three examples take three different approaches to laughter, approaches 
that will be dealt with below in relation to theories of the comic. The basic point is that
Bergson, Laughter, 5.
Sigmund Freud, Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, tiaiis. and ed. James Strachey
(London; Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960) 42-44. 
ibid., 41-42. Freud offers a detailed analysis of jokes.
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there exists in laughter a connection between the abstract or cognitive aspects and the 
concrete and material expressions of it. Comedy is in this respect like tragedy which 
connects the abstract and material through suffering and death whereas irony differs 
from both by being primarily cognitive with no analogous physical expression. Comedy 
tinged with irony may well evoke laughter, but pure irony is no laughing matter. 
Detached from experience, irony is cognitive to a much greater extent than romance, 
tragedy, and comedy. The connection between the cognitive and concrete, so 
important to laughter, will be seen to be important in the comic itself. But whatever 
the connection, the two must be kept separate, the cause or stimulus, being comedy or 
humor, must not be confused with its effect, laughter.
B-STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS OF COMEDY
B.l CHARACTER
Like tragedy, plot and character form the two most basic elements of comedy.
Following Aristotle, it was argued that in tragedy plot is more important than
character. Following this same line of reasoning. Cooper simply assumes a close
correspondence between comedy and tragedy so that whatever is not obviously
different in comedy and tragedy must be the same in both. The following statement
from Cooper may be compared to Aristotle’s statement on tragedy by substituting
“tragedy” for “comedy.” Cooper writes,
(1) The Plot, then, is the first principle, and, as it were, the very soul, of 
comedy. (2) And the Characters of the agents come next in order of 
importance. -There is a parallel in the art of painting; the most striking 
colors laid on with no order will not be so effective as the simplest 
caricature done in outline. -Comedy is the imitation of an action: mainly on
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this account does it become, in the second place, an imitation of personal 
agents.'^^
Thus, for Cooper, in comedy plot is primary and character is secondary. It will be 
argued, however, that Cooper is mistaken and that character is primary and plot is 
secondary in comedy.Whether  or not Cooper con ectly represents Aristotle here is 
not the issue. Referring to his own and Aristotle’s position that plot is primary over 
character in tragedy, Cornford remarks, “Notliing of all this applies to comedy.
Comedy relies less on a linear sequence typical of Aiistotelian thought and more on a 
holistic emphasis on character. The comic character is comprised of a mixture of 
beliefs, desires, freedom, and choice, these qualities being hard to separate from each 
other.
Hegel compares tragedy and comedy and argues for the supremacy of character 
over plot in comedy. Regarding dramatic poetry (tragedy, comedy, and drama), Hegel 
states that it “makes central the collisions between characters and between their 
aims.”'^  ^ For Hegel, the difference between genres has to do with the relation of the 
individuals to the nature and purpose of their aims which manifest themselves in 
actions. Every true action involves two parts: (1) the substance of the action, which 
Hegel traces to some aspect of the Divine, the good and great, such as honor, love,
CoaçQv, Aristotelian Theory, 184-185.
The Italian Renaissance critic Francesco Robortello offers anotlier attempt to transpose Aristotle’s 
work on tragedy on to comedy in “On Comedy,” in Paul Lauter, ed. Theories o f Comedy (New York: 
Anchor, 1964), 48-63.
Francis Cornford, The Origin o f Attic Comedy (London: Edward Arnold, 1914) 197. Cornford 
argues for the supremacy of character over plot in comedy.
G. W. F. Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1975) 1193. By “diania” Hegel means a work midway between comedy and tragedy. For a helpful 
discussion of Hegel, see George McFadden, Discovering the Comic (Princeton; Princeton University 
Press, 1982) 91-96.
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duty; and (2) the sttbjeci, which Hegel defines as “the individual himself in his 
unfettered self-determination and f r e e d o m . F o r  Hegel, tragedy is more closely 
related to substance, while comedy is more closely related to subject, or character. 
Hegel observes of comedy, “...the masteiy of all relations and ends is given as much to 
the individual in his willing and action, as to external contingency.”'^  ^ For Hegel, the 
resolution of tragedy relates to the substance in that “the eternal substance of things 
emerges victorious in a reconciling way,” whereas in comedy “it is subjectivity, or 
personality, which in its infinite assurance retains the upper hand.” Regardless of the 
accuracy of Hegel’s analysis of the respective resolutions of tragedy and comedy, his 
emphasis on character in comedy is correct. Comedy unmasks a character wliile 
tragedy unmasks a situation.
Using Hegel’s terms and analysis, it is in tragedy that a substance restricts a 
subject’s or character’s action. For example, m Antigone Creon must act according to 
duty and punish Polynices who has attacked the city. Pilate must act to administer 
justice and/or maintain political control as he confi-onts God in the flesh. The 
restrictions on action imposed on a subject results in a collision and the destruction of 
that character. On the other hand, in comedy a character chooses in fi^eedom to act 
according to a substance (love, honor, greed or whatever), and this choice, usually 
done in blindness and/or excess, result in complication and folly. Thus, Peter, a subject 
or character possessed of “infinite assurance” chooses to act according to some 
substance such as love or honor but does so in blindness.
Aesthetics, 1194, Ms emphasis.
'’’ ibid.
48 ■ibid., 1199.
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Again comparing tragedy and comedy, Wylie Sypher notes that tragedy is a
“closed” form of art with an emphasis on necessity and law, whereas comedy is less
complex and less structured with “a precarious logic that can tolerate every kind of
‘improbability.’”'^  ^ He observes.
The coherent plot is vital to tragic theater (Aristotle says that plot is the 
very soul of tragedy); and a tragic action needs to convey a sense of 
destiny, inevitability, and foreordination. The tragic plot often implies 
there are unchanging moral laws behind the falling thunderbolt. The fate of 
a tragic hero needs to be made “intelligible” as the comic hero’s fate does 
not; or at least tragic fate has the force of “necessity” even if it is not 
“intelligible.” Somehow tragedy shows what “must” happen, even while 
there comes a shock of unsurmised disaster. As Aristotle said, in tragedy, 
coincidence must have an air of probability. Then too, tragedy 
subordinates ‘character” to the design of the plot; for the purpose of 
tragedy, says Aristotle, is not to depict “character,” but, rather, to show 
“men in action,” so that the “character” of a tragic hero reveals itself in a 
deed which expresses his moral disposition. Comedy, on the contrary, can 
freely yield its action to surprise, chance, and all the changes in fortune that 
fall outside the necessities of tragic myth, and can present “character” for 
its own sake.'*®
Bergson expresses a similar opinion.
And so we see why action is essential in drama, but only accessory in 
comedy. In a comedy, we feel any other situation might equally well have 
been chosen for the purpose of introducing the character; he would still 
have been the same though the situation were different. But we do not get 
this impression in a drama. Here characters and situations are welded 
together, or rather, events form part and parcel with the persons, so that 
were the drama to tell us a different story, even though the actors kept 
the same names, we should in reality be dealing with other persons.
Wylie Sypher, “The Meanings of Comedy,” in Comedy: Meaning and Form, Robert Corrigan, ed. 
(Scranton, Pennsylvania: Chandler, 1965) 35-36.
^ibid. 35-36.
Bergson, Laughter, 145.
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Hegel, Sypher, and Bergson make the same essential distinction; tragedy relates to 
necessity while comedy relates to choice, a distinction inextricably linked with 
tragedy’s emphasis on plot, the vehicle of necessity, and comedy’s emphasis on 
character, the vehicle of choice. Obviously, these qualities will vary with each 
individual work, but they remain distinctive and defining tendencies to their respective 
archetypes all the same.
The primacy of character over plot in comedy is seen clearly in Cervantes’ Don 
Quixote, one of the great comic figures in all of literature. Having lingered too long 
over too many books on knights and knighthood, this misguided soul acts on his 
delusions and embarks on a career of knight en antry. The reality that Don Quixote 
sees is not usually the same one seen by everyone else. An inn becomes a castle, the 
innkeeper becomes the warden of the castle, windmills become giants, etc. The fact 
that Don Quixote mistakes them as such has nothing to do with inns, innkeepers, or 
windmills in and of themselves. Rather, perceiving them in this manner has everything 
to do with Don Quixote and his state of mind. Whatever happens in the book serves to 
expose this state of affairs by juxtaposing illusion with reality. Had Don Quixote been 
in his right mind, nothing would have happened; there is no hint of causality or 
necessity following on fi'om events alone. Only his false beliefs about reality propels 
the account of his wanderings.
Furthermore, because Don Quixote himself generates the action of the story, as 
in romance there is no necessary causal relationship between the separate incidents.
The fact that his tilting at windmills occurs before his encounter with the goatherds is
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of no consequence and reversing the order would have made little difference. This is 
not to say the book can be read in any order with no effect, the characters of Don 
Quixote and Sancho Panza and their relationship develops as the book proceeds, but 
this could have done irrespective of the order of the content of the incidents 
themselves. Don Quixote is typically comic in that it is fundamentally episodic. In 
contrast, Aristotle notes, “But most important of all [in tragedy] is the structure of the 
incidents.”^^  In this remark “structure of the incidents” means the incidents as they 
relate to one another more so than their individual composition. In tragedy there exists 
a strong causal link between incidents. For example, the public verses private clash in 
Antigone is causally and sequentially linked to the attack on the city, the action 
necessarily following from this incident. Strong causal links between incidents leads to 
an emphasis on plot. But in Don Quixote’s case, the primary link between the incidents 
is Don Quixote himself. In both comedy and romance, character is primary over plot. 
But in romance the hero is integrated with his/her surroundings and/or world view 
whereas in comedy the hero is not.
The example of Don Quixote is simple and obvious and illustrates the point. 
But other examples are to be found as well. It is no accident that Hardy’s novels 
emphasize plot and tend more toward tragedy, whereas Dickens’ works, especially the 
early Dickens, are generally comic and feature looser plots and generally flatter 
characters. The fact that comedians perform independently of plot and tragedies are
Aristotle, Poetics Vi. 9, p. 62.
The distinction of flat and round characters comes from E. M. Forster, who singles out Dickens as a 
writer whose characters are generally flat and Jane Austen as a writer whose characters are generally 
round. Forster, Aspects o f the Novel (London; Edward Arnold, 1927) 65ff.
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performed as works containing a causal sequence is not due simply to commercial 
reasons; it is inherent to the nature of comedy to be linked to character and tragedy to 
be linked to plot. The primacy of character over plot permits sitcoms to continue from 
week to week as the characters with their strengths and weaknesses proceed intact, 
ready for new adventures with each new episode. Comic strips rely on the same 
dynamic. The Canterbury Tales, a loose collection of tales connected only by the 
convention of a trip to Canterbury, relies mostly on character for its comic effect. The 
plays of Ai'istophanes (especially The Birds) are notable examples of works being 
driven by character rather than plot.^ "^
A more difficult example is a work like A Comedy o f Errors. Here the mix ups 
caused by the existence of two sets of identical twins is set in motion by an accident of 
plot. But even here the plot only provides opportunities for expressions of character. 
Although the play has a strong element of farce, in which character development tends 
to be limited, the characters drive the action by acting on their justified but false beliefs 
about reality. The existence of the two sets of twins, an accident of plot, provides the 
possibility of comedy, however likely, but not the necessity of it. Comic characters are 
deluded in some way, but it does not have to be so.
The example of Peter and the disciples follows the same pattern. Whatever 
their backgrounds, of which very little is given in the FG, each must respond to Jesus’ 
teaching, ministry, and person. This forms a common ground for all the disciples, yet
Frye notes, “In Aristophanes there is usually a central figure who constructs his (or her) own society 
in the teeth of strong opposition, driving off one after another all the people who come to prevent or 
exploit him, and eventually achieving a heroic triumph...” Northrop Fiy^ e, Anatomy o f Criticism 
(Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1957) 43.
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there is no set pattern of coming to faith. Peter, Thomas, and Pilate all respond to 
Jesus in different ways at different times. None is particularly constrained by a 
situation to act in the way they do. Peter’s comic actions happen by his own volition, 
not by what happens to Mm. Both Peter and Thomas persist in a course of tMnking 
when each has been given a warning or evidence to the contrary, a fact that is best 
explained by the power of characters to make choices. Jesus’ words to Peter serve as 
intended warnings, but Ms misunderstandings, propelled by the force of his character, 
causes Mm to overwhelm any helpful boundaries on his actions. Because the comic is 
more about character than about plot, Peter’s appearances in the FG need not be linked 
in any strong causal relationship manifest in tightly structured incidents, as is the case 
with Pilate, but can be of looser and more informally arranged, linked together by Peter 
Mmself. Sigmficantly, Shakespeare uses Falstaff in several plays on the same basis.
The stress in Comedy is fundamentally on character rather than plot has to do 
with the nature of comedy itself. Comedy is primarily driven by beliefs and desires 
rather than by events and beliefs and desires by their very nature reside in character. 
Only a conscious being can have beliefs and desires. Beliefs and desires have to do 
with the future as they relate to the present; they concern what will or might happen. 
Beliefs and desires are expressed as by making choices and choice concerns the present 
as it relates to the future. Tragedy, on the other hand, is concerned with what has 
happened, and the past is not subject to choice. Thus tragedy contains “reversals” 
while comedy features “unmasking.” While tragedy and comedy are very much
The substance of this paragraph will be elaborated in detail below as part of a discussion of 
conceptual elements in comedy.
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concerned with beliefs and their relationship to reality, in tragedy the reality is one 
related to the past and therefore irrevocable. Oedipus has killed his father and married 
his mother; this is reality. Events of incident and plot ruthlessly expose this reality and 
destroy previous beliefs as the past parks its car in the present. In comedy the relation 
to beliefs and reality is open-ended because comedy is about the fiiture rather than 
about the past. Don Quixote’s beliefs motivate him to ride into the future clad in armor 
with lance in hand. Like Don Quixote, Peter’s beliefs lead him to stride into the future 
sword in hand.
To be comic, a character must intrinsically possess a strong sense of freedom.
If he or she is to be at odds with reality, he or she must possess freedom to do so.
McFadden comments.
The associations of the comic with spontaneity, liberation from inhibition 
and constraint, unblocking, vital movement, and ease and grace of behavior 
all point to freedom as an indispensable component.
...we can conclude that the comic is in a special relation to freedom. Other 
genres of art cannot do without freedom; but comedy is the only genre 
continually to assert it. Furthermore, although no genre may be adequately 
defined by a simple quality, comedy is the only one wherein freedom 
predominantly gives the tone to the complex quality that emerges from the 
work as a whole.
McFadden relates the principle of freedom to his basic principle of the comic, which he 
defines as “...a characteristic maintenance-as-itself, despite the implicit threat of 
alteration.” *^ Thus, whatever threats reality may pose, the comic character is free to 
challenge them and remains intact. The onslaughts of plot test, and expose, but do not
McFadden, Discovering, 11. 
’^ ibid., 14.
^®ibid., 25.
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destroy. In Peter’s case there is never any hint that his denial is pre-determined or 
fixed; it is simply the outgrowth of his character, an outcome that any perceptive 
person might have seen coming. In the end Peter is still Peter, though chastened and 
changed.
In a similar way, this quality of self-preseiwation, or self-projection in the face 
of whatever difficulties prompts Torrance to argue that, rather than being simply a butt 
or scapegoat, the comic character is admirable. He writes, “The Comic hero is a 
contradiction in terms, or at least in perspectives. He is comic because he differs fi*om 
others and heroic because he is always himself. Although largely correct, there is a 
very real sense where the fact that the comic character “is always himself’ or displays 
“maintenance-as-itself,” deserves an important caveat, one separating comedy from 
romance. Allowing for an enduring dignity in the comic character, it must be noted 
that the comic character’s fieedom to act is a two edged sword; freedom to act is 
freedom for folly and mistakes. The same is true for self preservation and always being 
one’s self; the individual remains intact, but not everything is worthy of preservation. 
The comic character’s fi*eedom is best taken as an unconscious, or unexamined 
fi*eedom, a freedom that may result in examination and modification once exposed to 
experience and events. The comic character continues as self and displays perhaps the 
greatest freedom, the freedom to suiwive, modify one’s own behavior, and achieve an 
integration with one’s surroundings.
Freedom resulting in mistakes, rather than being an option for a comic 
character, is intrinsic to the comic itself. The comic character usually displays a
Robert M Torrance, The Comic Hero (Cambridge, MA; Haivard University Press, 1978) 1.
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mixture of mistaken or exaggerated beliefs or desires, as for example, the 
quintessentially comic Don Quixote. Scott notes this feature in his definition of the 
comic. For Scott,
...the comic is a contradiction in the relation of the human individual to the 
created orders of existence which arises out of an over-specialization of 
some instinct or faculty of the self, or out of an inordinate inclination of the 
self in some special direction, to the neglect of the other avenues through 
which it ought also to gain expression. ^
All the while the comic character may be unaware of his folly. For Bergson, “a comic 
character is generally comic in proportion to his ignorance of himself. The comic 
person is unconscious.”*^^  The comic character’s freedom is best taken as an 
unconscious, or unexamined freedom, a freedom that may result in examination and 
modification once exposed to events. The comic character is a veritable fountain of 
folly as much as freedom because he has the freedom to do so. To be free or ignorant 
or unconscious is to be free fi'om eveiything but one’s self. Choices about the future 
must be made by fallible beings within the blindness of the present.
If the comic stems more from character than from plot, and if the comic 
character is fundamentally about mistaken or exaggerated beliefs or desires freely 
expressed, then it becomes clear why comedy often features fantastic plots. Comic 
plots grow out of a character’s mistaken beliefs, and the human capacity to be mistaken 
is almost boundless, especially in regard to the future. Comic characters reflect the 
human propensity to make unjustified inferences that lead to a certain credible 
falsehood about life. Fantastic plots take on an air of plausibility, not because things
Nathan Scott, “The Bias of Comedy and tlie Nairow Escape into Faitli,” in Corrigan, Comedy, 104. 
Bergson, Laughter, 16.
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normally happen that way, but because characters express their beliefs and desires in 
choices that make them happen that way. One does not normally single-handedly 
confront a band of armed soldiers, yet doing so seems consistent enough with Peter’s 
character to lend it an inherent plausibility.
The supremacy of character over plot in the comic does not mean that comic 
characters are more fully developed than tragic characters; the reverse is quite often the 
case. In a comic character, some trait or belief is usually exaggerated such that other 
aspects of character suffer as a consequence, as Scott has noted above. The greater the 
exaggeration, the more the work tends to move fi*om drama (as Hegel defines it) 
toward farce with a consequent flattening of character. The characters in A 
Midsummer Night's Dream are less developed than those in Twelfth Night, the former 
having a more fantastic plot than the latter. Dicken’s novels can be richly comic, but 
his characters, Mr. Mcawber for example, tend to be relatively flat. The works of Jane 
Austen are generally comic and feature well rounded and developed characters coupled 
with a greater stress on plot. Much of the greatness of Don Quixote and Falstaff lies in 
the fact that both defy this tendency and combine a roundness of character with strong 
comic tendencies.
Peter displays all of the significant qualities of a comic character. His desires 
and beliefs propel him to make choices and act on those choices within a context of 
fi'eedom. Jesus can only do so much to curb his excess. Reality will eventually speak 
with its own voice. For Peter, the very freedom that made him the comic character he 
is becomes the very thing that will be restricted. Jesus tells him, “I tell you the truth,
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when you were younger you dressed yourself and went where you wanted; but when 
you are old you will stretch out your hands, and someone else will dress you and lead 
you where you do not want to go.” (21:18) This naiTowing of freedom will ultimately 
deprive him of life itself. Yet there is something gloriously refreshing about Peter and 
his next statement, “Lord, what about him?” The Peter we have come to know, 
although chastened and wiser, is still very much alive.
B.2 PLOT
Like any other type of plot, comic plots must feature a clash of some kind. 
Rather than the clash being related to the past being manifest in the present as in 
tragedy, comic plots feature competing versions of the future as they are manifest in the 
present. This is a fundamental difference between tragedy and comedy. Thus in 
tragedy a past action, or an action soon to be past, catches up to the protagonist in 
some way, whether or not the protagonist was responsible for it. In comedy, the future 
is envisioned in such a way as to impact the present. The future presents numerous 
opportunities that are inevitably tied to beliefs and desires. If character X has belief Y 
about the friture coupled with desire Z, X stands a good chance of acting on that 
desire. Acting on one’s desires with respect to the future contains as many pitfalls as it 
does possibilities.
The comic action usually grows out of a conflict between two or more visions 
of what the future should look like. Fiye notes, “The action of comedy is not unlike 
the action of a lawsuit, in which plaintiff and defendant construct different versions of
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the same situation, one finally being judged as real and the other as illusory.
Although Frye’s comparison is correct as far as it goes, a better comparison might be 
made between comedy and deliberative rather than judicial rhetoric, the latter being 
more appropriate for tragedy. In deliberative rhetoric, the rivals each construct 
competing versions of what should take place rather than what has taken place, as in 
judicial rhetoric, which may well be what Frye intended to say. To act, then, is to 
simultaneously display and test a set of beliefs and one’s character.
The comic action, then, features a course of events in relation to the ftiture, or 
possible futures, plots in which the one action or state of affairs competes with another. 
Usually a character’s desires are blocked in some manner and the desired future refuses 
to come easily into the present. Frye observes, “The obstacles to the hero’s desire, 
then, form the action of the comedy, and the overcoming of them the comic 
resolution. This makes no explicit value judgment on the desired future, the comic 
character could desire an inappropriate reality, as Malvolio does, just as easily as an 
appropriate one. In comedy there is usually a social judgment taking place as to the 
desirability of a given state of affairs, but this has less to do with the nature of the 
comic itself than with the values of the society in which it occurs. In comedy there is 
often a note of grace expressed in not having all one’s desires fulfilled, as is plainly the 
case with Peter.
Anatomy, 166 
^ibid., 164.
64 George Meredith presents tlie social functions of comedy. See Mereditli, An Essay on Comedy and 
the Uses o f the Comic Spirit (Constable: London, 1918).
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The comic character acts on his or her desires and meets with resistance, what
are normally called blocking agents. Blocking agents in comedy may be divided into
two types, active and passive. Active opposition takes the form of blocking characters,
usually members of the older establishment whose vision of the future is at odds with
those who desire change. Frye outlines this process as follows,
What normally happens is that a young man wants a young woman, that his 
desire is resisted by some opposition, usually paternal, and that near the 
end of the play some twist in the plot enables the hero to have his will . In 
this simple pattern there aie several complex element. In the first place, the 
movement of comedy is usually a movement from one kind of society to 
another. At the beginning of the play the obstructing characters are in 
charge of the play’s society, and the audience recognizes that they are 
usurpers. At the end of the play the device in the plot that brings hero and 
heroine together causes a new society to ciystallize around the hero, and 
the moment then this crystallization occurs is the point of resolution in the 
action, the comic discovery, anagnorisis or cognitio^^
A typical example of this pattern is A Midsummer Night's Dream, in which Egeus 
forbids his daughter to marry Lysander in favor of her mariying Demetrius. Several of 
these elements are apparent in the Peter’s situation in the FG. The prologue establishes 
a context wherein darkness has usurped the position of the light. Jesus is aligned with 
the light, with God, and has come into the world to bring light to everyone. Peter 
understands Jesus to be the Messiah, it is assumed, in 1 ;40-42 and he understands him 
further to be “the Holy One of God” in 6:69. This much Peter and Jesus have this 
understanding in common; those holding any other view are usurpers, hirelings, and 
false shepherds.
'VxyQ, Anatomy, 163
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The most obvious blocking characters in the FG are the Jewish leaders, 
opposing Jesus more than anyone else in the FG Throughout the FG the Jewish leaders 
represent the older established order, the insiders who block innovation and change and 
adamantly oppose Jesus. The temple, with its status as the center of Jewish religion, is 
destined to be replaced by Jesus himself, the true temple who will be thrown down and 
rebuilt in three days (2.19-22). Nicodemus, a cardinal member of the Jewish 
establishment, is told he must be “bom again.” The new society consists of those who 
are bom again, drink of the living water, receive deliverance from blindness. The 
Jewish leaders do not simply oppose Jesus, but also oppose those who follow or would 
follow him and attempt to block the formation of the new society by excommunicating 
believers from the synagogue. Furthermore, steps are taken to destroy Jesus himself. 
The disciples have been aware of the danger of following Jesus. (11:8) Following the 
resurrection of Lazarus, the Jewish leaders plot to take his life. (11:53) Events move 
toward their climax during the Passover celebration when the Jewish leaders come to 
the garden with a detachment of soldiers to arrest Jesus. In the garden Peter’s identity 
with Jesus is such that he draws a sword and opposes these blocking characters.
In so far as Peter’s view of things is concemed, the major blocking character is 
Jesus himself. Peter’s vision of a glorious future competes with Jesus’ own vision of 
what that glory consists of. In the incident of the foot washing, Peter’s understanding 
of Jesus, his mission, and Peter’s own role in it, conflicts with Jesus’ emphasis on love 
and service. Jesus’ command to Peter to “put your sword away” blocks his role as
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participant in this glorious revolution. Peter displays boundless confidence in Jesus’ 
identity, authority, and power, but profoundly misunderstands his specific intentions.
Those standing around the fire with Peter may also be seen as blocking 
characters serving a transitional function. Whatever the actual danger lurking behind 
each question, Peter’s denials are certainly out of proportion to the potential threat to 
his safety especially when compared with Peter’s previous actions. The Peter who 
commits three denials under verbal challenge stands in ironic contrast to the Peter who 
wields a sword at physical danger. Compared with the real danger of confronting an 
armed band, the potential danger posed around the fire seems small indeed. Whatever 
they themselves thought, nothing in the FG states explicitly that any of the disciples 
were in danger and care has been taken to show that Jesus took steps to secure their 
safety (18:8). Peter’s interlocutors provide three opportunities to take a stand, three 
unheeded warnings of perils to come. In this sense, they are blocking characters who 
perform a potential ministerial function. Their role is not so much to present a 
destructive threat to Peter as it is to prevent Peter’s self destruction. Or, given the 
larger purposes of Jesus, this fireside chat provides the situation that will expose and 
destroy Peter’s pretentious behavior. The denouement unfolds such that the 
pretentious side of Peter’s behavior dies at his own hand. Peter and Judas both hang 
themselves.
The blocking element in the comic plot could be passive and simply be reality 
itself. This is the case with Don Quixote, whose chivalric adventures constantly war 
with physical reality and society’s failure to be anything at all like that portrayed in his
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many books. In a kind of reversal of Don Quixote, Falstaff (King Henry IV, pt. 1) 
desires honor, but only to a point. Honor usually entails some sort of real encounter 
with difficulty or danger and this Falstaff cannot bring himself to do. For Falstaff, 
discretion as the better part of valor means above all things to avoid bodily hann. Don 
Quixote is comic because he acts on his beliefs and they are blocked by reality; Falstaff 
is comic because he sees the potential clash of belief and reality and only pretends to 
act. Peter’s character displays both of these aspects in his confrontations with reality. 
He is a garden variety Don Quixote m Gethsemane, but more like Falstaff in the high 
priest’s courtyard where erstwhile bravery gives way to denial. The crowing rooster 
signals the nadir of Peter’s mixture of action and pretension and suggests that Peter, in 
addition to being mistaken about Jesus, is ignorant of himself.
Ironically, in the process of promoting the cause of Jesus on earth, Peter 
himself becomes a blocking character. Peter’s attempt to stop Jesus’ washing of the 
disciples feet means much more than stopping the act itself; Peter knows full that Jesus’ 
actions define his role as leader and the disciples’ roles as followers and tries on this 
basis to stop it. In the garden, Jesus is willing to die for one reason and Peter for 
another. Jesus’ command to Peter, “Put that sword away. Shall I not drink the cup the 
Father has given me?” (18:11), shows that Peter’s action stands between the will of the 
Father and the mission of the Son and highlights the profound implications of Peter’s 
mistake. Peter’s role as blocking character must end if he is to participate in the 
ministry of Jesus.
^Fiye observes, “The blocking characters of comedy are nearly always impostors, though I is more 
frequently a lack of self-knowledge tlian simple hypocrisy that characterizes them.” ibid., 172,
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C) CONCEPTUAL ELEMENTS OF COMEDY 
C.l APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
The fiindamental issue of methodology is whether or not a definition can be 
given that is sufficiently comprehensive to cover an adequate amount of data while at 
the same time being narrow enough to offer clarification of issues. The same 
methodological issues and issues related to the validity of any theory arise in a 
discussion of comedy.^^ Although the details would vary, the arguments employed in 
defending the formation of a theoiy of comedy are substantially the same covered in the 
introduction and in relation to tragedy and will not be repeated here.
Raskin also offers an insightful classification of the theories of humor.^* The 
most important type, and the type offered by Raskin himself and the present work, are 
theories of incongruity wherein two or more incongruous elements are juxtaposed 
against each other. Bergson’s famous work on laughter is of this type.^  ^ The second 
type of theories are those based on “hostility, superiority, malice, aggression, 
derision, or disparagement.” ®^ The third type are the release theories of which Freud 
is the most famous proponent. Freud argued that creating a joke involved a psychic
For example, L. C. Knights is critical of any tliepiy of comedy and believes that tliey are useless in 
terms of actual literaiy criticism. He mentions tlie tlieories of Bergson, Freud, and Mereditli and is 
particularly critical of tlie latter. But Freud and Bergson make no attempt at literary criticism 
(Knights would probably admit this) and Knights does point out a certain generality in Meredith. 
Knights’ radical dichotomy between literary criticism and theories of comedy and categorical rejection 
of tliem is extreme. See L. C. Knights, “Notes on Comedy,” in Corrigan, Comedy, 181-191.
^ Victor Raskin, Semantic Mechanisms o f Humor (Boston and Lancaster: D. Reidel Publishing 
Company, 1985) 30-41.
Bergson holds that laughter results form the imposition of the mechanical upon the living, the rigid 
upon the living. But Bergson is only focusing on a narrow aspect of a more general one offered here. 
See Bergson, Laughter.
Raskin, Humor, 36, bold markings liis.
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compression that was released by the recipient and resulted in laughter. Rather than
being incompatible, these three approaches are really talking about different, although
related elements of the same thing. Raskin observes.
In our terms, the incongruity-based theories make a statement about the 
stimulus; the superiority theories characterize the relations or attitudes 
between speaker and the hearer; and the release/relief theories comment 
on the feelings and psychology of the hearer only.^^
Raskin’s analysis clarifies a number of issues. For example, superiority theories of the 
second type are primarily concerned with the ethical aspects of the employment of 
humor, not with the nature of humor itself. Setting these concerns aside avoids the 
confusion generated by the ethical or moral questions in a comic production, concerns 
of Plato, Puritans, and countless others, and whether or not a comic character is base 
or good. Release/relief theories focus on issues related to human biology and 
psychology of the hearer, whereas incongruity theories contain a strong conceptual 
element, as must be the case if humor is not a physical substance but must be 
transmitted in some manner that passes through cognitive processes. It may be 
observed that, depending on one’s point of view, most literary criticism either fails to 
make adequate allowance for these distinctions or is more holistic in its approach and 
all the better for it.
The conceptual elements of comedy themselves differ from tragedy such that a 
theory of comedy will look very different from a theory of tragedy. The movement in 
tragedy is from qualities or values in the abstract with latent potential opposition to 
their opposition in reality resulting in destmction. Tragedy concentrates its forces by
71 ibid., 40.
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means of plot, the vehicle of necessity. Conversely, comedy moves forward toward
integration by means of character, the vehicle of freedom. The comic pattern is toward
openness and expansion, from concrete reality with its difficulties toward an integration
with the imaginative and abstract where a sense of resolution is possible. Sypher’s
comment illustrates the point.
Often the comic hero is rescued because Improvisation and Uncertainty are 
the premises of comic action, and the goddess Fortuna presides over great 
tracts of the comic scene. But the law of Inevitability or Necessity bears 
heavily on the tragic hero, who is not eligible for rescue because in tragedy 
man must somehow take responsibility for the flaws in the nature of things 
or at least pay a penalty for them.^^
While tragedy moves from past to present and irony essentially stagnates in the present, 
comedy moves from present to future, the field of integration, possibility and hope. 
Comedy unmasks a character wliile tragedy unmasks a situation. The differences 
between the two archetypes are such that their respective theories take on a 
substantially different shape. A theory of tragedy tends toward causality, narrowness 
and exclusion, while the open nature of the comic fosters a tendency toward freedom, 
openness and generality.
C.2 BELIEFS AND FRAMES OF REFERENCE^^
The theory of comedy in the present work largely follows the basic outlines 
offered by Koestler and paralleled to a great extent by Raskin. Koestler sees comedy
Sypher, in Corrigan, Comedy, 48-9.
Equivalent to Raskin’s term “script”, the term “frame of reference” is used by Koestler and will be
used here.
Arthur Koestler, Creation’, Raskin, Humor.
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as the perceiving of a situation or idea in terms of two self-consistent but habitually 
incompatible frames of reference.’  ^ On his main hypothesis, Raskin writes,
(107) A text can be characterized as a single-joke-cari^ing text if 
both of the conditions in (108) are satisfied.
(108) (i) The text is compatible, fully or in part, with two different 
scripts
(ii) The two scripts with which the text is compatible are 
opposite ®
What Koestler and Raskin mean by this will become clear as this basic framework is 
expanded below. As the title indicates, Raskin is primarily concerned with two things; 
(1) semantic mechanisms, and (2) as applied to humor. But stripped of the jargon and 
methodology of the field of study in which and for which the book was written,
Raskin’s theory parallels Koestler’s and is at once simple and illuminating, capable of 
wide application far beyond the confines of its immediate audience and beyond its 
specific subject matter of humor. The validity of this will become apparent as these 
basic ideas are expanded and applied to literature and comedy.
In comedy, beliefs about the present are all important because out of these 
beliefs will flow the future. Beliefs animate actions and these actions shape the future as 
it is realized in the present. For better or worse, beliefs shape the present and future. 
The future is open because the actions that will shape it into the present are influenced 
by beliefs and combinations of beliefs that are subject to change. The open friture 
inherent to comedy relies on multiple possibilities. Thus, comedy resides to a 
significant degree in beliefs. Shakespeare, for example, exploits this frilly in Much Ado
’"ibid., 35.
Raskin, Humor, 99. All bold markings are his.
321
About Nothing where eveiything rests on false beliefs. There is nothing of substance in 
Benedick and Beatrice’s false information about each other or Hero’s supposed 
infidelity and death. The past is subject to various intei*pretations, interpretations often 
disputed in tragedy, while the essential facts remain unalterable, or the present is 
destined to be altered for the worse by mistaken interpretation of the past, as is the case 
with Othello, who is not at all concerned with the future. In comedy, beliefs will shape 
and arrange the present and thereby create facts rather than be merely subject to them.
Significant for comedy, few if any of the beliefs comprising any frame of 
reference can be exhaustively investigated and determined with absolute certainty. 
Uncertainty is part of life, especially in regard to the future. It is not necessary to enter 
into a debate about epistemology, this is only to say that any frame of reference 
includes tacit assumptions about reality that may not be adequately justified yet done in 
innocence. The lack of volition and the innocence in which one sees the world in a 
particular fi*ame of reference is an important component of comedy. For example, in 
Twelfth Night, Olivia justifiably and innocently assumes a certain frame of reference 
about Viola; i.e. that Viola is a man. On this (false) assumption, Olivia falls in love 
with her. If this fi*ame of reference breaks apart, the comedy is over in so far as it 
concerns Olivia’s frame of reference. Or, a character may be in large measure 
responsible for holding a patently false belief. For example, again in Twelfth Night, 
Malvolio’s own vanity and the manipulations of others leads him to believe 
(mistakenly) that Olivia is in love with him. However achieved, Malvolio’s frame of 
reference, once in place, governs his actions in a kind of innocent tranquillity.
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Malvolio’s frame of reference with its false beliefs about Olivia, endures beyond the 
point where actual contact with Qlivia might have more wisely been taken as a source 
of doubt.
C.3 FRAMES OF REFERENCE IN CONFLICT
Individual frames of reference do not in themselves produce comedy.
According to Koestler, “It is the clash of the two mutually incompatible codes, or 
associative contexts, which explodes the tension.”^^  Comedy results from the 
simultaneous conflict of two or more frames of reference set in motion when a 
character acts or is acted upon with a view toward a future integration o f some kind.
In irony, the clash of frames of reference is essentially stagnant, disembodied and 
concemed with the present and its perception. In comedy, as Richter observes, “An 
error in and of itself is not ridiculous, any more than ignorance is...But the error must 
be able to reveal itself through an effort, through an action. A frame of reference 
acted upon brings it into contact with reality, a movement teeming with comic 
possibilities. Malvolio’s infatuation with Olivia when acted upon conflicts with Olivia’s 
view of things, which is quite innocent. This kind of conflict sets up the incongruity, an 
essential feature of comedy. One way of understanding a given situation must conflict 
with another way of understanding the same situation. Bergson calls this clash of 
perspectives a “reciprocal interference of a series.” He writes,
...each of the characters in eveiy stage-made misunderstanding has his
setting in an appropriate series of events which he correctly interprets as far
”  Koestler, Creation, 35.
Jean Paul Richter, Introduction to Aesthetics, number 28, “Inquiiy into the Ridiculous,” in Lauter, 
317-318.
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as he is concerned, and wliich give the key-note to his words and actions. 
Each of the series peculiar to the several characters develops 
independently, but at a certain moment they meet under such conditions 
that the actions and words that belong to one might just as well belong to 
another. Hence arise the misunderstandings and the equivocal nature of the 
situation. But this latter in not laughable in itself, it is so only because it 
reveals the coincidence of the two independent series.
For example, in Moliere’s The Miser, Harpagon (the miser) accuses Valefe of stealing
his cash box. Valere knows nothing about the cash box, but thinks his own love for
Harpagon’s daughter Elise has been discovered. Harpagon knows nothing about the
love affair. Valere pleads,
A treasure indeed, no doubt of it, and the most precious you possess; but 
you will not lose it by letting me keep it. On my knees I beg you for this 
charming treasure; and if you would do what is right, you must needs let 
me have it. [act V, scene iii]
Each interprets the present with a frame of reference about the present that each is
justified in holding. Valere assumes a frame of reference completely at odds with
Harpagon’s, and “treasure” here forms a verbal neutral ground over which these two
parties duel in blindness. Perhaps the best example of this in the accounts of Peter
occurs in John 13:31-32, which bears repeating here.
When he [Judas] was gone, Jesus said, “Now is the Son of Man glorified 
and God is glorified in him. If God is glorified in him, then God will glorify 
the Son in himself, and will glorify him at once.
’^Bergson, Laughter, 96. This is not Bergson’s main tlieory, which has to do with the difference 
between tlie “mechanical” and the vital life force of human existence, laughter occurring when the 
former is superimposed upon tlie latter. See Koestler’s discussion of Bergson, Creation, 45-49. 
Koestler notes that Bergson was closer to the heart of the comic here than anywhere else.
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Although this example differs from the one above in that here only one party is 
mistaken, the dynamic Bergson calls “mutual interference of a series” is the same. 
“Now”, “Son of Man”, and the nature of God’s glorification of the Son provide 
equivocal issues of interpretation which Peter and Jesus understand within different 
frames of reference.
The clash of perspectives must be perceived to produce a comic effect. In 
Peter’s case, the reader perceives that something is amiss that colors Peter’s 
understanding of the situation. While the conflict must be evident to an observer to 
achieve its comic effect, observers may be internal and external to the action. In Twelfth 
Night, the realistic frame of reference shared by Sir Toby Belch and the audience allows 
them to know that Malvolio is deceived and to observe with laughter. Something may 
strike someone as comic in a way unique to an individual, as is the case when only one 
person finds a given situation comic or incongmous and laughs alone. It may happen 
that a participant may view things in a different light later on and see the incongiuity in 
a situation, as is often the case when one reinterprets the past on growing older.
The greater the juxtaposition and persistence of two competing perceptions 
about a given situation, the greater the comic effect. In A Midsummer Night's Dream, 
the fairy queen Titania’s spell induced love for Bottom the weaver would be comic in 
itself, but Bottom’s previous translation into an ass intensifies the comic juxtaposition. 
Malvolio’s advances on Olivia are all the more comic for his cross-gartered attire, a 
style she detests. Peter’s misunderstanding of the situation persists to the point of 
drawing a sword and beyond. The following are some of the innumerable variations on
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this basic theme of incongruity; serious/frivolous; big/little; rich/poor; fast/slow; 
knowledge/ignorance; fat/thin; insider/outsider; ideal/reai; best/worst; country/city; 
young/old; pretentious/realistic; public/private; male/female; divine/human, the last two 
pairs being perhaps the greatest sources of comic juxtaposition.^®
In order to be comic, the conflict of ways of understanding must remain open- 
ended. There must be the possibility of change and discovery so that it is perceived 
that the frames of reference at odds with each other might be resolved and resolved, 
not merely in perception, but in reality. Comedy operates to a large extent on beliefs 
and perceptions which are at odds with reality in the present but with reference to the 
future. These beliefs are not inevitable and necessaty as they relate to facts, as is the 
case with Oedipus who learns the truth of his situation. In comedy beliefs are merely 
mistaken. Beliefs and desires of any kind are open to change in a way that past events 
are not. L. J. Potts comments, “The abnormality of comic characters is not absolute; 
we should feel that they are capable of behaving normally if they would.”*^ For this 
reason, a juxtaposition of frames of reference caused by insanity or some mental 
deficiency is not comic because for those in such conditions, it must be this way. In 
tragedy the conflict of frames of reference embodies a sense of necessity and 
inevitability because certain facts drive the action along. But in comedy the 
juxtaposition of two frames of reference is more accidental and unexpected, The comic 
juxtaposition is tenuous because it relies on false beliefs to produce an incongruity that 
need not be so. Hence the emphasis in comedy on chance, coincidence, and the
®°For a fixrtlier treatment, see L. J. Potts, “The Subject Matter of Comedy,” in Corrigan, Comedy, 198-
213.
81 ibid., 199.
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unexpected. The observer is free to see the conflict of the competing fl ames of 
reference and exchange one for the other. This exchange or movement between one 
frame of reference and another produces laughter. The more established a frame of 
reference and the more sudden and decisively it is exchanged for another, the greater 
the laughter. In the FG, the separate frames of reference of Jesus and Peter move 
gradually apart, preventing a sudden, laughter producing exchange of one for the other.
The dramatic conflict in comedy remains open ended because it relies on a 
conflict arising in the present as it relates to the future and what will happen; tragedy 
relies on a conflict that is related to the past and grows out of what has happened. For 
example, Hamlet’s father was murdered and knowledge of this fact drives the action, in 
contrast, in comedy innumerable obstacles may yet be overcome. At sometime in 
comedy, perhaps at any moment, someone’s frame of reference might be altered such 
that all is seen in a new light, including mistaken beliefs about the past. Conversely, a 
comic juxtaposition might begin at any moment as when someone misunderstands 
something. Beliefs about a state of affairs are always subject to change, and, so long 
as change remains possible, comedy can continue. This is not to say that obstacles to a 
comic ending reside only in beliefs or desires. The obstacles may indeed be real and 
dangerous, but comedy can continue so long as the obstacles do not have the last word.
The juxtaposition of two competing frames of reference in comedy can proceed 
only as long as no decisive challenge is presented to a particular interpretation of 
events. The tenuous nature of a comic juxtaposition, the sense that things do not have 
to be this way but they are, suggests that each frame of reference will challenge the
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other, but only to a point. The degree of an individual’s adherence to a particular frame 
of reference determines the point at which a belief is modified by its holder. In Ben 
Jonson’s The Fox, Volopone (the Fox) and his clever servant Mosca marvel at the self 
deception of the three men who each hope to inlierit Volopone’s fortune.
Mosca:
“True, thy will not see’t
Too much light blinds them, I think. Each of them
Is soo possest and stuff with his own hopes,
That any tiling unto the contrary.
Never so true, or never so apparent,
Never so palpable, they will resist it—”
Volopone:
“Like a temptation of the devil.
Likewise, Don Quixote’s delusions of knighthood and chivalry withstand numerous 
conflicts with reality. On the other hand a comic misunderstanding may last only an 
instant, as is the case with most jokes and word plays. A decisive challenge to one 
frame of reference usually happens by means of some assertion of reality. All is cleared 
up m A Comedy o f Errors when the revelation of the existence of two sets of identical 
twins explains the wild misunderstandings. Thomas’ week long refiisal to accept Jesus 
as risen from the dead changes decisively on viewing the hands of the risen Lord. The 
cock crows for Peter and signals the end of the old way of understanding. The comic 
juxtaposition aspect of comedy ends when a particular frame of reference is no longer 
at odds with reality. Reality intrudes sufficient to modify beliefs and the multiple 
possibilities of the future dissolve into the realities of the present.
Ben Jonsoii, The Fox, Act V, Scene I., in The Complete Plays o f Ben Jonson, vol. I (London: J. M. 
Dent) 468.
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1C.4 COMIC REALITY®^
However much comedy relies on the incongruence of two competing frames of 
reference, and however much it relies on a resolution of its various frames of reference 
into reality, the reality that emerges must be of a certain type. A resolution and 
integration of competing frames of reference into reality does not mean that the reality 
achieved by that resolution is necessarily pleasant and comic. Unmasking of illusions 
does not in itself make for a comic resolution. For example, in Moliere’s Tartuffe, 
Tartuffe’s hypocrisy and parasitism are absolutely clear to everyone but Orgon.
Orgon’s persistence in believing in Tartuffe’s virtue otherwise drives the comic mixture 
of illusion and reality. Only when Tartuffe attempts to seduce Orgon’s wife Elmire in 
his hearing does Orgon belatedly see things as they really are. But Tartuffe’s 
unmasking alone will not do. Orgon has transferred ownership of his property to 
Tartuffe and faces the veiy real possibility of being evicted from his own house. The 
expulsion is only averted through the intervention of the prince who brings about a 
tmly comic ending.
The Tartuffe example illustrates the two most significant phases of comedy.
The first is the clash of frames of reference, generally what we refer to as comedy with 
its tendency to be funny, the second is a resolution into a desired reality, generally 
what we refer to as comic where the happy ending is achieved. In order to finally be 
comic, the multiple possibilities of the future characteristic of the comedy phase must 
dissolve into a desirable reality in the present. The relationship of the two phases can
Raskin offers no counteipart to tliis in his theory of humor.
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vary. In the case of Tartuffe, the first ends before the second, but they may coincide. 
For example, in Ben Jonson’s The Fox, the final unmasking of Volopone (the Fox) 
occurs at virtually the same time as the comedy resolves into a new reality wherein the 
innocents are restored and the villains punished. In another variation, the comedy 
phase may be essentially missing or de-emphasized yet the work contains a comic 
ending which requires that it must be taken in its entirety as comic, as is the case in The 
Winter’s Tale. Likewise, the comedy phase is missing from melodrama, which Frye 
calls “comedy without h u m o r . I n  another variation of the relationship of the two 
phases, the second phase does not occur at all nor is it even hinted what that phase 
might be. Such is the unpretentious nature of practical jokes, home video shows, 
slapstick, and related materials that need not be of present concern.
The two phases of the comic emerge separately in Peter’s presentation in the 
FG. The phase of comedy wherein the two frames of reference compete contains 
humor only if seen in a certain light, the humor of the comedy phase being 
overshadowed by the seriousness of the situation and by knowledge of the denials to 
follow. The conflict of firames of reference reaches its climax as Peter draws a sword 
and Jesus desires to drink the cup given him by the Father. Whatever remains of the 
courageous Peter departs with his denials in the high priests’ courtyard. The resolution 
phase of the comic, to the extent that it occurs at all, awaits fiarther development in 
chapter 21. A further distinction in the nature of the comic resolution will be made 
later.
84 Frye, Anatomy, 40
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Comedy relies on a course of events that is out of the ordinary and often
fantastic. Likewise, the emphasis in a comic resolution on chance, coincidence, and the
unexpected . In  comedy, the resolution of the circumstances is usually unlikely given
how mixed up things may appear in the present and ordinarily comes about through the
intervention of some outside force. This force may be impersonal and appear as luck or
providence, as when parents are reunited with children and children with siblings. Or it
may be the personal intervention of an outside agent, as when Oberon sorts matters out
in A Midsummer N ight’s Dream or Portia pleads the case of Antonio in The Merchant
o f Venice, or both, as in The Tempest where Prospero takes up where the storm leaves
off. Robertson observes.
This very arbitrariness is one of the most persistent aspects of comedy. 
Comic heroes are finally integrated into the society to which they properly 
belong, not because of their inherent goodness or prowess, but because of 
events that are unexpected, irrational, sometimes downright miraculous, 
and often precipitated by a deus ex machina who simply decides to act on 
behalf of the protagonist. ^
In any case, the normal linear flow of life and events is arrested, the iron links of 
necessity and causality are broken, and reality and life itself is altered for the better, as 
if the marvelous world of romance breaks into the confijsion of comedy with a touch of 
restorative grace. In a world governed by causality and necessity, the achievement of 
the comic ending by some outside intervention will quite naturally seem implausible, 
extraordinary and fantastic. To the extent that one excludes the fantastic, as Thomas 
the ironic realist does, the comic ending will seem unbelievable, or at least violating
For a discussion of these features, see Frye, 170.
David Robertson, “Tragedy, Comedy, and the Bible: A Response,” Semia 32 (1984) 102.
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aesthetic sensibilities by exchanging what we would like to happen for what is likely to 
happen.
Let us pause to reconnoiter the situation of Peter on that crucial week. As 
Jesus dies by crucifixion, any sort of restoration and comic ending appears impossible. 
With Jesus firmly in the grave, the story of Peter simultaneously flirts with farce and 
careens toward tragedy on precisely the same evidence. Peter’s earlier words, “To 
whom shall we go? We believe and know that you are the Holy one of God” seem 
ridiculous or painfiilly mistaken. Jesus’ washing of the feet becomes a supreme 
example of service laden with pathos or an ironic mockery of his friends. Judas, whose 
death is not mentioned in John, becomes either an even greater villain or the only one 
shrewd enough to change sides in time. Peter either did not defend Jesus adequately or 
he was lucky to escape with his life. The sword in the garden turns to ashes in his 
hands if he supposes that all he believed in was utterly without foundation. If his 
beliefs are true, the failure of Jesus is profound in that it implicates God who failed to 
act on his behalf, in which case the sword might have been put to best use on Peter 
himself. The denials become a series of unmaskings or sickening affirmations of 
reality. The bitter weeping of the Synoptics becomes anguished personal sorrow or the 
remorse of a fool. Time will either heighten regret or cast doubt on the validity of Jesus 
himself. One does not know whether to laugh or ciy.
A comic resolution is possible in Peter’s case only through an intervention from 
the outside, in this case God himself. Frye states, “The mythical or primitive basis of
Given Aristotle’s emphasis on causality, it is perhaps no accident that no Aristotelian tlieoiy of 
comedy exists.
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comedy is a movement toward the rebirth and renewal of the powers of nature...
But this is precisely not the case in the FG where the powers of nature are unable to 
renew, witness the death of Lazarus. “If he sleeps he will get better” (11:12) will not 
do. God raises Jesus from the dead and breaks the persistent linear pattern of life 
followed inexorably by death. God acting in freedom breaks the iron chain of causality. 
In so doing he vindicates the words of Jesus, transforms the disciples understanding of 
Jesus and the scripture, and establishes the foundation for the transformation all of 
reality itself. The linear pattern of tragedy irrevocably gives way to the circular pattern 
of comedy.
Nothing happens in comedy, if it is to remain comedy, that is final. Reality can 
only intrude so far. In this sense comedy contains a sense of life being cyclical by 
including things that are not final and excluding things about life that are final. Setting 
aside everything but plot, Romeo and Juliet is finally a tragedy only when Romeo 
mistakes Juliet’s sleep for death and kills himself. The tragi-comedy format of The 
Winter's Tale relies on “death” not being final after all. Because Malvolio is materially 
no worse off than before, he is free to laugh with everyone else about his humiliating 
foray into love but chooses instead to “be revenged on the whole pack of you.” In 
contrast to comedy, reality triumphs in tragedy in a way that excludes all but the most 
final aspects of life. The forcefulness of the evidence and the finality of the facts forces 
Oedipus to change his mind about the truth when he wished it were otherwise.
Northrop Fiye,4 Natural Perspective: The Development o f Shakespearean Comedy and Romance 
(London: Harvest/HBJ, 1965) 119, cf. 123.
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Even the resolution into happiness achieved at the end of a comedy is not final. 
Unlike tragedy, the desired reality is in large measure realized. Imaginative and 
millennial hopes for an ideal future have come true and grant something like a state of 
grace. Comedy resolves then into a reality in which realized hopes provide justification 
for the possibility of further realized hopes. But this resolution is precarious and can be 
only temporary. Marriage forms the traditional end of comedy rather than married life 
with its unavoidable conflicts. The details of exactly how “they lived happily ever 
after” are not normally included in the story. In Much Ado About Nothing, justice on 
the villain can wait until tomorrow and must not mar the festivities of the wedding day, 
yet tomorrow must inevitably come. Reality with all its difficulties and perplexities will 
intrude again. Recalling the four archetypes illustrated on the chart (see page 25 or 
242), comedy moves into romance where the dynamics and struggles are of a different 
order, a representation of self-evident and realized values and the struggle for their 
preservation. The comic resolution satisfies only by the curtain being drawn on a 
particular episode of life.
In a variation of the comic pattern that reflects the need for continuing contact 
with reality, the comic resolution may be strongly anticipated but not actually occur. If 
the normal pattern of the completed comic wherein the desired reality is realized may 
be referred to as transitive comic, its counterpart may be referred to as intransitive. In 
the latter, the hoped for resolution fails to take place or is modified to a significant 
degree. Transitive comic must end because any prolonged contact with the broken real 
world will destroy its imaginative synthesis; only intransitive comic can continue. The
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intransitive pattern is seen in Shakespeare’s Love *s Labour's Lost where the 
imaginative synthesis of the anticipated mamage of the four gentlemen to the four 
ladies fails to occur, partly through the death of the king of France and partly due to the 
gentlemen not being ready for it. The traditional transitive comic pattern is notable in 
the play for its being broken. Significantly, both Peter and the four gentlemen of 
Love ’5 Labour ’5 Lost must move from their separate abstractions and make greater 
allowances for present mortal life while their hopes await friture realization.
But rather than being an occasional exception the intransitive comic pattern is 
frmdamental to such comic formats as sitcoms, comic strips, and episodic comic works 
like Don Quixote. It must be this way because if the promise of transitive comic is 
realized, the story must end as there is no conflict to report. Thus Charlie Brown will 
never be a winning baseball manager nor will Lucy hold the football in place for him to 
kick it. Yet there is no necessary reason for it to be this way. The intransitive comic 
usually offers hope, however small, of becoming transitive.
As intransitive comic, Peter presents a character where the comic resolution is 
only partial. On Sunday morning Jesus rises from the dead, achieving a final victory 
over that most final of foes and a reconciliation of the believer with God. But the 
classic comic ending of wrongs being made right and a new order being established in 
material fact does not occur. Peter’s discord with Jesus is over, but the Romans still 
control Palestine and evil persists in a world as implacably opposed to Jesus as ever, a 
world soon to turn its opposition on his disciples. Peter’s great error consisted not so 
much in being wrong, but in being premature. The rule of God inaugurated in Christ
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will be established in fact in the eschaton. The intransitive will give way to the 
transitive at the direction of Christ himself and not before. Peter, then, becomes 
paradigmatic of every Christian, one invited to live between the future victory of God 
inaugurated in Christ and its actual eschatological realization. In the meantime Peter 
must readjust his expectation to conform with a life of humility and service. In 
differing formulations, Jesus instructs Peter to “Feed my sheep,” shepherding being 
associated with loyalty, persistence, and circumscribed sacrificial bravery rather than 
grandiose achievement.
Peter’s error consisted of supposing that the moment of comic resolution had 
arrived or was on the verge of doing so, to be inaugurated at the point of a sword. The 
rift between Jesus’ superior understanding of God’s purposes and his own sense of 
mission as onç sent by the Father to submit to and do liis will, and Peter’s perceptions 
of them provides the clash of frames of reference necessary for comedy.
IV CONCLUSION
The character of Peter, as has been shown, follows a recognizable pattern of 
identification with Jesus, self induced estrangement with Jesus, and restoration to 
service. This pattern illustrates the fundamental pattern of comedy, that of being at 
odds with reality, or a clash of frames of reference, with a movement forward towards 
a friture integration of beliefs with reality. Additionally, comedy has a greater emphasis
^^This reinforces the connection of chapter 21 with the rest of the book. Had the FG ended at 20:31, 
the resulting transitive ending would seem premature and out of place witli tlie disciples’ need to 
continue after Jesus’ departure.
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on character than plot corresponding to greater emphasis on freedom and openness 
than tragedy. The study of Peter as an archetypal comic character both illumines the 
character of Peter in its own right, but also supports and cast new light on his role as 
illustrating a certain path of discipleship. To the degree that Peter displays the 
discipleship theme and the comic archetype, this lends support to the inclusion of 
chapter 21 as fundamental to the unity of the FG.
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-CONCLUSION-
‘The Bible is an indispensable book fo r anyone who wishes to understand literature. 
LelandRyken, Triumphs o f the Imagination, 199.
I RETROSPECT
Ryken’s remark, “The Bible is an indispensable book for anyone who wishes to 
understand literature” signals a kind of conclusion, but might just has easily have 
marked a beginning. Even if Ryken intended his statement to be confined to the Bible 
in its importance as a historical and cultural document, its implications in the present 
work have been extended to the Bible as a work of theology which claims to interpret 
all of reality of which literature is a part. But, taking into account the Bible as a work 
of literature, Ryken’s statement might well be modified to read, “An understanding of 
literature is indispensable for anyone who wishes to understand the Bible.” In the same 
way, Eliot’s statement placed at the start of this study, “Literary Criticism should be 
completed by criticism from a definite ethical and theological standpoint,” by which he, 
like Frye, wished to grant literature a status in its own terms from a position of 
objectivity, a notion questioned by postmodernism, his statement might well be revised 
to read, “Literary Criticism should be initiated and undertaken by criticism from a
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definite ethical and theological standpoint.” In this sense, literature and theology do 
not merely interact when a given interpreter chooses to do so- they interact, however 
implicitly or explicitly, because it is impossible to do otherwise.
The principle of reciprocity has been applied to literature and theology in the 
present study in an effort to explore the broad contours at which this interaction takes 
place at a given set of reference points. Archetypal criticism provides the broad 
outlines of the interaction while Jesus, Pilate, Thomas, the Jews, and Peter provide the 
specific and living reference points. The present work presents a sustained effort to 
place theology and literature in dialogue with each other in a way that, it is hoped, is 
both meaningful and illuminating for both disciplines. Just as the opening words of the 
FG assert that Jesus is “the Word made flesh,” it may be seen that these characters in 
the FG are words made flesh in their own way according to patterns suggested by 
archetypal criticism and analogous to patterns they manifest in themselves.
Jesus himself provides the central reference point defining the other characters 
and indeed all of reality. The conceptual variable defining the differences between each 
archetype is the relationship between beliefs or values and reality or experience. The 
differences may be characterized by representation for Jesus and romance, reduction 
for Pilate and tragedy, negation for Thomas, the Jews and irony, and integration for 
Peter and comedy.
n  REVIEW
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Jesus, as a character typical of romance, is the archetypal hero, the one who 
simultaneously embodies and displays ideals which are held to be tme and worthy of 
emulation. Emphasizing the marvelous and vertical causality, the story of the hero 
offers an episodic account of the hero’s adventures wherein the hero’s identity with an 
ideal and the maintenance and display of that identity and ideal occurs in a context of 
challenges and difficulties. The hero is one who exceeds reality or the pressure of 
circumstances and maintains an ideal or belief worthy of death. The identification of the 
hero with the ideal is such that maintaining the ideal is synonymous with preservation 
of the self. The open and episodic nature of the romance allows encounters with a 
variety of other characters defined by their responses to the hero and the ideals which 
the hero embodies. Just as, for Frye, romance is the structural Core of all fiction, in the 
FG Jesus is the structural core of all reality. Pilate, Thomas, the Jews, and Peter are 
archetypal responses to Jesus in terms of both theology and literary mode of 
emplotment.
In Tragedy, the unity of beliefs and circumstance assumed in romance comes 
apart, exemplified in the tragic hero. An analysis of the narrative of Pilate in the FG 
revealed a series of shifting circumstantial and conceptual contexts, contexts which 
continually move into the future as the uncomprehending Pilate continually fails to 
grasp the dynamics of the present. Only when it is too late to extricate himself from the 
situation according to conventional notions of pragmatic action does Pilate realize his 
true predicament, effecting a tragic recognition and reversal. Aristotle’s Poetics, itself 
the foundational work for tragic criticism, formed the basis of an analysis of Pilate
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according to Aristotle’s notions of fear and pity, catharsis, plot, character, and 
hamartia. As outlined by Hegel and developed by Scheler, tragedy displays a tragic 
clash between opposites having at least some claim to legitimacy united in a causal 
nexus between a character and his or her values latent in circumstance. A violation of 
the moral order, whether committed by the tragic protagonist or not, exposes 
contradictions in present circumstances resulting in the hero’s destruction. The power 
of circumstances, expressed in plot as the vehicle of necessity, effects a fundamental 
divide between a tragic protagonist and a system of beliefs, yet the moral order 
contingent on God or transcendent beliefs, remains. Given the profoundly theological 
nature of Pilate’s encounter with Jesus coupled with its occurrence within the 
machinery of concrete reality, Pilate exemplifies tragic themes and characteristics. The 
separation of beliefs and circumstance inaugurated in tragedy anticipates a realized 
further separation inherent in irony.
Irony is a key feature of the FG, but can never be taken simply as a literary 
device and must be taken as derivative of its theology. Irony was explored in relation 
its embodiment in the characters of Thomas and the Jews as representative of variations 
on an ironic point of view. Thomas, distinguished fi-om the other disciples in chapters 
20 and 11, comments on the death Lazarus, “Let us go that we may die with him,” a 
comment that may be taken as ironic with “him” referring to Lazarus. Perception of 
this remark as ironic, however, entails identifying with Thomas and participating in his 
ironic blindness, a blindness resulting in his refiisal to believe. The Jews embody a 
tendency toward material reality and disbelief in which they repeatedly interpret Jesus
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and his remarks in a way dominated by earthly and literalistic concerns. Whatever form 
irony takes, be it verbal, dramatic, etc., its perception and use requires a value 
judgment of some kind, one inevitably bound up with questions of value and belief. In 
this light, irony may then be divided, into positive, equivocal, and negative irony.
While irony in the FG is generally positive, i.e. operating from a stable theological base, 
Thomas and the Jews function as explorations of equivocal and negative irony 
respectively. Equivocal irony features a sense of ambiguity with respect to the relation 
of beliefs and circumstance whereas the sense of the triumph of experience over values 
and beliefs pervades negative irony, one in which the notion of meaning itself tends to 
become problematic and where detachment and stasis predominate.
Comedy features a movement toward the reintegration of experience with 
values and beliefs, a movement characteristic of Peter in the FG. By the end of chapter 
6, the FG presents Peter as someone on the inside, a committed believer and follower 
of Jesus commanding a well developed understanding of who Jesus is. But Peter’s 
understanding of what it means to be obedient to God takes a triumphalist turn at odds 
with Jesus’ example and teacliing. The post-resurrection accounts detail Peter’s 
reinstatement and point to a more sober assessment of what it means to be a follower 
of Jesus. After the manner of Comedy, Peter displays the mistakes and 
misunderstandings as the fi ame of reference by which he interprets his experience 
collides with reality and then is replaced with another. Unlike tragedy with its emphasis 
on plot and necessity, in comedy the emphasis falls on contingency, character, and 
freedom. A character’s beliefs, freely chosen but mistaken, move the action towards its
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conclusion. In tragedy, normality is past but continues as ironic commentary on the 
present, while in comedy, normality, in which experience is integrated with beliefs, 
continues as a realistic hope for the future. With its tenuous incongruity between 
beliefs and reality, comedy continues as long as there is no decisive contact with reality. 
To be truly comic, the reality achieved must be desirable. Comedy may be divided in to 
transitive and intransitive comedy, the desirable comic reality being achieved in the 
former where in the latter it is not, however much that desirable reality remains implicit 
and possible.
m  RESULTS
The interaction presented here demonstrates the value of this type of extended, 
systematic comparisons. While it may be wide of the mark to speak of new 
discoveries, it is nevertheless possible to point to new or fresh angles of interpretation 
or clarification of those already present. Exploring and defining romance and tragedy 
should, it is hoped, establish the superiority of interpreting Jesus according to romance 
rather than according to tragedy. Employing tragedy to interpret Pilate offers a new 
perspective and brings to light the shifting interpretive contexts of the trial narrative. 
Pilate is an irreducibly a dynamic character incompatible with either weak or strong 
ironic readings. Interpreting Thomas according to irony provides the conceptual 
framework to view certain statements and by which to anticipate other exegetical data, 
wliich, taken together, brings out the full depth and coherence of lois character. With 
regard to the Jews as the collective character displaying unbelief, this accepted
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interpretation has been more adequately situated within the theology and purpose of the 
FG. Comedy as an archetype provides an overall coherence to Peter’s character and 
allows for a deeper appreciation of his role in displaying the theme of discipleship in the 
FG. The coherence of Peter suggested by the discipleship theme and by comedy 
supports the unity of the FG with respect to the status of chapter 21. Additionally and 
significantly, archetypal criticism helps to locate all of these particular characters within 
the literary and theological world of the FG and in doing so offers a way in which each 
character may be understood in relation to the location of other characters within that 
same world. Identification with one or more of the characters serves to locate the 
reader within the world defined by the FG.
To the extent the archetypal criticism illuminates these characters with respect 
to both the literature and theology of the FG, the validity of archetypal criticism is 
reinforced and enhanced, both in its own right and also as a means of exchange. 
Comparisons of Peter with Don Quixote, however justified on their own without 
reference to archetypes, receive additional validity by similarity to an archetype of 
ubiquitous scope. Conversely, an archetype may suggest common themes and helpful 
comparisons perhaps overlooked otherwise, Thomas and the arch-ironist Mr. Bennet, 
for example. Archetypal criticism places comparisons of the FG with literature outwith 
the FG on a more systematic basis. The present work offers an examination of the 
form and content of these four major archetypes from and within a Christian world 
view and with reference to characters in a specific Biblical text that renders literary
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analysis according to vague notions of comedy or tragedy or according to the simplistic 
designations u  and n, if they were ever adequate, no longer acceptable.
IV PROSPECTS
Two prospects growing out of the present work may be suggested. First with 
regard to the audience of the FG, the recent reassessment of gospel audiences by 
Bauckham and others questions the widely accepted assumption that the gospels were 
directed to isolated and specific “communities.”  ^ Extending the trajectory of this 
reassessment, to the extent that the presence of universal archetypes within the FG 
suggested by the present work points to and clarifies a wider and more universal 
reading of the FG, any sort of narrow and restricted reading of the FG is rendered less 
and less viable. In terms of both literature and theology, the FG is a work of some 
sophistication not easily reducible to sectarian concerns.
Secondly, on a related point, while the present concern has been with the 
interaction of literature and theology by means of archetypal criticism, such an analysis 
suggests the inclusion of history within a framework beyond that adopted here. This is 
not so much to suggest the application of narrative forms to histoiy, as has been 
explored by White, however helpful and valid, but to suggest a model of interpretation 
based around the three components of history, literature, and theology. As Sternberg 
notes in relation to OT narrative, “Biblical narrative emerges as a complex, because 
multifunctional, discourse. Functionally speaking, it is regulated by a set of three
* Richard Bauckham, ed.. The Gospels for All Christians: Rethinking the Gospel Audiences 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988).
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principles; ideological, historiographic, and aesthetic. How they cooperate is a tricky 
question....”  ^ With respect to the FG or any other Biblical text, these may be readily 
termed the theological, historical, and literary, respectively. Significantly, Brodie 
classifies the history of Johannine studies according to an emphasis on the theological, 
historical, and literary,^ a classification that extends to Biblical studies in general. Given 
the current impasse in hermeneutics, whatever the appropriate weight given to each 
factor in particular instances, the way ahead may well include a proper appreciation of 
each.
^Meir Sternberg. The Poetics o f  Biblical Narrative: Ideological Literature and the Drama o f Reading 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1985) 41.
 ^Thomas Brodie, The Gospel According to John: A Literary and Theological Commentary (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993) 3-10.
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